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Preface 
7KHSUHVHQWVWXG\LVDQHQTXLU\LQWRZKDWYDULDEOHVLQIOXHQFH(XURSHDQV¶DWWLWXGHV
to the idea of European union. The reason why I became interested in this problem is 
quite personal, and it may be illuminating if I start by briefly describing how the 
following pages came to be written. This will reveal not only some of my bias, but also 
the first-hand experience that forms the background of the project. 
In the fall of 1978, when I began studying at the University of Bergen, I came 
across a youth organisation called the Young European Federalists (in French Jeunesse 
Européenne Fédéraliste, JEF; and in Norwegian Europeisk Ungdom, the youth section 
of the European Movement). As I had a need for meaningful free time activities and 
was interested in European and international affairs, I joined. I was also influenced by 
my father, who had been an ardent supporter of Norwegian membership of the 
European Communities during the referendum campaign in 1972. Soon I found myself 
engaged at all levels of the organisation, from the local to the European one.  
Having just finished my undergraduate studies in the summer of 1982, I was 
accepted for the post of Secretary General of JEF Europe. Consequently, I moved to 
Brussels, where I lived and worked for two years. During my assignment in Brussels I 
had to travel extensively in Europe, east and west, north and south; to get acquainted 
with the European Community institutions (especially the Commission and 
Parliament); and to organise and attend innumerable meetings, conferences, seminars, 
etc. on issues related to European union. 
During these two years on the Continent, I met much more positive attitudes to 
European union than I had at home. In Norway, where the issue of EC membership had 
bHHQ DQDWKHPD VLQFH WKH ³1R´ RI WKH  UHIHUHQGXP RXU DGYRFDF\ RI (XURSHDQ
union had mostly met with indifference or hostility. At university, the conventional 
wisdom was that European union was a cause of the elite and the political right. 
However, in continental Europe, I discovered that it was championed by most 
mainstream political currents, although more eagerly by some than others. Still, I was 
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struck by the diversity of opinions that could be encountered, especially in the 
European youth fora I attended.  
Our discussions on Europe came to a head when we discussed the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union, adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 
1984 (also known as the Spinelli Initiative). Generally, and on practical matters nearly 
always, in the meetings of the European youth networks I sided with the 
representatives of what I considered rational and pragmatic organisations with their 
mainstay in northern Europe. However, on the Draft Treaty I found myself sharing 
beds with what some of us sometimes referred to as the Latin or Catholic faction from 
continental and southern Europe, facing fierce and emotional opposition from the 
otherwise so sensible and cool north, i.e. the UK, Ireland and Denmark (the Swedes I 
met were equally sceptical, but as this was before the end of the Cold War they stood 
quite aloof from the issue of European union). 
I discovered a similar geographical pattern of attitudes in the media and when I 
travelled in Europe. Moreover, I found that the votes in the European Parliament on the 
Draft Treaty, as well as the deliberations of the Council of Ministers and European 
Council generally reflected corresponding divisions. The further destiny of the 
initiative (Dooge Committee, various European Councils, the Maastricht Treaty, one 
referendum in Ireland, two in Denmark, etc.) indeed proved to be a contest between 
pro-Union and anti-Union tendencies along similar lines.  
I began asking myself: What can explain this pattern of Euro-attitudes? Why are 
so many people in northern Europe, and notably in the UK and Scandinavia, sceptical 
to European union, while continental and southern Europeans sometimes see it as a 
question of survival? How is it possible that what is considered a perfectly laudable 
and logical idea in one part of Europe is seen as the complete opposite in another? 
What determines attitudes to European integration? When I returned to Bergen to join 
the graduate study of Comparative Politics in the autumn of 1984, I decided to address 
these questions in my graduate thesis (Nedrebø 1986).  
Thesis and graduation done, I was admitted into the Norwegian foreign service. 
Most of the time since then I have been working on European issues and have 
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continued to observe the same pattern of attitudes to European integration I first noted 
when based in Brussels. Posted to Prague 1988-90, I could witness the fall of the Iron 
&XUWDLQDQG&]HFKRVORYDNLD¶VµUHWXUQWR(XURSH¶IURPFORVHTXDUWHUVDQGVWDWLRQHGLQ
Bonn 1990-94 I observed first-hand German reunification, the debate about reunited 
*HUPDQ\¶VSODFH LQ(XURSHDVZHOODV WKHFRQWURYHUV\RYHU WKH0DDVWULFKW WUHDW\DQG
European Monetary Union (my stay in Bonn resulted in a book on these questions: 
Nedrebø 1995).  
Back in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, I worked in the Political 
Department helping to prepare for Norwegian membership of the EU. A majority 
rejected membership for the second time in the referendum of 28 November 1994, but 
,FRQWLQXHGZRUNLQJRQLVVXHVUHODWHGWRWKH(8$VKHDGRIWKH0LQLVWU\¶V(XUopean 
Policy Section 2001-2005, I could closely monitor the enlargement of 2004 as well as 
the deliberations of the European Convention, the labours of the subsequent 
,QWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO&RQIHUHQFHDVZHOODVWKHUHMHFWLRQRIWKHµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO7UHDW\¶LQ
the French and Dutch referendums in 2005. Between September that year and the same 
month in 2009, I watched the convulsions over the final outcome, the Lisbon Treaty, 
from a more distant vantage point as ambassador to Nigeria, and after that from the 
MFA in Oslo. 
My graduate thesis contained a similar argument in outline as the present study. 
Still, I felt I had not had the time to do a proper job of it. In particular, the historical 
analysis was too superficial. Although I realised that the additional effort required was 
very substantial, I felt that the project had important unrealised potential. So 
eventually, in 1998, I decided to return to the quest. I then happened to be working at 
Arena, the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, during a leave of 
absence from the MFA, and was encouraged by Professor Johan P. Olsen.  
The present study differs so substantially from my graduate thesis as to constitute 
a separate, independent work. Although the research problem is the same and the basic 
argument and organisation similar, the framework of analysis and key concepts (see 
Figure 1 and Chapter 1.2 below) are new. Moreover, the analysis is now far more 
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wide-ranging and substantial, especially in the historical part. Much of it is based on 
historiography published after 1986. The theoretical discussion has been updated too, 
to take account of recent developments in European integration and international 
relations theory as well as in more general social theory. The Eurobarometer survey 
data analysis, which took up a larger part of my graduate thesis, has been greatly 
reduced, reflecting my positivism-critical realisation since then that the main value of 
survey analyses is descriptive and that their explanatory potential without extensive 
contextualisation is limited. The analysis of voting patterns in the European Parliament 
has been dropped altogether. In sum, the text is more or less completely rewritten.   
Since 1998, many of my evenings, weekends and holidays have been devoted to 
the present enquiry. Beside a lot of work, the effort has required a singular sense of 
purpose and a lot of patience. But as the pieces of the jigsaw have fallen into place, my 
endeavour has become increasingly rewarding. I hope reading it will be equally 
worthwhile. 
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Abstract 
This study sets out to explain why continental and southern Europe has been 
significantly more favourable to post-1945 European integration than the north. I argue 
that this is an important problem for two reasons. First, the fact that there are more and 
less Europeanist member states has been and remains the most basic political 
constraint on European integration. Second, I believe that by exploring this issue, I am 
able to present an innovative, comparative-historical analysis that not only advances 
our theoretical understanding of European integration, but also sheds new light on the 
evolution of nationalism and the nation-state.  
In line with broad trends in political and social theory over the last twenty to 
thirty years, notably social constructivism, in the introductory discussion in Part 1 I 
assume that a search for the sources of Europeanism ± territorial and other ± requires 
an appropriate consideration of the role of ideas. I argue that the attitudes of 
individuals and collectivities to political issues like European integration reflect their 
ideological preferences as well as their material interests, both of which are in turn 
products of, and may be modified by, learning. Key concepts in the study are thus 
µLQWHUHVW¶ µLGHRORJ\¶ DQG µOHDUQLQJ¶ , DVVXPH WKDW WHUULWRULDO-historical background 
fundamentally structures how agents are influenced by these variables.  
Inspired by the Norwegian comparativist Stein Rokkan, I interpret European 
integration as a case of polity-building comparable to other instances of state- and 
nation-building in history. This approach suggests that integration is a fundamentally 
political process with the issue of sovereignty at its core. Hence, regionally 
differentiated patterns of attitudes to European union may reflect territorially distinct, 
historically evolved ideas of sovereignty. On this assumption, I construct a 2x2 table 
defining four basic ideas of soverereignty ± polity-ideas, or normative ideas about a 
legitimate political order ± that structures the stud\¶VFRPSDUDWLYH-historical analysis: 
universalist-descending; particularist-descending; particularist-ascending; and 
universalist-ascending.  
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I argue that each polity-idea is associated with a particular discourse, ideology, 
and even an ontological and epistemological paradigm. The main controversy in the 
post-1945 European debate has been between what I term the national-liberal and the 
Christian-democratic paradigms of integration. The former is basically particularist 
and intergovernmentalist and is based in northern, Lutheran or Anglican Europe. The 
second is inspired by Christian universalism, favours a federal or unitary Europe, and 
has its mainstay in continental and southern, Catholic Europe.  
In Part 2, I examine existing integration and international relations as well as 
general political science theory in order to identify theoretically possible sources of 
Europeanist attitudes. This discussion concludes with a working hypothesis based on 
5RNNDQ¶V QRWLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ FLW\-belt. Could, as Rokkan himself explicitly 
suggested, the city-belt, stretching roughly from Central Italy to the North Sea and 
representing the historical core territory of the Catholic church and the Holy Roman 
(PSLUHEHWKHKRPHEDVHRUµSULPDU\WHUULWRU\¶RID(XURSHDQµQDWLRQ¶"&RXOGLWLQWKLV
sense play a similar historical polity-building role as that assigned by Karl W. Deutsch 
to the Île de France as the hub of the French nation-state, to Leon-Castille in Spain, 
Savoy-Piemonte in Italy, Prussia in Germany, England in Britain etc.? If so, it is indeed 
worthwhile comparing contemporary European union-building to historical nation-
building, Europeanism (pro-union ideology) to nationalism and Europeanness 
(European identity) to national identity.   
While conceding that his perspective is indeed valuable and relevant, the 
KLVWRULFDOGLVFXVVLRQ LQ3DUWFULWLFLVHV5RNNDQ¶VQRWLRQRI WKHFLW\-belt for national-
liberal reductionism. The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis neglects the ancient and 
medieval tradition for unity and universalism espoused by the Roman Church and the 
Holy Roman/Habsburg Empire and underrates the continued influence of these 
institutions even after the Peace of Westphalia. Moreover, the thesis is too structuralist, 
implying that the European Union emerged more or less by default. Like 
intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory, it underestimates the role 
of ideologically aware and reasoning human agency. Hence it is argued that Rome, 
represented by the Roman Church as well as by successive Roman empires, is a more 
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important territorial and historical source of Europeanism than city-studded Central 
Europe.  
Part 3 narrates how the ascendancy of particularist (or nationalist), discourse 
resulted from the fragmentation of unitary medieval Christendom into a modern 
Europe dominated by autonomous states. State-builders propagated the notion of 
territorial sovereignty, which eventually turned into the hegemonial, particularist-
ascending idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the Protestant states of north-
ZHVWHUQ(XURSHZHUH WKHSLRQHHUV WKHLUNLQJV¶FRQWURORIQDWLRQDOFKXUFKHVEHLQJDQ
important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was particularly conducive to 
particularism, which notably in the German context turned exclusivist and eventually 
racist. The particularist paradigm survived two World Wars in its more benign North 
Atlantic, liberal form. I submit that this paradigm has been a major source of British 
and Scandinavian ideological reluctance to post-war European integration.  
But the Holy See as well as the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires continued to 
represent a strong counterweight to particularist discourse even after the Reformation 
and the religious wars. The Papacy criticised nationalism as a political religion, and 
came to terms with the modern, secular nation-state and national mass politics only 
with difficulty. Still, in the late nineteenth century Catholic parties were allowed to 
emerge and enabled Catholics to participate in secular, national politics. But they 
continued to look beyond the nation-state. The final Part 4 of the study narrates how 
transnationally networked, Christian democratic parties of Western Continental Europe 
jointly formulated a Europeanist-ascending programme for European union after 
World War II. The European Union was launched on its supranational path when these 
parties, led mainly by statesmen from Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the 
governments of the six founding states from about 1945 to 1965. Their discourse in 
this regard was heavily informed by ideology rooted in the universalist European 
legacy, whose mainstay remains Catholic, continental and southern Europe.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem and approach 
Since the aftermath of the Second World War, when the initiative to what is now 
the European Union was taken, the public debate in Western Europe over European 
integration has evinced a striking territorial pattern. There has been a marked 
difference in attitudes between north and south. Public opinion surveys and referenda 
on European issues have shown northerners, notably Britons and Scandinavians, to 
take a more negative attitude to union than people from continental and southern 
Europe. Government policies have generally reflected this pattern: the original six 
member states as well as Spain, Portugal and, at least since the late 1980s, Greece have 
by and large been more Europeanist, i.e. favourably disposed to the idea of 
supranational European governance, than Britain and the Scandinavian countries (for 
empirical evidence, see Part 4 below).   
As European integration has widened and deepened over the years, the picture 
has become more nuanced. For instance, Eurobarometer polls (see Chapter 4.2 below) 
indicate that people in Ireland and Denmark on the whole have turned more 
favourable. Moreover, Finland has since 1995 been a relatively pro-European Nordic 
member state. On the other hand, since the 1990s public opinion has become more 
sceptical in some continental member states. In 2005 a majority of Dutch and French 
voters rejected the draft European Constitutional Treaty, as did most Irish voters with 
the revised, Lisbon Treaty in the referendum of June 2008 (the latter however reversed 
their verdict in October 2009). Still, the negotiations over the latest treaty suggest that 
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the traditional pattern of positive and sceptical attitudes largely persists in the older, 
Western European member states. 1  
The aim of the present study is to explain why there has been such a basic 
territorial division in attitudes to integration, at least in Western Europe. This is an 
important issue for at least two reasons.  
The first and most obvious is practical: The fact that there are more and less 
Europeanist member states has been and remains the most basic constraint on 
European integration. If more members had shared for instance the traditional Italian 
DWWLWXGH WKHUH ZRXOG LQ DOO SUREDELOLW\ KDYH EHHQ VRPH NLQG RI D µ8QLWHG 6WDWes of 
(XURSH¶ E\ QRZ &RQYHUVHO\ LI PRUH KDG DGKHUHG WR WUDGLWLRQDO %ULWLVK RU
Scandinavian positions, it is likely that today there would at most be a Council of 
Europe and/or a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Thus the territorial 
variation of Europeanism in Europe has had major political consequences for European 
integration.  
The other reason has to do with theory. I believe that by exploring this issue, I am 
able to present an innovative, comparative-historical analysis that not only advances 
our theoretical understanding of European integration, but also sheds new light on the 
evolution of nationalism and the nation-state in Europe.  
Any analysis must build on some a priori ontological and epistemological, 
assumptions that guide its approach, methodology and empirical discussion. Most 
fundamentally, I will assume that a search for the sources of Europeanism ± territorial 
and other ± requires a thorough discussion of the role of ideas in European integration.  
This assumption is supported by broad trends in the study of international 
relations and European integration over the last twenty to thirty years. The traditional 
theories or approaches, realism/intergovernmentalism and liberalism/neofunctionalism, 
have recently been complemented by a numbeURIQHZHUµFULWLFDO¶DOWHUQDWLYHV 
                                              
 
 
1 Although Caplanova, Orviska and Hudson (2004: 279) found that the more northerly Baltic states were less EU-positive 
than Poland, Bulgaria and Romania after 1989, it is difficult to see any clear pattern yet in the public opinion on the EU in 
the Central and Eastern European countries. However, see below, Chapter 4.7. 
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0RVWKHDGZD\KDVEHHQPDGHE\WKHDSSURDFKNQRZQDVµVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVP¶
Its distinguishing mark is an insistence on the mutual constitutiveness of agents and 
structures, in the sense that agents (as well as observers, including researchers) 
necessarily interpret and attribute meaning to reality according to socially received 
ideas. Social constructivists therefore highlight the importance of culture, norms, ideas, 
identity, ideology, discourses etc. Methodologically, this means that constructivists 
focus more on communicative and discursive practices as well as epistemological 
issues than the traditional approaches have done (Risse 2004).  
Still, Fierke (2007) argues that in practice the work of most constructivists has 
stayed within the bounds of well-established positivist methodological and 
HSLVWHPRORJLFDO DVVXPSWLRQV &KHFNHO IRU KLV SDUW GLVFHUQV EHWZHHQ µFRQYHQWLRQDO¶
µLQWHUSUHWDWLYH¶ DQG µFULWLFDOUDGLFDO¶ FRQVWUXFWLYLVP &RQYHQWLRQDO FRQVWUXFWLYLVWV
emphasise norms and identity, but within a positivist epistemology. Interpretative 
constructivists explore the role of language in meditating and constructing social 
reality. Critical/radical constructivists maintain the linguistic focus, but add an 
explicitly norPDWLYH GLPHQVLRQ E\ SURELQJ WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V RZQ LPSOLFDWLRQ LQ WKH
reproduction of the identities and world he or she is studying (Checkel 2006: 4-6)   
&KHFNHO LELG  DVVRFLDWHV WKH FRQYHQWLRQDOLVWV ZLWK ³$PHULFDQ-VW\OH´
positivism and the interpreters and critical-UDGLFDOVZLWK³(XURSHDQSRVWVWUXFWXUDOLVP´
He recommends scientific realism as a possible bridge between them. Most 
fundamentally, scientific realists assume that objects of scientific theories have a real 
H[LVWHQFH RXWVLGH WKH VWXGHQW¶V Pind and are cognitively approachable.  To them, 
³VRFLDO VFLHQFH LQYROYHV WKH VWXG\ RI WKH FRPSOH[ DQG LQWHUDFWLQJ VRFLDO REMHFWV WKDW
produce the patterns we observe. Because of their unobservable nature, most social 
REMHFWVKDYHWREHµJRWDW¶WKURXJKFDUHIXOFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ´.XUNLDQG:LJKW
24).  
Moreover, according to Kurki and Wight (ibid.), scientific realism is relativist in 
the sense that no epistemological position is given priority in the acquisition of 
knowledge. However, this does not mean that all views are accepted as equally valid. 
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Scientific realism argues it is possible to rationally adjudicate between competing truth 
FODLPV³:KDWLVLPSRUWDQWWRVFLHQFHLVWKDWDQ\DQGHYHU\FODLPLVRSHQWRFKDOOHQJH
and, moreover, that all claims UHTXLUHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOVXSSRUW´LELG6FLHQFHUHVWVRQ
a commitment to constant critique; evidence-based, conceptual and otherwise.  
Within international relations theory, Alexander Wendt (1999) is one scholar who 
has explicitly embraced scientific realism (Kurki and Wight 2007: 25). However, 
DQRWKHUµFULWLFDO¶VWUDQGRIVFLHQWLILFUHDOLVPLQVSLUHGE\%KDVNDUKDVHPHUJHG
WKDW GLVWDQFHV LWVHOI IURP ZKDW LW DUJXHV LV :HQGW¶V WRR SRVLWLYLVW UDWLRQDOLVW DQG
materialist methodology. For critical reDOLVWVVXFKDV3DWRPlNLDQG:LJKW³ERWK
ideas and material factors are important in producing social outcomes, and both need to 
EHLQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHUHVHDUFKSURFHVV´.XUNLDQG:LJKW7KHH[SODQDWRU\
YDOXHDVVLJQHGWRHDFKRIWKHP³LVan empirical matter that can be decided only on the 
EDVLVRIUHVHDUFKWKDWH[DPLQHVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSDQGLQWHUSOD\RIERWK´ 
This study is informed by the constructivist, critical realist and poststructuralist 
epistemology just described. Although I believe in evidence-based, intersubjectively 
agreed approximations to the truth, and in spite of the fact that the methodology and 
epistemology I adopt thus are fairly conventional (positivist and empiricist), I accept 
that all truth-claims are inherently indeterminate: we all interpret and attribute our own 
meaning to reality (Campbell 2007).  
However, a key poststructuralist insight is that what a society or social grouping 
considers true and right is fundamentally influenced by power structures. As Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Derrida and, notably, Foucault have successively pointed out, the 
relationship between power and knowledge, ideas, identity and ideology needs to be a 
central focus of social science. Moreover, as poststructuralists insist that agents (and 
students) are influenced by historically shaped power structures, they find it highly 
UHOHYDQW WR VWXG\ WKH KLVWRULFDO µJHQHDORJLFDO¶ RU µDUFKDHRORJLFDO¶ HPHUJHQFH RI
particular modes of interpretation, representation, understanding, and discourse 
(Campbell 2007: 223-224). The poststructuralist approach has indeed entered the fray 
RI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQVWXGLHVLQWKHJXLVHRIµGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLV¶:LHQHUDQG'LH]
eds., 2004).  
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Among the core theses of discourse analysts (whom Checkel classifies as 
interpreWDWLYH FRQVWUXFWLYLVWV LV WKDW µ(XURSH¶ LV D FRQWHVWHG FRQFHSW ZLWK PXOWLSOH
meanings; that the EU should not (only) be interpreted in state terms; and that 
European questions cannot be studied in isolation from other questions (Wæver 2004).  
Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung presented a programmatic statement in favour of 
discourse analysis applied to European integration in a seminal article in 1998 
(Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998). Their concept of polity-ideas as normative ideas 
about a legitimate politicaO RUGHU DQG WKHLU µFULWLFDO UHDOLVW¶ GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ
interests and ideas, are taken up below.  
However, social structures, as well as institutions, ultimately consist of humans ± 
they are socially constructed rules and traditions that have no objective, tangible 
existence except as represented in man-made words, actions, and physical objects that 
must be attributed meanings. In this perspective, the individual is the fundamental 
agent of politics and the basic unit of analysis of social science. Human agents 
µFRQVWUXFW¶ LH HVWDEOLVK GXUDEOHZLGHO\ VKDUHG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRU UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI
the social world of which they are part. Such constructions in turn become intellectual 
and epistemological, and, eventually, social structures. As the critical realists argue, in 
addition to the material incentives highlighted by rational choice theorists, individuals 
are motivated by beliefs, norms, values, ideas, identities and ideologies,± and, I submit, 
a search for meaning and knowledge.  
However, social structures certainly limit both the ideas and the scope for action 
of individuals. In most of the contemporary world, the predominant sociostructural 
given is the state. The segmentation of global society into states over at least the last 
half millennium severely limits our ability to imagine anything beyond the current 
multi-state reality. But poststructuralist ontology implies that the territorially bounded, 
internally sovereign and externally independent, so-FDOOHG µ:HVWSKDOLDQ¶ VWDWH RU
µQDWLRQ-staWH¶LVRQO\RQHKLVWRULFDOO\DQGJHRJUDSKLFDOO\FRQWLQJHQWW\SHRISROLWLFDO
FRPPXQLW\  µ&ULWLFDOO\¶ LQIRUPHG LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV WKHRULVWV )HUJXVRQ DQG
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0DQVEDFKWKXVPDNHDFRQYLQFLQJFDVHIRUWKHDGRSWLRQRIµSROLWLHV¶UDWKHUWKDQ
µVWDWHV¶ as the chief unit of IR historical analysis.   
Similarly, Barry Buzan and Richard Little (1999: 18-22) accuse Realist IR theory 
QRW RQO\ RI ³VWDWH-FHQWULVP´ DQG ³DQDUFKRSKLOLD´ EXW DOVR RI ³SUHVHQWLVP´
³DKLVWRULFLVP´ DQG ³HXURFHQWULVP´$QGUHDV2VLDQGHU in his analysis of the Peace of 
:HVWSKDOLD FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKHZKROH FRQFHSW RI WKH µ:HVWSKDOLDQ¶ VWDWH VRYHUHLJQW\
DQG WKH FRQFRPLWDQWPRGHORI LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV ³LVEDVHGRQQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\
rationalisations for conditions prevailing at the time that were not only historically 
XQSUHFHGHQWHGEXWE\WKHLUYHU\QDWXUHWUDQVLWRU\´2VLDQGHU 
6LQFHWKHµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOWXUQ¶LQDXJXUDWHGE\WKH0DDVWULFKWWUHDW\LQWKHV
in European integration theory there has been a related tendency to interpret the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQDVDQHPHUJLQJµSROLW\¶HJ6EUDJLD0DUNVHWDO3LHUVRQ
1996; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 1998; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, eds., 1999; 
Hix 1999; Wiener and Diez 2004). But also the original European integration theory, 
neo-functionalism, assumed that the European Community was a polity in the making 
(see e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). Theorists working 
on this assumption take a comparative politics rather than an international relations 
approach to the study of European integration.  
A comparativist approach to European integration challenges the view that the 
(XURSHDQ 8QLRQ LV D KLVWRULFDOO\ XQSUHFHGHQWHG XQLTXH ³sui generis´ SROLWLFDO
phenomenon, requiring a wholly new vocabulary and methodology. Simon Hix argues 
YLJRURXVO\WKDWWKH(8VKRXOGEHVWXGLHGXVLQJ³WKHWRROVPHWKRGVDQGFURVV-systemic 
theories from the general study of government, politics and policy-PDNLQJ´+L[
2).  
However, in my opinion the advocates of a comparative politics approach to 
European integration have not yet drawn the full, radical consequences implied by their 
argument. I submit that this can only be properly done if European integration is seen 
in a deeply historical, comparative perspective in accordance with the poststructuralist 
approach. From this view, the evolution of the European Union may be seen as a case 
of polity-building similar to past cases of state- and nation-building. The common 
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French expression for European integration, lD FRQVWUXFWLRQ GH O¶(XURSH, is in this 
perspective apposite. It is trivial to observe that all emerging polities have been unique, 
or sui generis, and without any predetermined outcome. From a contemporary 
perspective, the interesting point is not whether, but how European Union-building 
differs from other cases of polity-building.  
I propose that the answer is twofold. First, European Union-building is non-
coercive: Democratically governed states voluntarily join a new political entity, 
GHOHJDWH RU µSRRO¶decision-making powers to a new centre, and adopt and abide by 
common laws and policies without the threat or use of physical force. This calls for 
special attention to be paid to the role of attitudes, political ideology and public 
opinion in the evolution of the project, and warrants a comparative politics approach.  
However, the second unique feature of the European Union as an emerging polity 
is the fact that the integrating units are highly institutionalised, nominally sovereign 
µ:HVWSKDOLDQ¶VWDWHV This structural trait strongly suggests that the preoccupation of 
international relations theory with national power, sovereignty, prestige and interest is 
still highly relevant to understanding the dynamics of European integration. Together, 
these two aspects illustrate that what is unprecedented and unique in European 
integration as a polity-building process, is its bottom-up, or ascending, nature. Seen 
IURPD FRQWHPSRUDU\SHUVSHFWLYH WKHUH LV FOHDUO\ D µGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLW¶EXW IURPDQ
historical point of view European polity-building is singularly democratic.  
Interpreting the European Union as a case of polity-building may suggest that EU 
politics is indeed most basically a struggle over power, influence and resources. 
However, I find Realist internatLRQDO UHODWLRQV WKHRU\¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISRZHUZLWK LWV
focus on physical force and distributive power, too restrictive. This is especially so 
with European Union-building, which is essentially a voluntary process undertaken by 
democratic states, and whose very UDLVRQ G¶rWUH is the enhancement of common 
LQWHUHVWV DQG LGHDV , SUHIHU 0LFKDHO 0DQQ¶V ZLGHU SRVWVWUXFWXUDOLVW FRQFHSWLRQ RI
social power.  
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0DQQ   DVVXPHV WKDW WKHUH DUH IRXU EDVLF µVRXUFHV¶ RI SRZHU
political, economic, military, and idHRORJLFDO $OO RI WKHVH DUH DOVR µVRXUFHV¶ RI
European union in the sense that they in various ways, directly or indirectly, have 
influenced the people who have built or are building the European Union. Least 
relevant, in a post-WWII perspective at least, is military power. Accordingly, European 
Union politics is not only a zero-sum struggle over political and economic advantage 
(in the sense of allocation of votes in the Council, seats in the Parliament, contributions 
to and returns from the common budget, policy decisions more or less favourable to the 
µQDWLRQDO¶ LQWHUHVW LQ TXHVWLRQ HWF EXW DOVR D QRQ-zero-sum deliberation on how 
participants may best realise their political, economic and military interests and 
ideologies, ideas, norms and values collectively rather than individually.  
If we (as in the current context I think we must) conceive of Europe as a whole 
and consider the whole of European history, we will see that there have not only been 
centrifugal tendencies towards diversity, freedom and anarchy, but also significant 
centripetal tendencies towards unity, order and hierarchy. Indeed, like many others 
before me, I will argue that the dialectic between unity and diversity is a fundamental 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRI(XURSH¶VGHYHORSPHQW 
Europe has had and retains important supranational, universalist and 
cosmopolitan institutions, agents and traditions, with concomitant identities and 
LGHRORJLHVQRWRQO\µQDWLRQDO¶RUVWDWHRQHV,ZLOOGLVFXVVKRZWKHVHKDYHVLJQLILFDQWO\
influenced attitudes to ± and thus the actual course of ± European integration, 
including how member state governments see their national interests in EU treaty 
negotiations. These legacies thus constitute past sources of European union (with a 
minuscule u), interacting with present, more short-term, i.e. post-1945, sources of 
European Union (with a capital U).  Different parts of Europe are differently 
influenced, and that, I submit, is the key to solving the puzzle of territorially 
differentiated Europeanism. 
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1.2 The clash of paradigms 
If we interpret European integration as polity-building, the question of 
sovereignty takes centre stage. I will assume that controversy over notions of 
sovereignty is also at the core of the political debate on European integration, and thus 
a primary cause of the differentiated pattern of opinion that I aim to explain. As 
Koenig-$UFKLEXJL   FRQFOXGHV IURP ULJRURXV HPSLULFDO WHVWLQJ ³DWWLWXGHV
toward supranational integration are shaped by distinct conceptions of sovereignty and 
political authority that prevail in the political culture of the member-VWDWHV´ 0\
empirical analysis will therefore be structured according to a conceptual framework of 
sovereignty. In this chapter I will first present this framework, then summarise the 
arguments based on it that appear in the empirical parts of the study. 
)UDQFLV+LQVOH\DXWKRURI³WKHVWDQGDUG(QJOLVKODQJXDJHWUHDWPHQWRIWKHKLVWRU\
RIVRYHUHLJQW\´2QXIGHILQHVVRYHUHLJQW\DV³WKHLGHDWKDWWKHUHLVDILQDO
and absolute authority in the SROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\´+LQVOH\7KLVDQGLQGHHG
any definition of sovereignty logically distinguishes between what I will call the locus 
and the scope of sovereignty, i.e. between who exercises sovereignty and the 
community or territory over which it is exercised.  
$VWRORFXV³ILQDODQGDEVROXWHDXWKRULW\´PD\EHWKRXJKWWREHORFDWHGHLWKHUDW
the top of the political community, in one person (who may claim divine mandate), or 
below, ultimately in the whole people. The former case represents what the historian 
Walter Ullmann (1965) has called the descending (or absolutist) thesis of government, 
according to which supreme authority belongs at the apex of the social pyramid, or 
indeed above it, to God, and all authority below is delegated from above. The latter 
case, the ascending (or democratic) thesis, takes sovereignty ultimately to emanate 
from and belong to the people.  
Samuel Finer (1997: 35) similarly distinguishes between the rule of the elite (the 
µ3DODFH¶UHJLPHDQGRIWKHPDVVHVWKHµ)RUXP¶UHJLPH6XFKQRWLRQVRIVRYHUHLJQW\
are variations over the classical Greek taxonomy of polity types, most famously 
articulated by Plato and Aristotle. It posits three constitutional or legitimate types of 
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polity: the rule of one: monarchy; of the feZDULVWRFUDF\OLWHUDOO\UXOHRIWKHµEHVW¶
and of the many: democracy. Each category also had an unconstitutional and 
illegitimate version. 
However, political theorists have traditionally paid less critical attention to the 
territorial scope of sovereignty than to its social locus. The independent polis defined 
the classical world of Plato and Aristotle, and the nation-state the modern world within 
which historiography and political science developed as academic disciplines. Since 
the nineteenth century the nation-state has enjoyed conceptual near-monopoly as the 
fundamental unit of political-territorial organisation. 
Already Montesquieu (1990 [1748]: Book VIII, ch. 16, 19, 20) identified 
PXOWLQDWLRQDO µHPSLUHV¶ZLWK GHVSRWLVP7KH$PHULFDQ:DU RI ,QGHSendence (1775-
1783), the Paris peace settlements after World War I and the decolonisation from the 
late 1950s onwards have successively undermined the legitimacy of supranational, 
imperial governance in general and augmented that of national self-determination (see 
e.g. Doyle 1986: 19; Pagden 1995; Muldoon 1999: 109-113; Lieven 2003: 4).  
+RZHYHU ZLWK WRGD\¶V (XURSHDQLVDWLRQ DQG JOREDOLVDWLRQ WKHUH LV D QHZ
awareness of the need for effective authority to be exercised above and beyond the 
nation-state, and thus for a reconsideration of the scope of sovereignty and citizenship 
(see e.g. Linklater 1998). As we will see, there are solid historical precedents for 
supranational governance. Sovereigns have claimed authority not only over a particular 
part of the world ± ZKLFK,ZLOOWHUPµSDUWLFXODULVP¶± but also over the whole human 
community (or at least the world they knew or thought to be civilised) ± which I will 
FDOOµXQLYHUVDOLVP¶2  
If the locus and scope of sovereignty are dichotomised into respectively 
universalist/particularist and descending/ascending dimensions, they may be combined 
                                              
 
 
2 For the present purposes I concentrate on the territorial scope of sovereignty, bearing in mind however that sovereignty 
also has what may be termed a functional scope, which is a question of what functLRQV RU DVSHFWV RI  D FRPPXQLW\¶V
organisation and life should be subject to political governance (and to what degree): the economy, the currency, culture, the 
judiciary, religious life, media, etc.  
  
 
11 
as in Figure 1 below. The figure defines four basic polity-LGHDVLH³QRUPDWLYHLGHDV
DERXWDOHJLWLPDWHSROLWLFDORUGHU´-DFKWHQIXFKV'LH]DQG-XQJXQLYHUValist-
descending; 2) particularist-descending; 3) particularist-ascending; and 4) universalist-
ascending. I will argue that each polity-type has had or has a particular discourse, 
ideology, even an ontological and epistemological paradigm, attached to it. 
 
Figure 1: Historical polity-ideas defined according to their idea of 
sovereignty 
  Scope 
 
Locus 
 Universalist Particularist 
Descending Empire Kingdom 
Ascending Federation/Union City-state/ 
Nation-state 
 
This is a general, deductive scheme for classifying polity-ideas according to their 
notions of the locus and scope of sovereignty. As such it may be applied to any part of 
the world. If related to the European context, I submit that the theoretically possible 
polity-ideas have been (or may be) realised empirically as the polity-types indicated in 
the four boxes of the figure. I will argue that the post-war debate over European 
integration has been dominated by the discourses based respectively on the 
particularist-descending and the universalist/Europeanist-descending polity-ideas. 
These in turn are expressions of what I will call the national-liberal and the Christian-
democratic paradigms of European governance.  
Based on this, I will try to demonstrate that the most politically salient cleavage 
in the history of European Union-building has been that between central and southern 
Christian democrats pursuing a federalist or unitary political vision for the European 
Union, and northern national-liberals working for an intergovernmental and free-trade 
Europe, or indeed fundamentally opposing European integration. For many in the 
Europeanist core, European unity has been an end in itself, whereas for the Euro-
sceptic periphery it has at most been a means to advance the interests of its own sui 
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generis end ± the national community. The continental and southern core has generally 
favoured European state- and nation-building, the northern periphery at most an 
economically integrated Europe of sovereign nation-states. 
The Peace of Westphalia was the major historical turning point as far as the scope 
of sovereignty is concerned. Before 1648, sovereignty was generally identified with the 
ruling dynasty and not with a fixed territory, but the peace treaties confirmed its 
replacement by the principle of territorial sovereignty. The period between 1648 and 
1789 is conventionally seen as the classical era of particularist-descending, absolutist 
monarchy. Similarly, the French Revolution is commonly conceived as the critical 
juncture as far as the locus of sovereignty is concerned (although in fact the 
seventeenth-century Dutch republic and the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England, as 
well as the American Revolution of 1776 have fair claims to that title too). In Europe, 
that was when the ascent towards hegemony of particularist-ascending, or national-
liberal, ideology began.  
However, as we will also see, descending-sovereignty discourse survived 1789, 
and not only in the Restoration monarchies. Particularist-descending polity-ideas 
continued to find expression in the European overseas empires that endured, in the case 
of Portugal, until the 1970s. More significantly in the present context, the influence of 
the French idea of national sovereignty helped transform German particularist-
descending discourse into exclusivist, totalising nationalism. German intellectuals, 
beginning with Herder, developed a notion of the nation-state with a closed rather than 
open membership, defining the nation as a unique linguistic, ethnic and/or cultural 
community. Later German nationalists made German mother tongue and ancestry the 
criterion of membership in the German Kulturnation. In the Wilhelmine Reich, 
German nationalism deteriorated into a cult of the German nation, the genius of which 
was claimed to be superior to all other nations. Spurred by social darwinism, these 
notions carried over to the racism espoused by Hitler and his Nazi movement. This was 
arguably still a descending version of particularism, as the cult of the nation, imagined 
as a transcendental god-like community, was used to justify descending, 
authoritarian/totalitarian government (see below, Section 3.8.2). 
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By contrast, the concept of the nation-state promoted by Rousseau and the French 
revolutionaries was civic or political rather than ethnic, linguistic or cultural. Anyone 
who supported the fundamental ideas of the political community as expressed in the 
constitution could be a citizen, regardless of his or her birthplace, language, religion, 
etc. The state defined the nation, not vice versa as in the German case. This idea of 
citizenship can be placed in the ancient Greek and Roman tradition of republicanism 
and cosmopolitanism, but also in the closely related Catholic tradition of universalism. 
Its immediate ideological background was French Enlightenment theory and British 
constitutionalist practice, and it was first institutionalised in the modern age in the 
United States of America (see below, Section 3.8.3).  
Generally, the civic/liberal idea of the nation-state made its greatest impact in 
north-western Europe and North America, which is why it may also be designated the 
µ$WODQWLF¶GLVFRXUVHRQVRYHUHLJQW\1DWLRQDOHWKQLFLGHRORJ\E\FRQWUDVWRULJLQDWHGLQ
Germany and affected Central and Eastern Europe in particular. Racist nationalism and 
suprematism was discredited in the Second World War, but the ethnic/exclusivist 
variety has survived on the radical right of Western Europe. After the Cold War it 
enjoyed a revival in Central and Eastern Europe too (Mach anG3RĪDUOLN7KH
radical left has at the same time tended to reify the nation-state as the last and best 
defence against transnational capitalism, neo-liberalism and globalism.  
Be that as it may; the common denominator for latter-day nationalists as well as 
national-liberals remains the particularist-ascending idea of sovereignty. Sanctioned by 
the Paris peace treaties, the League of Nations as well as the United Nations, the 
principle of national self-determination legitimised not only the break-up of the 
Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires after World War I, but also decolonisation in 
the 1960s and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  
Speaking generally, two political notions with great normative and emotional 
appeal ± popular sovereignty and the nation ± have in the modern mind become 
indelibly associated with the territorially delimited state. Thus a core axiom of 
national-liberal ideology tends to be that democracy is only legitimate and workable in 
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the institutional framework of the sovereign nation-state. Moreover, the nation-state 
has become identified with the progress of modern (Western) egalitarian civilisation in 
general: human rights, rule of law, social welfare, compulsory schooling, universal 
health care, gender equality, rising living standards, employment, etc. It is the default 
that any alternative must trump. 
The conventional interpretation of European political history is of a succession of 
polity-ideas and polity-types, from the Greek city-state to the Roman Empire, via 
unitary but anarchical Christendom to the medieval and early modern kingdoms, and 
on to the late modern nation-state. Although at a very general level this is true and 
demonstrates the underlying unity of European history, in a fairly large and diverse 
area such as Europe, prevalent polity-ideas do not uniformly change from one to 
another. There have been and remain transitional polity-ideas as well as polity-types. 
Different polities and associated ideas concerning the scope and locus of sovereignty 
have co-existed with those that are later taken to be paradigmatic for the age in 
question.  
Even when revolutions have occurred, ideological and institutional elements, 
legacies and discourses from the old polities have survived into those that replaced 
them. The strength of such elements, discourses and legacies is socially and 
territorially differentiated, that is, it depends on the history of the particular territory in 
question and on the social power of their agents.  
The cardinal point in the present context is the strength and longevity of the 
universalist tradition in Europe, even in the ages of kingdoms and nation-states. 
Institutions expressing universalist ideas, ideals and traditions have existed as living 
realities practically throughout known European history. The universalist political 
µLPSHULDO¶ WUDGLWLRQ DUJXDEO\ H[WHQGV EDFN VRPH ILYH WKRXVDQG \HDUV VHH EHORZ
Chapter 3.2).  
However, probably most Europeans imagine ancient Rome as the paradigmatic 
HPSLUH ,Q WRGD\¶V QDWLRQDO-liberal world, the huge influence that notions from the 
Roman Empire (see below, Chapter 3.6) have had on subsequent European political 
thought tends to be neglected. The Papacy, the Byzantine empire, and the Holy Roman 
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Empire (as well as its close relative and descendant, the Habsburg monarchy) all 
claimed not only to succeed it institutionally and ideologically (see below, Chapter 3.7 
and Section 3.8.1), but therefore also had some sense of universal authority, at least 
over Christians.  
Even if the rivalry between the medieval Pope and emperor over sovereignty in 
Christendom fatally undermined the ability of each to assert his claims in practice (see 
below, Section 3.7.4), Roman universalist-descending ideas and ideals lingered on. 
The Byzantine empire represented an essentially unbroken institutional continuity with 
the Roman Empire until 1453. The Holy Roman Empire, established in 800 or 962 
(depending on whether Charlemagne or Otto I the Great is taken as the founder), ended 
only in 1806. The Habsburg line of emperors, still claiming Roman lineage, continued 
to rule a Central European empire until 1918. The Russian empire and the Ottoman 
empire, both of which claimed descent from the Roman Empire (via Constantinople), 
H[SLUHGRQO\LQDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\'HILQLQJLWVHOIDVµ6HFRQG¶WKH*HUPDQ
Reich founded in 1871 associated itself with the tradition oIWKHµILUVW¶*HUPDQ-Roman 
empire. Napoleon, Mussolini as well as Hitler (at least indirectly when he called his 
WRWDOLWDULDQ VWDWH WKH µ7KLUG¶Reich) evoked the Roman precedent to legitimise their 
power. Finally, the Holy See, located in Rome and intensely alert to its Roman lineage 
and universalist mission, is obviously still a hugely influential living institution.  
As we will see, at a particularly propitious historical moment, the universalist 
tradition was able to bounce back and make the European Union possible. In the late 
nineteenth century, its previously mainly descending legacy began to be democratised, 
and after World War II it was transformed into Christian-democratic ideology and 
discourse.  What is now the European Union was launched on its supranational path 
when transnationally networked Christian democratic parties, led by statesmen from 
Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the governments of the six founding 
states. As Wolfram Kaiser has recently demonstrated in a ground-breaking study 
.DLVHUWUDQVQDWLRQDO&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDF\KDVUHPDLQHGWKHIHGHUDOLVWµSDUW\RI
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(XURSH¶ WKURXJKRXW WKH KLVWRU\ RI (XURSHDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ VHH DOVR %\UQHV DQG
Katzenstein, eds., 2006, and Checkel and Katzenstein, eds., 2009).  
Christian-democratic discourse was originally inspired by Catholic universalism 
and its main territorial base remains western, central and southern continental Europe. I 
submit this is the main reason why even non-Catholics from these parts are more 
Europeanist than citizens from mainly Protestant, northern/insular/peninsular Europe. 
The Christian-democratic, or Europeanist-ascending, tradition is arguably today the 
main inspiration of centre-right Europeanism, which has so far been the most 
influential strand of Europeanism.  
Since Christian-democratic discourse draws much of its inspiration from ancient 
Roman and medieval Christian ideology, it attaches less intrinsic value to the national 
level of government. This discourse arguably takes the existence of European identity, 
or what I will call Europeanness, as granted because it is such an integral part of the 
historically and territorially conditioned individual identity of its proponents. I submit 
that the assumption that a European demos already exists, together with the tradition 
for top-GRZQ µGHVFHQGLQJ¶ SDWULDUFKDO FOLHQWHOLVW DQGRU HOLWLVW JRYHUQDQFH LQ
continental and southern Europe (Hofstede 2001), means that the adherents of the 
Christian-democratic paradigm tend to attach less importance to the problems of 
democracy and legitimacy in the European Union. In contrast to national-liberal 
GLVFRXUVH LW KDV EHHQ PRUH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH µRXWSXW¶ WKDQ WKH µLQSXW¶ VLGH RI
European governance.  
Centre-left Europeanism, on the other hand, I would place closer to the secular 
republican and cosmopolitan tradition, which has also contributed so much to national-
liberal ideology (see below, Section 3.4.3 ff). This tradition originally hails from 
Greco-Roman Stoicism, and has arguably been influenced E\ ,WDOLDQ µ/RWKDULQJLDQ¶
and Dutch republicanism, by medieval natural law thought, by Calvinism and by 
Enlightenment ideas. Cosmopolitanism and universalism overlap etymologically and 
historically, and now sometimes tend to be treated as equal (Linklater 1998: Pagden 
2008; Talbott 2008).   
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However, the respectively Greek and Latin origins of the terms remain relevant. 
µ8QLYHUVDOLVP¶ DUJXDEO\ UHIOHFWV WKH 5RPDQ QRWLRQ RI D XQLYHUVDO SROLW\ UXOHG
according to one law applying to all citizens, and with one ruler at its head to whom all 
RZH OR\DOW\ %\ FRQWUDVW PRGHUQ DGYRFDWHV RI µFRVPRSROLWDQLVP¶ HJ $UFKLEXJL
Held and Kohler, eds., 1998; Beck 2004; Beck and Grande 2007) arguably retain more 
of the original Greek emphasis on multiple state and other collectivity independence 
combined with equal individual rights. I regard the Roman-Catholic universalist 
tradition as more Euro-centric and conservative than the Greek-secular cosmopolitan 
tradition, which I submit is today comparatively more multiculturalist and liberal/leftist 
(cf. the new debate over the limits and identity of Europe).  
Particularist discourse may be expressed in opposition to joining the European 
8QLRQRULQWKHFDVHRIVWDWHVWKDWDUHDOUHDG\PHPEHUVWRµGHHSHQLQJ¶RUIHGHUDOLVLQJ
the 8QLRQE\WUDQVIHUULQJPRUHVRYHUHLJQW\DQGSROLF\UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWRLWµ$WODQWLF¶
national-liberals seek to retain the nation-state as the primary polity, but tend to be 
IDYRXUDEOHWRµQHJDWLYH¶LQWHJUDWLRQLHDEROLWLRQRIUHVWULFWLRQVRQWKHIUHHPovement 
of goods, services, capital and people, to mutual recognition and Lisbon Strategy best-
practice learning, etc.  
The varieties of European integration theories have tended to reflect these 
normative differences, intergovernmentalists seeking to retain as much national 
sovereignty as possible, neo-functionalists espousing the single market approach, and 
federalists of course a federal Europe with distinct supranational and direct democratic 
elements (see below, Part 2). 
A basic tenet of the modern particularist paradigm is that the natural political unit 
is the sovereign, democratic nation-state. As we will see, the ideology of the nation-
state emerged mainly north of the Alps, in a tension between liberal English, American 
and French notions of the civic state on the one hand and national-ethnic, nationalist 
and ultimately racist German ideas of the nation on the other. The continued strength 
of the particularist paradigm in northern Europe significantly contributes to the 
importance here being attached to the preservation of national sovereignty in European 
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integration. In addition, the national-liberal preoccupation with ascending democracy 
in the north3 conduces towards Euro-scepticism because a national community is seen 
as the ultimate framework for a functioning democracy. A supranational European 
Union cannot on this idealist view be democratically legitimate as there is allegedly no 
European identity, or at least no European demos, as the jargon goes.   
Arguably, northern, Protestant national-liberals and southern, mainly Catholic 
Christian-democrats tend to clash over European integration also because they are 
ideologically inclined to emphasise two different aspects of European Union politics: 
respectively distributive and collective power (Parsons 1960: 199-225; cf. Mann 1986: 
6-7). Distributive power is zero-sum: if A increases his power, B loses power, and 
vice-versa. Northern Europeans tend to focus on distributive power in European 
politics, and see the European Union mainly as an arena for the advancement or 
defence of national interests and national identity, i.e. of their nation-state. Their basic 
TXHVWLRQLV³:KDW¶VLQLWIRUPHRUIRUP\QDWLRQ´" 
Collective power on the other hand means that if A and B co-operate they may 
enhance their combined power vis-à-vis third parties or nature. In this perspective, 
European Union politics is less about the allocation of distributive power between 
member states and EU institutions, and more about how participants can increase their 
collective power relative to other polities such as Russia, the United States, China etc. 
as well as their joint ability to handle common challenges such as terrorism, economic 
competitiveness, unemployment, migration and environmental degradation. Christian-
democratic discourse tends to focus on collective power in European politics and 
generally on how joint governance can contribute to the good life for all according to 
common (European/Christian) values, rather than on struggles over distributive power 
within the UniRQ ,WV EDVLF TXHVWLRQV DUH ³:KDW LV WKH FRPPRQ LQWHUHVW RU WKH
FRPPRQJRRGDQGKRZGRZHPRVWHIIHFWLYHO\UHDOLVHLW"´ 
                                              
 
 
3 &IQRWOHDVWWKH*HUPDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUW¶VGHFLVLons regarding the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties. 
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Naturally, such a classification is a huge simplification. The two opposed 
paradigms, ideologies or discourses I have delineated are ideal-types. In practice there 
are many gradations and nuances that are changing over time as Europe and the world 
evolves. Moreover, the influence of these world-views is not restricted to their 
territorial origin but can be noted in every member state. As regards attitudes to 
European integration, they may be seen as two ends of a continuum, between 
adherence to complete national sovereignty on the one hand and to a centralised 
(XURSHDQµVXSHU-VWDWH¶RQWKHRWKHU 
However, as ideal-types I submit that today the national-liberal and the Christian-
democratic paradigms constitute the oft-observed dialectic nature of Europe, which 
Jonathan Steinberg recently has summarised as follows: 
The secret of Europe has always been [...] the tension between universal and 
particular, between the empire and the estates, between the princes and their 
towns, between universalist religious claims and sectarian practice, between 
universal values and particular rights. That constant irritating, relentless but 
ultimately creative struggle has made Europe the vital, vigorous, inexhaustibly 
interesting place that it is. [...] The tension between universal and particular, 
between centre and periphery, between federal and state power, may not always 
be comfortable to live with but it is the very core of European identity. That is 
what Europe is. (Steinberg 2002: 48) 
1.3 The relevance of Rokkan 
The Norwegian social scientist Stein Rokkan (1921-1979) was one of the 
founding fathers of the modern discipline of comparative politics (Caramani 2008: 18). 
Rokkan, who published most of his work in the 1960s and 1970s, analysed the 
historical interplay between political, economic, cultural, and territorial variables in the 
evolution of modern politico-territorial diversity in Europe.4 His original interest in the 
                                              
 
 
4 Rokkans main works are Rokkan (1966, 1970 and 1975). Rokkan (1999), which I will be referring to here, is a compilation 
edited by Peter Flora and Derek Urwin that also contains a full bibliography. 
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development of political participation expanded to encompass the evolution of Western 
European party systems and nation-states in general.  
2QHRI5RNNDQ¶VIXQGDPHQWDOLGHDVZDVWKDWVWDWH- and nation-building in Europe 
has been structured DURXQGD(XURSHDQFRUHRUZKDWKHFDOOHGWKHµFLW\-EHOW¶VWUHWFKLQJ 
from central Italy to the North Sea. Rokkan saw the autonomy and strength of the cities 
at the centre of Europe as originating in the Roman Empire and having been sustained 
by trade and other economic interaction between northern and southern Europe. 
Moreover, according to Rokkan, this central area encompassed the traditional 
strongholds of the supranational Roman Catholic church. The economically and 
culturally integrated but politically fragmented central city-belt was able to resist 
domestic and foreign state- and nation-building efforts to the extent that the strongest 
and most centralised European nation-states arose not in the middle, but in the 
European periphery.  
Rokkan in one brief passage explicitly suggested that his territorial, centre-
periphery perspective offers a key to understanding post-1945 European integration: 
³,W LVQRDFFLGHQWRIKLVWRU\ WKDW WKH5RPDQ/DZFRXQWULHVZHUH WKHRQHV WR WDNH WKH
lead [....] in the struggle for a supranational Europe. The conflict over extension of the 
Common Market is very much a conflict between the economically cross-cut city belt 
at the centre and the culturally distinctive territorial systems in the peripheries of this 
5RPDQ(XURSH´5okkan 1999: 167-168).  Rokkan left the idea there, and no one has 
yet explored it further. But Peter Flora suggests that it is high time to follow up: 
Europe regarded as a whole has the polycephalic structure of Central Europe, 
where the ideas of federalism and subsidiarity originated. Yet European-wide 
centre-SHULSKHU\VWUXFWXUHVZLOOIRUPRUVROLGLI\DQGDVWKH\GRVRWKHµFLW\EHOW¶
VRFHQWUDOWR5RNNDQ¶VWKHRU\PD\RQFHDJDLQSOD\DUROH,WLVQRFRLQFLGHQFHWKDW
the politicians who have been most important for the process of European 
XQLILFDWLRQFRPHIURPWKHµ/RWKDULQJLDQ¶]RQHRI(XURSHRUWKDWWKHPRVW
important political institutions of Europe and the economic core of the Continent 
DUHORFDWHGWKHUH>«@5RNNDQ¶VDSSURDFKDOVRRIIHUVDNH\WRXQGerstanding the 
latest developments in Europe. One might argue that as nation-states have 
declined in significance, intensive research into their differences has also become 
less important. But I would counter that the process of European integration has 
given these differences a wholly new meaning.  By looking back into the past, 
Rokkan points to the future. (Flora 1999: 91)   
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)ORUD¶V VXJJHVWLRQ WR LQWURGXFH 5RNNDQ¶V WKLQNLQJ WR WKH VWXG\ RI (XURSHDQ
integration is taken up in Chapter 2.5 and in Part 3 below. However, as we will see, 
Rokkan himself was much influenced by the national-liberal paradigm. Indeed, what 
has become known as methodological nationalism (Smith 1983; Wimmer and Schiller 
2002; Beck 2004; Beck and Grande 2007) is probably the most serious obstacle to a 
deeper theoretical and historical understanding of the European Union today.  
The preoccupation of political scientists and historians with the nation-state is no 
doubt related to the fact that history and political science were established as academic 
disciplines in the context of state- and nation-building and nationalism (Berger, 
Donovan & Passmore, eds., 1999: 3). The first professional historians, from whom 
early political scientists like Weber (an outspoken German nationalist himself) took 
their cue, uncritically agreed that the proper units of historical analysis were national 
communities:   
In this they reflected the fervent nationalism and intense state-building of 
nineteenth-century Europe. This state-building process prompted widespread 
fascination with national communities and profoundly influenced the 
development of historical scholarship. Indeed, professional historical scholarship 
is basically an artefact of the nation-state era of world history: in the absence of 
national states, professional historical scholarship as we know it is almost 
LQFRQFHLYDEOH>«@&RQWHPSRUDU\KLVWRULDQVKDYHPRVWO\PRGHUDWHGLIQRW
abandoned the patriotism of their nineteenth-century predecessors, but their 
enchantment with national communities persists until the present day (Bentley 
1999: 90, 91).   
However, a minority of scholars has upheld specifically European approaches to 
the interpretation of European history. A prominent early representative of this 
tradition was ChULVWRSKHU'DZVRQ$FFRUGLQJWRKLP³WKHXOWLPDWHIRXQGDWLRQRIRXU
FXOWXUHLVQRWWKHQDWLRQDOVWDWHEXWWKH(XURSHDQXQLW\´'DZVRQ'DZVRQ
observed that the works of the greatest nineteenth century historians were often 
manuals of nationalist propaganda and as such had wide-ranging effects. They 
SHUPHDWHGWKHSRSXODUFRQVFLRXVQHVVDQGGHWHUPLQHGRUGLQDU\SHRSOHV¶FRQFHSWLRQRI
KLVWRU\1DWLRQDOLVWKLVWRULRJUDSK\³ILOWHUHGGRZQIURPWKHXQLYHUVLW\WRWKHHOHPHQWDU\
school, and from the scholar WRWKHMRXUQDOLVWDQGWKHQRYHOLVW´LELG-22).  
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As other scholars in the same tradition may be mentioned Lord Acton, Ernest 
Barker, Marc Bloch, Fernand Braudel, Hendrik Brugmans, Kenneth Clarke, Jürgen 
Fischer, Oskar Halecki, Denys Hay, Friedrich Heer, Francis Hinsley, Edmund Husserl, 
Salvador de Madariaga, Henri Pirenne, Gonzague de Reynold, Denis de Rougemont, 
and many others. A recent practitioner whom I will frequently consult is the French 
historian Jacques le Goff (2005). Significantly, many of these intellectuals were 
Catholics (like Dawson) and/or were based in continental and southern parts of 
Europe.5  
1.4 Methodology and organisation 
It should be clear from the above that the methodology I have adopted for the 
present enquiry will mainly emanate from comparative politics (Pennings, Keman and 
Kleinnijenhuis 2006; Caramani, ed., 2008). However, the theoretical and empirical 
discussions also feed on international relations theory, historical sociology and, not 
least, historiography. The study may classified as an instance of comparative historical 
analysis, whose three distinctive features are a concern with causal analysis, an 
emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualised 
comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 10). Within contemporary political 
science the study belongs in the camp of historical institutionalism, which according to 
Pierson and Skocpol (cf. also Pierson 2004) also has three important features:   
Historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are inherently 
of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory 
arguments about important outcomes or puzzles, historical institutionalists take 
time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations and processes of 
varying scale and temporality. Historical institutionalists likewise analyse macro 
contexts and hypothesise about the combined effects of institutions and processes 
rather than examining just one institution or process at a time. (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002: 695-696; emphases in original) 
                                              
 
 
5 See also the introduction to the historical Part 3 below. 
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To repeat, the research question is: Why has there been such a basic territorial 
division, mainly between northern European countries on the one hand and continental 
and southern countries on the other, in individual and governmental attitudes to 
(XURSHDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ" 7KH µGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH¶ LV WKXV DWWLWXGH WR (XURSHDQ XQLRQ
ZKHUHDV WKH µLQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH¶ LV WHUULWRULDO ORFDWLRQ LQ (XURSH 7KDW WKHUH LV D
significant and consistent pattern of variation between the variables appears in Part 4 
below (see particularly Chapter 4.2). Therefore, the really interesting variables will be 
WKH LQWHUYHQLQJ RQHV , ZLOO DVVRFLDWH ZLWK WKH FRQFHSWV RI µLQWHUHVW¶ µLGHRORJ\¶ DQG
µOHDUQLQJ¶VHHEHORZ3DUW 
The spatial unit of analysis is the territory today identified as Europe, i.e. in 
principle Europe from Iceland and Ireland to the Urals and the Caspian Sea; from 
Gibraltar, Sicily and the Bosporus to the North Cape. I will however concentrate on the 
countries with the longest history of association with the European integration process, 
i.e. Western Europe, and notably what are now France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Great Britain. This is because these parts are 
the most relevant to the research question. They contained the agents most involved, as 
proponents and opponents, in the creation of the current EU. 
IR purists may reject Europe as a meaningful unit of analysis in anything but a 
geographical and, perhaps, contemporary institutional sense. But that Europe is more 
than a territory or a diplomatically constructed organisational unit is a fundamental 
premise of the present study. Indeed, without the historical-cultural developments that I 
will describe, the space we inhabit would hardly be called Europe. Europe does not 
HYHQ UHSUHVHQW D FOHDUO\ ERXQGHG WHUULWRU\ LW LV FRQFHLYHG DV D µFRQWLQHQW¶ RQO\ IRU
historical reasons. The name itself is probably of mythological rather than geographic 
or ethnic origin (unlike, e.g., the terms Norway or France). Time is thus an essential 
dimension of analysis for the current undertaking. Indeed, the main research strategy 
will be to investigate the development and interaction of similarity and difference, 
unity and diversity, centralisation and fragmentation, across European space and time.  
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As I argue that the historical perspective has to be very deep in order to be able to 
answer the research question adequately, it is not possible to operationalise the relevant 
variables in a way that can accommodate the quantitative (and overly positivist) 
analysis comparativists usually rely on. I will mainly refer to opinion surveys to 
document the pattern of attitudes I have personally observed and which inspired the 
research question (see Chapter 4.2). For reasons of capacity and space it will also not 
be possible to go much into primary historical material (this would be a very 
interesting follow-up for historians). The main source of empirical evidence and 
argument will thus have to be secondary historical accounts, the huge amount of which 
also necessitates a very selective approach.  
Moreover, synthesising 5000 years of history would obviously be a risky 
undertaking even for a professional historian. There is bound to be mistakes of both 
fact and judgement. Still, due to what I perceive as the deplorable ahistoricism of 
European integration theory, notably expressed in its typically modernist failure to 
recognise anything but national identity and nationalism in European history (see Part 
2 below), my narrative on Europeanness and Europeanism, and their predecessors, will 
be fairly detailed. My hope is that the general interpretative approach will yield results 
that are sufficiently valuable to compensate for particular errors. 
I will begin in Part 2 by defining basic concepts of analysis and developing a 
working hypothesis (a tentative answer to the research question) based on existing 
SROLWLFDO VFLHQFH DQG VRFLRORJLFDO OLWHUDWXUH 7KLV ZLOO WKHQ EH µWHVWHG¶ DJDLQVW WKH
empiULFDO KLVWRULFDO HYLGHQFH LQ 3DUWV  DQG  E\ PHDQV RI µWKLFN GHVFULSWLRQ¶ DQG
qualitative analysis in the tradition of social anthropology, historiography and 
historical sociology. To be able to assess the variation in the dependent variable across 
time and space, it is reconceived according to Figure 1 above. Thus for Europeanism 
(pro-(8DWWLWXGHV , VXEVWLWXWH µXQLYHUVDOLVP¶ DQG IRU QDWLRQDOLVPQDWLRQDO-liberalism 
(euro-sceptic or anti-(8 DWWLWXGHV , VXEVWLWXWH µSDUWLFXODULVP¶ (DFK RI WKHVH KDV D
descending and an ascending variety, so that four paradigms, ideologies and discourses 
are identified according to their norms regarding locus and the scope of sovereignty. 
Empirical expressions of these are discussed in Part 3, and notably in Chapter 3.8.  
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Regarding the validity and reliability of this operationalisation, the analysis will 
KDYH WR VSHDN IRU LWVHOI , DP QRW DZDUH RI DQ\ ZD\ WR µWHVW¶ LW SRVLWLYHO\ 7KH
conclusion, i.e. the answer I will propose to the research question, will thus have to be 
provisional. What I will suggest, is one way of answering, an interpretation that I think 
is not only empirically valid, but also reasonable and plausible. It does not pretend to 
be the final truth. Still, I would not have invested as much time and effort in the 
present undertaking if I did not believe I would come considerably closer to that truth.
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2. Possible Sources of European Union 
2.1 Attitudes 
In this theoretical chapter, I will discuss what clues I have found in political 
science and sociological literature to the question of how territorial belonging may 
affect attitudes to European union. Special attention will naturally be paid to European 
integration and international relations theory. However, it will be necessary to delve 
into comparative politics and political sociology literature more generally to find the 
beginnings of a satisfactory answer.  
But first we need to consider the general nature of attitudes. An influential 
definition of attitude from social psychology that seems well suited to the problem at 
KDQG LV ³D OHDUQHG SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ WR UHVSRQG LQ D FRQVLVWHQWO\ IDYRXUDEOH RU
XQIDYRXUDEOHPDQQHUZLWKUHVSHFWWRDJLYHQREMHFW´)LVKEHLQDQG$M]HQFI
Oskamp 1991: 5). In the debate over the essential nature of attitudes, some social 
SV\FKRORJLVWV KDYH HVSRXVHG WKH ³WKUHH-FRPSRQHQWLDO´YLHZDQGRWKHUV WKH ³VHSDUDWH
HQWLWLHV´ YLHZ 2VNDPS  -11; Stahlberg and Frey 1997: 207). The former 
viewpoint posits that an attitude is a single entity consisting of three components or 
dimensions: (1) a cognitive component, involving the knowledge, ideas and beliefs 
which the attitude-holder has about the attitude object; (2) an affective component, 
referring to the feelings and emotions one has toward the object; and (3) a behavioural 
FRPSRQHQW FRQVLVWLQJ RI RQH¶V DFWLRQ WHQGHQFLHV WRZDUG WKH REMHFW )HVWLQJHU 
5RVHQEHUJDQG+RYODQG(DJO\DQG&KDLNHQ7KH³VHSDUDWHHQWLWLHV´YLHZ
agrees that these three components are the ones that predispose behaviour, but holds 
that they are distinct, separate entities that may or may not be related, depending on the 
SDUWLFXODUVLWXDWLRQDQG WKDW WKH WHUP³DWWLWXGH´VKRXOGEHXVHGRQO\IRU WKHDIIHFWLYH
component or dimension (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Petty and Cacioppo 1982).  
The debate among social psychologists over this issue appears to be more 
empirically than theoretically grounded. Some empirical studies find a high correlation 
 28 
 
 
between the three dimensions, others a low or insignificant one. However, theories of 
inherently innate and unobservable attitudes may of course not only be inferred from 
observed behaviour, but also from logical reasoning. In his Knowledge and Human 
Interest, Jürgen Habermas (1971, cf. Giddens 1985) sets out what may be seen as a 
deductive version of the three elements social psychologists assume to determine 
DWWLWXGHV +HFDOOV WKHVHµNQRZOHGJH-FRQVWLWXWLYHLQWHUHVWV¶HDFKFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRDQ
DVSHFWRIKXPDQUHDOLW\7KHILUVWLVµODERXU¶ZKLFKUHODWHVWRSHRSOHV¶UHODWLRQVKLSWR
their PDWHULDO HQYLURQPHQW DQG WKHLU LQWHUFKDQJHVZLWK QDWXUH µ/DERXU¶SURPRWHV DQ
µLQWHUHVW¶LQSUHGLFWLRQDQGFRQWURORIHYHQWV7KHVHFRQGLVµV\PEROLFLQWHUDFWLRQ¶± the 
communication of individuals with one another. The study of symbolic interaction to 
Habermas ± as to present-day constructivists ± FUHDWHV DQ µLQWHUHVW¶ LQ WKH
understanding of meaning. The third knowledge-FRQVWLWXWLYHLQWHUHVWLVµHPDQFLSDWLRQ¶
from domination ± be it the domination of nature over human life, or the domination of 
some individuals or groups over others. 
Habermas later (1984, 1987) developed his theory of communicative action, 
which has been applied to the study of international relations and European integration 
in the guise of discourse analysis and, normatively, deliberation theory. According to 
Pollack (2005: 387), the deliberatist approach, as popularised by Risse (2000), assumes 
WKHUHDUHWKUHHµORJLFVRIVRFLDODFWLRQ¶7KHWZRILUVWKDYHDOUHDG\EHHQPHQWLRQHGWKH
logic of consequentiality (or utility maximisation) emphasised by rational-choice 
theorists, and the logic of appropriateness (or rule-following behaviour) associated 
with constructivist theory. The third one is a logic of arguing derived largely from 
+DEHUPDV¶VWKHRU\RIFRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQ 
Already Almond and Verba (1963, 1980), in their path-breaking enquiry into 
SROLWLFDO FXOWXUH LGHQWLILHG WKUHH PRGHV RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ RULHQWDWLRQV WR REMHFWV
evaluations, affects, and cognitions. Generally, however, empirically minded political 
scientists have tended to emphasise the evaluative (or utilitarian, instrumental, or 
µVSHFLILF¶ DQG DIIHFWLYH RU HPRWLRQDO LGHRORJLFDO LGHQWLYH RU µGLIIXVH¶
µFRPSRQHQWV¶ RI DWWLWXGHV RPLWWLQJ WKH FRJQLWLYH RQH (DVWRQ   SRVLWV D
dichotomy of diffuse (affective) and specific (utilitarian) support for political 
  
 
29 
institutions. March and Olsen (e.g. 1989, 1998; Olsen 2007) created the related twin 
WHUPVRIµORJLFRIDSSURSULDWHQHVV¶DIIHFWLYHLGHDWLRQDODQGµORJLFRIFRQVHTXHQWLDOLW\¶
(instrumental/utilitarian). Similarly, the notions of identive and utilitarian power are 
FHQWUDOLQ(W]LRQL¶VGLVFXVVLRQRISROLWLFDOXQLILFDWLRQ/LQGEHUJDQG6FKHLQJROG
(1970: 40) developed a comparable typology of the basis for pro-European attitudes: 
³8WLOLWDULDQ DQG DIIHFWLYH [support permits] distinctions between support based on 
some perceived and relatively concrete interest (utilitarian) and support which seems to 
indicate a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals 
embodied in the notion of EuropeaQXQLW\DIIHFWLYH´ 
Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1987) also used the concepts of utilitarian and 
affective support when discussing Eurobarometer surveys of attitudes to European 
LQWHJUDWLRQ7ZRRIWKHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQVLQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHJXlar public 
opinion surveys were in fact constructed specifically to measure utilitarian and 
affective support (see Diagram 1 in Chapter 4.2 below). Utilitarian support is measured 
by a question designed to elicit a calculated aSSUDLVDO RI WKH LPPHGLDWH ³FRVWV DQG
EHQHILWV RIPHPEHUVKLS LQ WKH&RPPXQLW\´ DQG DIIHFWLYH RU ³GLIIXVH´ VXSSRUW E\ D
TXHVWLRQ FRQFHUQLQJ DWWLWXGH WR ³JHQHUDO HIIRUWV WRZDUGV XQLWLQJ (XURSH´ ,QJOHKDUW
Rabier and Reif 1987: 141; see also Hewstone 1986; Gabel 1995; Niedermayer and 
Sinnott 1995). However, in reality the correlation between the two variables is high 
(Nedrebø 1986).  
I for my part basically share the three-partite view of social psychologists as well 
as of Habermas and Risse. However, I think it is necessary to separate analytically 
EHWZHHQ KRZ LQGLYLGXDOV UHODWH WR WKH µH[WHUQDO¶ ZRUOG ± to nature and to other 
individuals ± DQGWKHµLQWHUQDO¶ZRUNLQJRIWKHPLQG,WLVSULPDULO\WKHWZRILUVWSRLQWV
WKDW FRQFHUQ XV KHUH DWWLWXGH WR DQ µH[WHUQDO¶ LVVXH WKDW KDV ERWK DPDWHULDO DQG DQ
LGHDWLRQDOGLPHQVLRQ$GDSWLQJ0DQQ¶VQRWLRQRIIRXUVRXUFHVRIVRFLDOSRZHU,ZLOO
KHQFH FDOO WKH WZR EDVLF DWWLWXGLQDO µVRXUFHV¶ RI (XURSHDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWHUHVW DQG
ideology.  
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µ,QWHUHVW¶ VXEVXPHV 0DQQ¶V SROLWLcal, economic and military sources into one, 
expressing the fundamental desire for integrity, independence and prosperity for 
RQHVHOIDVDQLQGLYLGXDORUIRURQH¶VSUHIHUUHGFROOHFWLYLW\,QWHUHVWLQWKLVVHQVHLVVHOI-
regarding, instrumentalist and rather short-WHUPLVW 7KH µLQWHUHVW¶ RI WKH RUGLQDU\
members of a polity is that it helps provide them with physical protection and 
VXVWHQDQFH VHFXULW\ IRRG VKHOWHU KHDOWK DQG ZHDOWK µ,QWHUHVW¶ DSSUR[LPDWHV WKH
behavioural component of attitudes identified by social psychologists insofar as I 
assume its pursuit to be more immediately action-RULHQWHG WKDQ µLGHRORJ\¶ ,W LV DOVR
this action-oriented interest to predict and control the material world that approximates 
LW WR +DEHUPDV¶ QRWLRQ RI µODERXU¶ $V ZH Zill see, in the context of European 
LQWHJUDWLRQ D SUHGRPLQDQW µLQWHUHVW¶ RI ERWK VWDWHV DQG LQGLYLGXDOV LV HFRQRPLF7KH
VLJQLILFDQFH RI µLQWHUHVW¶ LQ WKH SUHVHQW FRQWH[W LV IXUWKHU GLVFXVVHG LQ &KDSWHU 2.2 
below. 
The self-regarding pursuit of individual or collective interest is a central tenet of 
the national-liberal paradigm of politics and of rational choice theory. Machiavelli and 
Hobbes are usually considered its main theorists, but already Aristotle acknowledged 
that men are by nature primarily self-interested and that what they take to be their 
interest are wealth and glory. However, in contrast to Hobbes and his successors, 
Machiavelli, like Aristotle and all ancient, medieval and Renaissance political thinkers 
in between did not see individuals as calculating and pursuing utility maximisation in 
atomistic isolation. They in fact described humans as inclined by their very nature to 
live in societies and to pursue not only their own, but also the common interest 
(Coleman 2000b: 253).  
:KHUHDV,ZLOOSODFHµLQWHUHVW¶PDLQO\LQWKHPDWHULDOUHDOP,ZLOOXVHµLGHRORJ\¶
in the present context to denote shared systems of doctrines, ideas, ideals, beliefs, 
values, norms, etc. about how humans should organise and make decisions 
FROOHFWLYHO\ µ,GHRORJ\¶ KHUH WKXV LPSOLHV SROLWLFDO LGHRORJ\ DQG LQIOXHQFHV QRW RQO\
how individuals pursue their material interest but also what objectives they pursue, 
how they interpret information, and which ideas of right and wrong they have. 
Ideology inevitably has an important historical, and usually also a territorial, 
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GLPHQVLRQ ,GHRORJ\ DSSUR[LPDWHV WKH µDIIHFWLYH¶ FRPSRQHQW DVVXPHG E\ VRFLDO
SV\FKRORJLVWVDQGE\+DEHUPDV¶QRWLRQRIµV\PEROLF LQWHUDFWLRQ¶DQGWKHµQRUPDWLYH¶
variety of institutionalism. The significance of ideology in the present context is further 
explored in Chapter 2.3 below.6 
+RZHYHU LI µLQWHUHVW¶ DQG µLGHRORJ\¶ DQG WKXV DWWLWXGHV LQ JHQHUDO DUH QRW WR
appear static and if we are to fully understand peaceful, long-term political change 
such as European Union-building, I submit that we need the concept of learning. 
Learning may be defined as change of attitudes and behaviour as a result of individual 
or collective experience and insight. It thus subsumes both individual and social 
learning. The significance of learning in the present context is further explored in 
Chapter 2.4 below.  
2.2 Interest 
The behaviouralist turn in political science entailed greatly increased focus on the 
economic or material interest component of attitudes. Much rational choice theory is 
still premised on it. According to this logic, people support political candidates, causes, 
parties, institutions, etc. that best meet their material interests on the basis of a constant 
calculation of individual or collective utility. Similarly, territorial integrity, political 
independence, national prestige, and economic and commercial advantage are assumed 
to be the primary national interests pursued by the modern state.  
The international relations theories of Realism and Liberalism both assign a 
primary role to the pursuit of material interest. The state-centred logic of Realists 
obviously focuses on state interests. By implication, as regards individual attitudes, 
5HDOLVPZRXOGJLYHSULPDF\ WRFLWL]HQV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ WKHLUVWDWH¶VUROH LQDVVXULQJWKHLU
survival and safety. Realists see human beings as basically egoistic and the world as 
                                              
 
 
6 +RZHYHU , UHDOLVH WKDW LW LVQRWSRVVLEOH WRPDNHDQDEVROXWHDQGXQLYHUVDOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµLQWHUHVW¶DQGµLGHRORJ\¶
Which interests individuals and collectivities pursue, and how they pursue them, are to varying extents ideologically and 
culturally determined, as well as influenced by social and temporal context. Still, I submit that a distinction is valid and 
fruitful in the relatively homogeneic context of modern Europe. 
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inherently divided into separate political communities (nation-states), each seeking to 
maximise its independence, power and prosperity. International relations according to 
Realism are therefore conflict-prone. Change mainly takes place as a result of war or 
serious crisis.  
Classical Liberalism puts greater emphasis on individuals¶DQGJURXSV¶ LQWHUHVWV
ZLWKLQ DQG EHWZHHQ VWDWHV WKDQ VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV YLV-à-vis other states. Their primary 
interests are assumed to be peace and economic wellbeing. The fundamental boundary 
between domestic and international politics posited by Realists is thus blurred, and the 
importance of the state as actor correspondingly diminished. In contrast to international 
power, the international pursuit of peace and economic advantage is not seen as a zero-
sum game. Liberal IR theorists stress that free trade, international co-operation, law, 
and institutions may enhance the welfare of everyone.  They therefore also tend to 
stress common international interests and interdependence. On this basis they think 
peaceful international change for the better is possible.   
The difference between the integration theory offshoots of these two strands of 
international relations theory, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is similar. 
Intergovernmentalists have traditionally assumed that territorial integrity and political 
independence are the main interests at the aggregate level of the state, which is the 
level that really matters for integration. The state is assumed to be the main actor as far 
as interest formulation, bargaining, and outcomes are concerned. At the secondary 
level of individual attitudes, intergovernmentalists tend to regard historically and 
socially shaped national identity, or nationality, as the best predictor of Europeanism.  
In recent European integration studies, intergovernmentalists such as Alan 
Milward (1984, 1992) and Andrew Moravcsik (1998) have assigned particular 
significance to national economic interest. The self-VW\OHG µOLEHUDO
LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVW¶0RUDYFVLNDUJXHV 
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My central claim is that the broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect 
three factors: patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of 
important governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate 
commitments. Most fundamental of these were commercial interest. European 
integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders 
who consistently pursued economic interests ± primarily the commercial interests 
of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macro-economic 
preferences of ruling governmental coalitions ± that evolved slowly in response 
to structural incentives in the global economy. (Moravcsik 1998: 3)  
Neo-functionalist integration theory, as liberal international relations theory, 
assigns real influence to individuals, non-governmental organisations and transnational 
institutions and corporations as agents. The authors saw European integration as an 
aspect of general, mainly economy-driven modernisation (Rosamond 2000: 31-42). As 
a result, they expected group and elite loyalties to be transferred from national to 
supranational institutions, and similar shifts among mass publics (Lodge 1978; 
Rosamond 2000: 60, 66). Integration was assumed automatically to advance as 
individual and group welfare became increasingly dependent on a transnational 
HFRQRP\0DWHULDOLQWHUHVWZDVWKHGULYLQJIRUFH³3HUKDSVWKHPRVWVDOLHQWFRQFOXVLRQ
we can draw from the community-building experiment is the fact that major interest 
groups as well as politicians determine their support of or opposition to, new central 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSROLFLHVRQWKHEDVLVRIDFDOFXODWLRQRIDGYDQWDJH´+DDV[[[LY 
After the initial take-RIILQWHJUDWLRQZDVDVVXPHGWRµVSLOORYHU¶IURPRQHSROLF\
sector to another through a process of more or less unintended consequences, helped 
by European institutions, particularly the European Commission, and by business, trade 
XQLRQVDQGRWKHULQWHUHVWJURXSV+DDVIDPRXVO\SRVWXODWHGWKDW³LWLVDVLPSUDFWLFDEOH
as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion and aWWLWXGHVXUYH\V´WR
explain integration (Haas 1958: 17). Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 41-42) 
introduced the influential neofunctionalist notion that technocratic elites could operate 
LQ DQ HQYLURQPHQW RI µSHUPLVVLYH FRQVHQVXV¶  7KLV QHJOHFW RI QDWLRQDO ideology, 
identity and public opinion in the member states was probably the greatest weakness of 
neofunctionalist theory and the main reason why its determinist assumptions have been 
abandoned.  
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A third traditional approach to European integration, federalism, generally also 
proceeds from the assumption of rational, self-interested actors and, like 
intergovernmentalist theory, expects states to be inherently opposed to ceding 
sovereignty. A founder and long-time leading figure of the European federalist 
movement, Altiero Spinelli, held national bureaucracies, and particularly diplomats, to 
be the natural enemies of European federation, as they would lose power and prestige 
if decision-making was moved to a new centre (Pistone 1990; Menéndez 2007). 
However, he expected those who do not hold permanent national power ± elected 
governments, political parties, non-governmental organisations, ordinary citizens, etc. 
± to be far more open to what to him were eminently sensible arguments in favour of 
federation. What was required to take the leap, was a dedicated federalist movement 
DQG IHGHUDOLVW LQGLYLGXDOV LQ NH\ SRVLWLRQV WKDW LQPRPHQWV RI FULVLV µFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
PRPHQWV¶FRXOGSRLQWRXWWRVXFKDFWRUV³WKDWWKHQDWLRQDOVWDWHVKDYHORVWWKHLUSURSHU
rights sincHWKH\FDQQRWJXDUDQWHH WKHSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFVDIHW\RIWKHLUFLWL]HQV´
(Spinelli 1972: 68).  
Thus federalists, like neofunctionalists, assumed (or hoped) that society-based 
interests would ultimately override national-bureaucratic interests in Union-building. 
However, federalists were less optimistic than neofunctionalists about integration as a 
side-effect of general social modernisation and more optimistic than 
intergovernmentalists about the influence and rationality of civil society vis-à-vis 
entrenched national power structures. Federalists thus accepted that national ideology 
and identity may militate against integration, but trusted that individual attitudes may 
become more favourable, at least in propitious circumstances. In fact, they arguably 
advocated federation exactly because it represents a compromise between reason and 
emotion; (common) material interest and (separate) national identity; unity and 
diversity (Pinder 1991; Sbragia 1992). 
In a constructivist or poststructuralist perspective, it can be argued that all these 
three traditional approaches are influenced by the territorial origin of their main 
proponents.  Intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists tend to be Northern 
Europeans and/or Anglo-Americans working within the national-liberal paradigm, the 
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former stressing the national element, the latter the liberal. The main proponents of 
federalism tend to be continental and southern Europeans, most unequivocally Italians 
such as Pistone and Spinelli, influenced by the universalist and cosmopolitan traditions 
prevalent there. 
2.3 Ideology  
Andrew Heywood defines ideology as  
a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organised political 
action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing 
system of power. All ideologies therefore (a) offer an account of the existing 
RUGHUXVXDOO\LQWKHIRUPRIDµZRUOGYLHZ¶ESURYLGHWKHPRGHORIDGHVLUHG
IXWXUHDYLVLRQRIWKHµJRRGVRFLHW\¶DQGFRXWOLQHKRZSROLWLFDOFKDQJHFDQ
and should be brought about. (Heywood 1998: 12)  
The polity-ideas I outlined in Figure 1 (see above, page 11) with reference to 
sovereignty approximate this definition. In a poststructuralist, discourse-analytical 
perspective, ideology is closely related to identity and other social, cultural and 
historical contexts. Both intergovernmentalists and federalists explicitly or implicitly 
highlight the importance of national identity, national political culture and public 
opinion in shaping attitudes to European polity-building. Stanley Hoffmann, a founder 
of intergovernmentalism, criticised neofunctionalists for failing to locate the forces of 
integration within a proper historical context (Hoffmann 1964: 85).  
More recently, perhaps inspired by constructLYLVWV¶UHGLVFRYHU\RIWKHUROHSOD\HG
E\ LGHDVDQG LGHQWLW\+RIIPDQQKDVGHVFULEHGVWDWH LQWHUHVWVDV³FRQVWUXFWV LQZKLFK
ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all 
SOD\ D UROH´ +RIIPDQQ  TXRWHG E\5RVamond 2000: 76). However, Charles 
Pentland, musing on the shortcomings of neofunctionalism, already in the early 1970s 
singled out variables related to culture, history and geography as meriting special 
DWWHQWLRQDVµEDFNJURXQGSUHFRQGLWLRQV¶WR(XURSHDQLntegration. In what he called the 
µDWWLWXGLQDO GLPHQVLRQ¶ WKH LPSRUWDQW EDFNJURXQG SUHFRQGLWLRQV DUH VKDUHG FXOWXUDO
traits and the compatibility of the major values of groups in the system:   
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Cultural traits in this case have to do with the religious, literary and mythical 
traditions prevalent in the system, as perpetuated or evolved in practices of 
upbringing, education and socialisation. The more ephemeral value-systems 
represented in ideologies and in patterns of social and economic motivation (such 
as WKHµ3URWHVWDQWHWKLF¶RUWKHµQHHGIRUDFKLHYHPHQW¶PXVWDOVREHFRQVLGHUHG
KHUH1HRIXQFWLRQDOLVWDVVHUWLRQVDERXWWKHLUUHOHYDQFHRIµRSHUDWLYHP\WKV¶RID
tradition of European unity stretching back to and beyond the Carolingian era, 
may be somewhat premature; in addition, ideology and myth seem to have played 
some part in integration schemes elsewhere.7 (Pentland 1973: 213-214; footnote 
added)  
5HJDUGLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO FKRLFHV IRU (XURSH HYHQ WKH µOLEHUDO
LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVW¶0RUDYFVLN OHWV WUDQVSLUH that ideology may in fact be the most 
important reason for what makes the EU institutionally unique relative to (other) 
international regimes, namely its degree of supranationality. For instance, in the 
negotiations of what became the Maastricht treaty, although according to Moravcsik 
national economic interests were generally decisive,  
ideology appears to have played a particular role in areas with no immediate 
economic implications, such as co-decision for the European Parliament and co-
operation in forHLJQDQGGHIHQFHSROLF\>«@(XURSHDQIHGHUDOLGHDVDQGWKHLU
nationalist counterparts appear to have been responsible for general national 
tendencies for or against integration, which created, at the very least, considerable 
leads and lags. (Moravcsik 1998: 439; see also Chapter 4.1 below)  
In a later article on the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty, Moravcsik and 
1LFRODwGHV FRQILUP WKDW ³>Z@KHUH VXEVWDQWLYH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI D FKRLFH DUH KLJKO\
uncertain, as for example in assigning powers to the European Parliament (EP), 
QDWLRQDOSUHIHUHQFHVDUH OHVVSUHGLFWDEOHRUPRUHGHSHQGHQWRQLGHRORJ\´0RUDYFVLN
and Nicolaïdes 1999: 61).  
Whereas the state-centred logic of Realist international relations theory puts a 
premium on national identity, comparativists and sociologists are more open-minded as 
to which social identity is most relevant to attitudes and policies in which specific 
context. Rokkan stresses that national identity is only one among a number of identities 
                                              
 
 
7 A reference to Pan-Africanism and East African integration. 
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a person can KDYH³,QGLYLGXDOVFDQSRVVHVVPRUHWKDQRQHLGHQWLW\DQGVHYHUDOOD\HUV
of identity can exist within a single territorial system: whether these multiple identities 
are benign or antagonistic depends in each instance upon the particular concatenation 
of eYHQWV SROLFLHV DQG WUHQGV´ 5RNNDQ   7KH KLVWRULDQ (ULF +REVEDZP
concurs:  
>«:@HFDQQRWDVVXPHWKDWIRUPRVWSHRSOHQDWLRQDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQ- when it 
exists ± excludes, or is always or ever superior, to the remainder of the set of 
identifications which constitute the social being. In fact it is always combined 
with identifications of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior to them. 
>«1@DWLRQDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQDQGZKDWLWLVEHOLHYHGWRLPSO\FDQFKDQJHDQGVKLIW
in time, even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgement this is the area 
of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed 
today.  (Hobsbawm 1992: 11) 
After the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the implosion 
of Yugoslavia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, identity ± national, ethnic, 
religious or otherwise ± regained currency in public and academic debate. The rise of 
constructivism in political science combined with the resurgence of nationalism in 
Europe led to a sharp increase in the study of national identity, nations and nationalism. 
With the draft Maastricht treaty, identity also took centre stage in the debate over 
European integration, where it has remained since. However, I prefer to use the notion 
RI µLGHRORJ\¶ UDWKHU WKDQµLGHQWLW\¶EHFDXVHRI WKH ODWWHU¶VFRQQRWDWLRQRISDVVLYLW\RQ
WKH SDUW RI WKH DJHQW )RFXVLQJ RQ LGHRORJ\ UDWKHU WKDQ LGHQWLW\ KLJKOLJKWV 0DQQ¶V
FRQFHSWRIKXPDQQDWXUHDV³UHVWOHVVSXUSRVLYHDQGUDWLRQDO´0DQQDQGDOVR
accommodates my emphasis on learning (see Chapter 2.4 below). 
An important issue in recent debate over European integration has turned out to 
be whether there can be a European demos that can legitimise the European Union like 
tKH µQDWLRQ¶ OHJLWLPLVHV WKH QDWLRQ-state. The sociologist Anthony D. Smith made a 
VLJQLILFDQW HDUO\ FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ +DYLQJ VHDUFKHG IRU µVSHFLILFDOO\
(XURSHDQFKDUDFWHULVWLFVTXDOLWLHVDQGH[SHULHQFHV¶ LQ(XURSHDQKLVWRU\KHJORRPLO\
conFOXGHGWKDWFRPSDUHGWRQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\³µ(XURSH¶LVGHILFLHQWERWKDVLGHDDQG
as process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past ± DµSUH-KLVWRU\¶ZKLFKFDQSURYLGHLW
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with emotional sustenance and historical depth. In these terms it singularly fails to 
combine, in the words of Daniel Bell à propos HWKQLFLW\ µDIIHFW ZLWK LQWHUHVW¶
UHVHPEOLQJ UDWKHU 6KHOOH\¶V EULJKW UHDVRQ µOLNH WKH VXQ IURP D ZLQWU\ VN\¶´ 6PLWK
1992: 62).  
6LJQLILFDQWO\ KRZHYHU 6PLWK DGGV WKH LGHD RI µSDUWLDOO\ VKDUHG WUDGLWLRQV and 
KHULWDJHV¶ 
On the other hand, there are shared traditions, legal and political, and shared 
heritages, religious and cultural.  Not all Europeans share in all of them; some 
share in particular traditions and heritages only minimally.  But at one time or 
DQRWKHUDOO(XURSH¶VFRPPXQLWLHVKDYHSDUWLFLSDWHGLQDWOHDVWVRPHRIWKHVH
traditions and heritages, in some degree. [These] partially shared traditions and 
heritages [....] include traditions like Roman law, political democracy, 
parliamentary institutions, and Judeo-Christian ethics, and cultural heritages like 
Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism, and romanticism and 
FODVVLFLVP7RJHWKHUWKH\FRQVWLWXWHQRWDµXQLW\LQGLYHUVLW\¶- the official 
European cultural formula - EXWDµIDPLO\RI FXOWXUHV¶PDGHXSRISDUWLDOO\VKDUHG
historical traditions and cultural heritages. [.....] What now needs to be 
established is how far those shared traditions and heritages have become part of 
HDFKRI(XURSH¶VQDWLRQDOLGHQWLWLHVKRZIDUHDFKQDWLRQDOWradition has embraced 
DQGDVVLPLODWHGWKHVHµWUDQV-(XURSHDQ¶FXOWXUDOKHULWDJHV6PLWK 
$V LI IROORZLQJ 6PLWK¶V VXJJHVWLRQ 7HLMD 7LLOLNDLQHQ  GLVWLQJXLVKHV
between three modern European political ideologies, cultures or traditions that each 
KDV KDG VLQJXODU FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKHLU DGKHUHQWV¶ DWWLWXGHV WR (XURSHDQ XQLRQ-
EXLOGLQJ 7KHVH DUH ³&DOYLQLVW LQGLYLGXDOLVP´ ³/XWKHUDQ VWDWH-FHQWULVP´ DQG
³&RXQWHU-5HIRUPDWLRQ&DWKROLFFRPPXQLWDULDQLVP´7LLOLNDLQHQWKXVJLYHVSULPDF\WR
religious confession as an explanatory variable: 
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7KH&DWKROLFSROLWLFDOWUDGLWLRQLV>«@GXHWRLWVGRFWULQHRI&KULVWLDQ
communitarianism, the original tradition of European unification, the tradition in 
which the idea of Europe as a federation originates. Protestant doctrines carried a 
different conception of Europe that originated in the denial of Christianity as a 
political community. Both the Calvinist and the Lutheran doctrines were based 
upon the State as the ultimate political community. The Calvinist tradition, 
bringing about the individualist conception of the State was, however, more 
internationally oriented as relations between States were conceptualised on the 
same model as relations between individuals provided with the same capacity of 
co-operation. The Calvinist tradition approached Europe through a position of 
liberal internationalism. Europe did not constitute the core political framework of 
liberal plans as it did in Catholic plans. It appeared, however, as a suitable first 
stage in liberal projects aiming at a universal peace, democracy or a market 
economy. Lutheranism, which conjured up a State-centric political tradition, is of 
all the three traditions doctrinally the most distant from the idea of a united 
Europe. From its point of view, the idea of European unification appears just as 
one political instrument to reinforce the power of the State. (Tiilikainen 1998: 56-
57) 
As I have indicated and will further argue in the historical discussion below (see 
Part 3), I certainly agree that religiously inspired ideologies have influenced the variety 
of Europeanism in Europe (see also Fraser, Nelsen and Guth 1997). However, I 
contend that Tiilikainen and other advocates of similar tripartite classifications (Bull 
1977; Wight 1991, cf. Knutsen 1997: 252) fail to locate the traditions they identify in 
their proper territorial and historical context, and not least to explore their important 
pre-modern background. Also the theoretical basis and implications of such ideas need 
to be clarified.  
Approaching the European Union as a case of polity-building suggests comparing 
Europe to a national territory, Europeanness to national identity, and Europeanism to 
nationalism.8 As Gerald Delanty argues, there is no difference in principle between the 
µFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ RI (XURSHDQ LGHQWLW\ DQG WKH µFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ RI D QDWLRQDO µLPDJLQHG
FRPPXQLW\¶'HODQW\YLLL 
                                              
 
 
8 However keeping in mind that in contrast to nationalism, the most common variety of Europeanism, federalism, favours 
sharing sovereignty among territorial levels, not monopolizing it at one level. 
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6XFKFRPSDULVRQVKRZHYHUUHTXLUHDFORVHUGHILQLWLRQRIµQDWLRQ¶,IZHWDNHWKH
demanding one of Anthony D. Smith, one of the most prolific contributors to the 
DFDGHPLFGHEDWHRYHUQDWLRQDOLVPDQDWLRQLV³DQDPHGKXPDQSRSXODWLRQVKDULQJDQ
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
FRPPRQHFRQRP\DQGFRPPRQOHJDOULJKWVDQGGXWLHVIRUDOOPHPEHUV´6PLWK
14).  
Even if such a definition of the nation in reality presupposes the existence of a 
complementary state and thus raises the highly pertinent problem of the chicken and 
the egg, the European Union is arguably to some extent approaching even these strict 
criteULD WRGD\ (FRQRPLF DQG 0RQHWDU\ 8QLRQ WKH µIRXU IUHHGRPV¶ RI WKH LQWHUQDO
market, common competition rules, the Social Charter, the Charter of Fundamental 
5LJKWV HWF DUH FRQVLGHUDEOH VWHSV WRZDUGV ³D FRPPRQ HFRQRP\ DQG FRPPRQ OHJDO
rights and duties foU DOO PHPEHUV´ 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\ LQ WKH FXUUHQW FRQWH[W WKH
FULWHULRQRI³DQDPHGKXPDQSRSXODWLRQVKDULQJDQKLVWRULFWHUULWRU\FRPPRQP\WKV
DQG KLVWRULFDOPHPRULHV´ LV DUJXDEO\ DOVR WR DQ H[WHQWPHW DVZHZLOO VHH LQ3DUW 
below.  
However, I submit that the near-hegemony of the national-liberal paradigm has 
led to a great underestimation of the real strength of Europeanness relative to national 
identity. More precisely, it is seldom realised today to what extent European and 
national identity are interwoven and interdependent (see however Risse 2004). In this 
regard, I agree with José Ortega y Gasset: 
If we were to take an inventory of our mental stock to-day ± opinions, standards, 
desires, assumptions ± we should discover that the greater part of it does not 
come to the Frenchman from France, or to the Spaniard from Spain, but from the 
common European stock. To-day, in fact, we are more influenced by what is 
European in us than by what is special to us as Frenchmen, Spaniards, and so on. 
If we were to make in imagination the experiment of limiting ourselves to living 
E\ZKDWLV¶QDWLRQDO¶LQXVDQGLILQIDQF\ZHFRXOGGHSULYHWKHDYHUDJH
Frenchman of all that he uses, thinks, feels, by reason of the influence of other 
sections of the Continent, he would be terror-stricken at the result.  He would see 
that it was not possible to live merely on his own; that four-fifths of his spiritual 
wealth is the common property of Europe (Ortega y Gasset 1932: 180.) 
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The point will be elaborated in Part 3 below. The problem is of course for 
Europeans to be aware of and to accept how fundamental their European identity is, 
and, even if they do, to draw any operational conclusions from that realisation 
regarding European union. Put in Marxian terms, there is a gap between objective and 
VXEMHFWLYH(XURSHDQQHVV7KHFOHDUO\PRVWFKDOOHQJLQJRI6PLWK¶VFULWHULDIRUWKH(8WR 
PHHWLVLQGHHGWKDWRIDVXEMHFWLYHO\IHOW³PDVVSXEOLFFXOWXUH´WKHODFNRIDFRPPRQ
language being the major deficiency usually cited. According to national-liberal 
discourse, this fundamental shortcoming means that Europeanness and Europeanism 
are actually and necessarily elite phenomena, that the politically relevant identity must 
and should remain the national one, and that to establish democratic legitimacy for the 
European Union is thus inherently impossible. Any shift of sovereignty from the 
nation-state to supranational bodies must on this view entail a net loss of democracy.   
To this a number of counter-arguments may be fielded. From an empirical point 
of view, most students of the rise of the nation-state agree that it was usually a political 
creation from the top down. National movements were mobilised and led by 
intellectual elites, who, in conjunction with state-builders and the predominant social 
FODVV RU FODVVHV RU µHOLWHV¶ KHOSHGPDNH µQDWLRQV¶RXWRISUH-existing, more vaguely 
national identities. This was the point of the famous nineteenth-century injunction: 
³:HKDYHPDGH,WDO\QRZZHPXVWPDNH,WDOLDQV´ 9 Moreover, in some cases, notably 
in France and Italy, the national elite imposed a language standard from the centre. In 
others, notably Switzerland, a distinct and cohesive national identity developed across 
VHYHUDO ODQJXDJH FRPPXQLWLHV 0RUHRYHU DGYRFDWHV RI µLQWHJUDWLRQ WKURugh 
GHOLEHUDWLRQ¶ HJ +DEHUPDV  :HLOHU  (ULNVHQ DQG )RVVXP HGV 
Risse 2000) hold that a cultural, national, ethnic, racial, etc. community should not be 
seen as a precondition for a working European democracy at all. Rather than on 
exclusivist, totalising identity, a European demos must be based on common ethical 
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and civic norms arrived at as a result of rational public deliberation across Europe. An 
expanding literature on cosmopolitanism is arguing similarly regarding globalisation. 
However that may be, in Part 3 below I will limit myself, as part of the historical 
discussion, to try to delineate the history of Europeanness and Europeanism in Europe 
as two interrelated, but separate phenomena. I will argue that Europeanness and 
EuropeanLVP DUH µSDUWLDOO\ VKDUHG WUDGLWLRQV DQG KHULWDJHV¶ ZKRVH VWUHQJWK YDULHV
across territorial Europe for specific historical reasons. At the most elementary level, 
Europeanness is a social identity whose salience is determined by the strength of 
common attributes, values or other signifiers, by who is seen as the most important 
µ2WKHU¶ DQG WKH LPSRUWDQFH DWWDFKHG RI WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ IURP WKH µ2WKHU¶ VHH HJ
Delanty 1995; Neumann 1998). This varies over time according to changing political, 
economic, cultural etc. context, including not least the level of perceived external 
threat. I will discuss how Europeans have tried to collectively differentiate themselves 
from outsiders and what shared traditions and heritages they identify with. By contrast, 
I define Europeanism as an ideology favouring supranational European union, with 
federalism as the most specific version. A sense of European identity is a necessary, 
but not sufficient precondition for an individual to be an Europeanist. Europeanism is a 
distinct phenomenon that requires additional explanation. 
$V , ZLOO GHPRQVWUDWH LQ 3DUW  (XURSH¶V SDVW DERXQGV LQ SHRSOH HYHQWV DQG
artefacts (statesmen, philosophers, authors, composers, artists, scientists; monuments, 
cities, architectural objects, pieces of art, books, inventions; battles, revolutions; etc.) 
that demonstrate the unity, or at least organicity, of her development. As Ortega y 
*DVVHWDUJXHGLWLVGLIILFXOWWRWKLQNRIWUDLWVRIQDWLRQDOµLGHQWLW\¶WKDWDUHQRWLQVRPH
sense related to common European or indeed global experiences and traditions rather 
than exclusively national ones. Europeanness is thus arguably more of a cultural,  
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
9 Often attribuWHG WR 0DVVLPR G¶$]HJOLR EXW DFFRUGLQJ WR G¶$SSRORQLD   DFWXDOO\ SURQRXQFHG E\ WKH ,WDOLDQ
minister of public instruction, Ferdinando Martino, in 1896. 
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ideological and even intellectual phenomenon to Europeans than a question of identity. 
It is not only a way of life, but also a way of thinking. In this sense Europeanness is not 
a secondary identity, but prior to national identities, which are embedded in it as 
variations on a common theme.  
I would argue that the main reason why most Europeans subjectively feel more 
national than European today is the centuries-old fact of political disunity, i.e. the 
fragmentation of modern Europe into nominally sovereign nation-states with national 
µPDVV SXEOLF FXOWXUHV¶ JHQHUDOO\ EDVHG RQ D VLQJOH ODQJXDJH 3ROLWLFDO GLVXQLW\
explains why conscious Europeanness ± the awareness of a common identity based on 
shared traditions and heritages ± and partly therefore also active Europeanism have 
UHPDLQHG µHOLWLVW¶ SKHQRPHQRQD$V6PLWK VXJJHVWV XVXDOO\ WRGD\ WKH QDWLRQ-state is 
simply too structurally/mentally entrenched to be much affected by cursory appeals to 
European identity or by rationalist arguments for European Union.  
I will discuss Europeanness and Europeanism further in the introduction to Part 1. 
The importance of territorial location for these two phenomena is discussed below, in 
Chapter 2.5. 
2.4 Learning 
Interest and ideology alone are static notions, unable to explain attitudinal and 
institutional change. Individual and collective learning is a major factor, if obviously 
not the only one, in changing political attitudes, identities and ideologies. In 
democratic societies, institutional change follows to the extent agents manage to 
influence relevant decisions through access to powerful positions; advocacy and 
coalition-building; elections; deliberation in parliaments and other elected political 
bodies; policy development in and among non-elected public institutions; dialogues of 
such institutions with non-governmental organisations and business; etc., etc. 
Lobbying and thus financial strength is obviously part of this, and agents who already 
have power have greater influence than those who do not. Also, media of course 
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greatly impact public discourse. But without going into a lengthy argument, I assume 
democratic deliberation also plays an important part. 
$V , KDYH LQGLFDWHG +DEHUPDVLDQ SURSRQHQWV RI µLQWHJUDWLRQ WKURXJK
GHOLEHUDWLRQ¶VHH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ-EXLOGLQJDVDOHDUQLQJSURFHVV%\³FRPPXQLFDWLRQ
WKURXJK UHDVRQ JLYLQJ´ (Eriksen and Fossum, eds., 2000) citizens involved in 
deliberation on the future of Europe get a growing awareness of common problems and 
interests and change their perception of personal and national interests accordingly. In 
the long run this leads to a decrease of exclusivist national identity and an increase of 
inclusivist European identity. The assumption is that deliberating Europeans learn to be 
Europeanist because that is reasonable. The deliberatist approach to European Union-
building thus relies more on appeals to individual reason and common interest than to 
ideology and common identity. However, just like neofunctionalists, the theorists of 
deliberative integration implicitly deny the possibility that pre-existing Europeanness 
and Europeanism, not just national identity and ideology, may be intervening variables 
that affect attitudes to Union-building.   
The deliberatist theory of communicative action is in effect close to the idea of 
social learning of one of the original integration theorists, Karl W. Deutsch. Deutsch 
studied historical cases of nation-EXLOGLQJDQGGHYHORSHGDµWUDQVDFWLRQDOLVW¶WKHRU\RI
integration in which social learning was a key concept (cf. Rosamond 2000: 42-48). In 
studying the emergence of modern nations, Deutsch began from the proposition  
that both society and community are developed by social learning, and that a 
community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other 
and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and 
services [....] Experience and complementarity may [...] continue to reproduce 
each other, like the proverbial chicken and the egg, in a syndrome of ethnic 
learning, that is, a historical process of social learning in which individuals, 
usually over several generations, learn to become a people. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 
99, 174)  
Deutsch et al. IXUWKHUPRUHGHILQHLQWHJUDWLRQDV³WKHDWWDLQPHQWZLWKLQ
D WHUULWRU\RIDµVHQVHRIFRPPXQLW\¶RI LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHVVWURQJHQRXJKDQG
widespread enough tR DVVXUH IRU D µORQJ¶ WLPH GHSHQGDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQV RI SHDFHIXO
FKDQJH´ 6HQVHRIFRPPXQLW\LV³DPDWWHURIPXWXDOV\PSDWKLHVDQGOR\DOW\RIZH-
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IHHOLQJ¶ WUXVW DQG PXWXDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI SDUWLDO LGHQWLILFDWLRQ LQ WHUPV RI VHOI-
images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviours; and of co-
RSHUDWLYHDFWLRQLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKLW´'HXWVFK2QWKHEDVLVRIHPSLULFDO
analysis, Deutsch found that common values and the development of a distinctive way 
of life have been the most iPSRUWDQW UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU DFKLHYLQJ DQ µDPDOJDPDWHG
VHFXULW\FRPPXQLW\¶XQLRQRUIHGHUDWLRQDPRQJIRUPHUO\LQGHSHQGHQWVWDWHV'HXWVFK
et al. 1957: 104). Interestingly, he also concluded from his historical studies that 
popular participation is the most HIIHFWLYHPHWKRGRISURPRWLQJµDPDOJDPDWLRQ¶ 
'HXWVFKODWHUDUJXHGWKDW³WKHVDPHSURFHVVHVZKLFKPDGHQDWLRQDOLVPSUREDEO\
PD\ VRRQ FRPH WR WXUQ DJDLQVW LW´ 'HXWVFK HW DO   6LPLODUO\ &KDUOHV
Pentland saw no logical reason why social learninJFDQQRW³RSHUDWHWRFUHDWHEURDGHU
SROLWLFDOFRPPXQLWLHVLQWKHIXWXUH>«@&HUWDLQO\WKHJURZWKRIFRPPXQLW\WKURXJK
µVRFLDO OHDUQLQJ¶ ZLOO EH HQKDQFHG E\ FHUWDLQ JHRJUDSKLFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG
SROLWLFDOEDFNJURXQGYDULDEOHV´3HQWODQG).   
These were notions on which also neofunctionalists relied heavily. Haas defined 
LQWHJUDWLRQDV³WKHSURFHVVZKHUHE\SROLWLFDODFWRUVLQVHYHUDOGLVWLQFWQDWLRQDOVHWWLQJV
are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
FHQWUH >«@´ +DDV    +RZHYHU HYHQ +DDV DQG WKH RWKHU QHRIXQFWLRQDOLVW
ZULWHUV FRQFHLYHG RI LQWHJUDWLRQ DV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW SHRSOH ZRXOG OHDUQ ³DUH
SHUVXDGHG´ WR DFFHSW UDWKHU SDVVLYHO\ IURP VFUDWFK DQG IURP µDERYH¶ 6RFLDO
constructivists (e.g. Checkel 2001) make similar assumptions. Again, the basic idea is 
national-liberal: national interests and identities are the preordained, incontestable 
point of departure. 
$OWKRXJKDOVR5RQDOG,QJOHKDUWVXEVFULEHGWRWKLVµEODQNVODWH¶WKHVLVRIEuropean 
identity, he is one of the very few scholars who have explicitly tried to explain the fact 
of territorially varied attitudes to European integration. His neofunctionalist inspiration 
and reliance on Deutschian notions of social learning are evident in his association of 
Europeanism with improved education and communication in modernising societies 
µFRJQLWLYH PRELOLVDWLRQ¶ 7R ,QJOHKDUW WKH SRVW-war generation tends to be post-
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nationalist and therefore Europeanist. In his Silent Revolution (1977) he developed the 
FRQWURYHUVLDOFRQFHSWRIµSRVW-PDWHULDOLVP¶DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKWKHPDWHULDOVHFXULW\RI
post-war Western society affords the younger generations to be more concerned with 
immaterial values such as democracy, quality of life, the environment, peace, European 
integration etc. than previous generations. The low level of European identity in 
Denmark, Greece and Great Britain (in the seventies) was seen to reflect these 
FRXQWULHV¶ EULHI H[SHULHQFH DV(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\PHPEHUV  7KH GHYHORSPHQW of 
Europeanness and Europeanism was thus understood as a question of time, of 
progressive socialisation and of learning to be European. The longer a country had 
been a member of the European Communities, the more Europeanist it was assumed to 
become. The SUR[LPLW\ RI WKH LGHDV RI ,QJOHKDUW DQG WKRVH RI WKH µGHOLEHUDWLVWV¶ LV
obvious. Inglehart makes little attempt to explain Euro-scepticism, preferring simply to 
ODEHOLWµQDWLRQDOLVW¶RUµSDURFKLDO¶ 
Intergovernmentalists do not rule out that reasoning and learning may lead to 
integration, but hold its potential to be limited because of the tenacity of national 
LGHQWLW\ DQG WKH VWUXFWXUDO SRZHU RI WKH VWDWH $V 3HQWODQG REVHUYHV WKH µVRFLDO-
SV\FKRORJLFDO GLPHQVLRQ¶ RI LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVW WKLQNLQJ OLNH+RIIPDQQ¶V VXJJHVWV
³WKDWFKDQJHVLQWKHSROLWLFDODWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXURILQGLYLGXDOVPD\EHFHQWUDOWR
WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D µFRPPXQLW\ RI VWDWHV¶´ 3HQWODQG   %XW XQOLNH /RFNHDQ
neofunctionalists, Hobbesian intergovernmentalists dismiss ± and to my mind rightly 
so ± any determinist notion of inevitable progress towards greater rationality and 
integration.  
Thus many integration theorists recognise the importance of reason and learning 
for attitudes to European Union-building. However, practically all the literature, 
LQFOXGLQJ QHZHU FRQVWUXFWLYLVW µGHOLEHUDWLVW¶ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW FRQWULEXWLRQV KDV D
very shallow historical perspective on the learning process, positing 1945 as its virtual 
µ\HDU]HUR¶)HZLIDQ\WKHRULVWVKDYH\HWVHHQDQHHGWRYenture further back in history 
in order to understand how historically shaped ideas, identities and experiences have 
influenced European Union-building. The exception is Tiilikainen, but she does not 
GHYHORS D µWKHRU\¶ RI LQWHJUDWLRQ DQG LQWHJUDWLRQ WKHRUists have neglected her 
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contribution. Only Ronald Inglehart has directly addressed the puzzle of territorially 
varied attitudes to European integration, but his historical horizon is also very limited. 
2.5 Location 
A brief glance at the map of Europe should suffice to indicate that geographical 
structures may exercise an independent influence on the pattern of attitudes to 
European integration in Europe. There is a mainland core and five or six insular or 
peninsular peripheries: the British Isles (and Iceland), Scandinavia (and Finland), the 
Iberian peninsula, the Italian peninsula, and the Balkan peninsula. In the western part 
of the continent, the Alps constitute a huge barrier between north and south. In eastern 
central Europe the main topographical features are the mountainous ranges in the 
north, west and south protecting the Danube basin. Generally on the continent, there 
are far fewer natural obstacles to east-west communications, at least north of the Alps, 
than to north-south contacts. From east to west, northern continental Europe has hardly 
any natural boundaries at all: the great Northern European Plain stretches unbroken 
from the French Atlantic coast to the Ural Mountains.   
If observing Europe from space, a sociologist from Mars would thus probably not 
have too great difficulty in accepting two propositions at face value: that common 
identity, traditions and heritages would ceteris paribus be strongest in the continental 
core, and that to the extent there were territorial divisions of attitudes to European 
union, they would have developed along north-south lines.  
As we have seen, however, established European integration and international 
relations theories offer few real clues as to the question of how territorial belonging 
affects attitudes to European integration. Only recently have some scholars started 
pointing to the importance of a territorial perspective:  
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[...T]erritory - the political recalibration of geographical space - matters for a full 
understanding of societal and political change and conflict. Territory has three 
dimensions that fuel thick attachments. Territory is social, because independent 
of scale, people inhabit it collectively; political, because groups struggle to 
preserve as well as to enlarge their space; and cultural, because it contains the 
collective memories of its inhabitants. Territory excludes and includes, and it is 
intimately connected to issues of membership, from the macro-level of the 
nation-state to the micro-level of the household. [...] Our approach was informed 
by a collective hunch that territory in all its dimensions, as well as its modern 
iteration - the nation-state - would matter more in accounts of European 
integration and Europeanisation than standard accounts in either the social policy 
or cultural studies literature suggest.  (Berezin and Schain, eds., 2003: vii, x) 
However, even Berezin, Schain et al. do not make any suggestions concerning the 
relationship between Europeanism and territorial context. We therefore still need to 
venture outside European integration studies to find theoretical pointers regarding its 
significance. 
In the political economy or structuralist tradition of international relations theory, 
dependency and Marxist theories (e.g. Gunder Frank 1967; Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 
1989) start from the very observation that territorial units and functional groups have 
structurally determined, diverse and often conflicting identities and interests. On this 
view, international relations is characterised by the structural parasitism of a developed 
core on an under-developed periphery, and politics in general by the dominance of an 
elite over the mass of the people. Moreover, such theories greatly emphasise the 
KLVWRULFDO GLPHQVLRQ  ³7KH UHYROXWLRQLVW DSSURDFK WKULYHVRQKLVWRULFDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQ
For only by understanding the long-term, large-scale forces which have shaped the 
world system is it possible to capture its essential dynamics and, in turn, understand the 
SUHVHQWLQWHUDFWLRQRILWVFRQVWLWXHQWSDUWV´.QXWVHQ 
Writing in a similar, but domestic perspective, the Norwegian sociologist Johan 
Galtung (1964) assumed that individual attitudes to foreign policy issues are a function 
RIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V ORFDWLRQRQDVRFLDOSRVLWLRQVFDOHRSSRVLQJµWRSGRJV¶ZLWKDKLJK
score on the inde[WRµXQGHUGRJV¶ZLWKDORZVFRUH*DOWXQJDVVRFLDWHGµWRSGRJ¶ZLWK
urban, central residence, male sex, high-status profession, high income and education, 
DQGHPSOR\PHQWLQWKHVHFRQGDU\RUWHUWLDU\VHFWRUDQGµXQGHUGRJ¶ZLWKWKHRSSRVLWH
This interpretation thus privileges individual material interest in the formation of 
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attitudes, and the logic of action is rationalist interest-maximising. In this sense, a 
dependency thesis on Europeanism would closely resemble the neofunctionalist one. 
The difference would be that Marx-inspired dependency theorists assume that the 
centre (or elites, or capitalist class) exercises structural hegemony over the periphery 
(or mass, or lower classes), whereas (neo)functionalism is agnostic in this regard.  
The enduring political controversy over Norwegian membership of the European 
Community/Union is probably the reason for the particular preoccupation of 
Norwegian social scientists with the nature of pro- and anti-EU attitudes (see e.g., 
Hellevik and Gleditsch 1977; Jenssen and Valen 1996; Gilljam et al., eds., 1998; cf. 
also Ingebritsen 1998). Probably inspired by the Weberian Rokkan (1966) as much as 
by the Marxian Galtung, Valen (1973, 1981), Bjørklund (1982, 1997) and Jenssen and 
Valen (1996) include not only material interest, but also cultural variables such as 
religiosity (pietism), language standard and attitude to alcohol consumption (the three 
1RUZHJLDQµFRXQWHU-FXOWXUHV¶LQWKHLUDQDO\VHVRIUHODWHGSUREOHPV 
On this basis, it is common to see the European debate in Norway as a centre-
periphery conflict along these dimensions. Thus, although the negative majorities in 
the two EU referenda in Norway have not exactly been overwhelming (in 1972, 53.5 
SHUFHQWYRWHGµQR¶ LQSHUFHQW LW LVZLGHO\DFFHSWHG that they expressed 
peripheral (in both a territorial and a socio-cultural sense) rebellion against a central 
µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ 2SLQLRQ VXUYH\V LQGLFDWH WKDW WKH PDMRULW\ RI WKH OHVV HGXFDWHG
workers, fishermen, farmers, women, young people, rural and peripheral residents, left-
wing socialists, low-church Christians, teetotallers etc. have been against membership. 
The referenda results in Sweden and Finland too indicated that the most fundamental 
public opinion cleavage over EU membership is territorial, running between north and 
south, centre and periphery, capital and province (Gilljam et al., eds., 1998; Ingebritsen 
 50 
 
 
1998: 169-183).10 The implication is again that membership in the Union, and indeed 
integration itself, is a cause of the central elite and/or the economically well-off. 
Stein Rokkan however suggests that this Scandinavian core-periphery pattern 
may be only part of a bigger European picture. To understand why, it is necessary now 
WR H[SODLQ5RNNDQ¶V WKLQNLQJRQ(XURSHDQ VWDWH- and nation-building in more detail. 
Thus we will also delve into a historical discussion that is pursued in much more detail 
in Part 3.  
5RNNDQ¶VDPELWLRXVREMHFWLYHLV³WRLGHQWLI\WKHFUXFLDOYDULDEOHVLQWKHORQJDQG
complex process that led up to the current constellations of territories, economies, and 
SROLWLFDODOLJQPHQWV\VWHPV>LQ(XURSH@´5RNNDQ7KXVKHDLPVQRWRQO\WR
explain the post-1945 political-territorial map of Europe, but also the fundamental 
political issues and cleavages that have structured WKH µPDVVSROLWLFV¶DQG LPSOLFLWO\
the political cultures, of individual European polities. Rokkan is emphatic that any 
analytical history of state- and nation-building in Western Europe must start out from 
µVL[JLYHQV¶ 
                                              
 
 
10 Ingebritsen emphasises economic interest in explaining the north-south/centre-periphery pattern of pro- and 
anti-EU attitudes in Norway, Sweden and Finland, leaving out cultural and ideological variables. However, the 
HPSLULFDOGDWDVKHSUHVHQWVGRQRWTXLWHEHDUWKLVRXW,QGHHGUHJDUGLQJ1RUZD\VKHFRQFHGHVWKDW³LQDSXEOLF
opinion survey conducted in Norway after the November 1994 referendum, loss of sovereignty and independence 
ZHUH WKH WZRPRVW IUHTXHQWO\ YRLFHG REMHFWLRQV WR WKH (&´ ,QJHEULWVHQ  0RUHRYHU ,QJHEULWVHQ¶V
argument (ibid.: 187-189) that there is a basic difference between the (sceptical) EU policies of Denmark, 
Norway and Iceland on the one hand and those of Sweden and Finland (favourable) on the other, is not quite 
convincing. She does not mention that prior to membership negotiations, the Swedish government unilaterally 
declared that it would adopt a final decision on monetary union at a later stage, keeping open the option of not 
joining the EMU after EU membership. In 1997, the Swedish parliament indeed decided not to join EMU, a 
decision that was supported by 56 per cent of the voters in a referendum in 2003. 42 per cent voted against, and 
turnout was 81 per cent. The north-south/centre-periphery antagonism was even more pronounced in 2003 than in 
the referendum on membership in 1994. According to Aylott (2003: 4), the 2003 referendum confirmed that 
³6ZHGHQ LV D (XURVFHSWLFDO FRXQWU\´ 6ZHGLVK SXEOLF RSLQLRQ OLNH WKDW RI 'HQPDUN DQG1RUZD\ DQG XQOLNH
Finland, has remained considerably more negative to the EU than the EU average (see e.g. Eurobarometer 61, 
spring 2004, Swedish national report, p. 20, for a trend 1999-2004, cf. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/nat_sweden.pdf, accessed 15 September 2009). See also af 
Malmborg 1994; Matlary 2004; and below, page 312. 
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First, the heritage of the Roman Empire, the supremacy of the Emperor, the 
systematisation of legal rules, the idea of citizenship; second, the supraterritorial, 
cross-ethnic organisations of the Catholic Church and its central role in the 
channelling of elite communications during the millennium after the fall of the 
Western Empire; third, the Germanic kingdoms and the traditions of legislative-
judicial assemblies of free heads of families; fourth, the extraordinary revival of 
trade between the Orient, the Mediterranean, and the North Sea after the defeat of 
the Moslems and the consequent growth of a network of independent cities across 
Western Europe from Italy to Flanders and the Baltic; fifth, the development and 
consolidation of feudal and manorial agrarian structures and the consequent 
concentrations of landholdings in important areas of the West; and sixth, and 
finally the emergence of literature in vernacular languages and the gradual 
decline of the dominant medium of cross-ethnic communication, Latin, quite 
particularly after the invention of printing. (Rokkan 1999: 149-150; emphases in 
original) 
2Q WKLV EDVLV 5RNNDQ LGHQWLILHV IRXU ³FUXFLDOO\ LPSRUWDQW´ GLPHQVLRQV LQ WKH
generation of the different systems of territorial control by the emerging modern 
European states.  These dimenVLRQVDURXQGZKLFKKHFRQVWUXFWVKLVµFRQFHSWXDOPDS
RI(XURSH¶DUH 
the geopolitical distance northward, from Rome, the fountainhead of the old 
Empire, the focus of Western Christendom after the Schism of 1054 and the 
symbolic centre for the effort of legal unification through the revival of Roman 
law; the geopolitical distance westwards or eastwards from the central belt of 
trade route cities from Northern Italy to the areas once controlled by the 
Hanseatic League; the concentrations of landholdings and the consequent 
independence or dependence of the peasantry; and the ethnic basis of the early 
efforts of centre-building and the linguistic conditions for early vs. late 
consolidation. (Rokkan 1999: 150) 
2QHSDUWLFXODUYDOXHRI5RNNDQ¶VDSSURDFKLQWKHSUesent context is that he treats 
Europe as an organic whole within which a number of economic, political, and cultural 
structures and agencies interact over time. He does not assign primacy to any one 
VWUXFWXUH RU DJHQF\ QRW RQO\ µQDWLRQDO¶ SROLWLHV RU LQVtitutions interact, but also a 
number of partly autonomous pre-, supra-, trans- and sub-national agents such as 
regions, cities, city leagues, the Roman church, kings, nobles, burghers, peasants, 
workers, etc.:  
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What needs to be emphasised is the multidimensionality of the model: at each 
stage it gives equal weight to economic/technological, political/territorial, and 
cultural/ethnic/religious dimensions. There is no economic determinism in the 
model, nor a geopolitical, nor a cultural: in this sense it seeks to combine the 
WUDGLWLRQVRI.DUO0DU[ZLWKWKRVHRI0D[:HEHUDQG(PLOH'XUNKHLP>«@7KH
central task for systematic macro-history is the analysis of the dynamics of 
interaction between the economic, the political, and the cultural systems: each 
system has its specific rhythm and its specific boundaries but the fate of a 
particular territory and its institutions is determined through processes of 
interaction among the systems across their boundaries. (Rokkan 1999: 140-141)  
6WLOOWKHµGLPHQVLRQV¶RIWLPHDQGVSDFHDUHIXQGDPHQWDOLQ5RNNDQ¶VPRGHODV
they must be in any analysis of social development.  Rokkan particularly emphasises 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIKLVWRULFDOWLPLQJRUWKHRXWFRPHRIZKDWKHFDOOVµFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHV¶
in history ± notably the Reformation and the French Revolution ± for later 
developments. Moreover, he acknowledges that next to time, the natural environment ± 
territory, topology, climate and other structural features of nature, including physical 
distance ± is the most basic constraiQWRQKXPDQOLIH7KLVPHDQVWKDW³>D@Q\DQDO\VLV
of variations among political systems must start from notions of territory. We cannot 
study such variations without looking into the structure of the space over which they 
H[HUWVRPHFRQWURO´5RNNDQ108).  
7KH IDFW WKDW PRVW SROLWLFV KDV WHUULWRULDO DVSHFWV LV WKH EDVLV IRU 5RNNDQ¶V
µFRQFHSWXDOPDSRI(XURSH¶7KHPDSLVVWUXFWXUHGDORQJDQRUWK-south and a west-east 
D[LVZLWKWKHµFLW\EHOW¶DV WKHFHQWUH-piece. According to Rokkan, the west-east axis 
differentiates conditions of state-building, and the south-north axis the conditions of 
nation-EXLOGLQJ5RNNDQGHVFULEHVWKHPDSDV³DVFKHPDWLVHGV\VWHPRIFR-RUGLQDWHV´
JHQHUDWHG WKURXJK WKHFRPELQDWLRQRI WKUHH³SUHFRQGLWLRQYDULDEOHV´± one economic 
³VWUHQJWKVWUXFWXUH RI FLW\ QHWZRUN´ RQH WHUULWRULDO ³JHRSROLWLFDO SRVLWLRQ >RI WKH
SROLW\LQTXHVWLRQ@´DQGRQHFXOWXUDO³RXWFRPHRI5HIRUPDWLRQ´0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\ 
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the west-east axis differentiates the economic resource bases of the state-building 
centres: surpluses from a highly monetised economy in the West, surpluses from 
agricultural labour in the East. The north-south axis measures the conditions for 
rapid cultural integration: the early closing of the borders in the Protestant North, 
the continued supraterritoriality of the Church in the Catholic South. This 
conceptual map reflects the fundamental asymmetry of the geopolitical structure 
of Europe: the dominant city network of the politically fragmented trade belt 
from the Mediterranean toward the north, the strength of the cities in the 
territories consolidated to the seaward side of this belt, the weakness of the cities 
in the territories brought together under the strong military centres on the 
landward marchland. (Rokkan 1999: 144)   
7KHFHQWUDOLW\RIZKDW5RNNDQYDULRXVO\FDOOVWKHµFLW\EHOW¶RUµWUDGHEHOW¶LQWKH
politico-territorial development of Europe appears clearly from these quotations. In 
view of this and our interpretation of European integration as polity-building it is 
VLJQLILFDQW WKDW 5RNNDQ HPEUDFHV.DUO:'HXWVFK¶V REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW µDPDOJDPDWHG
VHFXULW\FRPPXQLWLHV¶VWDWHVWHQGWRJURZDURXQGFRUHDUHDV 
Larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and 
educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength 
around which the integrative process developed. Political amalgamation, in 
particular, usually turned out to be a nuclear process.  It often occurred around 
single cores, as in the case of England, Piedmont, Prussia, and Sweden.  Each of 
WKHVHFDPHWRIRUPWKHFRUHRIDODUJHUDPDOJDPDWHGSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\>«@
Sometimes amalgamation occurred around composite cores, as in the case of the 
Habsburg monarchy [and in Switzerland and the United States] (Deutsch et al. 
1957: 37).  
As I have mentioned, Rokkan in fact himself specifically suggests that the 
(XURSHDQ µFLW\ EHOW¶ LV WKH 'HXWVFKHDQ FRUH RI D (XURSHDQ µDPDOJDPDWHG VHFXULW\
FRPPXQLW\¶ 
It is no accident of history that the Roman Law countries were the ones to take 
the lead [....] in the struggle for a supranational Europe. The conflict over 
extension of the Common Market is very much a conflict between the 
economically cross-cut city belt at the centre and the culturally distinctive 
territorial systems in the peripheries of this Roman Europe. (Rokkan 1999: 167-
168) 
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However, in spite of his European erudition and perspective, national-liberal bias 
FOHDUO\ LQIOXHQFHV5RNNDQ¶VDSSURDFKDQDO\VLVDQGWHUPLQRORJ\7KHSUREOHPKHVHWV
out to explain ± the formation of the sovereign European state ± itself favours a 
teleological narrative. The history of European state- and nation-building is presented 
essentially as a one-way street towards the national-liberal welfare state that 
predominated in western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. Rokkan himself 
SUDFWLFDOO\DGPLWVDVPXFKE\SRVLWLQJIRXU³LGHDO-W\SLFDO´SKDVHVRIVWDWH- and nation-
building: penetration, standardisation, participation and redistribution (Rokkan 1999: 
133). Moreover, he quite uncritically uses the denominations of twentieth century 
SROLWLHV ³'HQPDUN´ ³1RUZD\´ ³,FHODQG´ ³3RODQG´ ³$XVWULD´ ³*HUPDQ\´ HWF DV
units of analysis, even when discussing earlier periods when they were parts of 
multinational, composite polities. A great deal of attention is paid to tiny Luxembourg, 
whereas polities such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg monarchy and the 
2WWRPDQ HPSLUH DUH GLVFRXQWHG DV µIDLOXUHV¶ HYHQZKHQ WKH\ H[LVWHG IRU D WKRXVDQG
years and only disappeared fairly recently.  
When Rokkan does make DSRLQWRI WKH VLJQLILFDQFHRI WKH³LPSHULDOKHULWDJH´
(Roman, Carolingian, and Habsburg) for late modern Europe, it is presented in a 
QHJDWLYH OLJKW DV RQH RI WKUHH ³FUXFLDO´ H[SODQDWRU\ YDULDEOHV LQ WKH EUHDNGRZQ RI
democratisation and growth of fascism in Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain, and Portugal 
(Rokkan 1999: 239 ff).11  Empire is conflated with reactionary repression of small 
QDWLRQVDQGFRQWUDVWHGWRWKHGHPRFUDF\DQGIUHHGRPRIWKHµLGHDO-W\SLFDO¶QDWLRQ-state.  
Furthermore, Anglo-American, national-liberal bias and the fact that he worked 
GXULQJ WKH &ROG:DUPD\ H[SODLQZK\5RNNDQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH ODUJHU UHJLRQV RI
Europe today seems peculiar. Although it is actually placed in the western part of 
JHRJUDSKLFDO(XURSHWKHµFLW\-EHOW¶WDNHVFHQWUe stage, and the rest is either the eastern 
                                              
 
 
11 7KH VHFRQG FUXFLDO YDULDEOHZDV ³WKHgeo-economic peripheralisation of these five polities  brought about by the two 
great waves of capitalist advance, first the restructuring of trade flows in the sixteenth century, second the lags in the spread 
RI LQGXVWULDO WHFKQRORJ\ LQ WKH QLQHWHHQWK´ DQG WKH WKLUG ³WKH VXFFHVVLYH DWWHPSWV WR UH-establish their position in the 
international system through deliberate military/industrial alOLDQFHV´5RNNDQ 
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RU ZHVWHUQ µSHULSKHU\¶ (YHQ 3UXVVLD DQG WKH +DEVEXUJ PRQDUFK\ DUH FODVVLILHG DV
µHDVWHUQ¶ 
Indeed, Rokkan focuses quite exclusively on state- and nation-building in 
Western Europe. He writes a lot about the development of France, Britain, Italy, the 
Benelux and Nordic countries, but little about Central and Eastern Europe ± about 
Imperial Germany as such, the Habsburg monarchy, Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia; even less about Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia; and 
nothing at all about Estonia and Latvia (part of the Soviet Union when he was writing). 
He gives a detailed analysis of the growth of regional and linguistic identities in 
ZHVWHUQ(XURSHHJ$OVDFH/RUUDLQH6DYR\9DOG¶$RVWDWKe Norwegian periphery, 
Schleswig), but says next to nothing about such identities in central and eastern Europe 
(e.g., in Silesia, Galicia, Bukovina, Transylvania, the Banat, individual German 
principalities such as Saxony and Bavaria, even the Tyrol).12   
In a similar national-liberal vein, Rokkan particularly emphasises the importance 
of linguistic mobilisation for nation-EXLOGLQJ DUJXLQJ WKDW ³>Z@KLOH ODQJXDJH LV RQO\
one of several expressions of identity, it is the most pervasive and obvious stigma of 
GLVWLQFWLYHQHVV´ 5RNNDQ   ,Q KLV GHVFULSWLRQ RI QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\
nationalism, his terminology has a clearly national-liberal bias. Examples (from 
5RNNDQHPSKDVLVDGGHGLQFOXGH³German possession of the Danish G\QDVW\´
³FHQWXULHV-old [Norwegian] dependence on Danish FXOWXUH´  ³WKH KLVWRU\ RI WKH
liberation of Norwegian from the Danish LQKHULWDQFH´ ³WKH SROLWLFV RI liberation´
³WKUHDW RI submersion under alien FXOWXUH´ ³Austria and Prussia were rivals for the 
control of the territories of Middle Europe, but derive much of their strength from their 
subjection RIRWKHU ODQJXDJHDUHDV WR WKH(DVW´³7KH%HOJLDQV WKH/X[HPERXUJHRLV
                                              
 
 
12 The reason may be, as Peter Flora suggests, that Rokkan was less conversant with the history of southern, central and 
HDVWHUQ(XURSHWKDQZLWKWKDWRIZHVWHUQDQGQRUWKHUQ(XURSH5RNNDQKLPVHOILQIDFWFRQFHGHVWKDWKLVµPRGHORI(XURSH¶
³GRHVQRWFRYHUWKHZKROHRI(XURSHWRNHHSLWZLWKLQPDQDJHDEOHERXQGVLWFRQFHQWUDWHVRQWKH(XURSHRIWKHCeltic, the 
Latin, and the Germanic SHRSOHV´5RNNDQ 
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and the Swiss simply accepted standards from the outside´³7KH WHUULWRULHVDFTXLUHG
[by Sweden] from Denmark and Norway at the heyday of her imperial SRZHU´ 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG 5RNNDQ¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH 8QLWHG
Kingdom is conspicuous for its failure to mention repressive British policies in Ireland. 
,QVWHDGKHVWDWHVWKDW³,QWKH8QLWHGKingdom the basic attitude to the peripheries was 
PRUHRQHRIEHQLJQQHJOHFWZLWKOLWWOHFRQVFLRXVSROLF\RILQWHJUDWLRQ´5RNNDQ
198).13   
Moreover, national-OLEHUDOPRGHUQLVW ELDVPD\KDYH SOD\HG D UROH LQ5RNNDQ¶V
adoption of the perspective of power-hungry, calculating state-builders in his writings. 
He does not discuss possible independent effects on political events of intellectual 
developments; he leaves out the important subjective and unpredictable dimensions of 
history; and he neglects the social perspective from below. Agents appear as interest-
calculating automatons with socially given identities, not as actors with individual 
personality, will, and reason. States appear to be the result of domestic and 
international struggle for distributive power only, having nothing to do with any quest 
for the common good, for order, justice and meaning. Thus when Rokkan accords 
considerable importance to church and religion, Catholic or Protestant, it is primarily 
in view of their instrumental interest to state- and nation-builders. The emergence of 
nationalism is implied to be an expression of the material interests of the rising 
bourgeoisie, and ethical and ontological problems implied by the rise of nationalism 
are not considered.  
Otherwise it may be noted that Rokkan pays too little attention to international 
power politics as a factor in the emergence and persistence of the European city-belt. 
IR theorists would correctly argue that the relative autonomy of the central European 
cities was very much a result of the search for a European balance of power. The 
                                              
 
 
13 The Kingdom of Ireland merged with the Kingdom of Great Britain to form the United Kingdom through the Act of Union 
in 1800. 
  
 
57 
emerging Great Power nation-VWDWHV RQ WKH µSHULSKHU\¶ KDG D FRPPRQ LQWHUHVW LQ
preventing any one of them from controlling Central Europe, and in keeping  
µ*HUPDQ\¶ IUDJPHQWHG DQG SRZHUOHVV $W Whe same time, as I will argue in Part 3, 
Rokkan as well as IR historians overly discount the Holy Roman Empire as a 
significant political actor in its own right, even after the Peace of Westphalia. 
2.6 Conclusion 
I have indicated that attitudes of individuals and collectivities to political issues 
like European integration reflect their material interests and ideological preferences, 
which are in turn products of, and may be modified by, individual and collective 
learning (in addition to personal idiosyncrasies). A fundamental influence on such 
learning, or socialisation, is territorial-historical context.  
On the basis of this and the wider theoretical discussion above, a tentative answer 
WR WKH UHVHDUFK TXHVWLRQ PD\ EH IRUPXODWHG 7KLV LV WKH µ5RNNDQLDQ-DeutscKLDQ¶
working hypothesis on the territorial distribution of Europeanism in Europe whose 
validity will be considered in the following historical discussion:  
7KH(XURSHDQµFLW\-EHOW¶VWUHWFKLQJURXJKO\IURP&HQWUDO,WDO\WRWKH1RUWK6HD
is the main historical and territorial source of European identity (Europeanness) and 
pro-European attitudes (Europeanism). It is the part of Europe that has been most 
FRQWLQXDOO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHLGHDDQGUHDOLW\RI(XURSHDQXQLW\7KHµFLW\-EHOW¶FRUH
of Europe may thuVEHVHHQ WRSOD\ WKHSDUWRIKRPHEDVHRUµSULPDU\WHUULWRU\¶RID
(XURSHDQµQDWLRQ¶VLPLODUWRWKHUROHRIWKHÌOHGH)UDQFHDVWKHH[SDQGLQJFRUHRIWKH
French nation-state, Leon-Castille in Spain, Savoy-Piemonte in Italy, Prussia in 
Germany, England in Britain etc. The relative proximity of European territories to the 
core can be seen to be of major importance in predisposing attitudes to European 
Union-building.  Citizens of well-established nation-states in the Protestant northern 
and western EuropeaQ µSHULSKHU\¶ ZLWK ORQJ-standing loyal and relatively 
homogeneous political cultures can be expected to be less intrinsically pro-European 
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than those of more problematic state- and nation-building cases in Roman-Catholic 
Europe-cum-city belt Europe. 
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3. Past Sources of European Union 
3.1 Introduction 
In this historical part of the study I will attempt to identify sources of post-1945 
Europeanism ± i.e. attitudes favourable to supranational European governance ± as 
well as of opposition to it in pre-1945 history. I will be looking for ideas, ideologies 
and identities propitious or detrimental to authority being exercised at the universal-
cum-supranational-cum-European level of governance and try to identify their 
institutional and individual agents. What follows is thus an attempt at a 
1LHW]VFKHDQ)RXFDXOWHDQ µJHQHDORJ\¶ RI (XURSHDQLVP LQ WKH VHQVH RI DQ KLVWRULFDO
investigation of the sources and interaction of universalist and particularist discourse 
(Foucault 1977). The aim is to explain the emergence of what I have called 
respectively Christian-democratic and national-liberal ideology. According to Torbjørn 
Knutsen, this kind of genealogy is historiography written in the light of current 
FRQFHUQVXQGHUWDNHQ³WRVKLQHDFULWLFDOOLJKWRQXQTXHVWLRQHGYDOXHVDQGWruth-claims 
E\VKRZLQJKRZDOOWUXWKVDUHLQIDFWSURGXFWVRISDVWSUDFWLFHV´.QXWVHQ 
In view of the empirical problem under investigation, I will particularly 
emphasise the territorial context. Thus I will focus on the possible causal relationship 
between material, ideological and intellectual developments in European history on the 
one hand and territorially differentiated levels of Europeanism and nationalism in post-
World War II Europe on the other. The ground covered will in principle be the whole 
of what is today considered territorial Europe, i.e. Europe from Iceland and Ireland to 
the Urals and the Caspian Sea; from Gibraltar, Sicily and the Bosporus to the North 
Cape. However, I will concentrate on what is now France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Great Britain, because these are the countries 
that are most relevant to understanding the emergence and nature of the European 
Union, and thus to the current research question.  
Moreover, these countries represent the area that since the early Middle Ages 
have made the greatest contribution to the formation of the modern European identity 
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that is today shared by large parts of the inhabitants of geographical Europe. However, 
as I have noted, we should differentiate between Europeanness as a common identity 
UHIOHFWLQJ(XURSH¶VFXOWXUDOXQLW\DQG(XURSHDQLVPDVDQRUPDWLYHLGHRORJ\IDYRXULQJ
European political unity. It is perfectly possible to identify with shared European 
traditions and heritages and still not support supranational European union. In fact, that 
is basically what national-liberal discourse is about. Explicitly or implicitly, it 
stipulates that the essence of European history is the growth of diversity and freedom, 
whose political-territorial conclusion, the national-OLEHUDOµHQGRIKLVWRU\¶DVLWZHUHLV
the sovereign nation-state.  
On the other hand, we may safely assume that most people who favour European 
union also to some extent identify with Europe, whatever they associate with it. I have 
argued that like national identity, Europeanness arises in two interdependent ways: 
exclusively as a joint feeling of difference from outsiders (non-Europeans, or even 
Europeans deemed beyond the pale, such as Hitler), and inclusively as a sense of 
distinct, shared traditions and heritages. The one presupposes the other. To understand 
the basis for Europeanness and Europeanism we therefore need to investigate not only 
KRZWKH(XURSHDQµ6HOI¶KDVEHHQGLIIHUHQWLDWHGIURPWKHµ2WKHU¶LQ(XURSHDQKLVWRU\
as Delanty (1995) does, but also the evolution and impact of the common legacy that is 
the substance of Europeanness. In fact, part of that legacy militates against 
exclusiveness and particularism. 
Moreover, since in the following discussion we are interested in the historical 
sources of attitudes, it is just as important to identify relevant and influential 
interpretations, receptions or memories of the past as the actual events and junctures 
that constitute the past. Paradigms such as the Christian-democratic and national-
liberal ones are in large part based on how the present has interpreted, received or 
UHPHPEHUHG WKHSDVW0\DQDO\VLVZLOO WKHUHIRUHEHKLVWRULRJUDSKLFDO DQG µUHFHSWLYH¶
quite as much as it will be empirically historical.  
My comparative advantages in the search of new insights, I hope, lie in my 
research question and in my analytical framework for exploring it (cf. Figure 1 above). 
Unlike the predominant national-liberal approach in historiography and, particularly, 
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political science, I will be looking for the institutional and ideological sources of 
European unity and universalism more than those of diversity and particularism. 
General European historiography, especially the writing of political history, has tended 
to be narratives of the nation-state, either individually or collectively. Even the claims 
WR WUXHU (XURSHDQQHVV RI 1RUPDQ 'DYLHV¶V Europe ± A History (1996) are largely 
staked on just more particularism: giving more equitable narrative space to the 
histories of smaller nations relative to those of the Great Powers, and notably to the 
Central and Eastern European states that have gained sovereignty after the end of the 
Cold War. At least since the French historian and statesman François Guizot (see 
below, page 220), the most basic assumption of national-liberal historiography has 
indeed been that diversity is the main characteristic and explanatory factor of European 
history.  
The question of whether unity or diversity has been more important cannot be 
positively answered. However, in a historical perspective, Christian/European unity 
was undeniably prior to national diversity. The problem is that the unity tradition has 
been under-researched and underestimated, not least by European integration theorists. 
A proper, critically informed history of European unity-in-diversity remains to be 
written. Attempts beyond fairly conventional histories of Europe like that of Davies 
focus too much on individual plans for European union or peace (de Reynold 1944-57; 
Gollwitzer 1951; de Rougemont 1957, Halecki 1957; Hay 1957, 1966; Barraclough 
1963; Duroselle 1965; Heater 1992; etc.), neglecting the larger, structural context. 
They share two other fundamental weaknesses too: they do not distinguish between, 
but rather conflate Europe, Europeanness and Europeanism, and they assume that 
universalist-cum-Europeanist ideology for all practical purposes disappeared with the 
rise of the nation-state. Thus they largely ignore the significance of the Holy See and 
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the Holy Roman/Habsburg empires as institutional transmitters of this discourse to the 
post-WWII, mainly Christian-democrat politicians who founded the EU.14  
These are also the main limitations of the work that so far probably has come 
closest to meeting my ambitions here, Gerard DelaQW\¶V Inventing Europe (1995). 
Delanty makes an ambitious attempt at a post-modernist deconstruction of Europe as 
³LGHD LGHQWLW\UHDOLW\´ +LVPDLQWDUJHWDSSHDUVWREHWKH(8¶VRIILFLDOGLVFRXUVHRQ
µWKH(XURSHDQLGHD¶ZKLFKDVKHULJKWO\QRWHVLVQRW a self-evident, fixed entity but a 
FRQVWUXFWLRQ ZKRVH PHDQLQJ KDV YDULHG RYHU WLPH DQG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH DGYRFDWHV¶
FRQWH[W LGHRORJ\DQGLQWHUHVWV+RZHYHU'HODQW\¶VDUJXPHQW LVKLJKO\DEVWUDFWZLWK
PDQ\ REVFXUH DVVHUWLRQV OLNH ³LGHQWLWLHV EHFRPH SDWKROogical once they take on the 
character of a dominant ideology and the individual can no longer choose his or her 
LGHQWLW\´ 'HODQW\   +H LQDGHTXDWHO\ VSHFLILHV ZKDW DJHQWV LQWHUHVWV
ideologies and contexts have influenced the construction of the µ(XURSHDQLGHD¶ 
Moreover, throughout his narrative, Delanty tends to contradict the whole 
argument of social construction, giving the European idea a life of its own. An 
H[DPSOH LV WKH SKUDVH ³(OHYDWHG WR WKH VWDWXV RI FRQVHQVXV WKH LGHD RI (XURSH E\
virtue of its own resonance, functions as a hegemon which operates to produce an 
induced consensus ± which is less a compliance with power than acquiescence and 
helplessness ± ZLWKZKLFKDV\VWHPRISRZHUFDQEHPRELOLVHG´'HODQW\,Q
spite of hiV LQWHQWLRQV 'HODQW\ WKXV HVVHQWLDOLVHV D UDWKHU YDJXH µ(XURSHDQ LGHD¶
without distinguishing between Europe as a geographic space, European identity and 
Europeanist ideology, or even between ideas, agents and structures.  
From a normative point of view, the idea of Europe can of course be identified 
with negative traditions and heritages just as well as positive ones. It is thus legitimate 
to argue, like Delanty and other detractors do, in the self-critical tradition of  
                                              
 
 
14 The more recent study by Peter Rietbergen (1998) is better in this regard, but focuses mainly on the evolution of 
Europeanness. 
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Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Spengler, Fanon, Sartre, Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Marcuse and many others, that racism, nationalism, imperialism, anti-Semitism, 
WRWDOLWDULDQLVP IDVFLVP RULHQWDOLVP HWF DUH PRUH VDOLHQW µ(XURSHDQ¶ OHJDFLHV WKDQ
rationalism, humanism, liberalism, pluralism, constitutionalism, democracy, etc. (cf. 
Herman 1997). But this is a matter of normative choice, depending on personal context 
and convictions.  
I myself, being politically middle-of-the-road, born long after WWII, a northwest 
European, and considering EuroSHDQ KLVWRU\ UHWURVSHFWLYHO\ IURP WRGD\¶V YDQWDJH
point, take it as an empirical fact that the latter discourses or ideologies are more 
representative of the European legacy than the former (my experience in Africa has 
strengthened this conviction). After all, they are generally those that have prevailed 
and indeed, officially at least, received a fairly universal normative status. Moreover, 
learning-based critique and rejection of objectionable practices in the European past 
such as military aggression, the slave trade, the Holocaust and the Gulag may itself be 
seen as a constitutive part of contemporary Europeanness. But it is also my normative 
choice to critically accept modernity as mainly moulded by (north-western) Europe and 
to identify modern Europeanness with positive European traditions and heritages and 
the rejection of negative ones. Indeed, one of the worthy traditions is exactly the 
FRVPRSROLWDQLVP³WKHLGHDRIFLWL]HQVKLS´'HODQW\IDYRXUV 
Which are the main historical-territorial sources of Europeanness, then? The 
conventional answer has been: Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome. Ernest Rénan famously 
VDLGWKDW³/¶(XURSHHVWJUHFTXHSDUODSHQVpHHWO¶DUWURPDLQHSDUOHGURLWHWMXGpR-
chrétienne par la religion´ TXRWHG E\ 'DYLHV   6LPLODUly, Paul Valéry 
concluded:   
These, it seems to me, are the three essential conditions that define a true 
European, a man in whom the European mind can come to its full realisation. 
Wherever the names of Cæsar, Cajus, Trajan, and Virgil, of Moses and St. Paul 
and of Aristotle, Plato, and Euclid have had simultaneous meaning and authority, 
there is Europe. Every race and land that has been successively Romanised, 
Christianised, and, as regards the mind, disciplined by the Greeks, is absolutely 
European. (Valéry 1922, quoted by de Rougemont 1966: 367) 
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7RSRVLWDIRXUWKµ*HUPDQLF¶FRPSRQHQWKDVDOVREHHQFRPPRQQRWDEO\VLQFH
the rise of Germanist historiography in eighteenth century Germany. Gonzague de 
5H\QROGLVRQHRI WKRVHZKRDUJXHWKDW WKH(XURSHDQµKRXVH¶KDVIRXUIORRUV*UHHN
5RPDQ*HUPDQLFDQG&KULVWLDQ³&RPPHQWO¶(XURSHV¶HVWHOOHFRQVWUXLWHHWTXHOOHHVW
son architecture? Sur un soubassement préhistorique, reposant lui-meme sur un 
WHUUDLQJpRJUDSKLTXHRQ\YHUUDV¶pOHYHUDXFRXUGHVDJHVHWdes siècles, un rez-de-
chaussée grec, un étage romain, un étage germain, puis se poser sur eux, pour les 
achever et les couvrir, un toit chrétien´GH5H\QROG, +HJHOIRUKLVSDUW
saw World History unfold in East-West direction as a succession of Greek, Roman 
(Catholic) and Germanic (Protestant) stages. However, as we will see (especially in 
Section 3.7.2 EHORZWKHµ*HUPDQLF¶HOHPHQWLVWRGD\FRQWURYHUVLDO,QIDFWWKLVPD\
be one of the underlying reasons why the national-liberal world view is now 
increasingly contested, at least by cosmopolitan-minded intellectuals and scholars.  
I for my part, based on my differentiation between Europe, Europeanness and 
Europeanism, will argue that the main pre-modern historical sources of the specifically 
European culture from which Europeanness emanates have indeed been biblical Israel, 
ancient Greece and the Roman Empire. Ancient Israel and Greece are major sources of 
European cultural (including normative and intellectual) unity, but also inspirations of 
modern national diversity and thus European political disunity. The Roman Empire, on 
the other hand, contributed greatly to forging European cultural unity as well as to 
realising and transmitting universalist and cosmopolitan political ideas.  
Universalist ideology and cosmopolitan practice had however emerged in the 
Near East over the preceding three millennia, and was transmitted to the Romans 
notably by Alexander the Great. The ancient Near East created other important 
traditions that were later transmitted to the West too, but then mainly through the 
medium of the Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament). Ancient Israel was of course an 
integral part of ancient Near Eastern civilisation, as was, more peripherally, classical 
Greece. Jewish and notably Hellenistic culture made significant contributions to the 
ODWHU ,VODPLF DQG ,QGLDQ FLYLOLVDWLRQV0RUHRYHU WKH WZRPDLQ µ2WKHUV¶ WRPHGLHYDO
Europe, the Byzantine empire and the Islamic Caliphates (Umayaad, Abbasid, 
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Hispanic, Ottoman), not only represented ancient universalist-imperial as well as, in 
part, Near Eastern-Hellenistic traditions, but also contributed to transmitting cultural 
and scientific legacies of the classical Greek and Roman world to Europe.15 
Moreover, rather than inWURGXFLQJDSXUHµ*HUPDQLF¶HOHPHQWRIGLYHUVLW\LQWKH
development of Europe, the four centuries between c. 300 and 700 AD represent a 
cosmopolitan period when peoples speaking Latin, Germanic, Gallic/Celtic and other 
languages and dialects met and intermingled. This era of assimilation, now known as 
µ/DWH$QWLTXLW\¶LVWRGD\FRQVLGHUHGµWKHELUWKRI(XURSH¶WKHWLPHZKHQDWHUULWRULDOO\
and culturally distinct civilisation, Europe, emerged in the westernmost tip of Asia (le 
Goff 2005). We will see that the Middle Ages not only forged European cultural unity, 
but also inherited from the Romans and transformed the ancient tradition of 
cosmopolitan-imperial political and economic unity. The heyday of European 
Christendom, the period from roughly 700 to 1300 is thus probably the most important 
historical source of both Europeanness and Europeanism, with the Roman Church and 
the Holy Roman Empire as the main institutional agents of cultural-religious and 
political unity. 
Later, however, Europeanness and Europeanism have arguably parted ways. 
(XURSH¶VFXOWXUDOXQLW\FRQWLQXHGWRLQFUHDVHDWOHDVWXQWLO:RUOG:DU,,DWWKHVDPH
time as the rise of the nation-state entailed growing political and national particularism. 
Modernity, including not least national-liberal ideology, radiated mainly from north-
western Europe. However, throughout even the modern era, the Roman Church and, to 
a lesser extent, the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires, continued to embody and 
propagate political and cultural-religious unity. After the Second World War, the 
universalist legacy was picked up and realised in the European Union by what may be 
considered the democratic progeny of the Roman Church: a transnationally organised 
network of Western European, mostly Roman Catholic, Christian-democratic parties.  
                                              
 
 
15 However, the contribution of the former in this regard far outweighed that of the latter (Gouguenheim 2008). 
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3.2 The Near East 
Europe was preceded and fundamentally influenced by ancient Near Eastern 
civilisation, the history of which may be bracketed by the years c. 3000 and 323 BC 
(van de Mieroop 2004). Indeed, the ancient Near East formed a nexus between what 
the Greeks towards the end of that period began calling respectively Europe, Asia and 
Africa (or Libya). It was a distinct cultural-historical community that stretched from 
the Indian Ocean to the Aegean Sea, and from the Nile River to Central Asia, 
encompassing ancient Israel as well as eastern parts of ancient Greece. Its core was 
0HVRSRWDPLD D *UHHN ZRUG PHDQLQJ µEHWZHHQ ULYHUV¶ LH WKH 7LJULV DQG WKH
Euphrates, but which can be broadly defined to encompass also what is now eastern 
Syria, south-eastern Turkey, and most of Iraq.  
In this fertile region the first civilisation in world history emerged in the first city-
VWDWHV DQG HPSLUHV RU LQ ZKDW 0LFKDHO 0DQQ   FDOOV ³FLYLOLVDWLRQ DV
IHGHUDWLRQ´ ,W KDG SRZHUIXO DQG ZHDOWK\ NLQJV commanding effective armies, a 
sophisticated, literate bureaucracy and administrative system with some redistributive 
functions, an affluent and resourceful merchant class, private property, a productive 
agriculture with an intricate system of irrigation, and a developed network of roads and 
sea routes that allowed an extensive exchange of ideas and knowledge, texts, 
manpower, goods, services, artefacts, merchants, craftsmen, soldiers, diplomats, 
priests, scientists, etc. 
The ancient Near East, or wider Mesopotamia, was characterised by great 
linguistic and cultural variety, numerous regime changes as well as by the lack of 
geographic unity and of a permanent capital city. It was a cosmopolitan civilisation 
whose main unifying factors may be summarised as four (Mann 1986: ch. 3; Watson 
1992: 24-32; Ferguson and Mansbach 1996: 104-110; Buzan and Little 2000: 167-182; 
Talbott 2008: 32). First, the worship at common shrines of a rich, shared pantheon 
appeared and gradually evolved towards a common, increasingly monotheistic religion. 
Second, a shared tradition of literary and other texts in the cuneiform script emerged. 
Over time, this tradition increasingly converged on the city of Babylon and tended 
towards a common identity, clearly demarcated against outside µEDUEDULDQV¶ 7KLUG
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evolving with hegemonic-imperial governance of varying length and territorial scope, a 
common ideology of universalist-descending rule emerged, according to which the 
responsibility of the king was to mediate between his realm and the cosmos, between 
humans and gods. This ideology was inherited and further developed from one regime 
to another. As Ferguson and Mansbach argue, successive centres had earlier models to 
imitate, and attempted to draw on and adapt the ideological discourse of the past for 
themselves. At the core of such discourse was the belief that the assembly of gods 
FKRVH WKH FRPPRQ µJUHDW JRG¶ DVZHOO DV WKH NLQJ RI WKH ODUJHU SROLW\ VR WKDW ERWK
acted as officials of the cosmic state. Fourth, both elites and masses had DQµLQWHUHVW¶LQ
the establishment of an empire as it provided them with additional security, wealth, and 
SUHVWLJH ³(PSLUHV QHHGHG ERWK D VHFXUH LGHRORJLFDO IRXQGDWLRQ DQG HIIHFWLYH
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQWRVXUYLYH´)HUJXVRQDQG0DQVEDFK 
Van de Mieroop (2004: 195- LGHQWLILHV WKUHH 1HDU (DVWHUQ µHPSLUHV¶ WKH
(neo-)Assyrian (c. 880-612 BC), the (neo-) Babylonian (626-539 BC), and the Persian 
(539-323 BC). However, an imperial ideology emerged already with the hegemonic 
rule over the city-states of Sumer and Akkad (2350-2000 BC), as is indicated by 
universalistic titles invented by kings. The first such title was probably King of Kish, 
µ.LQJRIWKH/DQG¶DGRSWHGE\WKHHDUO\6XPHULDQNLQJ/XJDO-Zagesi (r. c. 2375-2350 
BC). His successor, Sargon of Akkad (r. 2334-%&XVHG.LQJRI.LVKDQGµ.LQJ
RIWKH)RXU4XDUWHUV¶7KHVL[WKUXOHURIWKHILUVW%DE\ORQLDQNLQJGRP+DPPXUDELU
c. 1792-%& FDOOHG KLPVHOI µ.LQJ RI 6XPHU DQG$NNDG¶ DQG µ.LQJ RI WKH )RXU
4XDUWHUV RI WKH:RUOG¶16 and the Assyrian king Shamsi-Adad I (c. 1808-1776 BC) 
DGRSWHGWKHWLWOHRIµ.LQJRIWKH8QLYHUVH¶)HUJXVRQDQG0DQVEDFK7KH
3HUVLDQVHPEUDFHG WKH WLWOH µ.LQJRI.LQJV¶&\UXV,,U-530 BC) called himself 
µ.LQJRI WKHZRUOGJUHDWNLQJ OHJLWLPDWHNLng, king of Babylon, king of Sumer and 
$NNDGNLQJRIWKHIRXUTXDUWHUVRIWKHZRUOG¶'DULXVWKH*UHDW'DULXV,U-486 
                                              
 
 
16 The United Nations celebrates Hammurabi as the founder of international law. A replica of the tablet with his famous code 
is mounted outside the General Assembly Hall in New York (Talbott 2008: 43). 
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%& ZDV µNLQJ RI DOO WKH SHRSOH RI DOO RULJLQ NLQJ RI WKH JUHDW HDUWK DQG EH\RQG¶
Xerxes II (r. 485-%&ZDVµNLQJRYHUDOOWKHGLVWDQWDQGYDVWZRUOG¶7DOERWW
32). 
The first Near Eastern empire, the neo-Assyrian one, was a multicultural zone 
where people with many different backgrounds interacted closely, mixing languages, 
cultures, and devotion to various gods. Artistic styles mixed various influences without 
difficulty. People seem to have maintained an international spirit and were outward-
looking (van de Mieroop 2004: 214). This Assyrian empire was ideologically focussed 
on the king, who expected loyalty from all his peoples and all subject rulers. The king, 
as representative of the god Assur, represented order. Wherever he was in control, 
there was peace, tranquillity, and justice, and where he did not rule, there was chaos. 
There was no religious intolerance, and vassal treaties were sworn in the name of the 
YDVVDO¶VJRGVDVZHOODVWKRVHRI$VV\ULD7KHNLQJ¶VGXW\WREULQJRUGHUWRWKHHQWLUH
world was the justification for military expansion. The royal palaces were decorated 
with wall-reliefs portraying the king as master of the world. Many peoples and cultures 
were incorporated under the rule of the Assyrian kings, but by their ideology they tried 
to erase the differences between them and to make them all Assyrian (van de Mieroop 
2004: 242-244; 274). 
The defeat of Assyria was mainly the work of two peoples, the Medes and the 
Babylonians, who afterwards divided the empire between them and further expanded 
their territories (van de Mieroop 2004: 253). Forced deportations and extensive 
contacts with foreign states made cities such as Babylon multiethnic, with a multitude 
of languages and customs. However, the kings pursued a policy of maintaining, or 
even reviving, ancient Babylonian culture and traditions. The Neo-Babylonian kings, 
although they represented the last native Mesopotamian dynasty in ancient Near 
Eastern history, saw themselves as very much part of an old tradition of Babylonian 
greatness going back to the third millennium, and promoted an awareness of that 
tradition. Babylonian culture was extremely strong by the time the dynasty was 
overthrown, and survived unscathed in the following historical era (van de Mieroop 
2004: 265-266).  
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The Neo-Babylonian empire was replaced by the Persian empire, lasting for 
about two centuries (559-323 BC) and covering the entire Near East and regions 
beyond from the Indus valley to northern Greece, from Central Asia to southern Egypt. 
The willingness to adopt local customs and to insert the Persian king into existing 
traditions made it possible to bring unity to a vast empire created in a short time span. 
The Persian empire thus successfully brought together areas with different languages, 
cultures, economies, and socio-political organisations. It was the first in Near Eastern 
history to acknowledge the variety among its peoples, but was at the same time highly 
centralised (van de Mieroop 2004: 267-274). The ease with which Cyrus conquered the 
Median overlordship and Darius the Great extended and organised an enormous and 
heterogeneous area of Persian suzerainty suggests that imperial legitimacy was well 
established in most of its communities, and that powerful elements were eager for a 
restoration. Like the Assyrians, the Persians assimilated Mesopotamian civilisation, 
including the cuneiform writing and other inventions that derived originally from 
Sumer; and they fostered and diffused Egyptian skills in administration, science and 
medicine. They also took over the Assyrian governmental structure (Watson 1992: 40-
46).  
From a union of states held together by the person of the king, the Persian empire 
HYROYHGLQWRDQ³DQLPSHULDOO\UHJXODWHGFRQIHGHUDF\DQGDIHGHUDWHGHPSLUHRIQDWLYH
HOLWHV´:DWVRQ%\WKHHQGRIWKHILIWKFHQWXU\WKHHPSLUHZDVGLYLGHGLQWR
provinces, or satrapies, which provided administrative uniformity. Still, the person of 
the king remained pivotal; he appointed governors, granted estates as rewards, and 
made all decisions. He was king of Babylon, Egypt, and so on, but first and foremost 
KHZDV WKH*UHDW.LQJDQG.LQJRI.LQJV³7KHJRGDQGNLQJguaranteed order and 
they represented justice and truth. This message is clear in the royal texts and imagery, 
EXWLWZDVQRWLPSRVHGDWWKHH[SHQVHRIRWKHUFXOWV´YDQGH0LHURRS 
Alexander the Great (see below, Chapter 3.5) embraced and emulated the Persian 
political tradition. Satrapies and political arrangements with local populations endured; 
kings used the local cults and their rituals to further their political interests; and 
administrative practices survived. New political offices did develop, new 
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administrative languages replaced older ones such as Babylonian, Greek buildings 
appeared in old cities and new cities were founded that followed a Greek layout, but 
these changes were gradual. Alexander has been caOOHG³WKHODVWRIWKH$FKDPHQLGV´
but his death in 323 did not present a clear end or a new beginning of the Near East 
(van de Mieroop 2004: 280).  
The international relations theorists Buzan and Little summarise their positive 
reappraisal of the role of empires in global history by emphasising the importance of 
the early empires of Mesopotamia:  
There was a learning process, and as history unfolded, the techniques of imperial 
control improved, enabling larger and more durable constructions to be built. In 
such a turbulent environment, military power and skilful, energetic, and ruthless 
leadership were the keys to successful empire. But even the possession of these 
did not guarantee more than short-term success. Creating a broader and more 
deeply rooted ruling elite better able to survive variations in the talent of leaders 
was one key. Another was the attraction of the imperial idea itself. This took root 
especially strongly in China and the Middle East, so that even during periods of 
fragmentation, the warring states were often motivated by the desire to re-
establish a wider imperial domain. Over the five millennia of this era, there is a 
pattern of progressive development from Sumeria through Rome to the Ottoman, 
Chinese, and other empires that overlapped with the rise of Europe, in which the 
techniques of imperial construction and control discussed above [ideology, 
bureaucracy and administrative technique, professional army, merchant class] 
became more effective. (Buzan and Little 2000: 178)  
3.3 Ancient Israel 
Alexander the Great was the main transmitter of the Near Eastern imperial 
tradition to the future West. But ancient Israel also conveyed universalising impulses. 
Its main contribution in this regard was the Old Testament narrative with its 
monotheist mesVDJH $V OH *RII SRLQWV RXW LQ WKH 0LGGOH $JHV ³WKH %LEOH ZDV
regarded and used as an encyclopaedia that contained all the knowledge that God had 
passed to humankind. It was also a basic historical handbook which, after telling of the 
patriarchs and prophets, proceeded to unfold the meaning of history ever since the 
DGYHQWRIUR\DOW\ LQ WKHSHUVRQVRI6DXODQG'DYLG´OH*RII/DWHU-HZLVK
historiography such as that of Flavius Josephus (AD 37- c. 100) conveyed the same 
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universalising sense of history, subsuming the histories of other nations into the 
biblical account and chronology (Kelley 1998: 79). Josephus initiated a tradition, later 
adopted by Jerome, Augustine, Orosius, Isidore and other Christian writers, that 
descendants of Japheth settled in Europe, those of Ham in Africa, and the progeny of 
6KHP LQ $VLD /H *RII   FRQFOXGHV WKDW ³WKH KLVWRULFDO PHPRU\ WKDW KDV
become an essential element in European consciousness stemmed from a twofold 
source: on the one hand, Herodotus, the Greek father of history; on the other, the 
%LEOH´ 
The ancient universalising tendency is reflected also in the myth of the four world 
empires that would pass from one kingdom to another until the end of the world. Based 
on Greek historiographical tradition as well as on the Old Testament (Daniel 7), the 
translatio imperii theory became a defining element of the historical ontology of 
medieval Christians. In the biblical version, Daniel interpreted a vision of the 
Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar and he dreamt of four beasts emerging from a river. 
To Daniel this signified a succession of four kingdoms and their rulers, beginning with 
%DE\ORQLD DOO VXEMHFW WR*RG¶V NLQJGRPZKLFK LV HYHUODVWLQJ /DWHU WLPHV WRRN WKH
Medes, the Persians and the Macedonians to be the three other empires. During Roman 
times, the Roman empire took the place of the fourth beast, and in Christian tradition 
Babylon was dropped from the series (Kelley 1998: 77).  
St Augustine however reminded his readers that it was the kingdom of Antichrist 
that was prophesied to be the last of these states before final judgement (Kelley 1998: 
 *RG¶V XQLYHUVDO SODQ ZDV WKXV KHOG WR EH WKH SDVVLQJ RI HPSLUH IURP WKH
Babylonians to the Romans, whose empire was sanctified by the coming of Christ, and 
which would be succeeded by Antichrist (T. Brown 1988: 34; Pagden 1995: 42). This 
ZDVRQHUHDVRQZK\WKHFUXPEOLQJRIWKH5RPDQ(PSLUH¶VDXWKRULW\DQGWKHEDUEDULDQ
onslaughts in the fifth century west were considered so momentous. Post-Reformation 
Protestant propaganda often argued that the Roman Church was the final empire and 
the Pope Antichrist. In the heated debate over membership in the European Union, 
Lutheran fundamentalists in Norway have sometimes identified the EU with the fourth 
and final beast. 
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However, more important in the present context is the fact that ancient Israel 
became a powerful inspiration for tendencies towards particularism and nationalism in 
PHGLHYDODQGPRGHUQ(XURSH7KH-HZV¶LGHDRIKLVWRU\ZDVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DVHQVH
of the uniTXHQHVVRIWKHLUQDWLRQWLHGWRWKHLUGHVWLQ\DV*RG¶VFKRVHQSHRSOH.HOOH\
1998: 76). They were the People of the Book, a distinctive, divinely favoured ethnos. 
³*HQHVLVFRQFOXGHVZLWKWKHVWRU\RIKRZWKHFRYHQDQW± the sacred pact between God 
and his chosen people ± passes from one generation to the next and thus to an extended 
IDPLO\DWULEHWKDWKDVDSLHFHRIUHDOHVWDWHLWFDQUXOHDQGGHIHQGDVLWVRZQ´7DOERWW
2008: 36). Moreover, according to Talbott, both the Genesis and the Exodus convey 
the notion of Israel born through liberation from an ancient empire, Babel (Babylon):   
[....] in Exodus as in Genesis, a universal, inclusive, polytheistic divine order has 
become a national, exclusive, monotheistic one. [....] the idea emerges of Israel as 
DQH[HPSODUWRDOOKXPDQLW\µDOLJKWXQWRWKHQDWLRQV¶>@7KLVLVWKHVPDOO-is-
beautiful alternative to imperialism: Israel will liberate other peoples not by the 
sword but by example ± by the power of its God-given ideas and ideals about 
how to live and how to govern. (Talbott 2008: 37)17  
In its representation of ancient Israel, the Old Testament thus provided the 
Christian world with the original model of the nation. Adrian Hastings (1997: 4) 
DUJXHV WKDW ³ZLWKRXW LW DQG LWV &KULVWLDQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ Dnd implementation, it is 
DUJXDEOH WKDW QDWLRQV DQGQDWLRQDOLVP DVZHNQRZ WKHP FRXOGQHYHUKDYHH[LVWHG´
Moreover, he submits that the model of ancient Israel was destined to have a greater 
impact among Protestants than among Catholics:   
                                              
 
 
17 Much of the foreign policy of latter-day Protestant, non-EU Norway could be similarly characterised. 
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Protestantism KDV>«@IUHTXHQWO\EHHQSUHVVHGDORQJDQDWLRQDOLVWURDGQRWRQO\
by erastianism but also by according greater weight to the Old Testament than 
Catholicism is prepared to do in the shaping of the Christian mind. Christians in 
general have always tended to use the Old Testament, especially its historical 
sections, as providing a set of precedents, pairing a situation there with one here. 
7KLVOHDGVRQO\WRRHDVLO\WRLGHQWLI\LQJWKHJHQHUDOH[SHULHQFHRIRQH¶VSHRSOH
with that of Israel, in a way productive of nationalism and it long made much 
Protestant thinking naively nation-affirming. (Hastings 1997: 204) 
As regards the evolution of Europeanness and Europeanism, the historical impact 
of ancient Israel has thus been a mixed one. Her legacy has deeply influenced the 
emergence of a common European identity, but politically it has provided modern 
Europeans with both universalist and particularist, cosmopolitan and nationalist, 
models. In this regard, its legacy has been similar to that of ancient Greece. 
3.4 Ancient Greece 
Ancient Greece ± its historical reality as well as its later reception and 
interpretation ± has made a deep impression on modern Europe. I will highlight three 
ways in which the received Greek legacy has influenced modern Europe, Europeanness 
and (XURSHDQLVP )LUVW DQG PRVW REYLRXVO\ WKH *UHHNV LQYHQWHG µ(XURSH¶ DV D
JHRJUDSKLFDOQRWLRQDQGFRPELQHG LWZLWK WKH LGHDRIVXSHULRU µ:HVWHUQ¶FLYLOLVDWLRQ
After having been revived in the Renaissance, these conceptions merged into the 
modern, secular idea of Europe. Second, ancient Greece created an intellectual and 
material legacy that has become a constituent part of European identity and society. 
Third, eighteenth-century Protestant Northern Europeans constructed a national-liberal 
or national-romantic ideological (particularist-ascending) alternative to Roman-French 
(universalist-descending) imperialism based on the particularist Greek political legacy.  
3.4.1 The Greek origin of geographical Europe 
The notion of Europe originates in ancient Greek mythology. The Greek historian 
Herodotus (c. 484-424 BC) writes that  
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[a]s for Europe, no one can say whether she is surrounded by the sea or not; 
neither is it known whence the name of Europe was derived, nor who gave it 
name, unless we say that Europe was so called after Tyrian Europé, and before 
her time was nameless, like the other divisions [Asia and Libya/Africa]. But it is 
certain that Europé was an Asiatic, and never even set foot on the land which the 
Greeks now call Europe. (Herodotus History: II, 45) 
HeURGRWXV¶V(XURSpLVWKH3KRHQLFLDQSULQFHVVRIWKHP\WKVRPHWLPHVNQRZQDV
µWKHUDSHRI(XURSD¶$FFRUGLQJWRRQHYHUVLRQ3DJGHQ-2), Zeus is supposed 
to have fallen in love with this daughter of King Agenor, metamorphosed himself into 
a bull and charmed her to go with him to Crete. Their union produced Minos, a 
civilising king and lawgiver. His offspring became the Europeans and Europé herself 
³WKH WXWHODU\ GHLW\ RI WKHLU FRQWLQHQW´ +DOH   ,Q DQRWKHU YHUVLRQ+HURGRWXV
however says (in History I, 2) that it was ordinary Greeks from Crete who abducted 
Europé as a retribution for an earlier Phoenician capture of the Greek woman Io from 
Argos. The abductions were supposed to be the original reasons for the fateful wars 
between Greeks and Persians that began with the Greek destruction of Troy and 
culminated with the battles of Marathon and Salamis, respectively in 490 and 480 BC. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR OH*RII  WKHZRUG µ(XURSH¶ZDVGHULYHGIURPD6HPLWLF WHUP
that was taken over by Phoenician sailors in the eighth century BC to designate the 
VHWWLQJVXQ%XWZKLOHERWKWKHP\WKDQGWKHQDPHRIµ(XURSH¶RULJLQDWHGLQWKH(DVW
it was the Greeks who bestowed it on the extreme western tip of the continent of Asia.  
The abduction of Europa was a popular theme in literature and the visual arts in 
the classical period (den Boer 1995: 15). Hale vividly relates how the myth much later 
ZDV UHYLYHG DQG EHFDPH YHU\ SRSXODU LQ 5HQDLVVDQFH (XURSH ³:KDW D VXEMHFW WKLV
was!  Sex, violence, seascape, landscape, beauty and the beast, gestures of alarm and 
affection, all enriched by analogies with other increasingly popular subjects [...] In 
every medium, from painting to pottery, relief sculpture to enamel, the story soared on 
>@´+DOH$FFRUGLQJWo de Rougemont, who thinks the background of the 
Greek myth is Semitic/Assyrian-+HEUHZ ODWHU JHQHUDWLRQV¶ UHFHSWLRQ RI LWZDVPRVW
strongly influenced by the version produced by the second century BC poet Moschus 
from Syracuse:  
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He provided the vernal scenery which Western poets, sculptors, and painters have 
used for twenty centuries in their sensual and imaginative reinterpretations of the 
myth ± works ranging from the metope of Selinus to the bas-relief decorating a 
modern railway station in Geneva, from Ovid to Victor Hugo, and from the 
creator of the Aquileia mosaics to painters such as Veronese, Titian, Claude 
Lorrain, and Tiepolo. (de Rougemont 1966: 7)  
7KH OHJHQGPD\ WKXV EH VHHQ DV D SRZHUIXO µFRPPRQP\WK¶ QHFHVVDU\ IRU WKH
creation of a national identity (cf. Smith 1992: 73), or in this case of Europeanness. 
7KHDQFLHQW*UHHNVDUJXDEO\DOVRPDGH(XURSHDQDWLRQLQ6PLWK¶VVHQVHRI³DQDPHG
KXPDQ SRSXODWLRQ VKDULQJ DQ KLVWRULF WHUULWRU\´ 7KH HDUOLHVW SRVW-Homerian sources 
DSSOLHGµ(XURSH¶WRPDLQODnd Greece in opposition to the Aegean islands (Hay 1957: 
2). During the colonisation period from the ninth to the sixth centuries BC, Hay argues 
that it was extended to the whole of continental Greece and then also to areas to the 
west and north. At this time the terms Asia and Libya (the latter of whom the Romans 
re-baptised Africa) also gained currency.  
At first the world was seen as divided into two parts, West and East, Europe and 
Asia (Libya was considered a part of the latter). But Herodotus adopted a tripartite 
division that may have existed among the ancient Egyptians (den Boer 1995: 15). At 
first it was debated whether the Nile was the boundary between Asia and Africa or the 
isthmus of Suez; and for a while the small River Phasis (Rioni, now in the Republic of 
Georgia), which flowed into the eastern end of the Black Sea was regarded as the true 
boundary between Europe and Asia, before this became established as falling at the 
Tanais river (Don). This fixing of the border between Europe and Asia at the Don 
prevailed until Peter the Great began Europeanising Russia. Russia was accepted as 
part of the European states system after its defeat of Sweden in the Great Nordic War, 
concluded by the Peace of Nystad in 1721. Its recognition as a European Great Power 
came with the Russian contribution to the joint defeat of Napoleon. Wilhelm Friedrich 
Volger confirmed the removal of the European frontier to the river Ural and the Ural 
mountains in his Handbuch der Geographie of 1833 (Hay 1957: 125; Davies 1996: 8). 
7R WKH DQFLHQW *UHHNV WKH µ3LOODUV RI +HUFXOHV¶ *LEUDOWDU FRQVWLWXWHG WKH ZHVWHUQ
limit (de Rougemont 1966: 32). 
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+RZHYHUDV+D\DOVRSRLQWVRXW IRU WKH*UHHNV µ(XURSH¶ UHPDLQHGSULPDULO\D
neutral geographical name. Delanty (1995: 19) and others (Gollwitzer 1951) argue that 
WKHLU LGHD RI (XURSH ZDV VXERUGLQDWHG WR WKHLU QRWLRQ RI WKH µ:HVW¶ RU µ2FFLGHQW¶
Herodotus (History: I, 4) suggests that antagonistic ideas of East and West, or Asia and 
Europe crystallised after the Persian Wars. Then a shared sense of Hellenistic identity 
HPHUJHGDQGDOORXWVLGHUVZHUHOXPSHGWRJHWKHUDVµEDUEDULDQV¶OLWHUDOO\VSHDNHUVRI
unintelligible tongues) (Finley in Finley, ed., 1981: 8-9; Keene 2005: 27-³%\WKH
ILIWK FHQWXU\ µ$VLDWLF¶ ZDV ILUPO\ OLQNHG ZLWK FRQFepts of lavish splendour, of 
vulgarity, of arbitrary authority, of all that was antithetical to Greece and Greek 
YDOXHV´ +D\ 7KH WKHDWUH EHFDPH WKH IDYRXULWH SODFH WR H[SUHVV WKH*UHHN
sense of superiority. Nearly half of the surviving Athenian tragedies of the fifth century 
%&SRUWUD\EDUEDULDQSHUVRQDJHV³DFKDPEHURIKRUURUVRIWKHPRVWGLYHUVHNLQGV± 
incest, crimes, human sacrifices ± characterises them and differentiates them from the 
*UHHNV´)RQWDQD$FFRUGLQJWRGHQ%RHULWwas also from the fifth century 
BC that  
Greek authors began to connect the geographical concepts of Europe and Asia 
not only with differences in language, customs and characteristics, but also with 
distinct systems of government. The city-state of Athens became the symbol of 
Greek freedom, while Persia was seen as the immense empire of an absolute ruler 
who respected neither god nor law. The opposition between Greece and Persia 
was viewed by the Greeks as representing that between Europe and Asia, and 
stood for freedom as opposed to despotism. (den Boer 1995: 16)  
Isocrates (d. 338 BC) thus equated Europe with Greece, and Asia with Persia, not 
only geographically, but in an active political sense, whereas Aristotle (384-322 BC) 
saw Greece as intermediate between Europe and Asia. Aristotle, who was to have a 
huge influence on European political thought in the Middle Ages, in his Politics (VII, 
6) suggested that the climate made Greece a golden mean between the tribal anarchy of 
European barbarians and the absolutism of Asian empires. 
$ULVWRWOH¶V QRWLRQV ZHUH SUREDEO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ DQ ROGHU *UHHN WUDGLWLRQ
expressed in the fifth-century BC study Influence of Atmosphere, Water and Situation 
attributed to Hippocrates, which praises the climate and natural geography as well as 
the political freedom of Greece as compared to that of Asia. However, with the 
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subjection of Greece first to the Macedonian, then the Roman empires, notions of 
*UHHN VXSHULRULW\ VHHP WR KDYH EHHQ µ(XURSHDQLVHG¶ ³E\ WKH WLPHRI6WUDER >*UHHN
geographer, c. 60 BC- AD 21] Europe and its peoples were regarded as best favoured 
E\QDWXUH´+D\ 
6WLOO0LFKDHO0DQQDUJXHVWKDWWKH*UHHNV¶UDWLRQDOLW\WRRNSUHFHGHQFHRYHUWKHLU
ethnocentric tendencies:  
The Greeks responded to the Persians in terms not of ethnic stereotypes but of 
geopolitical strategies in their own multistate system. Greek citizens wished to be 
self-governing. They did not wish to be ruled by Persians and they were willing 
to combine to avert that danger. When the danger receded, they were more 
concerned to avert being ruled by other Greeks. They treated Persia as just 
another state whose rulers were as capable of loyalty and reason as any Greek 
polis. The Greeks ultimately lacked a consistent sense of their own ethnic 
superiority. They were too outward-looking, too interested in the characteristics 
of (male) humanity at large, too inclined to project outward the diplomatic 
rationality of their multistate system. (Mann 1986: 215-216) 
0DQQ LQGHHG REVHUYHV WKDW ³PDQ\ *UHHNV SUoclaimed the unity of mankind at 
ODUJHDQGH[WHQGHGLWIXUWKHURYHUFODVVEDUULHUVWKDQWKHLUSUHGHFHVVRUV´0DQQ
+HTXRWHV6RSKRFOHV¶SOD\Tereus, in which the chorus of citizens proclaim that 
³>W@KHUH LV RQH KXPDQ UDFH $ VLQJOH GD\ EURXJKW Xs all forth from our father and 
PRWKHU1RPDQLVERUQVXSHULRUWRDQRWKHU%XWRQHPDQ¶VIDUHLVDGRRPRIXQKDSS\
GD\VDQRWKHU¶V LV VXFFHVV DQGRQRWKHUV WKH\RNHRIVODYHU\¶VKDUGVKLSIDOOV´0DQQ
concludes: 
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Greek self-consciousness was extraordinary ± it was one of contradiction. On the 
RQHKDQGLWVDZWKHµXQLW\RIPDQNLQG¶>@XQLWHGE\UHDVRQSUDJPDWLFDOO\
regulating the most violent interstate and class struggles. On the other hand, it 
recognised contradictory practices: the imputation of reason only to free civilised 
men, that is, not to slaves, the supposedly servile dependents of eastern rulers, 
ZRPHQFKLOGUHQRUµEDUEDULDQV¶/DWHUDSDUWLDOVROXWLRQZDVIRXQG%HLQJD
*UHHND+HOOHQHZDVDPDWWHURIWKHFXOWLYDWLRQRIUHDVRQWKURXJKµeducation in 
ZLVGRPDQGVSHHFK¶DV,VRFUDWHVH[SUHVVHGLW$IWHU$OH[DQGHU¶VFRQTXHVWVWKLV
definition was implemented as policy, Greeks and upper-class Persians and others 
became the cultivated rulers of the Hellenistic world, from which non-Greek 
natives were excluded. The definition worked as a restrictive ruling-class device 
IRUDWLPH%XWHYHQWXDOO\*UHHNµKXPDQLW\DWODUJH¶HPHUJHGWUDQVIRUPHGLQWKH
salvation religions of the Near East, now fused with other forces. (Mann 1986: 
225-226)  
Socrates waVWKHILUVWSKLORVRSKHUWRVD\WKDWKLVIDWKHUODQGZDVµWKHKXPDQUDFH¶
and not merely his native city (de Rougemont 1966: 32). His declaration that he was a 
³FLWL]HQRI WKHZRUOG´ZDVRQHRI WKH VWDWHPHQWV WKDW OHG WRKLV WULDO DQG VXEVHTXHQW
death (Talbott 2008: 25). De Rougemont also reminds us that Isocrates, who he calls 
WKH DQFHVWRU RI DOO VXEVHTXHQW(XURSHDQ µIHGHUDOLVWV¶ DQG µXQLRQLVWV¶ZURWH WKDW ³WKH
man who shares our paideia is a Greek in a higher sense than he who only shares our 
EORRG´GH5Rugemont 1966: 34).  
7KXV LI WKH DQFLHQW *UHHNV µLQYHQWHG¶ (XURSH DQG WKH:HVW LQ D JHRJUDSKLFDO
mythological and perhaps ethno-centric sense (Delanty 1995: 19), if the notion of 
*UHHN DQGRU µ(XURSHDQ¶ RU µ:HVWHUQ¶ VXSHULRULW\ZDV SDUW RI WKHLU OHJDF\ WR future 
Europe, so was the cosmopolitan idea of a common mankind, suggesting a 
fundamental equality of all citizens.   
3.4.2 The Greek contribution to Europeanness 
The contribution of the ancient Greeks to the formation of modern European and 
Western civilisation and thus identity is massive. Their legacy of architecture, art, 
biology, ethics, historiography, law, literature, logic, mathematics, medicine, music, 
philosophy, physics, politics, and psychology has fundamentally and pervasively 
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influenced modern European values, norms and ideas.  Practically all histories of 
Europe ± DQG VWLOO WRGD\ HYHQ PDQ\ µZRUOG KLVWRULHV¶ ± begin with or exhaustively 
discuss ancient Greece.18 Jacques le Goff (2005: 10) identifies the figure of the hero, 
humanism, religious edifices, wine, the city, the word democracy, and the word Europe 
as Greek bequests to the Middle Ages, and thus to Europe. Norman Davies (1996: ch. 
,,DYRLGVH[SOLFLWO\VWDWLQJWKDWWKHDQFLHQW+HOOHQHVZHUHWKHILUVWµ(XURSHDQV¶EXWKLV
ample coverage certainly suggests so. J.M. Roberts in his History of Europe is more 
explicit:   
>«:@KHQVFHSWLFDOPRGHUQVFKRODUVKDYHGRQHWKHLUVSHFWDFXODUEHVWWRTXDOLI\
and explain the limits of civilisation in the Greek and Roman worlds, we are left 
with a huge mass of cultural facts which down to this day have helped to 
determine the way in which Europe and the minds of Europeans took shape in 
history. To understand that, we have to begin with the Greeks. (Roberts 1996: 25)  
Like most modern historians, Roberts particularl\HPSKDVLVHVWKHDQFLHQW*UHHNV¶
systematisation of rational philosophical enquiry:  
The Greek challenge to the weight of irrationality tempered its force as it had 
never been tempered before even if that was not always obvious. For all the 
subsequent exaggeration and myth-making about it, the liberating effect of this 
emphasis was to be felt again and again for thousands of years. (Roberts 1996: 
42-43)   
6LPLODUO\ 6DPXHO)LQHU UHJDUGV WKH DQFLHQW*UHHNV DV ³WKHSLRQHHUVRI UDWLRQDO
WKRXJKW´ )LQHU   DQG0DQQ FRQVLGHUV ³WKH FXOW RI KXPDQ UHDVRQ´ RQH RI
three Greek institutions that together constituted a revolution in the history of 
collective power (Mann 1986: 195).  
$VWROLWHUDWXUH+RPHU¶VIliad and Odyssey ³DUHE\JHQHUDOFRQVHQWWKHEHJLQQLQg 
RI (XURSHDQ OLWHUDWXUH´ *UDQVGHQ LQ )LQOH\ HG   7 * 5RVHQPD\HU LQ
)LQOH\HGDUJXHVWKDW³(XURSHDQGUDPD>«@LVDOPRVWHQWLUHO\GHVFHQGHG
                                              
 
 
18 One notable exception was Jean-%DSWLVWH 'XURVHOOH¶V Europe: A History of its Peoples (1991), a historical project 
sponsored by the European Commission, which hardly mentions ancient Greece and Byzantium. After many protests, in 
particular from Greece, the Commission eventually dissociated itself from it (Davies 1996: 43-44).  
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IURP *UHHN WUDJHG\ DQG FRPHG\ >«@ )RU WZR WKRXVDQG \HDUV EHJLQQLQJ ZLWK WKH
Roman developers of Greek drama, and again with the Humanists of the Renaissance, 
WKH *UHHNPRGHOV H[HUFLVHG D GRPLQDQW UROH´ 2Q WKH ILJXUDO DUWV 3HWHU .LGVRQ LQ
)LQOH\HGZULWHVWKDW³XQWLOQRWVRYHU\ORQJDJRLWZDVJHQHUDOO\DJUHHG
that all art worthy of the name conformed to a single set of universal and unchanging 
standards. These had been discovered by the Greeks, transmitted to the Romans, 
destroyed or rejected by the barbarians, and slowly brought to light again by the 
Italians of the RenaiVVDQFH´5HJDUGLQJKLVWRULRJUDSK\$UQDOGR0RPLJOLDQRLVRIWKH
opinion that  
OLNHWKHDQFLHQW5RPDQVZHDUHFRQVFLRXVRIKDYLQJLQKHULWHGµKLVWRU\¶historia) 
IURPWKH*UHHNV+HURGRWXVLVWRXVµWKHIDWKHURIKLVWRU\¶DVKHZDVWR&LFHUR
We are also conscious that history has come to us as part of a greater legacy 
which includes the most important intellectual activities (philosophy, 
mathematics, astronomy, natural history, figurative arts, etc.) in which we are still 
involved ± and, more particularly, the most prestigious literary genres (epic, lyric, 
eloquence, tragedy, comedy, novel, idyll) by which we still satisfy our needs for 
verbal expression. (Momigliano in Finley, ed., 1981: 153)   
Moreover, the ancient Greeks created a material infrastructure and extensive 
communications that later helped pave the way for the Hellenic and Roman empires. 
Visible and tangible expressions of Greek culture such as their alphabet, finely 
engraved silver coins, the Doric temple, and figural art were diffused by a steady 
traffic of travellers, merchants, artisans and migrants among the far-flung Greek 
communities around the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black seas (Finley in Finley, ed., 
1981: 7). An unmistakably Greek material legacy came to characterise particularly the 
Greek mainland and islands (modern Greece), the western coast of Asia Minor 
(modern Turkey), much of the coast of Sicily, and Italy south of Naples. Many ruins of 
these, most famously the Acropolis of Athens, have survived to be embraced by 
modern Europeans as relics of their spiritual ancestors.  
The Greek intellectual heritage was transmitted to the West, via the Hellenistic 
monarchies, by the Romans, who also adopted the Greek paideia ideal of upbringing as 
the cultivation of human perfection. Thus it was incorporated in the legacy of Rome, 
through which it would profoundly influence educational institutions and practices in 
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medieval Christian Europe, reinforced by the return to the antique that characterised 
the early renaissance of the twelfth century and the humanist one in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries (Marrou in Finley, ed., 1981: 185).  
As I have indicated, the ancient Greeks themselves were the originators of the 
LGHD WKDW FDPH WR LQIRUP WKH PRGHUQ µFXOW RI *UHHFH¶ WKDW WKH\ ZHUH PRGHOV RI
superior thought and action. The Romans, however, surpassed them in their fervent 
admiration of assumed Greek perfection. In the late first century BC, the poet Horace 
famously summarised the Roman sense of Greece when he wrote of the Roman 
FRQTXHVW WKDW ³captive Greece captured her savage victor and brought civilisation to 
UXVWLF /DWLXP´ Graeca capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes íntulit agresti Látio). 
5RPDQSKLOKHOOHQLVP UHDFKHG D KLJKSRLQW LQ3OXWDUFK¶VParallel Lives (c. AD 100). 
After the fifth century collapse of Roman authority there, Greek learning and culture 
were largely lost in the West. The last important post-Roman philhellenist in the West 
was arguably the Visigoth encyclopaedist and theologian Isidore of Seville. A few 
works of Plato and Aristotle also survived in Latin versions or commentaries. Apart 
from this, Greece and Greek culture were almost entirely unknown during the centuries 
when the Western synthesis of classical and Christian culture took place (see below, 
Section 3.7.2). Meanwhile, however, the Greek legacy survived in the Byzantine 
empire. Scientific parts of it were also embraced by the Arabs as they conquered 
Byzantine, Hellenic and Christian territories. 
In the High Middle Ages, a broader range of ancient Greek thought and science 
was rediscovered in the Latin West when complete Latin versions of Plato and 
Aristotle became available, some translated directly from Byzantine Greek versions 
and others from Arabic versions and commentaries. But this rediscovery was restricted, 
overwhelmingly, to Latin editions and to philosophy. Greek historians, poets, artist, 
and writers other than Plato and Aristotle remained known only to a few, and later 
medieval Europe knew nothing like the philhellenism of the Roman Empire.  
According to David Gress (1998: 57-59), the first tentative return of Graecophilia 
was the work of Renaissance humanists who learned Greek and began recovering the 
complete range of ancient Greek literature, philosophy, history, theology, and medical 
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writings. Modern philhellenism, however, emerged in Germany, where it was 
WUDQVIRUPHGLQWRDµFXOWRI*UHHFH¶LQWKHHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\VHHDOVREHORZ6HFWLRQ
3.8.1). As we will see, in the first decades of the sixteenth century Germans discovered 
similarities between their language and Greek. As Martin Bernal points out, after the 
Reformation Greek and Germanic languages emerged as the languages of 
Protestantism:  
Luther fought the Church of Rome with the Greek Testament. Greek was a sacred 
Christian tongue which Protestants could plausibly claim was more authentically 
Christian than Latin. With the spread of the Reformation to England, Scotland 
and Scandinavia, a feeling developed that the Teutonic-speaking peoples were 
µEHWWHU¶DQGPRUHµPDQO\¶WKDQWKH5RPDQFH-speaking nations of France, Spain 
and Italy and that their languages as a whole were superior to Latin and on a par 
with Greek. (Bernal 1987: 193)  
Greek studies flourished in Protestant schools and universities throughout the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Bernal notes moreover that many of the major 
French Hellenists of the seventeenth century were Huguenots (Bernal 1987: 194). Also 
Gress points to a subtle affiliation between the secular Greek legacy and Protestantism 
in north-western Europe, particularly in English academia:  
The study of ancient Greece flourished in the English Renaissance, both before 
and after the Reformation, but then gave way to the rising tide of Puritanism and 
doctrinal debate within Anglicanism that led to the English Civil War. From the 
early seventeenth to the late eighteenth century the colleges of Oxford and 
Cambridge, with a few shining exceptions, were largely forgotten backwaters. 
>«@:KHQFODVVLFDOVFKRODUVKLSDUULYHGRn the scene, renovated and rejuvenated 
by the Germans, it filled the need left by the religious void. Nineteenth-century 
fellows were still like monks: they remained celibate and had to conform to 
Anglican doctrine. Now they had, again, a real source of worship and meaning in 
their lives: ancient Greece as interpreted by the new scholarship became an ersatz 
religion. The modern West adopted Greece as a partial replacement for 
Christianity. This was not the actual Greece of two thousand five hundred years 
ago, however, but the Greece re-created by adoring scholars, mostly in Germany 
and England, starting around 1770. (Gress 1998: 59-60) 
The heavy predominance of northern German, secularised Lutherans in 
eighteenth to twentieth-century German Graecophilia and neohumanism is confirmed 
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by Suzanne L. Marchand. She concedes that even Catholics in e.g. Bavaria became 
smitten by Graecophilia. However: 
German philhellenism partook so heavily of that peculiar form of secularised 
/XWKHUDQLVPNQRZQDVµVHFXODULVHG3URWHVWDQWLVP¶Kulturprotestantismus) that in 
1862 the biographer of the philologist F. A. Wolf felt he had to correct the 
pervasive impression that Greek was exclusively the language of Protestantism. 
In addition, the basic institutions of neohumanism, the Gymnasium  and the 
philological seminar ± were borrowed from the north, and their integration into 
the Catholic lands occurred less as an abrupt shift in state policy than as a 
continuation of eighteenth-century classicism. Throughout the Second Empire 
and into the Weimar period, Berliners controlled central neohumanist institutions 
like the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut and the Royal Museums. Catholics 
rarely participated in their activities, sometimes by choice, sometimes by 
sociological coincidence (there were few Catholics in academia in comparison to 
their numbers in the general population), sometimes by deliberate exclusion. 
(Marchand 1996: xxiii) 
The university of Göttingen, founded in 1734 by George II, elector of Hanover 
and King of England, formed a cultural bridge between Protestant Britain and 
Protestant Germany. The humanities were established at Göttingen as a modern 
disciplinary scholarship, including the historiography of peoples and races and their 
institutions. An important inspiration was Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-68), 
³WKH JUHDWHVW FKDPSLRQ RI *UHHN \RXWK DQG SXULW\ LQ WKH PLG-18th FHQWXU\´ %HUQDO
  :LQFNHOPDQQ IDPRXVO\ DGPLUHG ³WKH QREOH VLPSOLFLW\ DQG VHUHQH
JUHDWQHVV´DQG³WKHSHUIHFWODZRIDUW´ZKLFKLQIXVHGHYHU\WKing Greek, and took the 
PRWWRRI WKH DQFLHQW*UHHNV WREH µQRWKLQJ LQ H[FHVV¶ DQG µPRGHUDWLRQ LQDOO WKLQJV¶
(quoted by Davies 1986: 97).  
Winckelmann founded not only art history as an academic discipline, but, 
together with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich von Schiller 
(1759- DOVR WKH PRGHUQ FXOW RI *UHHFH *UHVV   II 7KH µ:HLPDU
FODVVLFLVP¶ RI *RHWKH DQG 6FKLOOHU VHUYHG WR LQVSLUH WKH RXWVWDQGLQJ \RXQJ*HUPDQ
poets and philosophers that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, including Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Hölderlin, Heinrich von Kleist and 
)ULHGULFKYRQ+DUGHQEHUJNQRZQDV1RYDOLV$VDUHVXOWRIWKHµVHFRQG5HQDLVVDQFH¶
LQGXFHG E\ *RHWKH DQG 6FKLOOHU ³FODVVLFDO VFKRODUVKLS DQG HVSHcially Greek 
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scholarship, replaced philosophy as the queen of the humanities and reigned supreme 
IRUDFHQWXU\´*UHVV-63). 
0RUHRYHU%HUQDOVHHV WKHDQFLHQW*UHHNV¶DVVRFLDWLRQRIYLUWXHZLWKFOLPDWHDV
an important inspiration for the modern romDQWLF UHYHUHQFH IRU D µEDUEDULDQ¶ FROG
wild and free north, i.e. of Northern, Germanic Europe. The predilections of nineteenth 
FHQWXU\ URPDQWLFV DQG UDFLVWV ³ZHUH QHDUO\ DOZD\V IRU WKH PLVW\ DQG PRXQWDLQRXV
North of Europe, which was seen as the true repRVLWRU\RIKXPDQYLUWXH´%HUQDO
204). Bernal notes that national romanticism and racism were less evident in 
eighteenth century France than in contemporary Britain and Germany. In addition to 
the rationalist and cosmopolitan tradition from the Enlightenment, an important reason 
for this was that the French remained more obsessed with ancient Rome than the 
Germans and British, who increasingly turned to Greece. Gress makes a similar point, 
noting that the Roman models invoked both by the French revolutionaries and 
1DSROHRQHQKDQFHGWKHSUHVWLJHRI*UHHFHLQ%ULWDLQDQG*HUPDQ\³,Q%ULWDLQSHRSOH
compared their struggle against Napoleon to the Greek struggle against the Persians 
and insisted that the final British victory against great odds was due, as was the Greek 
YLFWRU\WRWKHVXSHULRUPRUDOHDQGFRPPLWPHQWRIDIUHHSHRSOH´*UHVV 
7KHµW\UDQQ\RI*UHHFHRYHU*HUPDQ\¶WKHWLWOHRI%XWOHUWKDWEHJDQLQWKH
V WKXV KDG LWV FRXQWHUSDUW LQ D µ5RPDQ W\UDQQ\RYHU)UDQFH¶7KLVSKHnomenon 
became politically significant during the French Revolution, but began much earlier. 
The revolutionaries sought models in the intense patriotism and virtuous frugality they 
identified with the Roman republic. For instance, Robespierre quoted Cicero¶V
MXVWLILFDWLRQRIWKHPXUGHURI& VDUWRGHIHQGWKH6HSWHPEHU0DVVDFUHRI³7KH
5HSXEOLFNLOOHGWKHPLQRUGHUQRWWRIDOOLQWRWKHLUKDQGV´TXRWHGE\*UHVV
When Napoleon dissolved the revolutionary government and took power in 1799, he 
was accused of being a new Cæsar. As a rejection of this claim, he took the title of 
µFRQVXO¶ WKH SULPH PDJLVWUDWH RI WKH 5RPDQ UHSXEOLF 6WLOO ILYH \HDUV ODWHU KH KDG
himself crowned emperor of the French, stressing the secular Roman imagery of the 
event. He insisted, just as had Augustus in 27 B.C., that he was emperor by popular 
will and acclamation, and that his mission was to bring law, clarity and order to a 
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Europe torn by strife and conflict. He therefore put the imperial crown on his head 
himself, with the Pope merely a witness (see below, section 3.8.3).  
Napoleonic aggression reinforced the German identification with the ancient 
Greeks. According to Gress (1998: 65-66), an extraordinarily intense, almost religious 
philhellenism made most German thinkers and poets see themselves as Greek victims 
RI5RPDQLPSHULDOLVP*HUPDQVFKRODUVKLS¶VPDLQLQWHUHVWLQ*UHHFHZDVWRGLVFRYHU
the causes of Greek political decline in order to prevent a similar fate from befalling 
Germany. In particular, historians explored the reasons for the failure of the Greek 
city-states to unite in a nation-state against foreign enemies. This focus often led to a 
contempt for Athenian democracy, since ancient Greek writers themselves, notably 
Plato, had suggested that democracy was a hindrance to effective governance in war 
and therefore to victory. Thus Sparta became the model polis for German nationalists 
(Gress 1998: 68). Gress points in particular to the pro-Spartan bias of the German 
classicists Julius Beloch in the 1890s and Helmut Berve in the 1930s. In the words of 
*UHVV%HUYHSUDLVHGWKH1DWLRQDO6RFLDOLVWUHJLPHRI*HUPDQ\DV³WKHWUXHVXFFHVVRU
WR6SDUWDDQGWKHYHULWDEOHHPERGLPHQWRI*UHHFH´*UHVV 
Gress moreover notes the significant contrast between the German preference for 
Thycudides as a Greek historian over the British favourite, Herodotus:  
$FFRUGLQJWR7KXF\GLGHV$WKHQVORVWWKHZDUEHFDXVHWKHFLWL]HQVDIWHU3HULFOHV¶
death, listened to demagogues who promised riches and easy victories. 
Democracy, he implied, degenerated into policy by popular whim unless 
controlled by an authoritarian leader, such as Pericles. By contrast, Herodotus 
was more popular in Britain, because his history of the Persian War (490-479 
BC) was DOVRDSDHDQWROLEHUW\>«@7KH*HUPDQVKDGOLWWOHXVHIRU+HURGRWXV
He was an optimist, and they considered themselves rational pessimists, at least 
in politics. Democracy was a dangerous gamble, especially if you lived in the 
middle of a continent, as WKH\GLGZLWKERUGHUVRSHQWRHQHPLHVRQDOOVLGHV>«@
To men like Beloch and Berve, it was not so much Greek freedom as the Greek 
nation that Leonidas and his men saved. (Gress 1998: 69) 
Furthermore, still according to Gress, the idea of the nation as a collective entity, 
PRUDOO\VXSHULRUWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOJUDGXDOO\UHSODFHG*RHWKH¶VDQG+|OGHUOLQ¶VQDWXUDO
man as the focus of German philhellenism. Hegel turned the ancient Greek reverence 
of the polis into a cult of the state as the sublime expression of all human endeavours. 
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After a transitional period when Nietzsche stressed the Dionysian mysticism as well as 
WKH UDWLRQDOLVP RI WKH DQFLHQW*UHHNV WKH LQWHOOHFWXDO µW\UDQQ\RI*UHHFH¶ LQ$QJOR-
Saxon Europe and America reached its apogee in the years before World War I. 
Ironically, as Gress (1998: 75) points out, it was just before this war that Oswald 
Spengler in his Decline of the West launched the first serious blow against the idea of 
the West as the child of Greece. To Spengler, the Greeks and Romans were not 
µ:HVWHUQ¶ DW DOO EXW UHSUHVHQWHG D GLIIHUHQW FXOWXUH RI WKHLU RZQ D FORVHG FKDSWHU
utterly alien to modernity.  
Gress argues that in twentieth century Germany, Britain and the United States, 
WKH µFXOW RI *UHHFH¶ HYROYHG LQWR D QDWLRQDO-liberal LQWHOOHFWXDO FDQRQ µWKH *UDQG
1DUUDWLYH¶ $ UHDFWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH 1DUUDWLYH¶V DOOHJHGO\ FRORQLDOLVW DQG (XURFHQWULF
µ3ODWR WR1$72¶ DVVXPSWLRQV VHW LQZLWK WKH UDGLFDOLVDWLRQRI$PHULFDQXQLYHUVLWLHV
during the Vietnam war. In classical studies, the most prominent result was Martin 
%HUQDO¶V DWWDFNRQ WKH WUDGLWLRQDOLVW UHYHUHQFHRI DQFLHQW*UHHFH LQKLVBlack Athena 
(1987, quoted above).  
Gress notes that the reverence for the Romans and their peace, order and harmony 
proved far more tenacious in Latin Europe than in Germany, Britain and the United 
States:   
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Roman or civil law predominated on the Continent, languages derived from Latin 
were spoken across southern Europe, and scores of millions of Europeans lived in 
regions that had been part of Rome for a thousand years or more when the empire 
ended. Roman names for political practices and institutions, such as consul, 
prefect, diocese, senate, forum, market, republic, city, or province, retained a 
resonance in Europe that neither did nor could exist in the new transatlantic 
democracy. Americans prided themselves on being innovators and free of the 
past; Europeans, including the revolutionaries of France, prided themselves on 
FRQWLQXLW\>«@7KHZKROHKLVWRU\RI(XURSHFRXOGEHUHDGDVWKHQHYHU-ending 
attempt to recreate the Roman Empire on foundations stronger, more permanent, 
DQGPRUDOO\EHWWHUWKDQWKHRULJLQDO>«@$IWHUWKHYLROHQWDWWHPSWVDWXQLILFDWLRQ
by Napoleon, imperial Germany, and Adolf Hitler, Europeans rallied in the 1950s 
for one final attempt, this time under the aegis of the Common Market, later 
known as the European Union. (Gress 1998: 125)19    
The idea of Rome has obviously survived most powerfully in the Roman Catholic 
Church, the only contemporary institution with an unbroken history from the time of 
the original Roman empire (see below, Chapter 3.7). But it also continues to exercise a 
profound influence on French and Italian identity in particular. According to Gress, the 
intellectual debate over Greece and Rome after World War II became a debate between 
on the one hand  
Anglo-American liberals with their Christian-inspired, postimperial guilt; on the 
other, French and Italian thinkers for whom Rome was part of their history, and 
who saw it not as an oppressor but as the guarantor of order and peace. This 
rhetoric could still be heard from officials of the European Union in the 1990s. 
>«@7KH&RQWLQHQWDOQDUUDWLYHRI:HVWHUQLGHQWLW\FXOPLQDWHGLQDV\QWKHVLVRI
Rome, Christianity, and modern social democracy.  The [Anglo-American] liberal 
narrative preferred Greece, the Renaissance, and individualism. (Gress 1998: 
126)  
                                              
 
 
19 Here it must be added that the Founding Fathers of the United States obviously took the Roman Republic as their model 
and gave Latin-derived names to many of the central political institutions. The American fascination with ancient Greece 
followed at a later stage. 
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3.4.3 The national-liberal polis  
7KHLGHDRIµWKH*UHHNLQYHQWLRQRISROLWLFV¶LVFRPPRQVHHHJ)RUUHVW
According to Samuel Finer, the *UHHNV DIIHFWHG ³D UHYROXWLRQ LQ WKH WKHRU\ DQG WKH
SUDFWLFH RI JRYHUQPHQW´   )LQHU    DUJXHV WKDW WKHLU PDLQ
political innovations were four: the idea of the citizen (as opposed to the subject); 
democracy; the accountability of the governors to the governed; and the distinction 
between deliberative, executive and judicial power. These innovations add up to the 
FUHDWLRQ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH ILUVW µ)RUXP-W\SH¶ DVFHQGLQJ-locus polity in 
world history: 
From the beginning of recorded history in Sumeria and Egypt ± for some two-
and-a-half thousands of years ± every constituted state had been a monarchy: not 
only in the known world of the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, but in the 
worlds of India and distant China too. These monarchs had all been absolute, and 
godlike too, except for the Jewish kingdom where God ruled the kings. Suddenly 
there was government without kings or god. Instead, there were man-made, 
custom-built republics of citizens. These Greek polities speak to us in a modern 
idiom and it was the Greeks who coined such terms as monarchy, autocracy, 
tyranny, despotism, aristocracy, and oligarchy, as well as democracy. (Finer 
1997: 316) 
However, in retrospect, Greek democracy was a dead end. The classical polis was 
crushed by the Macedonians in 322 BC, and had no independent institutional issue.20 
)LQHU   DUJXHV WKDW ³XQWLO WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ LWZDV6SDUWD QRW$WKHQV
that was the model for the European avant-garde. The harsh fact is that the Greek 
democratic poleis form but a tiny spot, both spatially and temporally, on the five 
PLOOHQQLDRIWKHZRUOG¶VIRUPVRIJRYHUQPHQW´0RGHUQSROLWLFDOLGHDOVLQGHHGFDPH
to differ considerably from those of ancient Greece. The Greeks did not separate 
conceptually between the state and civil society as did the liberal theory espoused by 
the French and American Revolutions. Moreover, the Greek polis was obviously much 
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smaller than the modern nation-state. Also the fact that the Athenian political 
philosophers and publicists were in various degrees oligarchic in sympathy contributed 
WR*UHHNGHPRFUDF\¶VORZDSSHDOWRPRGHUQGHPRFUDWV-RQHV 
The main point in the present context is however that the polis was an 
particularist-ascending type of polity. To qualify as a citizen, one had to be a free male 
born in the polis concerned (Finley 1963: 57). Naturalisation was possible, but rare. In 
Athens, citizenship was hereditary and linked to local settlements called demes (from 
demos, people of a village settlement) with their own cults and self-government (Finer 
1997: 343-344). Moreover, as we have seen, within the Hellene community as a whole 
there was a strong sense of community vis-à-vis the Other, the barbarians, in particular 
the Persians. Herodotus, ostensibly quoting Pericles, famously defined shared Greek 
LGHQWLW\ DV ³RXU FRPPRQ EURWKHUKRRG  >«@ RXU FRPPRQ ODQJXDJH WKH DOWDU DQG
VDFULILFHV RI ZKLFKZH DOO SDUWDNH WKH FRPPRQ FKDUDFWHUZKLFKZH EHDU´ History, 
VII: 144). Thus the Greeks, like modern Europeans, had multiple identities: as citizens 
of the individual states; as Greeks; and as rational human beings. 
The Greek polis was belatedly but very effectively launched as a universal model 
by the English banker and scholar George Grote (1794-1871) when he published his 
History of Greece (1846-56). The twelve volumes were quickly recognised as the best 
Greek history in any language, and its authority remained unchallenged for half a 
FHQWXU\ 'HQ %RHU DUJXHV WKDW *URWH¶V History brought about a fundamental 
UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH RULJLQ RI (XURSH ³,W ZDV QR ORQJHU WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI
Christianity, but Athenian democracy, which was to be regarded as the cradle of 
(XURSHDQ FLYLOLVDWLRQ´ GHQ %RHU   VHH DOVR EHORZ SDJH 222). Moreover, 
*URWH¶VZRUN VLJQLILFDQWO\ FRQWULEXWHG WR WKH IDFW WKDW LQ%ULWDLQ WKH LGHD RI DQFLHQW
Athens as the original precursor of modern democracy prevailed over older French and 
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
20 However, many cities in the later Hellenistic world continued to practice democracy in their local government (see below, 
Chapter 3.5). 
 90 
 
 
American progressive traditions that tended to take the Roman republic as their ideal. 
According to Gress, Grote aimed  
to demonstrate that Athenian democracy was both liberal and secular and 
constructed on principles opposed to the aristocratic and religious principles of 
WKH%ULWLVKROGUHJLPH>«@7KH9LFWRULDQYLHZRI*UHHFHstrongly influenced by 
Grote, was positive and emphatic. Victorian liberals understood from Grote that 
Athenian democracy was the greatest political achievement in human history 
before their own day. The Greeks were our ancestors; their example showed that 
cultural and political progress could, and ought to, go hand in hand. (Gress 1998: 
85, 86).  
Also in inter-state relations, ancient Greece became a model for modern Europe, 
DQGQRWDEO\IRUWKHµ5HDOLVW¶VFKRRORILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVWKHRU\7KH*UHHNV shared 
a Hellenic identity and joined forces against the Persians under the joint leadership of 
Athens and Sparta. But otherwise the poleis guarded their independence, pursued their 
µQDWLRQDO¶LQWHUHVWVHQJDJHGLQDOPRVWFRQVWDQWZDUIDUHDPRQJWKHPVHOYHV, entered and 
left alliances and leagues in a constant game of balance of power dominated by Athens 
DQG6SDUWDWKHµ*UHDW3RZHUV¶RIWKH*UHHNZRUOGDQGWUDGLWLRQDODUFK-enemies when 
WKH3HUVLDQWKUHDWZDVQRWLPPLQHQW7KXF\GLGHV¶History of the Peloponnesian War is 
WRGD\FRQVLGHUHGDFODVVLFRI5HDOLVPRQDSDUZLWK0DFKLDYHOOL¶VPrince DQG+REEHV¶
Leviathan (Jackson and Sørensen 1999: 70-72).  
Although Athens came to dominate the Delian-Attic League to the extent that 
modern historians tend to call it aQ$WKHQLDQµHPSLUH¶WKHDQFLHQW*UHHNVXQOLNHWKH
Mesopotamians, Macedonians and Romans, never developed an imperial ideology. 
Rather, the combination of polis independence and continuous outside (fellow Greek 
or Persian) threats to that independence encouraged the formation of confederal or 
federal arrangements between poleis. The Delian League started out as a sympoliteia of 
equals, consisting mostly of democratic poleis with a common decision-making 
assembly. The Peloponnesian League of mostly oligarchic poleis remained egalitarian, 
HYHQLI6SDUWDZDVFOHDUO\PRVWSRZHUIXO7KHµV\PSROLWLHV¶SUREDEO\FRPLQJFORVHVWWR
federation was the first and second Boeotian Leagues (c. 447-386 and 379-338 BC 
respectively), and the rival Aetolian and Achaean Leagues (c. 290/250-189 BC).   
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Whether the ancient Greeks thus also invented the concept of federation, i.e. the 
first ascending-universal polities in European history, is controversial. Larsen (1961) 
answers in the affirmative, whereas Finer (1997: 372-80) as well as Elazar (1987: 120-
 DUJXH WKDW WKH OHDJXHV ZHUH DW PRVW FRQIHGHUDWLRQV LH ZLWK µQDWLRQDO¶
sovereignty intact). The fact remains, however, that the Achaean League was invoked 
as a federal model for the British Empire as well as for the United States (Pinder 1991: 
113; Pagden 1995: 127; see also below, page 271). 
3.5 The Hellenistic Monarchies 
Remarkably, a new and enlarged Hellas emerged in the eastern Mediterranean 
and Near East from the decay of the polis. The Hellenistic era lasted well over three 
FHQWXULHVVWUHWFKLQJIURPWKH0DFHGRQLDQNLQJ3KLOLS,,¶VILQDOGHVWUXFWLRQRI7KHEHV
in 335 BC, marking the end of the independent Greek polis (as was mentioned, 
classical Greek democracy came to an end in 322), to the Roman conquest of the last 
+HOOHQLVWLF VXFFHVVRU VWDWH &OHRSDWUD¶V 3WROHPDLF (J\SW LQ $'  7KH +HOOHQLVWLF
world was largely the achievement of one towering, if ephemeral, historical figure, 
Alexander III (the Great, r. 336-323 BC). He was the son of Philip II. 
According to Alexander Demandt (1997: 23), modern historians have variously 
emphasised Alexander as the father of Western absolute monarchy; the trail-blazer for 
Christianity; the author of a Greek-barbarian synthesis; the initiator of the 
Hellenisation of the Orient; and the founder of world empire. He notes that in the 
modern age, the perceived absolutist, nation-building and heroic legacy of Alexander 
KDV EHHQ HPEUDFHG E\ 3UXVVLDQ NLQJ )UHGHULFN WKH *UHDW WKH µ,URQ &KDQFHOORU¶
Bismarck as well as by Adolf Hitler. Nazi propagandists even elevated him to the 
position of a Nordic-Germanic popular Führer. Many Prussian nationalist historians on 
WKH RWKHU KDQG REMHFWHG WR $OH[DQGHU¶V FRVPRSROLWDQLVP ZKLFK WKH\ WKRXJKW
fundamentally contradicted the national principle. The national-liberal Englishman 
George Grote (see above) blamed Alexander for the collapse of Athenian democracy 
and freedom. The early nineteenth century German historian Bertold Niebuhr saw 
Alexander as an ancestor of Napoleon, and the Macedonian invaders of Greece as the 
 92 
 
 
equivalents of the French invaders of Germany. Conversely, Georges Clémenceau in 
1926 published a biography of Alexander in which he trumpeted the 1913 German 
attack on France as a parallel to the invasion by rustic Macedonia of cultured Greece, 
casting himself as the French prime minister at the time in the role of Demosthenes, the 
late classical advocate of Athenian democracy and independence.  
Demandt, an eminent historian of Antiquity himself, concludes that each of these 
reDGLQJV WKRXJKGHSHQGHQWRQ WKH LQWHUSUHWHUV¶SHUVRQDOFRQWH[WDQGFRQYLFWLRQVDUH
valid in the sense that they are not emphatically contradicted by the sources. Each is 
also relevant in the present context.  
Alexander embraced the Near Eastern tradition of universalist-descending 
government and transmitted it to Rome and Constantinople. The expansion of 
Hellenistic cosmopolitanism, civilisation and empire thus blazed a trail for the Roman 
Empire as well as for Christianity. However, Hellenism was not just a transitional 
phenomenon between classical Greece and the Roman Empire; it left a legacy of its 
own which was to prove of lasting significance to east as well as west. The eastern, 
Hellenistic and Greek-speaking half came to represent the material and intellectual 
mainstay of the Roman Empire, and was also the part that survived the longest, until 
the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Hellenism left a mark on all the 
territories once directly and indirectly touched ± present-day Eastern Europe and 
Russia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the rest of the Near East. Not only 
were large parts of the Near East thus Hellenised; the Roman Empire in turn also 
became the major mediator of the Greek and Hellenistic legacy to European 
Christendom as well as to its eastern successor empires. The Eastern Roman/Byzantine 
empire in particular, but also the Persian Abbasid Caliphate, the Umayyad Arab 
Caliphate, the Hispanic Caliphate, as well as the Ottoman Caliphate tolerated, 
embraced and preserved much of Greek and Hellenistic culture, not least in science, 
representational art and architecture. 
The Macedonians spoke Greek, believed Achilles was their ancestor and saw 
themselves as part of greater Hellas. Aristotle, hailing from Macedonia himself, 
tutored Alexander. A passionate Hellene allegedly always carrying a copy of Homer on 
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KLV FDPSDLJQV $OH[DQGHU HQWKXVLDVWLFDOO\ DGRSWHG KLV DVVDVVLQDWHG IDWKHU¶V JUHDW
ambition: to revenge the invasion of Greece by the Persian Great King Xerxes 150 
years earlier. After conquering the Persians, he marched across present-day Iran and 
Afghanistan and invaded the Punjab. He wanted to go on along the Ganges to the 
µZRUOG RFHDQ¶ LQ WKH HDVW WR IRXQGD WUXHZRUOG HPSLUH EXWZDV IRUFHG WR WXUQEDFN
towards home by hiV RZQ H[KDXVWHG VROGLHUV LQ  %& $OH[DQGHU¶V VKRUW-lived 
empire thus came to stretch roughly from the Adriatic and Egypt in the west to the 
mountains of Afghanistan in the east. After he died of fever at Babylon at the age of 
33, it took forty years of infighting before the lands he conquered were conclusively 
GLYLGHG LQWRDQXPEHURINLQJGRPVHDFK UXOHGE\RQHRI$OH[DQGHU¶VJHQHUDOVRUD
descendant of one. By about 275 BC, three main successor states had emerged: the 
Seleucid empire, the Ptolemaic empire (the richest part, including Egypt) and 
Macedonia. These came to dominate the eastern Mediterranean until the arrival of the 
Romans. 
For half a century before this resolution, whole armies of Macedonians and 
Greeks spent their lives fighting in the Near East. They were eventually settled in the 
conquered territories, establishing Hellenic influence in many places where it had 
never been felt before. Great numbers of migrants from overpopulated Greece and 
Macedonia followed, forming a new governing class, and adding merchants and 
artisans to the Greek-speaking soldier-settler middle class, on top of the native 
population. A degree of material and cultural Hellenisation followed, mainly in urban 
centres. The subject people in the countryside as well as in the cities remained largely 
untouched.  
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Everywhere Alexander and his successors founded new cities modelled on the 
Greek (or refounded old ones). Some, like Alexandria, Antioch and Seleucia-on-
the-Tigris became great metropolises, far surpassing even classical Athens in size 
and prosperity. (These three reached and perhaps exceeded half a million in 
population, to be matched only by Rome and Carthage.) The characteristic 
elements of a Greek polis were transplanted: the Agora and temples, the 
gymnasia and stoas, assemblies, councils and magistrates. And of course the 
immigrants and their descendants spoke Greek, a modified Attic dialect which 
became uniform throughout most of the Hellenistic world (best known today as 
the Greek of the New Testament). The educated and the old ruling elements 
among the conquered people quickly adopted the Greek tongue and much of 
Greek culture. The natives of the lower class, however, clung tenaciously to their 
own speech and writing ± Egyptian, for example, or Aramaic, the original 
language of the Gospels ± and this was the most obvious external sign of a 
fundamental cleavage in the population. (Finley 1963: 172-173) 
The initial material basis for Hellenisation was the enormous booty in bullion and 
precious objects released by $OH[DQGHU¶V ZDUV 7KLV DQG WKH UXOHUV¶ VXEVHTXHQW
encouragement of economic development, communications and trade made it possible 
to pay for considerable standing armies and bureaucracies. The former Persian empire 
was joined with the Mediterranean world in a great common market controlled by 
Greek and Hellenised producers, traders and bankers. For instance, the reopening by 
Alexander of the old sea route around the Arabic peninsula and into the Red Sea 
facilitated a lively trade in luxuries like spice, ebony, and gemstones between the 
Mediterranean and India.  
However, since the main trading centres were in the East and because of the 
emigration, the Greek homeland suffered great material decline. Politically, 
economically and even culturally it had to yield primacy to the Hellenistic centres in 
the East and South. Only in philosophy did the Athenian academy remain pre-eminent. 
The growing wealth made the great Hellenistic cities hubs of art and science. Egyptian 
Alexandria became the greatest cultural centre of the Hellenistic world through the 
3WROHPDLF NLQJV¶ JHQHURXV VSRQVRUVKLS RI WKH 0XVHLRQ LQVWLWXWH 2QH RI WKH WZR
greatest libraries of the ancient world was established there (the other was located at 
Pergamon in Asia Minor). Alexandria became pre-eminent in natural science by 
EXLOGLQJ RQ WKH VFLHQWLILF UHFRUGV IURP $OH[DQGHU¶V FDPSDLJQ DQG RQ WKH ZRUNV RI
Aristotle. Most famous of all became the contributions of Archimedes to mathematics, 
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physics and chemistry, but many other scientists made important innovations in 
medicine, anatomy, physiology, biology, botany, zoology, astronomy, geography, 
DJULFXOWXUHDQGPRVWO\PLOLWDU\WHFKQRORJ\,QVKRUW³WKH+HOOHQLVWLFSHULRGZDVWKH
JROGHQDJHRI*UHHNVFLHQFH´%DUQHV 
Moreover, the humanistic science of philology was founded, as was the so-called 
New Theatre. Architecture and the figural arts blossomed, if perhaps without the 
originality of the classical Greeks. Even classical Greek political ideas spread, as all 
Hellenistic cities had democratic constitutions and even practiced democratic local 
government. However,  
while democracy was accepted by all as the ideal civic constitution, in practice 
real popular participation in government declined in the Hellenistic age and 
dominance by the weDOWK\LQFUHDVHG>«%@\WKHHQGRIWKHIRXUWKFHQWXU\WKH
balance between the power of rich and poor had shifted in favour of the rich. 
Cities became dependent on the rich for their very survival (Price 1986: 382, 
383).  
In religion, the veneration of the old Greek gods became merely a convention. 
Many Greeks turned to oriental mystery religions, in particular to the worship of the 
Egyptian goddess Isis and the Iranian god Mithra, which at the same time to some 
extent were Hellenised. However, many members of the enlightened elite found 
religion unsatisfactory and sought a rational philosophy adapted to the post-polis, 
cosmopolitan Hellenistic world. Thus around 300 BC two new philosophical schools 
were founded in Athens: that of the Epicureans and that of the Stoics. Epicureanism 
and Stoicism indeed became the main Hellenistic contributions to western philosophy. 
Stoicism was particularly portentous for the Roman and Christian future of the West: 
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Greek philosophy was a more potent force in its decline than it was in the great 
days of Plato and Aristotle; and Stoicism exerted a greater influence on the lives 
of men and the development of States than the Academy or the Lyceum. There is 
much in the philosophy of Stoicism which reflects the era of Alexander; and it 
was perhaps powerful because it marched with the times. The era was one of 
uprooting and emigration and the mixture of peoples, in which the West moved 
eastwards on a steady tide, and an ebb sometimes set from the East to the West. 
The early Stoics came from the East, and though they might inherit Greek physics 
and metaphysics, they were free from the prepossessions and prejudices of Greek 
political thought. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was a hellenised Phoenician 
from Cyprus [whose youth coincided with the beJLQQLQJRI$OH[DQGHU¶VUXOH@Ҡ
(Barker 1923: 51-52)   
Both Epicureanism and Stoicism were initially individualistic systems of thought 
focussed on the achievement of the good and virtuous life in the private sphere. 
However, Stoicism was eventually able to go public, as it were, and become an 
ideology of empire:  
Above all, it was Stoic quietism which underwent important changes. 
Indifference to social position ± and hence acceptance of whatever status one 
happened to have ± was turned into a doctrine of vocation and duty, particularly 
for rulers. The shift was largely the work of the Rhodian school, whose chief 
figures were Panaetius and the immensely learned Poseidonius (131-51 BC), 
&LFHUR¶VWHDFKHULQSKLORVRSK\6WRLFLVPWKHQEHFDPHWKHPDLQSKLORVRSKLFDO 
school of the Romans as well. Among the outstanding Roman Stoics were Seneca 
(who held high office for a long time under Nero) and the emperor Marcus 
Aurelius. For such men of action obviously the brotherhood of man and the rule 
of natural reason had altogether different overtones from those of early Stoicism. 
The object now was to find a moral basis on which to rule an empire, and after 
Augustus established monarchical government in Rome this was further 
narrowed to rule by an absolute monarch. The king who was also a philosopher 
became the Stoic ideal, and the Cynic as well. (Finley 1963: 178) 
7KLV LGHRORJLFDO GHYHORSPHQW KDG EHHQ SUHSDUHG E\ 3KLOLS¶V DQG $OH[DQGHU¶V
imperial practice. Macedonian rule forced the Greeks, first, to start grappling with the 
idea of a wider political unity than the polis, and second, to relate more closely to the 
µEDUEDULDQV¶RI WKH(DVW$OWKRXJK$OH[DQGHUPD\KDYHVWDUWHGKLVFDPSDLJQWRZDUGV
WKH(DVWDVDFUXVDGHDJDLQVWWKHµEDUEDULDQV¶KLVSXUSRUWHGDLPEHFDPHWRXQLWH(ast 
and West in a universal community of equal individuals regardless of nationality.   
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Alexander had united the known world of his time (save Italy and the confines of 
the West) in a single society; and he had assumed the equality of all the members 
of that society. He had contradicted the two axioms hitherto current in the 
political thought of the Greeks ± that a multiplicity of separate self-governing and 
self-sufficing cities was the best constitution of politics, and that differences and 
inequalities between the members (enfranchised and disenfranchised, citizen and 
alien) were inevitably implied by the very genius of the city. His conquests and 
his policy had implied two opposite conceptions ± that of a single cosmopolis of 
the inhabited earth, transcending cities as it transcended tribes and nations; and 
that of the equality of all men, or at any rate all free men, in the life of a common 
humanity. These are the two fundamental conceptions which inaugurate a new 
epoch ± an epoch which succeeds to that of the polis, and precedes that of the 
national state; an epoch which covers the centuries that lie between Aristotle and 
Alexander at one end and Luther and Henry VIII at the other, and embraces in its 
scope the three empires of Macedon and Rome and Charlemagne. They are again 
the two conceptions which we find in the teaching of St. Paul, who believed in 
one Church of all Christians which should cover the world, and held that in that 
&KXUFKWKHUHZDVµQHLWKHU*UHHNQRU-HZ«EDUEDULDQ6F\WKLDQERQGQRUIUHH¶
(Barker 1923: 47-48)  
Thus, to help sustain his rule, Alexander fostered intermarriage between Greeks 
and Persians; received Persians into his army; adopted the ceremonial of the Persian 
court; dressed like a Persian king; appointed Persians to many important administrative 
positions (or left them in the places they had); and preserved the Persian system of 
provincial government (which was later taken over by the Romans). A particularly 
famous symbol of his policy of amalgamation was the mass wedding at Susa in 324, 
where he himself married two daughters of the defeated Persian Great King Dareios 
III; 80 Macedonian officers wed daughters of Persian aristocrats; and 10,000 members 
of the Macedonian army took Persian wives.  
However, as has been noted, the successors of Alexander did not continue his 
amalgamation policy, but ruled through a Greek-speaking elite deeply separated from 
WKH QDWLYH VXEMHFWV ³7KH *UHHNV >VWLOO@ EHOLHYHG LQ WKHLU FXOWXUDO VXSHULRULW\ RYHU
µEDUEDULDQV¶DQGIRUWKHPWKLVEHOLHI MXVWLILHGSROLWLFDOGRPLQDQFH´3ULFH 
Alexander also tried to advance imperial cohesion and loyalty by adopting the 
WUDGLWLRQDO 1HDU (DVWHUQ FXOW RI WKH UXOHU +LV µDEVROXWLVW¶ LGHDV ZHUH SHUKDSV
conceived, or reinforced, at his visit to the shrine of the Egyptian god Ammon at the 
Siwa Oasis west of the Nile in 332-331. Here the priests greeted the new ruler in the 
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old Pharaonic tradition as the son of Ammon. Alexander seems henceforward to have 
actively encouraged this practice by e.g. forcing his Macedonian officers to salute him 
by prostration (proskynesis).  Such veneration was however also in part a continuation 
of the Greek tradition to promote founders of cities when they died to the rank of hero 
and thus objects of hero-worship. Moreover, monarchy was a traditional part of the 
Macedonian state.  
$OH[DQGHU¶VVXFFHVVRUVZHUHLQDQ\FDVHDEOHWRHIIHFWLYHO\FDUU\RQWKHZRUVKLS
of the ruler as the divine benefactor and saviour of the people. Not only the kings, but 
also the rulers of the Hellenistic cities were adored. This universal-descending tradition 
was eventually adopted by the Roman emperors as a means to hold together a divisive 
empire, as well as by the individual Roman cities. Thus Stoicism and emperor-worship 
became two of the main Hellenistic ideological legacies to the Roman Empire.  
3.6 The Roman Empire 
The Romans dominated the Mediterranean world and large parts of future Europe 
for well over half a millennium. The Graecophone part of the empire survived the fall 
of the western emperor in AD 476 and, though gradually diminished and taking on an 
LQFUHDVLQJO\GLVWLQFWµ%\]DQWLQH¶FKDUDFWHUOLYHGRQLQWKHHDVWHUQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQDQG
Near East for more than twice that time, until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople 
in 1453. At the height of its power and prestige, the Antonine period (AD 96-180),21 
the Empire ruled more than 3 million square kilometres and perhaps 56 million 
people.22  ,WVWUHWFKHGIURPWRGD\¶V1RUWKXPEHUODQGWR$OJHULDIURP3RUWXJDOWR6\ULD
from the Rhine to the Nile. A fairly regular and lawful imperial government, tolerant of 
ethnic and religious diversity, provided the territory of what is now more than thirty 
                                              
 
 
21 The near-FHQWXU\IURPWKHGHDWKRI'RPLWLDQ WR WKHDFFHVVLRQRI&RPPRGXVZDVLQ(GZDUG*LEERQ¶VRSLQLRQWKHRQH
ZKHQLQWKHHQWLUHKLVWRU\RIWKHZRUOG³WKHFRQGLWLRQRIWKHKXPDQUDFHZDVPRVWKDSS\DQGSURVSHURXV´Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire, ch. 3, quoted approvingly by Finer 1997: 564).  
22 According to Finer, there is no evidence for the size of the population, but the estimate of 56 million is adopted by many 
scholars (Finer 1997: 532).  
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sovereign states with relative prosperity, civilisation, peace and unity (see e.g. 
Rietbergen 1998: 49 ff.).   
As Jacques le Goff (2005: 10-11) points out, medieval Europe emerged directly 
from the Roman Empire. Among the major Roman legacies to Europe, le Goff 
identifies its Latin language and culture, military skills, the architectural tradition, 
superior WHFKQLFDO H[SHUWLVH ³WKH RSSRVLWLRQ DQG FRPSOHPHQWDULW\ WKDW REWDLQHG
EHWZHHQWRZQDQGFRXQWU\VLGH´5RPDQODZDQGWKHOLEHUDODUWVWKHtrivium or arts of 
speech and the quadrivium or numerical arts).  
However, the Romans did not identify themselves consciously as Europeans. 
Their empire was centred on the Mediterranean and covered parts of what is today 
considered Europe, Asia and Africa. According to Delanty (1995: 20), the Romans 
retained the basic Greek, geographical understanding of Europe as the present 
continent of Europe, with the exception of Scandinavia and, often, Britain and the 
Iberian peninsula. Sometimes the western half of the empire was called Europe and the 
eastern half Asia (de Rougemont 1966: 41). Still, the legacy of Rome has had a huge 
influence on subsequent Europeanness and Europeanism. As we have seen (in Chapter 
2.5 DERYHDPRQJLWVHIIHFWV5RNNDQVWUHVVHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH5RPDQ³WUDGLWLRQ
IRU WKH (PSHURU¶V VXSUHPDF\ WKH V\VWHPDWLVDWLRQ RI OHgal rules, and the idea of 
FLWL]HQVKLS´ 5RNNDQ  , IRUP\SDUWZLOOHPSKDVLVH IRXUHOHPHQWVRI WKH
Roman legacy as particularly pertinent for attitudes to post-1945 European Union-
building. 
First, the Roman empire embraced the universalist-descending, Near Eastern and 
+HOOHQLVWLF WUDGLWLRQ RI HPSLUH 5RNNDQ¶V ³WUDGLWLRQ IRU WKH (PSHURU¶V VXSUHPDF\´
creating an example of civilisation, peace and order that remained an ideal throughout 
the Middle Ages and which survived to significantly influence modern European 
political thought and practice. I submit that the Romans thus established an extensive 
basis for later Europeanism, particularly in areas with a Roman past. Moreover, as the 
Roman Empire during most of its history actually (if not in theory) was not a 
centralised empire but a federation of city-states, its political legacy contributed 
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WRZDUGVWKHIHGHUDOLVWLGHDVDQGSUDFWLFHWKDWHPHUJHGLQWKH(XURSHDQµFLW\-EHOW¶VHH
Section 3.6.1).  
Second, by extending Greco-Roman, Mediterranean civilisation (including 
SROLWLFDO LGHDVQRWOHDVW³WKHLGHDRIFLWL]HQVKLS´QRUWKZDUGVLQWRWUDQVDOSLQH(XURSH
and leaving an immeasurable material and intellectual legacy to modern-day Europe, 
the Roman Empire has greatly influenced the identity and culture (Europeanness) of 
modern Europeans, most notably of those living in areas once ruled from Rome. The 
Romanisation of the barbarians living in or near the empire was effected either directly 
by the Roman empire itself or, later in the West, by the Roman Church under papal 
leadership (see Section 3.6.2 and later sections). 
Third, an essential part of the Roman governmental and cultural legacy, and 
again, one that touches especially areas that were part of the empire, was a reverence 
IRUDQGDSSOLFDWLRQRI5RPDQ ODZ5RNNDQ¶V³V\VWHPDWLVDWLRQRI OHJDOUXOHV´ZKLFK
was universal-scope law. This contributed towards Europeanness as well as 
Europeanism (see Section 3.6.3).  
Fourth and finally, the Roman empire provided an indispensable administrative-
political and cultural basis for the rise of the transnational community of Christendom, 
which in turn facilitated the growth of European community feeling (Europeanness) 
and reinforced a predisposition, particularly in post-Roman parts of modern, 
geographic Europe, to accept cosmopolitan-cum-universal-cum-European governance 
(Europeanism) (see Section 3.6.4 and later sections).     
3.6.1 The Roman idea of empire 
The Roman polity was initially a traditional conquest empire, or what Samuel 
)LQHU FDOOV D µ0DUN ,¶ HPSLUH LQZKLFK ³DQ LGHQWLILDEOH HWKQLF RU FRPPXQDO JURXS
and/or a core territorial unit (which might be state-generic, national, or, indeed, a city-
state) H[HUWGRPLQLRQRYHURWKHUHWKQLFWHUULWRULDORUFRPPXQDOJURXSV´)LQHU
8). However, the endurance and stability of this far-flung, cosmopolitan empire rested 
QRWRQSK\VLFDOFRHUFLRQDORQH7KHHPSLUHVXUYLYHGIRUVR ORQJGXHWRWKH5RPDQV¶
unique ability to forge strong bonds of interest, identity and ideology between central 
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and peripheral oligarchies within their dominion, but also because of the political, 
economic and cultural advantages the Empire offered wider segments of Roman 
citizens. The principal means of cohesion were military force, political control and co-
optation, economic development and integration, advancement of a common high 
culture, or civilisation, and the rule of law. Crucially in the current context, the 
application of these means were justified and legitimised by reference to an idea, or 
vision, of universal empire.  
The practical success of Roman strategy and ideology eventually enabled the 
5RPDQV LQ WKH'RPLQDWHRU/DWHU(PSLUHSHULRG WR HVWDEOLVKZKDW0DQQFDOOV³WKH
first territorial empire, the first predominantly non-segmental extensive society, at least 
LQ LWV KLJKHU UHDFKHV´ LQZRUOG KLVWRU\ 0DQQ   )LQHU VSHDNV YDULRXVO\ RI
µ(PSLUH0DUN,,¶ZKHUH³WKHUHKDVHYROYHGDFRPPRQLPSHULDOFXOWXUHZKLFKDFWVDs 
µWKHWLFNHWRIHQWU\¶IRUDQ\ZKRZDQWWRMRLQWKHUXOLQJVWUDWXP´D³FRXQWU\-VWDWH´RU
³DQHDUO\IRUPRIDµFRQVRFLDO¶VWDWH´)LQHU 
As we have seen, the Hellenistic empire of Alexander, and before that the Near 
Eastern empires, had in many ways foreshadowed the Roman Empire. But the 
European concept of empire is, like the term itself, mainly inspired by the Roman 
model. The Latin term imperium originally meant military order or command (Barker 
1911; Keene 2005: 56-57). It related to the locus of such orders or commands, i.e. to a 
person, and not their scope. It had neither territorial nor, strictly speaking, political 
connotations. In the republican period, imperium indicated the sovereignty of the 
people and senate of Rome. Each of the higher magistrates was vested by a specific 
law with both military and civil imperium, which varied in degree according to the 
level of the office. In the later days of the Republic the resident consuls and praetors in 
Rome, and in the provinces the various proconsuls and propraetors, enjoyed such 
imperium.   
But now the term began to be invested with universal scope: imperium merged 
with the Hellenistic-Stoic notion of a single universal human race (Pagden 1995: 19). 
By the first century AD imperium KDGFRPHWREHLGHQWLILHGVLPSO\ZLWKµWKHZRUOG¶
the orbis terrarum or orbis terrae:  
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De iure at least, Augustus and his successors had become rulers of the world. It 
now required only an act of legislation, duly provided by the Emperor Antonius 
Pius in the second century in the famous Lex Rhodia, to transform the imperator 
LQWRWKHµ/RUGRIDOOWKH:RUOG¶µGRPLQXVWRWLXVRUELV¶. The concept of the orbis 
terrarum became in effect the appropriation by the political realm of the Stoic 
notion of single human genus. It was, as the French historian Claude Nicolet has 
VDLGRILWDµWULSOHDFKLHYHPHQWVSDWLDOWHPSRUDODQGSROLWLFDO¶3DJGHQ
23) 
Pagden adds that this universalist notion of sovereignty did not mean that the 
Romans were unaware of an independent world outside the actual frontiers of the 
Empire. On the contrary. But it did mean that they thought e.g. the Chinese had no 
separate identity as a community, and that China one day would be absorbed by the 
universal Empire.  
During the Principate (or Early Empire, 27 BC ± AD 284), the locus of imperium 
was re-centralised in the hands of the princeps (literally, first among equals). In 27 BC 
Octavian (taking the title Augustus) obtained an imperium whose scope was 
coextensive with the whole of the Roman world, but whose locus was concurrent in 
some provinces with the imperium of the senatorial proconsuls. This diarchy 
disappeared with the Dominate. By the time of Constantine the Great, when a near-
absolutist monarchy had been established, the emperor enjoyed sole imperium. 
According to Barker (1911), the locus of sovereignty, the nomen imperii, had shifted 
from the many via the few to one. At the same time, its scope remained universal.  
In practice, however, considerable power remained with the governors of the 
provinces and with the cities. Moreover, by the fourth century AD the Empire was 
colloquially known as Romania, and everyone within it counted as a romanus, whether 
Roman or not (P. Brown 1971: 19, 41). More formally, however, even after the demise 
of the Republic, the Romans themselves persisted in calling their empire not the 
Imperium Romanum (though this name was sometimes used), but the res publica, 
ZKLFKPD\EHWUDQVODWHGDVWKHµFRPPRQLQWHUHVW¶RUWKHµFRPPRQGRPDLQ¶$EVWUDFWO\
this deQRPLQDWLRQ ZDV SUREDEO\ XQGHUVWRRG DV µWKH FRPPRQZHDOWK¶ RU VLPSO\ µWKH
VWDWH¶ ZLWKRXW DQ\ SDUWLFXODU WHUULWRULDO HWKQLF RU RWKHU TXDOLILFDWLRQ $FFRUGLQJ WR
Finer, the Romans were thus the first to conceive of the res publica DV ³D QH[XV RI
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goods, activiWLHV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQV ZKLFK EHORQJHG DW ODUJH >«DV@ DQ DEVWUDFW
LPSHUVRQDO DWWULEXWH RI WKH FROOHFWLYLW\´ )LQHU   7RJHWKHU WKH 5RPDQ
notions of imperium and res publica add up to something close to the idea of 
sovereignty usually associated with the rise of the modern state ± but with a 
universalist rather than a particularist scope.  
The ethos that informed the Roman notion of the res publica, and thus their 
µHPSLUH¶ ZDV VWURQJO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ *UHHN DQG +HOOHQLVWLF PRUDO DQG SROLWLFDO
thought, particularly Stoicism. The Greek idea of the polis, or city-state, tending as we 
have seen in the Hellenistic period towards the universal-scope Stoic notion of the 
cosmopolis, or world state, helped produce an imperial ideology which inclined Rome 
³WR think that she governed all men and that her own universal law was closely related 
WRWKHQDWXUDOODZ´+LQVOH\7KHLQIOXHQFHRI6WRLFLVPZDVVXFKWKDWHYHQ
the Christianity eventually embraced by the Romans acquired strong Stoic 
underpinnings:  
The vogue which Stoic philosophy came to enjoy at Rome, from the days of the 
Scipios to the days of Marcus Aurelius, is a matter known to every scholar. It 
imbued the Roman lawyers with their tenets of a universal law of nature and the 
equality of all mHQEHIRUHWKDWODZ>«@7KHWKRXJKWRQZKLFKWKHEHVWRIWKH
Romans fed was a thought of the World-State, the universal law of nature, the 
brotherhood and the equality of men; and thought of this nature inevitably 
penetrated and determined the general conception which they entertained of their 
empire. It is of peculiar importance, therefore, that we should understand the 
stage of development which Stoicism had reached, and the form of presentation 
which it had found, in the days of the establishment of the Roman Empire ± the 
days, which we may also add, of the beginnings of the Christian Church, which 
also claimed to be a universal society, and also came under the influence of 
Stoicism. (Barker 1923: 53) 
It was first and foremost in the writings of the intellectual, jurist and politician 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) that the Greek, political concept of polis and the 
Roman and legal formulation of imperium became merged with the Stoic notion of a 
single joint community of gods and men (Pagden 1995: 19). According to Cicero, there 
was, first, a universal law of nature arising from divine providential government of the 
world and from the rational and social nature of human beings which makes them 
similar to God (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 161 ff.). This constitution of the world-state 
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is equally present and binding everywhere. Second, in the light of this eternal law all 
persons are equal in the possession of reason. Cicero held that everybody has the same 
capacity for experience and for the same kinds of experience, and all are equally 
capable of discriminating between right and wrong. Thirdly, according to Cicero the 
state is a moral community, a group of persons who possesses the state and its law in 
common. Expressed in speeches that were later taken as models of Latin rhetoric, these 
Ciceronian-Stoic conceptions became a decisive influence on medieval European legal 
and political thought:  
&LFHUR¶VWUXHLPSRUWDQFHLQWKHKLVWRU\RISROLWLFDOWKRXJKWOLHVLQWKHIDFWWKDWKH
gave to the Stoic doctrine of natural law a statement in which it was universally 
known throughout western Europe from his own day down to the nineteenth 
century. From him it passed to the Roman lawyers and not less to the Fathers of 
the Church. The most important passages were quoted times without number 
WKURXJKRXWWKH0LGGOH$JHV>«@7KHLGHDVZHUHRIFRXUVHLQQRVHQVHRULJLQDO
with Cicero but his statement of them, largely in Latin expressions of his own 
devising to render the Stoic Greek, became incomparably the most important 
singlHOLWHUDU\PHDQVIRUVSUHDGLQJWKHPWKURXJKZHVWHUQ(XURSH>«@7KHVH
general principles of government ± that authority proceeds from the people, 
should be exercised only by warrant of law, and is justified only on moral 
grounds ± achieved practically universal acceptance within a comparatively short 
time after Cicero wrote and remained commonplaces of political philosophy for 
many centuries. There was substantially no difference of opinion on the part of 
anyone in the whole course of the Middle Ages; they became a part of the 
common heritage of political ideas. (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 161, 164) 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC ± AD 65) added another twist to the Stoicist 
notion that every person is a member of two commonwealths: the particular state he is 
a citizen of and the universal community of all rational beings, to which he belongs by 
virtue of his humanity. More than Cicero, Seneca emphasised the importance of the 
latter, which he saw as a moral and even religious society deserving of the greatest 
loyaOW\ RI PHQ 7KXV 6HQHFD¶V WKRXJKW IRUHVKDGRZHG WKH &KXUFK )DWKHUV¶ LGHD RI
Christendom as the kingdom of God on earth. Seneca may have known St Paul, but 
insisted he was a Stoic rather than a Christian (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 171-176). 
However, the material basis of Roman power was no doubt the military. The 
5RPDQ DUP\ ZDV ³WKH FRUH WKH FHQWUDO WKH FULWLFDO LQVWLWXWLRQ >«@ WKH XOWLPDWHO\
GHFLVLYHSROLWLFDOIRUFH>«@1RSUHYLRXVFXOWXUHH[FHSWSHUKDSVWKH$VV\ULDQDQGWKH
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&K¶LQ ZDV VR SHUYDVLYHO\ DQG LQWHQVHO\ PLOLWDULVWLF´ )LQHU   6WLOO WKH
gradual build-up of internal loyalty and/or submissiveness by non-coercive means ± 
ideological, political, legal, cultural and economic ± allowed the army to concentrate 
its resources on foreign wars anGGHIHQFH³>7@KH(PSLUHZDVQRWKHOGGRZQE\IRUFH
for most of the first century A.D., for instance, there was only one legion stationed in 
1RUWK$IULFD DQG QRQH DW DOO LQ6SDLQ´ *ULIILQ7KHSUHVHQFHRI WKH DUP\
significantly helped Romanise the provinces were it was stationed, and Romanised 
µEDUEDULDQV¶HYHQWXDOO\FDPHWRFRQVWLWXWHLWVFRUHWURRSVDQGRIILFHUVVHHEHORZSDJH
145).  
The economic part of Roman polity-building consisted in incorporation of the 
SHULSKHU\ LQWRZKDW0LFKDHO0DQQ FDOOV µWKH OHJLRQDU\ HFRQRP\¶7KH5RPDQ DUP\
legions not only conquered territories, but also built infrastructure and consumed goods 
and services, thus facilitating economic integration. Space was pacified, the 
agriFXOWXUDO VXUSOXV DQG SRSXODWLRQ URVH WKH VWDWH¶VPLOLWDU\ H[SHQGLWXUHV VWLPXODWHG
demand and boosted the monetary economy. Economic complexity grew and living 
standards improved. Roman rule became territorially continuous and resources 
diffused across the (PSLUH³7KXVWKHUHHPHUJHGDXQLYHUVDOUXOLQJFODVV± extensive, 
monopolising land and the labour of others, politically organised, and culturally 
conscious of itself. The fully developed republic/empire was not ruled by congeries of 
particularistic local rulers, or by a Roman conquering core over or through native 
HOLWHVEXWE\DFODVV³0DQQ 
+RZHYHU0DQQVWUHVVHV WKDW WKHXQLIRUPHFRQRP\DOVRKHOSHGFUHDWH³WKH ILUVW
H[WHQVLYHFLYLOVRFLHW\ LQRXUPRGHUQVHQVHRI WKHWHUP´0DQQ7), or more 
SUHFLVHO\³DEDODQFHRISRZHUEHWZHHQVWDWHDQGµFLYLOVRFLHW\¶WKURXJKDPL[WXUHRI
VWDWH DXWKRULW\ DQG SULYDWHO\ RUJDQLVHG VXSSO\ DQG GHPDQG´ 0DQQ   $Q
autonomous private economic sector arose, underpinned by an ethos which embraced 
fundamental norms that later became foundations of capitalism and of western civil 
society generally: private property and possession, inheritance, juridical personality, 
individual legal responsibility and status, contract, liability, obligation, etc. Uniquely in 
the contemporary global context, these and other norms regulating the relations 
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between citizens as well as their relations with the state became codified in a 
sophisticated, systematic, effectively enforced and generally respected system of law 
(see below, Section 3.6.2).  
The political part of Roman polity-building combined the creation of a strong, but 
relatively small centre of control and the co-optation of local oligarchies that were 
largely left to govern the periphery as long as they deferred to some minimal central 
requirements, including the adoption of the imperial culture. The size of the central 
state apparatus remained limited even with the emergence of a de facto Mediterranean 
empire after the First and Second Punic Wars (resp. 261-241 and 219-202 BC). And so 
it remained after further conquests and the tumultuous politics of the late Roman 
³EDQDQDUHSXEOLF´)LQHUOHGWRDFHQWUDOLVDWLRQRISRZHULQWKHprinceps.  
The new constitution instigated by Emperor Augustus in 27 BC confirmed the 
shift of power from the nobility to a populist princeps. The emperor eventually, after 
'LRFOHWLDQ¶V $' -305) restoration and reorganisation became an absolutist 
dominus. Mainly due to external pressure from Germanic, Hun, Slav and other restless 
µEDUEDULDQ¶SHRSOHV WKHHPSLUHGXULQJ WKH µ'RPLQDWH¶SHULRG RU/DWHU(PSLUH-
526) turned into a bureaucratic, unitary state that adopted the universalist-descending, 
Hellenistic tradition of emperor-ZRUVKLS³7he notion of the princeps vanished and the 
office was invested instead with all the attributes of the earlier divine monarchies of 
WKH+HOOHQLVWLF(DVW³)LQHU 
Obedience was what the Empire most fundamentally demanded from its citizens 
and subjects. This however entailed mainly two things: that taxes be paid and Roman 
ODZ EH UHVSHFWHG2WKHUZLVH ORFDO DIIDLUV DQG µFLYLO VRFLHW\¶ZHUH OHIW ODUJHO\ DORQH
7KH 3ULQFLSDWH ZDV ³OLWWOH EXW D VXSHUVWUXFWXUH IRU FR-ordination and control; high 
policy was indeed made at the top, but the dynamics of workaday affairs came from the 
FLWLHV´)LQHU&LWLHVUHWDLQHGDFRQVLGHUDEOHGHJUHHRIORFDOVHOI-rule until 
WKH'RPLQDWH7KHFODVVLFDO5RPDQ(PSLUHPD\WKXVEHVHHQDVD³IHGHUDWLRQRIFLW\-
states´+R\WDQG&KRGRURZ 
Local elites were usually more than willing to let themselves be drawn into the 
empire-wide, ideologically integrated, politically and economically advantaged ruling 
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class. Key means of political co-optation were the conferral of citizenship and the 
diffusion across the Empire of membership in the Senate and of the imperial 
VXFFHVVLRQ ,Q WKH ODWWHU FDVH ³>W@KH SXUSOH SDVVHG IURP5RPDQ DULVWRFUDWV WR ,WDOLDQ
µERXUJHRLV¶ WKHQ WR ,WDOLDQVHWWOHUV LQ6SDLQDQG6RXWKHUQ*DXO When to Africans and 
6\ULDQVWKHQWRPHQIURPWKH'DQXELDQDQG%DONDQDUHDV´0DQQ7KH
Edict of Caracalla, which conferred citizenship on all free male inhabitants of the 
(PSLUHZDVLQGHHGWKHILQDOFRQILUPDWLRQRIWKH(PSLUH¶VH[SUHVVO\Fosmopolitan and 
universalist character:  
There was no longer a single capital city, province, tribe, ethnos, sect, or any 
other segment in society that held imperium over the rest. Instead, this oecumene 
was overlaid and run by a stratum sharing the same imperial culture. This is what 
Romanitas now meant. To possess this culture was the necessary passport to an 
active role in society. (Finer 1997: 584)  
Even after Diocletian in 293 divided the Empire into a western and an eastern 
half to be ruled by two emperors and two deputies (the so-called Tetrarchy) the empire 
was thought of as a single and indivisible state with two geographical and 
administrative halves: utraque pars, pars orientalis et pars occidentalis (see further 
below, Section 3.6.4).   
3.6.2 The Romanisation of Europe 
7KH 5RPDQLVDWLRQ RI WKH (PSLUH RU 5RPDQ µQDWLRQ-EXLOGLQJ¶ LQYROYHG WKH
diffusion across the Empire of an urban, literate, complex and remarkably uniform 
high culture or civilisation. After about a century of Roman dominance, it generally 
became impossible to detect local cultural survivals among the elites. Schoolboys 
studied the same books across the empire; cities arose with similar layout, temples and 
public buildings; there was a uniformity of style in private residences ranging from the 
silver on the table and the mosaics on the floor, to the floor heating (Griffin 1986: 6). 
According to Finer, 
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Romanisation spread downwards from the local oligarchies to the wider circle of 
city dwellers, and outwards, where it was often superficial and disappeared with 
the empire; as witness its rapid and total effacement in Britain. But it was 
substantial enough in its time to create a common pattern of urban life over the 
whole of this vast area, and a common identity, Romanitas, much like (it seems to 
me) the common pattern one observes throughout the length and breadth of the 
USA, despite widely different ethnic and religious backgrounds. (Finer 1997: 
533)  
Roman civilisation was however to a considerable extent Romanised Greek 
culture. By diffusing Hellenistic culture throughout the West, the Romans assured its 
historical survival and future influence on Western letters and thought. The Greco-
5RPDQµFRPPRQLPSHULDOFXOWXUH¶WKXVFDPHWREHIRUPDWLYHRI(XURSHDQDQGZHVWHrn 
civilisation ± of Europeanness.  
Rome had enjoyed very close contacts with the Greek world from the very 
earliest times. The Greek influence on Rome began in earnest in the third century BC 
when the Romans began to take seriously and systematically study Greek culture. They 
imported goods and services from Greece, and after a while their writers began to copy 
Greek literary models. The Greek colonies of Magna Graecia in southern Italy and 
Sicily were subjected to Roman rule between 270 and 241 BC, and Rome conquered 
the whole Hellenistic East between 200 and 133 BC (including, in 146 BC, mainland 
Greece). As we have seen, rather than erasing the culture of their new subjects and 
imposing their own, the Romans recognised the cultural superiority of the Greeks, 
embraced their heritage, adulating the Greek genius and contriving to inherit it. 
Arguably, it was their entry into the rich Hellenistic East that gave the practically 
minded Romans the material and intellectual means to found and maintain a world 
empire.  
The Romans began studying Greek rhetorical techniques, which were useful in a 
society dominated by deliberative assemblies and law courts, in the early second 
century BC. This meant setting up schools similar to those in Greece, which opened 
the door to a flood of Greek culture. By the time of Cicero, studying under Greek 
WHDFKHUV LQ 5RPH DQG JRLQJ WR$WKHQV RU 5KRGHV WR FRPSOHWH RQH¶V HGXFDWLRQZDV
common among the members of the ruling class. Assimilation of Greek skills in 
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dialectic, grammar and rhetoric was an important precondition for ruling the Greek 
ZRUOG HIILFLHQWO\ DQG WKXV NHHSLQJ WKH HPSLUH XQLWHG $IWHU GHIHDWLQJ WKH µRULHQWDO¶
Mark Antony-Cleopatra alliance (at the battle of Actium off western Greece in 31 BC), 
Octavian (Augustus) pressed forward the development of a Latin culture to match the 
Greek. Freeborn immigrants, freedmen, and slaves who had received a Greek 
education (paideia) became prominent in the learned professions, arts, and luxury 
trades of the western part of the empire, serving as secretaries, tutors, actors, and 
courtesans. Absorption of the paideia, which in practice meant being able to read, 
write and speak Latin well in the rhetorical tradition that had developed under Greek 
influence, indeed became a precondition for elevation to the Roman elite (Rietbergen 
1998: 50). Under the Flavians and the Antonines, men of Greek origin could be found 
alongside the Romans in all social categories, and a Latin literature and a Latin 
educational system evolved which quite successfully mirrored the Greek.  
Thus the Romans came to do much more than passively transmit the Greek and 
Hellenistic legacy. Most obvious to modern Europeans are the tangible expressions of 
the Roman engineering talent: cities, roads, aqueducts, canals, forts, bridges, baths, 
harbours, amphitheatres. But they also left an impressive, if less original heritage of art 
in the form of mural paintings, frescoes, mosaics, and sculpture as well as innumerable 
pieces of handicraft, jewellery and utensils, etc. The intellectual legacy of the Romans 
is also exceptional and put an indelible stamp on European culture. The classical Latin 
writers of the first century B.C., above all Cicero, Virgil, Livy and Horace, came to be 
FRQVLGHUHG WKHVHFRQGµIDWKHUV¶RI WKH:HVWHUQ OLWHrary tradition (after Homer, whose 
pre-eminence they all recognised).  
Moreover, the Latin linguistic heritage became the basis for the Romance 
languages that still prevail in large parts of Europe. This meant that the classical Latin 
authors were studied as part of the national literary heritage in the schools of all 
Romance-speaking nations, and due to the impression it made (and because of the later 
general veneration of the Roman empire) in other parts of the medieval and modern 
West too. Latin itself remained highly prestigious and influential as the academic, 
ecclesiastical, official and diplomatic lingua franca of Western and Central Europe 
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until modern times. In the Hungarian kingdom, Latin was used as the language of state 
administration and higher education until the mid-nineteenth century (see below, 
Section 3.8.3).  
3.6.3 Roman law 
The legal element of Roman state- and nation-building ± the institution and 
effective enforcement of a sophisticated and (mostly) humane system of law ± became 
a constitutional political-normative contribution of ancient Rome to modern Europe. 
The Roman legal corpus left an indelible impression on European legal and political 
thought and became a crucial part of the common culture of Europe ± of Europeanness. 
Roman law survived and prospered without interruption in the Byzantine empire, but 
KDGWREHµUHGLVFRYHUHG¶LQWKH:HVWLQWKHHOHYHQWKFHQWXU\,WVLPSDFWRQZHVWHUQDQG
central Europe multiplied during the Renaissance when,  
[d]espite the de facto validity of local law, Roman civil law provided an accepted 
µPLQG-VHW¶ZKLFKIRUPHGWKHEDVLVIRUSROLWLFDODQGOHJDOWKRXJKWWKURXJKRXW
Europe. As part of the common culture of Christian Europe, it appeared quite 
naturally in great works of philosoSK\DQGOLWHUDWXUH6W7KRPDV$TXLQDV¶V
Summa theologia  DQG'DQWH¶VDivina commedia offer ready examples. (Stein 
1999: 67)  
From the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, Roman law together with canon and 
feudal law thus came to form the jus commune of Europe that put a permanent mark on 
national codes, jura propria, which would otherwise have been based exclusively on 
HWKQLFFXVWRP%HOORPR³,QWKHHQGWKH5RPDQODZEHFDPHRQHRIWKHJUHDWHVW
intellectual forces in the history of European civilisation, because it provided principles 
and categories in terms of which men thought about all sorts of subjects and not least 
about politics. Legalist argumentation ± UHDVRQLQJLQWHUPVRIPHQ¶VULJKWVDQGRIWKH
justifiable powers of rulers ± became and remained a generally accepted method of 
SROLWLFDOWKHRULVLQJ´6DELQHDQG7KRUVRQ 
Roman law survived to be rediscovered in the West largely due to the 
compilation initiated by Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, the Corpus juris civilis. 
The Corpus originally consisted of three parts: the Digest contained general 
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jurisprudential principles and the private laws; the Code laid down the laws of the 
Roman emperors, the so-called imperial constitutions (constitutiones), largely dealing 
with public law; and the third part, the Institutes, was a short textbook for the students 
at the law school at Beirut. The constitutions of Justinian himself were collected as so-
called Novellae (novae leges; new laws) and from the twelfth century onwards were 
published as the fourth part of the Corpus.  
Roman civil or private law became a vehicle for Europeanness in the sense that it 
contained rules for civil society that became widely accepted in large parts of Europe. 
Thus it was a crucial precondition for the cross-boundary transactions that are so 
FHQWUDOWR5RNNDQ¶VFRQFHSWRI(XURSHDQGHYHORSPHQW5RNNDQ-168). Finer 
LGHQWLILHV WKH UXOH RI ODZ RU WKH ³ODZ-ERXQGHGQHVV´ RI WKH 5RPDQ (PSLUH ± ³WKH
XELTXLW\RIODZLQERWKWKHSXEOLFDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU´± as one of the great Roman 
innovations in the history of government (Finer 1997: 601- 7KH ³KXPDQLVWLF
UDWLRQDODQGFRKHUHQWQDWXUHRIODZ´ZDVDQRWKHU³,WZDVDOOWRGLVDSSHDULQWKH:HVW
with the barbarian invaders and not to be reversed till the Middle Ages, but it was our 
FXUUHQWPRGHUQSDUDGLJPRIµODZ¶WKDWZDVKHUHLQYHQWHG´)LQHU 
The basic principles of Roman civil law included private property and possession, 
juridical personality, individual legal responsibility and status, contract and obligation. 
)LQHUVWUHVVHV WKDW WKLVSULYDWH ODZQRUPDWLYHO\SUHVXSSRVHGDQGOHJDOO\FRQILUPHG³D
world of free-willing and equal individuals. More than that, it presupposes individual 
action to bring suits to law. The law is not imposed by the state, it is invoked by 
LQGLYLGXDOV´)LQHU 
Of particular interest in the present context is the Roman establishment of 
µLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶ FLYLO ODZ WKH jus gentium, or law of nations. The need arose out of 
Roman imperial practice, but the inspiration was Greek. The Romans became aware of 
the potential utility of a universally binding legal regulation of civil society in the third 
century BC, after their expansion beyond Latium. Roman rule from that point onwards 
comprised an increasing number of often conflicting local customs and legal traditions, 
and Rome itself came to contain a growing body of resident aliens (peregrini) who had 
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to transact business among themselves and with Romans. As such business grew, it 
became more and more impractical to apply the principle of personal law. 
The jus gentium was thus developed to extend the law to non-citizens, based on 
the Greek assumption of a natural reason (naturalis ratio) ± µFRPPRQVHQVH¶± inherent 
in human nature. The Institutes GHFODUHVWKDWµQDWXUDl law, which is uniformly observed 
by all peoples, was established by a kind of divine providence and remains always 
FRQVWDQW DQGXQFKDQJLQJ´ TXRWHGE\&DQQLQJ ,QSUDFWLFH WKLV UHIHUUHG WR
the elements or principles that seemed to be common to the various customary laws of 
the Mediterranean local communities outside of Italy (Hinsley 1986: 162).23 The 
conception of natural law was inherent in Stoicist cosmopolitanism: 
,WLVTXLWHSRVVLEOHWKDWWKH5RPDQODZ\HUVUHDOLVHGWKHµQDWXUDO¶FKDUDFWHURI the 
jus gentium before they were imbued with Stoic philosophy: it is certain, as they 
came to understand the Stoic conception of a universal law of nature, they came 
to regard the jus gentium as a close approximation to that conception; and though 
it was never universally or completely identified with the law of nature, it was at 
any rate regarded as the concrete expression of such a law in actual human 
society ± less perfect, in that it denied equality and recognised slavery; but more 
serviceable, because it was actually formulated and administered in courts. 
(Barker 1923: 69) 
The practical differences between the customary jus civile and positive jus 
gentium ceased when citizenship was extended throughout the empire in AD 212. By 
making Roman law the common law of all the empire, the central government aimed to 
increase its control over (and taxation of) its subjects.  
Roman public law became distinguished from civil or private law by Ulpian, one 
of the three Roman jurists generally considered most eminent (the other two being 
Papinian and Paul). This happened in the classical period of Roman jurisprudence that 
culminated in the decade following the Edict of Caracalla. Roman public law was 
                                              
 
 
23 The jus fetiale ZDV WKHRULJLQDO µLQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ¶RI WKH5RPDQVDQGFRQVLVWHGRI³WKHVROHPQIRUPV WRZKLFK LWZDV
proper to conform when the city was conducting relations ± making war and concluding treaties ± with other communities.  
:LWK WKH WHUULWRULDOH[SDQVLRQRI WKH5HSXEOLFDQGHYHQPRUHUDSLGO\DIWHU WKH5HSXEOLF¶VUHSODFHPHQWE\ WKH(PSLUH WKH
outstanding development was one by which the jus fetiale fell into disuse and the jus gentium, while coming to greater 
SURPLQHQFHORVWHYHQWKHWHQXRXVUHVHPEODQFHWRDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLWKDGRQFHSRVVHVVHG´+LQVOH\ 
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positive law (constitutiones) promulgated by the emperor concerning matters of 
politics and government, for instance the powers of magistrates and the state religion, 
in contrast to law that concerned the interests of private individuals (Stein 1999: 21). 
The imperial constitutiones, most notably the lex regia WKH µUR\DO ODZ¶ZKHUHE\ WKH
Roman people allegedly transferred its imperium to the emperor), conveyed politico-
legal conceptions of universal monarchy that were to have a momentous effect on 
political thought and practice in later Christian Europe.  
The positivist bias of the Corpus, in favour of seeing law as something made by 
the ruler rather than handed down by custom, was an important reason why it appealed 
to western Popes, emperors and kings after it had been revived in the eleventh century. 
However, it also contained ascending-locus notions that were embraced by 
democratically minded medieval thinkers, e.g. in the conciliar movement. A number of 
statements in the Corpus indicate the original possession of sovereignty by the Roman 
SHRSOH0RUHRYHU HYHQ WKH µDEVROXWLVW¶ HPSHURUV RI WKH ODWHU DQG %\]DQWLQH HPSLUH
were expected not only to rule by law, but to live by the law themselves.  
8OSLDQ GHYHORSHG WKH 5RPDQ GRFWULQH RI WKH HPSHURU¶V µDEVROXWH¶ VRYHUHLJQW\
EDVHGRQWZRSULQFLSOHVWKHHPSHURULVµab legibus solutus¶GLVSHQVHGIURPWKHODZV
DQG µquod principi placuit habet legis vigorem¶ µZKDW SOHDVHV WKH SULQFHSV KDV WKH
IRUFH RI ODZ¶ 7KH IRUPHU SULQFLSOH IURP ZKLFK WKH ZRUG µDEVROXWH¶ LV GHULYHG
RULJLQDWHG LQ WKH 6HQDWH¶V GLVSHQVDWLRQ RI $XJXVWXV DQG Vome later emperors from 
FHUWDLQODZV+RZHYHU³WKLVDQGQRW WKHODWH5HQDLVVDQFHVHQVHZDVZKDWZDVPHDQW
by absolute. In point of fact many emperors averred that they were bound by the laws 
>«@-XVWLQLDQ¶VCodes DUHVSHFLILFLQWKLVUHVSHFW´)LQHU 544). Within a century 
RI$XJXVWXV¶V GHDWK WKH MXULVWVZHUHPDLQWDLQLQJ KH FRXOG LQGHHGPDNH ODZV RQ KLV
own account.  In a surviving bronze tablet, the Senate formally and legally confers on 
9HVSDVLDQ³WKHULJKWDQGSRZHU>«@WRWUDQVDFWDQGGRZKDWHYHUthings divine, human, 
SXEOLFDQGSULYDWHKHGHHPVWRVHUYHWKHDGYDQWDJHDQGRYHUULGLQJLQWHUHVWRIWKHVWDWH´
TXRWHGE\)LQHUµVWDWH¶KHUHSUREDEO\EHLQJDWUDQVODWLRQRIres publica).  
The later juristic maxim relating to the absolutism of the emperor was a 
generalisation based on this law ± but also on the fact that some emperors simply 
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ignored the laws and could not be called to account. Still, Finer argues that civil law to 
a very large extent remained free-standing, that is, independent of the emperor. In a 
largely autocratic empire lawyers were concerned with matters which concerned 
private individuals without involving the state. Jurists serving the emperor replied to 
appeals for clarification practically without changing established civiO ODZ ³,Q WKLV
way, a huge area of human regulation was extruded from the concern of the ruler and 
GHYHORSHGLQGHSHQGHQWO\LQWDQGHPZLWKKLVFRQWUDVWLQJO\DEVROXWHGLVFUHWLRQLQµVWDWH
PDWWHUV¶´)LQHU 
8OSLDQ¶V VHFRQG SULQFLSOH µquod principi placuit habet legis vigorem¶ ZDV
incorporated into the lex regia. However, according to Finer, the epigram should be 
XQGHUVWRRGDV VD\LQJ µZKDWKDVEHHQDSSURYHGE\ WKH HPSHURUKDV WKH IRUFHRI ODZ¶
(Finer 1997: 544). The late emperors continued to justify their conduct by reference to 
law and legal theory; even the most brutal emperors, such as Nero, Caligula and 
Domitian, generally did not interfere with, but rather encouraged the development of, 
private law. The lex regia also included a reference to WKH IDFW WKDW WKH HPSHURU¶V
SRZHURULJLQDWHVLQWKHSHRSOH³WKHSHRSOHWUDQVIHUVWRKLPDQGYHVWVLQKLPDOOLWVRZQ
SRZHU DQG DXWKRULW\´ $FFRUGLQJ WR &DQQLQJ WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH lex regia for 
SROLWLFDO WKRXJKW ³LV WKDW WKH HPSHURU¶V SRZHU GHULYHG from the people, and thus 
provided a model for the popular source of governmental power to be elaborated later 
LQWKH0LGGOH$JHVDQGWKHHDUO\PRGHUQSHULRG´&DQQLQJ 
Imperium WKXV FRQWLQXHG DW OHDVW LQ WKHRU\ WR EH H[HUFLVHG LQ WKH QDPHRI µWKe 
6HQDWHDQG3HRSOHRI5RPH¶Senatus Populusque Romanus), i.e. in the Roman public 
interest, for the common good. The abbreviation SPQR adorned coins, monuments and 
the standards of the Roman armies. It was a part of the Roman ascending legacy that 
both the Byzantine and the Holy Roman imperial dignity, as well as the chair of St 
Peter, were to remain elective. The elevation ritual served as a constant reminder that 
the citizens had delegated sovereignty to the emperor, who was thus expected to rule in 
their interest. The same concern for the public interest or common good, the res 
publica, was contained in other famous maxims at the core of the Greco-Roman ethos: 
salus populi suprema lex µWKH ZHOIDUH RI WKH SHRSOH LV WKH KLJKHVW ODZ¶ omnes 
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homines natura aequales sunt µDOOPHQDUHE\QDWXUHHTXDO¶DQGquod omnes tangit, 
ab omnibus comprobetur µZKDWWRXFKHVDOOVKRXOGEHDSSURYHGE\DOO¶$OWKRXJKLQ
practice the late Roman empire was universalist-descending, its theory remained 
universalist-ascending. 
3.6.4 The Christian empire 
The starting point for the eventual triumph of Christianity in the Roman empire 
was the fact that in 4 BC the Romans took over the administration of Judea, the 
kingdom where Christ was born. The imperial peace and unity allowed people, goods 
and ideas to travel easily over long distances. Christianity spread first among the 
Hellenised Jews of the towns of Palestine and the Near East. One of them was St Paul 
of Tarsus (d. c. AD 65), the most important early Christian missionary and theologian. 
Christianity then followed Greek and Jewish traders and artisans along the seaways 
and roads of the Empire, northwards to Antioch, on to Ephesus, Corinth and 
Thessalonica, and westwards to Cyprus, Crete and Rome. The suppression of a great 
Jewish revolt in first-FHQWXU\ 3DOHVWLQH DGGHG JUHDWO\ WR WKH QHZ VHFW¶V GLIIXVLRQ DV
Greco-Jewish Christians (together with the Jews, who subsequently became a diaspora 
nation) fled to settle throughout the Mediterranean world.  
By the mid-second century, Christian communities were established in every city 
in the eastern provinces, many in the central provinces, and a few in the western. 
Persecution in fact contributed to a particularly strong growth in the number of 
Christians during the third century. When emperor Constantine issued a decree of 
toleration in 313, probably about five percent of the inhabitants in the western half of 
the empire, and ten per cent in the east, were Christians (Bagge 2004: 33).  
Among the factors working to the advantage of Christianity in the competition 
with the great number of other cults in the early empire, four in particular should be 
emphasised (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 30-31). First, Christianity built on a clearly 
defined and well-established Judaic historical heritage. Second, the Jewish legacy as 
well as its monotheistic doctrine gave the Christian church an exclusiveness, unity and 
autonomy that prevented it from succumbing to other cults or to the imperial 
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authorities. Third, because Christianity was a religion of the book, building on the 
literate traditions of the Jews and presenting a complete, alternative worldview, it 
intrigued Greco-Roman intellectuals and could blend with their tradition of analysis 
and argument. Fourth, despite its Judaic and eastern origin, the Christian canon 
evolved within and adapted to the reality of the empire. The New Testament was 
formulated in Greek in the second half of the second century under heavy Hellenistic 
influence.  
The last point is particularly important in the present context. Early Christianity 
became much influenced by Greek and Roman rationalist and cosmopolitan thought. 
The famous letter allegedly sent in the 90s to the Christians of Corinth by the head of 
the Roman congregation, Clement (retroactively designated Pope Clement I), 
FRQWDLQHG ³D WUHPHQGRXV FODLP 7KH WUXH LQKHULWRUV RI $WKHQLDQ DQG 6SDUWDQ FLYLF
virtue, and of Roman military virtu, were the Christians. It was an appeal to Greeks, 
but to their widest conception of themselves; not as bounded by ethnicity or language, 
EXWDVEHDUHUVRIFLYLOLVDWLRQLWVHOIWRUDWLRQDOKXPDQEHLQJVDWODUJH´0DQQ-
320).  
Because Greeks lived throughout the empire, the cosmopolitan part of their 
heritage combined with their new-won Christianity was influential everywhere. 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180) virtually made Stoicism the imperial philosophy, 
and the first Greek Church Father,24 St Clement of Alexandria (d. c. 215), incorporated 
it into Christianity (Herrin 1987: 58). As a result of expanding Christianity and the 
growing entanglement of Christian religion, imperial political realities and Greco-
Roman civilisation, there arose  
                                              
 
 
24 7KHWHUP)DWKHUVRIWKH&KXUFKKHQFHWHUPVOLNHµSDWULVWLF¶ZULWLQJLVXVXDOO\DSSOLHGWRWKH&KULVWLDQZULWHUVRIWKHIirst 
five centuries. Sometimes the Greek and Latin fathers are distinguished, the former including Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
Cyprian, Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzen, and Chrysostom; the latter Tertullian, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine 
of Hippo, and even Gregory (Pope Gregory I) and Bernard. 
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a notion of the collective existence of humanity at large, in a universal 
RUJDQLVDWLRQWKH&KXUFK8QLYHUVDOWKHHFXPHQH>«@&KULVWLDQLW\LPSlied that 
human society itself need not be bounded by existing states, by existing class or 
ethnic divides, that integration could be brought by something other than force, 
by transcendental ideological power itself. (Mann 1986: 326) 
Christianity became cosmopolitan due to the influence of Stoicism and because it 
was shaped within the reality of a cosmopolitan empire. But its doctrines were also 
explicitly cosmopolitan. In his letter to the Colossians (3:10-11), Paul called on 
Christians to make no distinction between Greek and Christian, Jew and Gentile, slave 
and master. Each is individually obliged to Christ, who recognised no distinction 
between persons. Baptism was the means to transcend all temporal frontiers of race, 
VH[QDWLRQDQGVRFLDOUDQN³7UDQsforming the Stoic tradition of the equality of human 
QDWXUH DPRQJ DOO PHQ IUHH DQG XQIUHH &KULVWLDQV LQVLVWHG WKDW LW ZDV &KULVW¶V
UHFRJQLWLRQRIHDFKDQGDOOWKDWHQVXUHGXQLYHUVDOHTXDOLW\´&ROHPDQD 
To overcome initial pagan intellectual UHVLVWDQFH DQG SUHMXGLFH DJDLQVW µWKH
UHOLJLRQRIWKHXQHGXFDWHG¶WKH&KULVWLDQFKXUFKJUDGXDOO\FDPHWRDFFHSWDQGPDVWHU
the rhetoric, method of argument as well as many basic ideas of Greco-Roman 
learning. Most Christian thinkers came to agree with Origen of Alexandria (c. 185- c. 
254), perhaps the greatest of the Greek Fathers, that Christians had to be able to refute 
the pagan philosophers on their own terms and intellectual level. Moreover, 
Christianity contributed decisively to closing the cultural divide between the new late 
fourth century ruling class that hailed from the frontiers and the urban civilisation of 
the Mediterranean.  
&OHPHQW¶VDQG2ULJHQ¶VDGYRFDF\RIWKHVWXG\RIWKHEHVWSDJDQSKLORVRSKHUVZDV
later taken up by Latin Fathers such as Jerome and Augustine, who crucially assisted 
the transmission of the classical intellectual heritage to medieval Europe. Late antique 
schoolbooks condensed and simplified ancient learning and literature into what became 
the standard medieval curriculum of the seven liberal arts: grammar, rhetoric, logic 
(the trivium), arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy (the quadrivium ³7KH
Church was heir to Rome not only in ecclesiastical organisation; the Fathers of the 
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Church incorporated the intellectual heriWDJH RI5RPH LQWR&KULVWLDQ WKRXJKW´ +R\W
and Chodorow 1976: 54). 
Initially the early Christians were wary of the Empire: they refused to participate 
in the cult of the emperor as the Sol invictus (Unconquered Sun; that was the main 
reason why they were persecuted 249-64 and 303-12). Some, however, took a more 
positive attitude, recognising the necessity and indeed divine sanction of the Roman 
(PSLUHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHJRVSHOV³5HQGHUXQWR& VDUWKHWKLQJVWKDWDUH& VDU¶VDQG
to God the things that are God¶V´-RKQ³)HDU*RGDQGKRQRXUWKHHPSHURU´
6W3HWHUTXRWHGLQ0DWWKHZDQG³<RXPXVWREH\DOOWKHJRYHUQLQJDXWKRULWLHV´
(St Paul in Romans 13:1). The view propagated by the gospel of St Paul, that there is 
one Church with Christ as the head, and of which all Christians are members, 
reinforced the conception of a necessary political unity of the entire world under a 
single, Christian head. Thus Origen taught that the foundation of the universal 
Christian Church had been expressly synchronised with the foundation of a universal 
5RPDQ SHDFH E\ $XJXVWXV ³$ &KULVWLDQ FRXOG UHMHFW QHLWKHU *UHHN FXOWXUH QRU WKH
Roman Empire without seeming to turn his back on part of the divinely ordained 
SURJUHVVRIWKHKXPDQUDFH´3%URZQ-84).  
BuilGLQJ RQ 2ULJHQ¶V LGHDV (XVHELXV RI & VDUHD -339) founded what 
became the standard Christian view of the Middle Ages. The conversion of 
Constantine and his establishment of the Christian empire was  
a crucial turning-point in human history, nothing lesVWKDQWKHIXOILOPHQWRI*RG¶V
promise to Abraham. This view interpreted Roman history as being determined 
by divine providence: that the empire was founded under Augustus, in whose 
reign Christ was born, in order to facilitate the spread of the Christian religion, a 
development culminating in the conversion of the emperor himself. (Canning 
1996: 4)  
The conversion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century not only greatly 
advanced such ideas among Christians, but, significantly in the present context, 
reinforced the Roman imperial ideology and the position of the emperor. The Empire, 
already one and indivisible as a polity, was welded still more firmly together when it 
was permeated by a common Christianity. Christianity provided a more solid 
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ideological backbone than the pagan Greco-Roman imperial culture, and it improved 
its ability to mobilise the middle and lower social strata against increasing external 
pressure from barbarians.  
Even before his official conversion (on his deathbed), and in accordance with 
ancient Roman traditions that placed all religious affairs under state control, emperor 
Constantine assumed active leadership in Christian ecclesiastical affairs. In relief at the 
end of persecution, the bulk of the Christian Church was only too willing to accept 
WKLV 7KH ILUVW HFXPHQLFDO LH µZRUOG-ZLGH¶ FRXQFLO WKH &RXQFLO RI 1LFDHD
summoned and led by Constantine in 325 to halt the spread of Arianism, tacitly 
DFFHSWHG WKH HPSHURU¶V VXSUHPDF\ LQ WKH &KXUFK 7KH &RXQFLO PDGH WKH &KXUFK D
corporation (corpus fideli) under Roman public (imperial) law. Thus Roman law was 
introduced into it. Particularly the western, Catholic, Church was set to follow a 
legalistic path, both in its later quarrels with the eastern and western emperors and in 
its internal administration. This greatly contributed to the transmission of Roman legal 
ideas, including of course the fundamental rule of law principle, to future Europe.  
But Constantine accepted that bishops had authority over purely spiritual matters, 
such as the formulation of doctrine and the administration of sacraments. Theological 
issues were to be settled by future ecumenical councils. The emperor himself remained 
a layman throughout the Byzantine period, and the patriarch was recognised as the 
head of the Church at Constantinople (Canning 1996: 14).  
The original Constantinian conception of the relations between temporal and 
VSLULWXDO SRZHU LQ WKH&KULVWLDQ HPSLUHZDV LQFRUSRUDWHG LQ -XVWLQLDQ¶VCorpus Juris 
DQGEHFDPH³WKHFODVVLFH[SUHVVLRQRI&KULVWLDQ5RPDQHPSHURUVKLS´&DQQLQJ
5-6). The emperor was cast in the role of earthly head of the Church seen as the 
Christian empire, i.e. the universal polity of Christians. According to the Novellae both 
emperorship (imperium) and priesthood (sacerdotium) derived from God. The emperor 
ZDVFRPPRQO\FDOOHGµSULHVWDQGNLQJ¶*Uhiereus kai basileus, Lat. rex et sacerdos) 
throughout the Byzantine period.  
However, he was at the same time a layman. He was not a priest as he did not 
possess the sacramental power of orders: he had not been ordained. He was only priest 
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in the sense of possessing jurisdictional powers in ecclesiastical matters, including the 
requirement established by Constantine that he must confirm an elected bishop (and 
thus Pope and patriarch) ³$OWKRXJK WKH HPSHURU ZDV WKH KHDG RI WKH FKXUFK
understood as the empire, he was definitely not the head of the church conceived as an 
ecclesiastical body. Justinian accepted the primacy of the Pope and the second place of 
the patriarch of ConstantinoplH´&DQQLQJ 
When Constantine died in 337, as a mark of special reverence he was declared a 
Christian saint, the equal of the apostles (isapostolos). And indeed, without the 
conversion of Constantine and eventually the empire, Christianity may have remained 
a minority oriental cult. After some years of renewed persecution in mid-century under 
WKHSDJDQ LQWHOOHFWXDOHPSHURU -XOLDQ µWKH$SRVWDWH¶ WKH&KULVWLDQLW\RI WKH(PSLUH
was confirmed in 380 when emperors Theodosius I and Valentinian II made 
&KULVWLDQLW\WKH³FDWKROLF´IURP*Ukatholikos: universal) and thus official religion. In 
391 all pagan cults were proscribed. Henceforward, Christianity was integrated into the 
structure of the Roman empire and progressively Romanised. The church indeed 
EHFDPH WKH HPSHURUV¶PRVW HIIHFWLYH VRXUFH RI OR\DOW\ DQG VXSSRUW ,W HVWDEOLVKHG D
hierarchical organisation that fitted itself into the imperial subdivisions of province, 
diocese, and parish; it adopted Roman law as the basis for canon and ecclesiastical 
law; and it increasingly collaborated in the enforcement of imperial decrees. Moreover, 
After the triumph of Christianity, these notions of simultaneous singularity and 
exclusivity were further enforced by the Christian insistence upon the uniqueness 
both of the truth of the Gospels and of the Church as a source of interpretative 
authority. [...] The orbis terrarum thus became, in terms of the translation 
HIIHFWHGE\/HRWKH*UHDWLQWKHILIWKFHQWXU\WKHµRUELV&KULVWLDQXV¶, which, in 
turn, soon devHORSHGLQWRWKHµImperium Christianum¶$FHQWXU\ODWHU*UHJRU\
WKH*UHDWZRXOGWUDQVODWHWKLVLQWRWKHµsancta respublica¶DFRPPXQLW\HQGRZHG
with the same simultaneous open exclusiveness which had been a feature of the 
&LFHURQLDQµrespublica totius orELV¶ (Pagden 1995: 24) 
A contemporary Christian Roman lawyer, civil servant and poet, Prudentius (c. 
348-405), wrote thus about the conversion of the empire in his poem Contra 
Summachum:  
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:KDWLVWKHVHFUHWRI5RPH¶VGHVWLQ\",WLVWKDW*RGZLOOVWKHXQLW\ of mankind, 
since the religion of Christ demands a social foundation of peace and 
international amity. Hitherto the whole earth from east to west had been rent 
asunder by continual strife. To curb this madness, God has taught the nations to 
be obedient to the same laws and all to become Romans. Now we see mankind 
living as citizens of one city and members of a common household. Men come 
from distant lands across the seas to one common forum, and the peoples are 
united by commerce and culture and intermarriage. From the intermingling of 
peoples a single race is born. (Quoted by Dawson 1932: 23) 
Finally, it may be noted that the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity 
did not at first have any effect on the concept of Europe, which remained geographical 
DQGVHFXODUXQWLOPRGHUQWLPHV6WLOOWKHWHUPµ(XURSH¶ZDVEHLQJXVHGE\&KULVWLDQV
DQGDUJXDEO\EHFDPH³DSDUWRI WKH&KULVWLDQZD\RI WKLQNLQJ´GHQ%RHU
0RUHRYHU DOWKRXJK WKH %LEOH GRHV QRW PHQWLRQ µ(XURSH¶ WKH *HQHVLV VWRU\ RI WKH
settlement of the sons of Noah reflects the ancient tripartite division of the world. As 
has been noted (see above, Chapter 3.3), the Jewish historian Josephus wrote down the 
tradition that descendants of Japheth settled in Europe, those of Ham in Africa, and the 
SURJHQ\ RI 6KHP LQ $VLD 7KH QRWLRQ RI (XURSH¶V -DSKHWKLF RULJLQ ZHQW YLUWXDOO\
uncontested until the nineteenth century (de Rougemont 1966: 21). 
3.7 European Christendom 
,Q WKH IDVFLQDWLQJ SHULRG WKDW LV QRZ ODEHOOHG µ/DWH $QWLTXLW\¶ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH
µ'DUN $JHV¶ IRXUWK WR HLJKWK FHQWXULHV RU WKHUHDERXWV WKH 5RPDQ (PSLUH FDPH
under increasing pressure. Historians have proposed literally dozens of theories to 
explain the breakdown of the western part of the Empire (Demandt 1984). The most 
contentious scholarly issue is whether the dissolution was caused by internal 
disintegration or by barbarian invasion (Noble, ed., 2006). After  the fall of the Soviet 
empire, the controversy has become politicised too. Neo-particularists in Central and 
Eastern Europe (and some in the West too, like Jean-Marie le Pen) justify demands for 
national purity and self-government by claiming exclusive rights to land established 
during the migrations of Late Antiquity (Geary 2002: Introduction). However, as we 
will see, this period of presumed national ethnogenesis may equally well be interpreted 
DVWKHHUDRIWKHµ0DNLQJRI(XURSH¶RUPRUHSUHFLVHO\RI(XURSHDQ&KULVWHQGRP 
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:KHWKHUDVFDXVHRUFRQVHTXHQFHWKHLQIOX[RI*HUPDQLFDQG6ODYµEDUEDULDQV¶
from the north and east accompanied the collapse of the western part of the Empire and 
the near-collapse in the East. Contacts between East and West declined sharply. In the 
eighth and ninth centuries communications deteriorated further due to the westward 
advance of the new Islamic and Arab, Umayaad Caliphate. Europe north of the Alps 
was profoundly affected by these developments. Here, raids by Vikings from the north 
and nomads from the east too sharpened divisions and contributed to the emergence of 
the fragmented and personalised authority structure known as feudalism. The 
UHPDLQLQJ5RPDQ(PSLUHLQWKH(DVWGHYHORSHGLWVGLVWLQFWµ%\]DQWLQH¶FKDUDFWHULQD
constant struggle against Persian, Germanic, Avar, Slav, Bulgar, Arab, and eventually 
Turkic incursions. Still, it survived until 1453 and thus provided vital strategic 
protection for Western Europe and permitted its material and intellectual growth from 
the twelfth century onwards.   
,WZDVXOWLPDWHO\WKHLQHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH%\]DQWLQHHPSHURU¶s coercive power 
that enabled (or forced) the bishop of Rome to declare western independence in the 
eighth century, substituting Frankish for Byzantine protection. This made the Frankish 
NLQJDSDSDOFOLHQWDQGHQGHGWKH3RSH¶VVXEVHUYLHQFHWRWKHHDVWHUQemperor. The year 
which inaugurated the papal-Frankish, South-North alliance in the West, 754, thus in 
effect marked the birth of a distinct European Christendom. From this critical juncture 
onwards, differences between West and East only deepened. The mutual 
excommunication of the eastern and western churches in 1054 was thus the formal 
confirmation of a long-existing separation in fact.  
At the same time the Pope, in conjunction with the new western emperor he had 
created, with other western kings and with monastic movements, was able to build up a 
strong church organisation with himself at the apex. The Roman Church eventually 
brought most of Europe under its sway. At the same time as it engineered the 
conversion of northern Europe, the Papacy also became the main depository and 
transmitter of the Greco-Roman cultural legacy to European Christendom. In an 
otherwise fragmented, rural and primitive society, Greco-Roman, Latin-writ 
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Christianity became the main identity and ideology of the inhabitants of western, 
central and northern Europe.  
However, by allying with the Frankish king in 754, the Papacy also created a 
potential competitor for universalist-descending power. Later alliances with other 
kings eventually proved fatal for the idea of universal papal monarchy. But in spite of 
differing ideas of ultimate leadership in Christendom, until the later Middle Ages, 
according to Southern, 
all agreed that a universal coercive power resided in the church. Whether in the 
hands of the Pope, the emperor, king, or community, the purpose of human 
government was to direct men into a single Christian path. [....But the church] 
was not just a government, however grandiose its operations. It was the whole of 
human society subject to the will of God. [...] It was membership of the church 
WKDWJDYHPHQDWKRURXJKO\LQWHOOLJLEOHSXUSRVHDQGSODFHLQ*RG¶VXQLYHUVH6R
the church was not just a state, it was the state; it was not just a society, it was the 
society ± the human societas perfecta. Not only all political activity, but all 
learning and thought were functions of the church. Besides taking over the 
political order of the Roman Empire, the church appropriated the science of 
Greece and the literature of Rome, and it turned them into instruments of human 
well-being in this world. To all this it added the gift of salvation ± the final and 
exclusive possession of its members. And so in all its fullness it was the society 
of rational and redeemed mankind. (Southern 1970: 21-22)     
The significance of the Middle Ages in forming modern Europeanness and 
Europeanism can hardly be exaggerated. Jacques le Goff argues that  
of all the legacies at work in the Europe of today and tomorrow, that of the 
Middle Ages is the most important. The Middle Ages manifested, and frequently 
embodied, the major real or supposed features of Europe: these include the 
combination of a potential unity and a fundamental diversity, the mixing of 
populations, West-East and North-South oppositions, the indefinite nature of its 
eastern frontier, and above all, the unifying role of culture. (Le Goff 2005: 3) 
I for my part will highlight four medieval developments as particularly portentous 
for future Europeanness and Europeanism:  
First, the division between East and West and discrete Eastern, or Byzantine, and 
Western, or European, Christendoms emerged (Section 3.7.1). Second, within 
European Christendom, the amalgamation of Roman-Latin, Christian, Celtic and 
Germanic elements facilitated the appearance of a distinct European identity, with its 
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political, economic and intellectual core north of the Alps (Section 3.7.2). Third, the 
first papally created emperor of the west, Charlemagne, boosted the nascent sense of 
Europeanness and its identification with the western peninsula of Eurasia, and came to 
have a formative influence on modern Europeanism too. Charlemagne was the only 
medieval ruler ever to unite most of European Christendom north and south of the Alps 
in one polity. The often observed fact that the original territorial extent of the European 
Union quite nearly matched that of the Carolingian empire, and that even their 
respective territorial centres, Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, and Aachen (Aix-la-
Chapelle), lie not far apart, is a legacy of Charlemagne (Section 3.7.3). 
Fourth, the struggle between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Papacy in the 
later Middle Ages not only facilitated the division between temporal and spiritual 
power in later Europe, but also added crucially to the territorial separation of temporal 
authority into sovereign states. These and other structural or institutional freedoms 
(e.g. between executive, legislative and judicial power, and between levels of 
government), together with individual liberties in the political, economic and religious 
realms, would be distinctive features of modern Europe and Europeanness, indeed of 
WKH µ:HVW¶ JHQHUDOO\ 7KH 3DSDF\ DGYDQFHG WR LWV SHDN RI XQLYHUVDOLVW-descending 
power in the twelfth century, but in the process fatally undermined that of the Holy 
Roman Emperor and thus left itself at the mercy of emerging particularist-descending 
kings. Approximately the year 1300 may be seen as the turning point in the 
transformation of medieval, unitary Christendom into modern, multistate Europe 
(Section 3.7.4).  
3.7.1 Christendom, West and East 
In the late Roman Empire, the influx of mainly Germanic and Slavic-speaking 
peoples from the north and northeast as well as the continuing attacks of the Persians 
from the east widened the old Greco-Roman, East-:HVWILVVXUH&RQVWDQWLQH¶VUHPRYDO
in 330 of the imperial capital to the old Greek colony Byzantion (Lat. Byzantium) on 
the Bosporus, renaming it Konstantinopolis/Constantinople, had already rendered the 
imperial core more Greek in language and Hellenistic in culture. In the fifth century, 
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the empire lost the western provinces, including Rome, to Germanic armies advancing 
from the north. Henceforth, autonomous new Roman-Gallic or Roman-Germanic 
polities emerged in western, central and northern Europe (see below, Section 3.7.2). 
7KHQHZµVXE-5RPDQ¶ UXOHUVZHUHJHQHUDOO\HDJHU WRDGRSW5RPDQZD\VEXW LQ IDFW
presided over a significant decline in economic complexity, living standards and 
general civilisation (Ward-Perkins 2006). However, they recognised the sovereignty of 
the Roman emperor and vaguely saw their kingdoms as part of the Empire. In the 
West, Latin became the supranational tongue indispensable for the extension of 
Christianity to non-Romans. Greek never obtained the same supremacy in the East 
(Herrin 1987: 92-93). 
The Roman Church was the one imperial institution to survive the collapse of the 
western empire. It remained a vital element of continuity and contact with the Roman 
past and with the rump Empire in the East. Even after 476, the West was considered de 
jure part of the Christian and Roman Empire. There were Byzantine reconquests in the 
sixth century and large, but diminishing, parts of Italy stayed Byzantine until the 
HOHYHQWK FHQWXU\ 7KH 3RSH UHPDLQHG WKH%\]DQWLQH HPSHURU¶V VHFXODU GHSXW\ LQ WKH
5RPDQGXFK\DQGWKH5RPDQ&KXUFKZDVSDUWRIWKHHPSLUH¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYHV\VWHP
Its internal organisation has basically retained its imperial structure until the present 
day.  
The Church came to offer the sole opportunity for a public career open to the 
remaining western senatorial class. As Roman and Gallo-Roman bishops they emerged 
as the main agents in the Romanisation and Christianisation of the new sub-Roman 
kingGRPV³7KH OHDGHUVRI WKHQHZ&KULVWLDQVRFLHW\FDPHIURPDULVWRFUDWLFIDPLOLHV
The aristocracy was educated and it ensured that government fell to the new, Christian 
HOLWH´OH*RII7KHELVKRSVDQGHVSHFLDOO\WKHELVKRSRI5RPHDOVRWRRNRQ
more and more responsibility of civil government, diplomacy and defence. Already in 
the sixth century, Justinian had conferred on the bishops administrative powers in wide 
areas of civil government: treatment of prisoners, orphans, foundlings and lunatics, 
civil expenditures, public works, aqueduct maintenance and the supply of foodstuffs to 
the troops (La Due 1999: 63).  
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As the Roman Church expanded in the North and West, the new territories were 
divided into dioceses according to Roman administrative tradition. The power of the 
bishops governing the dioceses was increasing, particularly in the administration of 
towns. In parallel to the remodelling of space, time was refashioned too. The seven-day 
weekly rhythm, with one day rest, as well as an annual rhythm of Christian holidays, 
notably Christmas and Easter, were introduced. New church bells marked daily, 
weekly and annual Christian time from bell-towers both in town and countryside. In 
parallel with the decline of towns that followed the fall of the western Roman empire, 
new monasteries were built all over the rural West. From the fourth century to the 
eighth, monks played a key role in the Christianisation of peasants, thus assimilating 
them into the formerly mainly urban Roman-Christian culture. A growing cult of 
Western saints and holy relics added to the unity of this culture. Places that contained 
famous relics, such as Tours, Rome and Santiago de Compostela, were promoted as 
destinations of pilgrimages. These forged links among the peoples of the European 
West and stimulated long-distance trade along the same routes. The routes were soon 
organised into definite stages and networks (le Goff 2005: 23-25). Another sign of 
µPHGLHYDO (XURSHDQLVDWLRQ¶ ZDV WKH GLIIXVLRQ WKURXJKRXW (XURSH RI PLQWLQJ DQG
charters (Bartlett 1993).  
By contrast, repeated theological disputes undermined the religious and 
ecclesiastic unity of West and East, notably the quarrel over images (icons) in the 
eighth century. Other issues were Byzantine claims to dominate the whole of 
ChULVWHQGRP/DWLQDVZHOODV*UHHNDORQJZLWK%\]DQWLXP¶VUHIXVDOWRDFNQRZOHGJH
the bishop of Rome as overall sovereign of the Church, in addition to differences in 
liturgical language (le Goff 2005: 26). In Roman eyes, the eastern churches were 
hopelessly prone to theological argument and heresy. In reality, the problem was the 
diversity and ambiguities of the Scriptures and the need to establish an authoritative 
Christian interpretation and canon. The Hellenistic tradition for philosophical 
argument and speculation enabled eastern scholars to make the major contribution to 
this task. Greek- and Syriac-speaking theologians had excelled at the councils and 
synods of the late ancient church, whereas the less erudite Roman and African 
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churches were sometimes not present at all. Many decisions did not even reach them, 
were not translated into Latin, or were mistranslated.  
In the West, the pre-eminence of the bishop of Rome and the generally low 
intellectual level permitted the emerging Pope25 to impose a certain theological unity. 
Major arguments for his sovereignty, or primacy, was his residence in the ancient 
capital and in the city where the graves of the apostles Peter and Paul were located. A 
so-called Petrine or petrinological thesis emerged, according to ZKLFK WKH µSULQFHRI
WKHDSRVWOHV¶6W3HWHUKDGIRXQGHGWKH5RPDQFRQJUHJDWLRQDQGLQVWLWXWHGLWVKHDGWKH
Pope, as his successor.  
The Latin Church Fathers, and notably Ss Ambrose (339-397), Jerome (c. 347-
420) and Augustine (354-430), were instrumental in defining a distinct western or 
Latin Christian theology. The patristic doctrines also contributed fundamentally 
towards European cultural unity (le Goff 2005: 15). As bishop of Milan, Ambrose 
insisted on the autonomy of the Church in spiritual matters, thus challenging the 
Constantinian, Cæsaropapist argument. He claimed jurisdiction over all Christians, 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH HPSHURU IRU WKH&KXUFK 6W -HURPH¶V WUDQVODWLRQ RI WKH+HEUHZ%LEOH
LQWR/DWLQDUHYLVHGYHUVLRQRIZKLFKEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKHµ9XOJDWH¶ZDVFUXFLDOLQ
impressing Roman legalistic, universalist-descending ideology and discourse on the 
European Middle Ages: 
                                              
 
 
25 The title of Pope (Latin papa, father) was first used by Pope Siricius (384-99), but was applied to all the patriarchs until 
about 700 (Bagge 2004: 84). In the eastern orthodox church all priests are VWLOOFDOOHGµ3RSH¶DVLVWKH&RSWLFSDWULDUFKRI
$OH[DQGULD ,QWKHZHVW WKHWLWOHRIµ3RSH¶EHFDPHPRUHDQGPRUHH[FOXVLYHO\UHVHUYHGIRUWKHELVKRSRI5RPHGXULQJWKH
ninth or tenth centuries, a practice Gregory VII formalised in 1073.  
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The original Hebrew as well as the Greek texts of the Bible now became 
available in a Latin which was the language of the late fourth-century educated 
Roman classes. But since a good deal of the Old Testament especially was 
legalistic, the employment of Roman law terminology to convey the meaning of 
Old Testament expressions suggested itself. Roman legal terminology was thus 
unobtrusively disseminated throughout the Bible text of the Vulgate. The readers 
of the Bible in the Middle Ages absorbed at the same time basic Roman 
jurisprudence. It is commonly overlooked that the Latinised Bible was one of the 
most influential transmitters of Roman law ideas to the European Middle Ages. 
That for the Papacy the availability of a competent and elegant Latin text of the 
Bible was of vital concern, was self-evident. What needs stressing however is 
that the legal and institutional character of the Papacy came to be strongly 
buttressed by the Vulgate: the service rendered by this translation to the nascent 
as well as the matured Papacy is hardly recognised, but deserves to be properly 
appreciated. (Ullmann 2003: 13) 
However, according to le Goff (2005: 15), it was St Augustine who, after St Paul, 
made the greatest contribution to the establishment and development of Christianity. 
Augustine elaborated the Stoic notion of two commonwealths into the Christian idea of 
the two kingdoms, the kingdom of Earth and the kingdom of Heaven. Similarly, he 
argued that human beings have two natures: the material one emanating from the 
interests of the body and the immaterial one that belongs to the soul. This distinction 
was to be fundamental to all Christian thought on ethics and politics (Sabine and 
Thorson 1973: 184-186).  
Later patristic writing, notably that of Gregory the Great and Isidore of Seville, 
interpreted Augustine as identifying the Church with the Kingdom of God on earth. As 
the ultimate goal of earthly existence is to enter the Heavenly kingdom, God has 
instituted the Church to guide all of humanity to salvation. According to what has been 
termed political Augustinianism, the fundamental duty of temporal government is to 
help the Church achieve this (Canning 1996: 42-43). The earthly kingdom must 
WKHUHIRUH QHFHVVDULO\ EH&KULVWLDQ DQG VSLULWXDOO\ VXEMHFW WR WKH&KXUFK$XJXVWLQH¶V
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De civitate dei26 thus inspired the later medieval notion of Christendom as the kingdom 
of God on earth with the Church, headed by the Pope, as the guiding agency. But also 
WKHWKHRU\RIWKH+RO\5RPDQ(PSLUHZDVEXLOWXSRQ$XJXVWLQH¶V&LW\RI*RG 
3RSH*UHJRU\,µWKH*UHDW¶-604) and his successors rejected claims by the 
SDWULDUFKRI&RQVWDQWLQRSOHWREHVW\OHGµXQLYHUVDOSDWULDUFK¶*UHJRU\VWUHQJWKHQHGKLV
temporal power by gaining control over and developing the so-called Patrimony of St 
Peter ± landed estates of the Holy See located mainly in Italy. His extensive pastoral 
DFWLYLWLHVJUHDWO\HQKDQFHGWKH3DSDF\¶VJHQHUDOprestige in the West and advanced the 
emergence of a distinctly western Christian identity. He intervened in doctrinal 
disputes and ecclesiastical affairs of every western kingdom; promoted the conversion 
of the Arian Visigoths in Spain to Orthodox Catholicism; initiated the conversion of 
the Anglo-Saxons in England; and imposed a Roman rite that became the basic liturgy 
of the West. Especially important for the future, Gregory encouraged the cult of St 
Peter among the Christians of northern Europe, thus building up a religious fervour 
and loyalty there that would be essential for the future of the Roman Church, and for 
the emergence of a distinctly Latin Christian, western and ultimately European identity.  
Another important means for the build-up of papal authority was the increasing 
reliance on Roman law and legal principles. According to Ullmann, the Papacy thus 
contributed vitally to making the rule of law a defining aspect of Europeanness: 
From its infancy the Papacy had spent its life on Roman soil and in Roman 
environs. However much the legal complexion of the Papacy has been 
misunderstood, the great legacy which the institution handed to later medieval 
(and modern) Europe is undeniable, for in the public field it was the Papacy as 
primarily an organ of the law which formed the bridgehead between the raw, 
illiterate and barbarous Germanic West and the ancient, mature and fully 
developed Roman civilisation. There was no other link between these two but the 
Papacy in Rome. In transmitting the idea of the law as the vehicle of government 
the Roman Papacy has made a fundamental and perhaps its most important 
contribution to the making of Europe. (Ullmann 2003: 11) 
                                              
 
 
26 Normally traQVODWHG DV WKH µ&LW\ RI *RG¶ EXW civitate, the Latin version of the Greek polis, may also be rendered as 
kingdom, state or society. 
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In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a reformist Papacy was to develop canon 
law out of Roman law as the basis for the practical exercise of papal authority (see 
below, Section 3.7.4&DQRQODZZDVµVXSUDQDWLRQDO¶H[DFWLQJREHGLHQFHDOORYHUWKH
Christian world. Although concerned primarily with spiritual, moral, and ecclesiastical 
matters, it intruded widely into secular affairs. As the problems facing the Church 
increased in complexity, its references to Roman law increased. This was also one 
reason why the Papacy came to play such a crucial role in promoting the western 
revival of Roman law in the eleventh century.   
These developments contributed to a transformation of western attitudes to the 
role of the emperor. On the basis of the writings of the Latin Fathers (especially Ss 
Ambrose, Gelasius, Augustine and Gregory), a dualist western theory of Christian 
empire emerged. Influenced by Stoicist dualism and spurred by Roman disaffection 
with Byzantine aberration from orthodox (Nicean) doctrine, the idea emerged that 
imperium and sacerdotium, temporal and spiritual power, were distinct, parallel 
powers instituted by God. Though the most sacred duty of both princes and clerics 
remained to work jointly for the salvation of mankind, according to this western 
scheme the temporal and spiritual spheres of authority should have their own laws, 
organs of legislation and administration and proper right (Sabine and Thorson 1973: 
189; Canning 1996: 34). Thus was born the idea of the libertas ecclesiae, a 
fundamentally important, early medieval contribution to western liberal theory and 
practice.  
However, in the shorter term the rise of Islam from 622 onwards was more fateful 
for Christian unity and for the formation of European identity as distinct from Greco-
Roman, Mediterranean identity. In the period from 632 to 656 newly converted Arabs 
conquered Syria, Palestine, Persia and Egypt in lightning succession. The Holy City of 
Jerusalem, the spiritual centre for all Christians and thus an essential part of the 
Christian Roman Empire, fell in 638. Blocked on the northern front by resilient and 
strategically well-located Constantinople, the Umayaad Caliphate advanced along the 
southern shore of the Mediterranean. In 711 they crossed the strait of Gibraltar, 
overwhelming Visigothic Spain, and advanced into southern France. Here they were 
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eventually stopped by the Austrasian (Frankish) king Charles Martel at the epic battle 
on the road between Tours and Poitiers in 732 (or 733). A contemporary source calls 
WKHPHPEHUV RI&KDUOHV¶ DUP\ µ(XURSHDQV¶ DQG SUHVHQWHG WKH EDWWOH DV D YLFWRU\ IRU
them (le Goff 2005: 27). Also subsequent Frankish and papal propaganda glorified 
their victory as a great success for Christendom and Europe, which they came to see as 
one and the same.  
7KLV ZDV WKH ILUVW WLPH WKDW WKH 0XVOLP µ2WKHU¶ ZDV DFWLYHO\ XVHG LQ WKH 
FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI D GLVWLQFW (XURSHDQ LGHQWLW\ ,VODP ZDV ODWHU WR SURYH D ³YLROHQW
PLGZLIH´ RI (XURSH WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW &DUGLQL   VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH SURSKHW
0RKDPPHGVKRXOGEHQDPHGRQHRIWKHµIDWKHUVRI(XURSH¶7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH
universalist Caliphate, which like the Ottomans later sought to wrench the title to 
world hegemony from the Roman emperor in Constantinople, had important 
consequences for Church politics. The loss of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem to 
the Arabs strengthened the relative position of the patriarch of Constantinople vis-à-vis 
his colleague in Rome. The bipolarity that replaced the earlier pentarchy increased the 
risk of head-on East-West clashes over theology and primacy. Moreover, the loss of 
Jerusalem to the Arabs augmented the importance of Rome, the site of the graves of Ss 
Peter and Paul, as a destination of pilgrimage.  
The rise of an Islamic competitor for universal empire was also the main reason 
for the transformation of the remaining eastern Roman into the µ%\]DQWLQH(PSLUH¶LQ
the seventh and eighth centuries. According to Ostrogorsky, the deposition and murder 
of the last emperor of the Heraclian dynasty in 711 was the turning-point in this regard: 
The universal Roman Empire now belonged to the past. While Germanic 
kingdoms were growing up in the West, Byzantium, however much it clung to 
Roman political conceptions and Roman traditions, became a medieval Greek 
Empire. Greek culture and the Greek language finally triumphed in the eastern 
reaches over the artificially cultivated Romanism of the early Byzantine 
transitional period, thus giving the Eastern Empire its own distinctive character 
and guiding its development in a new direction. (Ostrogorsky 1969: 146)  
7KHLQHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI1HZ5RPH¶VXQLYHUVDOLVWSretensions was demonstrated by 
WKH IDLOXUH RI +HUDFOLXV¶ VXFFHVVRUV WR FKHFN QRW RQO\ $UDE FRQTXHVW RI 5RPDQ
possessions in the Near East, but also new barbarian encroachments from the north and 
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west. Increasing numbers of Slavs settled in the southern Balkans and in Greece, and 
just north of the Danube a Bulgarian kingdom arose. Only Asia Minor and the other 
predominantly Greek-speaking and Orthodox Christian areas put up serious resistance 
and remained part of the empire. Constantinople withstood repeated Arab attacks and 
eventually reversed its fortunes through crucial victories in 678, 718 and 740. But the 
ancient cultural unity of the Mediterranean had been lost forever. 
The territorial extent of the Empire was now drastically reduced, but within its 
neZ IURQWLHUV LW ZDVPRUH FRPSDFW FRKHVLYH DQG µQDWLRQDO¶ WKDQ EHIRUH 7KH$UDE
advance thus caused a new particularist tendency, expressed in increased references to 
Old Testament models. Having restored the True Cross to the rebuilt church of the 
Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in 630, Emperor Heraclius took the title of king (basileus, 
to which was however added ton rhomaion ZKHQ µ5RPDQ¶ LPSHULDO SUHWHQVLRQV UH-
emerged in the West; see below, page 169). Foreshadowing a later western European, 
nationalist idea, Emperor Leo III saw Byzantium as a new Israel (Angold 2001: 44, 
7KHGLPLQLVKHGHPSLUHFDPH³WRUHJDUGLWVHOIDVWKH&KULVWLDQIRUWUHVVRIWKH1HDU
East: the Holy Cross at Jerusalem was the Ark of the Covenant, and the Byzantines 
regarded themselves no longer as citizens of a world-empire, but as a Chosen People 
ULQJHGE\KRVWLOHSDJDQQDWLRQV´3%URZQ 
The Byzantine Empire, like the original Roman Empire, straddled geographical 
Europe, Asia and (until the seventh century) Africa. Thus it could not consider itself 
µ(XURSHDQ¶LQDQ\EXWDSDUWLDOJHRJUDSKLFDOVHQVH7KHµ%\]DQWLQH¶GHQRPLQDWLRQZDV
promoted by Enlightenment historians and philosophes such as Edward Gibbon, 
Charles Lebeau, Montesquieu and Voltaire, who contrasted its un-European and 
oriental character with the rational civilisation of the proper (i.e. Western) Europe of 
their time (Ostrogorsky 1969: 4-5; Fontana 1995: 58).   
However, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards the German 
KLVWRULDQV5DQNHDQG0RPPVHQEHJDQWRGLVSHOWKH*LEERQLDQP\WKRIWKH³WKRXVDQG
\HDUV¶ GHFOLQH´ 7KH\ WKXV SDYHG WKH ZD\ IRU D EHWWHU LQIRUPHG DQGPRUH EDODQFHG
scholarship of the period they began to call Late Antiquity (c. 300-800) in preference 
WR WKH HDUOLHU XVDJH RI µWKH 'DUN $JHV¶ ,Q UHFHQW GHFDGHV %\]DQWLQH VWXGLHV KDYH
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grown enormously (Mango 2002: v). This has led to an improved understanding of the 
Byzantine Empire and its historical significance for Europe and the Mediterranean and 
wider region. On the basis of this newer literature, it is possible to argue that the 
Byzantine Empire contributed to the definition of future Europe, Europeanness and 
Europeanism, in four important ways that can only be briefly described here: 
First, as I have already indicated, its survival as a viable polity in the eastern 
Mediterranean had critical implications for the whole region. In a European 
geopolitical perspective, the protection Byzantium provided against Arab, Seljuk, 
Mongol, and Ottoman invasions from the east was a necessary prerequisite for what 
KDVEHHQYDULDEO\FDOOHGµWKHULVHRIWKH:HVW¶µWKHPDNLQJRI(XURSH¶µWKH(XURSHDQ
PLUDFOH¶HWF 
Second, Constantinople remained the core of the distinct Eastern or Greek 
Christianity that evolved from the increasing division between East and West just 
described and that spread from Byzantium towards the northwest and north into the 
eastern part of Europe. This assured that new Slavic and Bulgarian polities, most 
significantly Russia, became part of wider Christendom and eventually also were 
significantly influenced by the modern European civilisation that emerged in the West.  
Third, the Byzantine Empire contributed importantly to the survival and 
continued influence in Europe of the Roman universalist-descending idea, as well as 
that of Greco-Roman, Stoic-Christian cosmopolitanism. The Byzantines continued to 
VHH WKHPVHOYHV DV WKH WUXH LQKHULWRUV RI WKH 5RPDQ OHJDF\ 7KH µJROGHQ DJH¶ RI WKH
Macedonian dynasty (867-1056) revived the Byzantine belief in the universality of the 
HPSHURU¶VVRYHUHLJQW\LQWKHHPSLUH¶VULJKWWR,WDO\DQGWKH:HVWDQGLQWKHLGHDWKDW
the rulers of western Europe, like those of the Slavs, held their authority by virtue of 
their special relationship to the one true emperor in Constantinople. As Ostrogorsky 
puts it, 
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Byzantine history is indeed only a new phase of Roman history, just as the 
Byzantine state is only a continuation of the old imperium romanum. The word 
µ%\]DQWLQH¶LVRIFRXUVHWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIDOater generation and was not used by 
the so-FDOOHGµ%\]DQWLQHV¶7KH\DOZD\VFDOOHGWKHPVHOYHV5RPDQVRomaioí) and 
their Emperor considered himself as a Roman ruler, the successor and heir of the 
old Roman Cæsars. They remained under the spell of the name of Rome as long 
as the Empire lasted and to the end the tradition of Roman government dominated 
their political thought and purpose. The Empire contained many different races 
all bound together by means of the Roman idea of the state, and the relation of 
the Empire to the outside world was determined by the Roman concept of 
universality. As heir of the Roman imperium Byzantium aspired to be the sole 
Empire and claimed control of all lands which had originally belonged to the 
Roman orbis and now formed part of the Christian world (oikoumene). Hard 
reality thrust this claim further and further into the background, but the states 
which grew up within the Christian ecumenical jurisdiction on former Roman 
territory side by side with the Byzantine Empire were not regarded as being its 
equals. A complicated hierarchy of states developed, and at its apex was the ruler 
of Byzantium as Roman Emperor and head of Christendom. In the early 
Byzantine era imperial politics concentrated on maintaining direct control of the 
orbis romanus; in the middle and late Byzantine periods they were concerned 
with maintaining what was by then a theoretical supremacy. (Ostrogorsky 1969: 
28)  
Still, in its part-WLPH UROH DV WKH:HVW¶V µ2WKHU¶%\]DQWLXP UHLQIRUFHG WKH VHOI-
awareness and ambitions of both the Pope and the new western emperor he created, as 
well as their joint forging of a distinct Western Christendom. From the eleventh 
century onwards, if not earlier, this entity was called christianitas (Jordan 2002: 75).27 
In this capacity the eastern empire also became a pretext for the designs on the East of 
the Normans, the crusaders and other high and late medieval westerners. Even Arabs, 
Bulgars, Serbs, Russians, and Turks were impressed ± or provoked ± by the 
%\]DQWLQHV¶SUHWHQFHWKDWZKRUXOHGQHZ5RPHUXOHGµWKHZRUOG¶RUDWOHDVWZDVSUH-
eminent among rulers. After the Ottomans captured Constantinople in 1453, the Sultan 
stepped into the Roman imperial legacy and made such claims for the Sublime Porte, 
whereupon Moscow presented a counter-FODLP WR EH µ7KLUG 5RPH¶ )RU DOPRVW D
century after Greeks began the struggle for independence from the Ottomans in 1821, 
  135 
Greek nation-builders were vexed by the question whether Constantinople must be 
recovered as the capital of a cosmopolitan empire including all Greeks in the East (the 
megalea idea) or they should aim instead for a compact Greek nation-state centred on 
Athens (Woodhouse 1991: Introduction, ch. IV-VI).  
)RXUWKLWLV%\]DQWLXP¶VGLVWLQFWLRQWRKDYHLQWURGXFHGWKH*UHFR-Roman legacy 
to eastern Europe and Russia, and to have contributed to its revival in the West by way 
of Italy. While holding that Byzantine culture generally had an epigonic and eclectic 
character and a predilection for compilation, imitation and empty conventional 
rhetoric, Ostrogorsky thus argues that  
a great deal is owed to Byzantium for its solicitous preservation of classical 
PDVWHUSLHFHVDQGLWVFDUHIXODWWHQWLRQWR5RPDQODZDQG*UHHNFXOWXUH>«@
Christian Byzantium proscribed neither pagan art nor pagan learning. Roman law 
always remained the basis of its legal system and legal outlook, and Greek 
thought of its intellectual life. Greek learning and philosophy, Greek historians 
and poets, were the models of the most devout Byzantines. The church itself 
incorporated into its teaching much of the thought of the pagan philosophers and 
used their intellectual equipment in articulating Christian doctrine. This tenacious 
awareness of the classical achievements was a special source of strength to the 
Byzantine Empire. Rooted in the Greek tradition, Byzantium stood for a thousand 
years as the most important stronghold of culture and learning; rooted in Roman 
concepts of government, its Empire had a predominant place in the medieval 
world. (Ostrogorsky 1968: 32-33) 
Similarly, Constantinople became such an important source of western (mainly 
north Italian) wealth through trade ± and plunder ± that it helped develop capitalism 
DQG WKH IUHH FLW\ DQG WKXV DUJXDEO\ HYHQ GHPRFUDF\ LQ HPHUJLQJ µ(XURSH¶ ,WDOLDQ
coastal cities (some, notably Venice, originally under Byzantine suzerainty) flourished 
as entrepots and entrepreneurs of long-distance trade with the Byzantine and Islamic 
east and the European north. This contributed importantly to the Italian Renaissance, 
which in turn prepared the subsequent scientific and philosophical revolutions, with all 
its repercussions for Europe and the world (see below, Chapter 3.8).  
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
27 According to Melve (2009: 303), Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) was the first to use the term. 
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After Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, Byzantine traditions were assumed by 
the grand princes of Moscow and sealed by the marriage in 1472 between Sophia, 
niece of the last emperor, and Ivan the Great. Their grandson, Ivan IV (better known as 
µWKH7HUULEOH¶ZDVFURZQHG7VDUDZRUGSUREDEO\GHULYLQJIURPWKH*UHHNkaisar = 
Cæsar), adopted Byzantine court ceremonial, which he transferred to the newly 
constructed Kremlin in Moscow, and perpetuated descending-universalist elements in 
an empire that lasted until 1917 (Herrin 1987: 476).   
The Tsars also adopted the Byzantine model of state-church relations, using the 
church as their primary support in the effort to create a strong central government. 
They therefore worked eagerly to reinforce the position of the church among the 
people and in the state administration, for instance through an extensive building of 
churches patterned on Byzantine architecture and iconography. After the establishment 
of a new patriarchate in Moscow in 1589 to oppose then expanding Polish and 
&DWKROLFLQIOXHQFH0RVFRZEHJDQWREHFDOOHGµWKH7KLUG5RPH¶L.e. the successor of 
µWKH 6HFRQG 5RPH¶ &RQVWDQWLQRSOH 7KH SDWULDUFKDWH ZKLFK 3HWHU WKH *UHDW
transformed into the Holy Synod in 1721, became an effective means to expand the 
Orthodox creed and Russian rule among the various non-Russian tribes to the south 
and east. The Russian Orthodox Church, like other Orthodox national churches in 
eastern and south-eastern Europe, thus became a vital instrument of nation-building.   
Their historical disputes with Rome and close association with the state have in 
turn made the Orthodox churches in Europe apprehensive of contemporary European 
integration. On the other hand, they are anxious that the EU assumes a more explicitly 
Christian identity, differentiating itself both from secularism and Islam, including 
Turkish membership (Philpott and Shah in Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006). 
As for the Greeks, under Ottoman rule and later they continued to call themselves 
Romans, and Rûm (Rome) remained the name of the areas where the majority of 
Greeks lived, be it Anatolia or mainland Greece (Woodhouse 1991: 16). The Sultan in 
the first phase after conquering Constantinople made clear his claim to Roman 
succession by calling himself Kaisar-i-Rûm and his empire mamâlik-i-Rûm. Later the 
Greek-RUWKRGR[ µQDWLRQ¶ OLYLQJ LQ WKH HPpire was called millet-i-Rûm (Clogg 1992; 
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Østergård 1998: 175). As noted, the Byzantine heritage inspired nineteenth century 
Greek state-builders to pursue a vision ± the megalea idea ± of a resurrected 
Constantinopolitan empire encompassing most of the Greeks scattered around the 
eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. Arguably, two historical ideas thus have 
encouraged the identification of modern Greeks with Europe: Byzantine 
cosmopolitanism and the notion of ancient Greece as the cradle of Europe. The Greek 
Orthodox Church, although regarding itself as a guardian of Greek national identity, 
has since about 2002 voiced cautious support of European integration (including the 
accession of eastern Orthodox countries), albeit stressing that the European Union 
must be preserved as a Christian European project (Philpott and Shah in Byrnes and 
Katzenstein, eds., 2006: 56).  
3.7.2 The Making of Europe 
As we have seen (above, page 50), Rokkan stresses the significance for future 
nation-EXLOGLQJ RI ³WKe Germanic kingdoms and the traditions of legislative-judicial 
DVVHPEOLHVRIIUHHKHDGVRIIDPLOLHV´5RNNDQ7KLVVWDWHPHQWUHIOHFWVWZR
common assumptions of national-liberal historiography: that the Germanic war-bands 
that penetrated the Roman Empire in the first century AD represented the origins of the 
later European nation-states, and that they practiced constitutional monarchy. These 
notions of the origins of particularist-ascending, modern sovereignty are now contested 
in a historiographical debate that is undermining the traditional national-liberal 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHµ0DNLQJRI(XURSH¶ 
The modernist, national-liberal reading of Late Antiquity was mainly constructed 
E\ WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ µ%RUXVVLDQ¶ VFKRRO RI KLVWRULRJUDSK\ EDVHG in Protestant 
QRUWKHUQ*HUPDQ\,WVFRUHWKHVLVWKDWµ*HUPDQLF¶VRFLHW\LQWKHILUVWFHQWXU\$'ZDV
composed of free and equal peasants organised into state-type polities, was launched in 
1844 by the eminent historian Georg Waitz (Bakka 1998: 187-189). Bakka argues that 
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:DLW]¶VSRVWXODWLRQRID*HUPDQLFUrdemokratie entered Marxism as the notion of an 
Urkommunismus, and also tied in with British Whig and French national-revolutionary 
historiography and with American social science.28  
$JDLQVW WKLV µ*HUPDQLVW¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ µ5RPDQLVW¶ KLVWRULDQV KDYH HPSKDVLVHG
the continued influence of Roman institutions and traditions (Noble, ed., 2006). 
$FFRUGLQJ WR &DQQLQJ   WKHUH LV ³D JURZLQJ RSLQLRQ WKDW >WKH@ ZKROH
intellectual structure of Germanic [popXODU@NLQJVKLSLVDP\WK´&DQQLQJLELGDUJXHV
that the kind of kingship that in fact emerged in the post-Roman barbarian kingdoms 
was overwhelmingly Roman and Christian in character and stressed the power and 
authority of the monarch. Similarly, Hagen Schulze starts his Germany: A New History 
ZLWKWKHDVVHUWLRQWKDW³7KHRULJLQVRI*HUPDQKLVWRU\OLHQRWLQWKHSULPHYDOIRUHVWVRI
WKHQRUWKEXWLQ5RPH>«@´6FKXO]H 
3DWULFN - *HDU\¶V Myth of Nations (2002) contains a particularly sustained 
FULWLTXH RI WKH HWKQLF QDWLRQDOLVW RU µSULPRUGLDOLVWLF¶ 6PLWK  YLHZ RI WKH
EDUEDULDQV$FFRUGLQJWR*HDU\WKH*HUPDQLFµQDWLRQV¶RI5RPDQDQGHDUO\PHGLHYDO
times were created from above; they did not grow democratically from below. In fact 
they first appeared in the imagination of the Romans as ideas that were only much later 
embraced and adapted by modern nation-builders. Political and military centralisation 
led to common government, which in turn resulted in the evolution of community 
feeling among ethnically and culturally disparate subjects. As far as political ideas are 
concerned, in the process of building early medieval regna, sophisticated Roman and 
Christian ideology was far more influential than Germanic, Celtic, Slav or other 
µEDUEDULDQ¶WUDGLWLRQV 
Roman authors such as Julius Cæsar indeed referred to the loose corporations of 
Franks, Alamanni, Goths etc. that appeared on the borders of the Empire in the second 
                                              
 
 
28 According to Iggers (1999:  WKHKLVWRULFDOGLVFLSOLQH WKDWHPHUJHGLQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV LQ WKHVDQGV³QRW
only followed German models of scholarship but created a historical myth which saw the origins of American liberty in the 
primeval forests of Teutonic Northern EurRSH´  *HDU\ UHPLQGV XV WKDW WKH WKLUG$PHULFDQ SUHVLGHQW 7KRPDV -HIIHUVRQ
propsed to put replicas of Hengist and Horsa, the first Saxon chiefs to arrive in Britain, on the official seal of the United 
States (Geary 2002: 6-7). 
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FHQWXU\$'DVµ*HUPDQV¶GermaniEXWWKLV³WKH\ZRXOGFDOODOORIWKHSHRples who 
DSSHDUHGRQWKH5KLQHIURQWLHUUHJDUGOHVVRIOLQJXLVWLFRURWKHUµHWKQLF¶FULWHULD´*HDU\
2002: 81). Cæsar had borrowed the name from the Gauls,  
who used this term for the savage peoples who tried to penetrate Gaul from across the Rhine. 
From the name of these tribes Cæsar also derived the term for the region beyond the Rhine and 
the Danube: Germania7KHZRUGµ*HUPDQ¶ZDVQRWPXFKPRUHWKDQDGHVLJQDWLRQRIRULJLQIRU
someone who came from the little-known regions east of the Rhine; the degree of ethnic and 
linguistic homogeneity prevailing among these peoples is still a matter of debate among 
scholars. (Schulze 1998: 4)  
7KH ILUVW HWKQRJUDSKLF GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH µ*HUPDQV¶ DQG WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW
SULPDU\VRXUFHRIWKHJORULILFDWLRQRIµ*HUPDQLF¶Oiberty is the work Germania by the 
first century Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus. Here Tacitus praises what he saw as 
WKH*HUPDQV¶ ORYHRI IUHHGRPDQGEUDYHU\ZKLFKKHFRQWUDVWHGXQIDYRXUDEO\ WR WKH
decadent Romans of his day.29  According to Geary, classical Roman ethnography 
came to contrast a constitutionally or politically defined populus romanus, whose 
PHPEHUVKLSZDVDPDWWHURIFLWL]HQVKLSZLWKELRORJLFDOO\GHILQHGµEDUEDULDQ¶populi, 
gentes, natii or tribi, whose membership depended on descent, custom and geography. 
µ:H¶ WKH JORULRXV 5RPDQV GHVFHQGDQWV RI WKH 7URMDQV DQG VXFFHVVRUV RI WKH
magnificent Greeks, were part of universal history, i.e. of the unfolding of civilisation. 
µ7KH\¶ WKH EDUEDULDQV ZHUH LQWHUHVWLQJ EXW XOWLPDWHO\ LQVLJQLILFDQW bystanders, 
destined to be Romanised and disappear or remain on the margin (Geary 2002: 49-50).   
Once established in formerly Roman provinces, barbarian kings attempted to 
transform the culturally disparate members of their armies into a unified people with a 
common law and a common sense of identity. At the same time, they attempted to 
maintain a certain distance from the majority Roman population of their kingdoms. 
Equality however required equal antiquity, learning and virtue. Late Roman writers on 
ethQRJUDSK\VXFKDV&DVVLRGRUXVDQG-RUGDQHV WKXVVRXJKW WRJLYHWKHµQHZ¶SHRSOHV
                                              
 
 
29 Behind Tacitus and the otKHU 5RPDQ µHWKQRJUDSKHUV¶ VWRRG +HURGRWXV DQG WKH DQFLHQW *UHHN LGHD RI WKH EDUEDULDQV
Herodotus arguably pioneered not only historiography (see above, page 71), but ethnography too. But even Herodotus 
recognised that peoples (ethne; sing., ethnos) and tribes (gene, sing., genos) were contingent, volatile social entities that 
could appear as well as disappear in history. 
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on the imperial borders a history as ancient and glorious as that of the Romans and to 
place them in a Roman context as early as possible (Geary 2002: 61).   
By the beginning of the fifth century, inhabitants of the Roman world, whether 
&KULVWLDQ-HZLVKRUSDJDQNQHZWZRWKHRUHWLFDOPRGHOVRIµSHRSOHKRRG¶± one ethnic, 
based on descent, custom, and territory; and one constitutional (or civic), based on law 
and adhesion (Geary 2002: 55).30 In reality, however, even the barbarian 
confederations were constitutional (political), and over time, the two models tended to 
FRQYHUJH 7DFLWXV¶Germania got lost and forgotten, and medieval men of learning 
tended to take Roman society and culture as their great model. Germanic groupings 
such as the Franks, Goths and Saxons flaunted parallel, not common, pedigrees, and 
did not think of themselves as related. The Franks indeed preferred to imagine that 
they originally were Trojans (like the Romans), not Germans.  
The idea of a common Germanic past began to receive historical significance in a 
Germanic (rather than Roman) environment only in the court of Charlemagne. 
&DUROLQJLDQSDWURQVLQ*HUPDQ\EURXJKWWRJHWKHUXQGHUWKHVLQJOHUXEULFRIµ*HUmanic 
WDOHV¶ WKHHSLFVRIYDULRXVJURXSV WKDWKDGSUHYLRXVO\QRWVKRZQDQ\ LQWHUHVW LQZKDW
they had in common (P. Brown 1996: 309). Again the intention was clearly 
constitutional or political: to give cultural unity to an existing political reality: the new 
empire of Charlemagne. But this empire represented a loose amalgamation of 
DPRUSKRXV )UDQNLVK UDWKHU WKDQ µ*HUPDQLF¶ 5RPDQ DQG &KULVWLDQ HOHPHQWV DQG
soon broke into three parts (see below, Section 3.7.3. France and French emerged in 
the western part, Germany and German eventually in the eastern part, with 
Lotharingia-Burgundy for long a contested territory between them.  
Schulze for his part argues that a German common identity only started to gel 
only around the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth century:  
                                              
 
 
30 Obviously, ideas replicated much later in the differing French and German notions of nationality and citizenship (see 
below, Section 3.8.2) 
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For many centuries the people living east of the Rhine had no inkling that they 
were German; in contrast with the Franks or Anglo-6D[RQVDVLQJOHµ*HUPDQ
3HRSOH¶GLGQRWH[LVW>@7KH(DVW)UDQNLVKNLQJVFDOOHGWhemselves rex, but not 
rex teutonicorum. [....] The unifying idea was Roman, not German. [....] Deutsch 
was a purely linguistic term and remained so for a long time [...] The German 
nation existed in the shadow of the Holy Roman Empire and its powerful 
mythical associations, and the important political symbols ± the holy lance, the 
FURZQ&KDUOHPDJQH¶VWKURQHLQWKH$DFKHQFDWKHGUDO± were all connected with 
the empire, not the kingdom. [...] In sum then, the period we are dealing with 
cannot be called the *HUPDQ0LGGOH$JHVRUWKHQRRQGD\RIWKHµ*HUPDQ¶
emperor, we cannot even speak of the beginnings of German history, for the 
people in question had no notion of being German. (Schulze 1998: 15-20). 
Throughout most of the European Middle Ages, and later too, Roman order and 
civilisation remained the prevailing political ideal whatever the ethnic composition of 
the polity in question. As Keen argues,  
To the peoples of the Mediterranean basin the Roman Empire had in its time 
provided a great measure of political, cultural and commercial unity. Under its 
rule, peace and prosperity had accompanied a high standard of civilisation. The 
men who lived in Europe in the Middle Ages were well aware of this, and knew 
too that a comparison between this Roman past and their own times would not be 
in their favour. Hence the Roman past for them appeared to have set a standard, 
which it should be their object to re-achieve. Everything which they rediscovered 
about the classical world, about its knowledge of philosophy and of natural 
science, about its systems of law, about its literary achievements, tended to 
underline this attitude. The restoration of the world-wide dominion of Rome was 
the dream not only of medieval Popes and emperors but also of many of their 
subjects and servants. It was a very natural desire, given the blessings which had 
once followed in the wake of Roman peace. (Keen 1968: 14-15) 
:KHQ WKH+RO\ 5RPDQ(PSLUH DFTXLUHG WKH HSLWKHW µRI WKH*HUPDQ QDWLRQ¶ LQ
1512,31 µQDWLRQ¶ UHIHUUHG WR WKH DULVWRFUDF\ ³WKH RQly estate able to take political 
DFWLRQ´6FKXO]H+RZHYHUWKHWHUPZDVVRRQWRDFTXLUHFXOWXUDORYHUWRQHV
7KH ,WDOLDQ KXPDQLVW 3RJJLR %UDFFLROLQL KDG MXVW UHGLVFRYHUHG 7DFLWXV¶ Germania. 
%UDFFLROLQL¶VHIIRUWVZHUHSDUWRIWKHJHQHUDO5HQDLVVDQFHVHDUFKIRUDQFLHQWµFODVVLFDO¶
origins. Humanists in the Holy Roman Empire, France and Poland became fascinated 
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ZLWK7DFLWXV¶VLPDJHRIDIUHHSXUH*HUPDQLFSHRSOH7KH\EHJDQWRV\PSDWKLVHZLWK
the victims of Roman imperialist expansion: the Gauls, the Germans, or the Slavs. 
6WLOOGXHWRWKHODFNRIQDWLRQDOXQLW\WKHZRUGµ*HUPDQ\¶GLGQRWFRPHLQWRJHQHUDO
use until about the end of the sixteenth century (Schulze 1998: 15).  
The rediscovery of the Germania and emerging national awareness contributed to 
WKHIDPRXVGHEDWHEHWZHHQWKHµ$QFLHQWV¶DQGWKHµ0RGHUQV¶IRUHVKDGRZLQJWKHODWHU
one between the Romanists and Germanists. Characteristic of the position of the 
$QFLHQWVZHUH VWDWHPHQWV OLNH ³:KDW LV DOO KLVWRU\ EXW WKH SUDLVH RI 5RPH"´ E\ WKH
hisWRULDQ DQGSRHW3HWUDUFK DQG³RXUV >WKH5RPDQV¶@ LV ,WDO\RXUV*DXORXUV6SDLQ
Germany [....] and many other lands; for wherever the Roman tongue holds sway, there 
LVWKH5RPDQ(PSLUH´E\WKHSKLORORJLVW/RUHQ]R9DOODTXRWHGE\.HOOH\
176). µ0RGHUQ¶ KLVWRULDQV GHYHORSHG DQ DOWHUQDWLYH QDUUDWLYH EDVHG RQ WKH translatio 
imperii myth, arguing that the modern empire was the German one, indeed that it had 
been Germanic since its inception in 800. Many humanists eventually concluded that 
the modern Germanic world was superior to the classical Greco-Roman one. 
The quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns was exacerbated by the 
Reformation, with Lutheran scholars repudiating the whole Roman heritage, including 
Trojan ancestry, in favour of GermanLFWUDGLWLRQVDQGRULJLQV³,QWKHVL[WHHQWKFHQWXU\
truth took both national and confessional forms, as the European states, in imitation of 
ancient Rome, generated their own secular cults and ideology and their 
historiographers began the task of inventiQJWUDGLWLRQVWRVXLWPRGHUQQHHGVDQGKRSHV´
(Kelley 1998: 174).  
As Kelley moreover notes, after the Reformation also English historiography 
³WXUQHGDJDLQVWWKHFODVVLFDOKHULWDJHDQGORRNHGWRLWVRZQQDWLRQDOSDVWDVDVRXUFHRI
legitimacy and prestige. As English Protestants rejected the tyranny of the Pope, so 
students of Anglo-6D[RQ OLEHUW\ VRXJKW WR WKURZ RII UHWURVSHFWLYHO\ WKH µ1RUPDQ
\RNH¶ DQG DWWHQGDQW )UHQFK DWWULEXWHV´ .HOOH\   2QH RI WKH ILUVW (QJOLVK
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
31 It should be noted that the Latin version is in the plural: Sacrum Romanum Imperium Nationis Germaniae. 
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historians to embrace the Germanist interpretation was Richard Verstegan. Also in 
Spain and other countries, historical scholarship took a national turn after the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation.    
Even Frenchmen ± Gallicans as well as Protestants ± now wanted to declare 
historiographical and ancestral independence from Rome, celebrating their Frankish 
and Gallic forefathers. Thus distinct Germanist and Gallic schools of historiography 
emerged. According to Geary (2002: 21), in early modern France the king and nobility 
(the first estate) came to hold the view that they themselves derived from the Germanic 
Franks, whereas the commoners (the third estate) were the descendants of the original 
Gallic population. They had been enslaved by Cæsar but liberated by the Franks, who 
had thus established their right to rule. Later, Montesquieu was one the most notable 
DGYRFDWHVRI*HUPDQLVP,QVSLUHGQRWOHDVWE\WKHDVVRFLDWLRQRIWKHZRUGVµ)UDQN¶DQG
µ)UHH¶ WKH )UHQFK *HUPDQLVWV QXUWXUHG WKHP\WK RI D WUDGLWLRQDO DJH-old Germanic 
love of freedom. 
In early modern France, it was mainly monastic scholars who defended the 
Romanist thesis against the Germanism championed by the nobility (Kelley 1999: 
220). However, the Enlightenment added vital new support. Particularly important was 
Edward GibERQ¶VDecline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-89). Gibbon depicted 
WKH µ)DOORI5RPH¶DVDEUHDNGRZQRIFLYLOLVDWLRQFDXVHGE\EDUEDULDQ LQYDVLRQVDQG
IROORZHG LQ KLV IDPRXVZRUGV E\ WKH ³UHOLJLRQ DQGEDUEDULVP´RI WKH µ'DUN$JHV¶
During the French RHYROXWLRQ $EEp 6LH\qV LQIOXHQWLDOO\ DUJXHG WKDW WKH QRELOLW\¶V
µ*HUPDQQHVV¶PDGHWKHPDIRUHLJQHOHPHQW 
By contrast, Augustin Thierry in his History of the French Revolution submitted 
that the Revolution signified the final victory, after an age-long struggle, of the 
GHPRFUDWLF*DXOVRYHU WKHDULVWRFUDWLF)UDQNV +HUPDQ ,Q*HDU\¶VZRUGV
WKH*DOOLFWKHVLVZDVWKDW³WKHWUXH)UHQFKSHRSOHGHVFHQGDQWVRIWKH*DXOVKDGORQJ
borne the yoke of foreign servitude, first under the Romans and then under the Franks. 
It was time to send this alien race back to the forests of Franconia and return France to 
WKH WKLUG HVWDWH WKH RQH WUXH QDWLRQ´ *HDU\   +RZHYHU WKH FRQWLQXLQJ
influence of the Romanist tradition in France is illustrated by the French 
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UHYROXWLRQDULHV¶DGXODWLRQRIWKH5RPDQUHSXEOLFDQGHYHQPRUHQRWDEO\1DSROHRQ¶V
carefully deployed Roman imagery (see below, Section 3.8.1).  
7DFLWXV¶ ERRNV FDPH WR EH PRVW HQWKXVLDVWLFDOO\ HPEUDFHG LQ 3UXVVLD ZKHUH
historiography was pioneered as an academic discipline in the eighteenth century (see 
above, Section 3.4.3). Herder and the Göttingen historians (including Waitz), who 
were precursors of German national romanticism, took them as evidence of the 
antiquity and historical greatness of the German nation. By aggrandising the Tacitan 
myth they helped create German cultural nationalism and paved the way for political 
nationalism too (Geary 2002: 22). During the Napoleonic occupation, Fichte in his 
famous Addresses to the German Nation equated the imperialist Romans of the first 
century with the contemporary French occupants, and the German resistance to Roman 
expansion with himself and his German compatriots (see below, Section 3.8.3). 
*HUPDQQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\EHFDPHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK7DFLWXV¶VGHVFULSWLRQVLQKLVAnnales 
RI WKH *HUPDQ YLUWXHV DQG WKH DFFRXQW RI $UPLQLXV¶V µ+HUPDQQ¶V¶ YLFWRU\ DW WKH
Teutoburg forest in 9 B.C. In the Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Historical 
Monuments of Germany, one of whose original editors was Waitz) German historians 
posited an uninterrupted history for the German nation back to the Goths, the Franks, 
the Burgundians and the Vandals. Kelley concludes: 
How Franks and Gauls beFDPHµ)UHQFK¶$QJOR-Saxons and Normans became 
µ(QJOLVK¶,EHULDQVDQG9LVLJRWKVEHFDPHµ6SDQLVK¶DQG7HXWRQV$OOHPDQV
6D[RQVDQGDJDLQ)UDQNVEHFDPHµ*HUPDQ¶LQYROYHGFRPSOH[SURFHVVHVRI
Christianisation, dynastic state building, and vernacular linguistic and cultural 
formations; but in fact the emergence of national traditions was due in large part 
to the retrospective labours of scholars ± the legal fictions of jurists, the 
ideological constructs of publicists, the sentiments of poets, and especially the 
mythologising of historians, usually with the Roman model in mind. As 
&DUOULFKDUG%UOHUKDVZULWWHQ³,WLVDJUHDWKLVWRULFDOIDOVHKRRGWRSUHWHQGWKDW
RQHLVGHDOLQJZLWKµ)UHQFK¶RUµ*HUPDQ¶KLVWRU\ZKHQLQIDFWRQHVKRXOGVSHDN
of Gallic, FranNLVKRU*HUPDQLFKLVWRU\´7KHFRQWHQWLRXVDQGFKDXYLQLVWLFZD\V
in which nationality was projected back into medieval times is a striking example 
RIPRGHUQ³ZRUNRQP\WK´DQGLWLVLURQLFWKDWWKLVKDVEHHQDSURMHFWFDUULHGRQ
E\WKHPRVWOHDUQHGDQG³VFLHQWLILF´RIKLVWRULDQVZRUNLQJLQWKHVHUYLFHRI
political interests. (Kelley 1998: 118) 
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2QWKLVEDFNJURXQGLWVHHPVQDWXUDOWRSRVLW-XOLXV& VDU¶VFRQTXHVWRI*DXOLQ
%&DVWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWRIWKHµ0DNLQJRI(XURSH¶,WZDVKLVLQYDVLRQWKDWEURught 
barbarian northwestern Europe into the Roman orbit. Later, in the second and third 
centuries AD, the economic centre of gravity of the western part of the Empire shifted 
from Italy to Gaul. Moreover, just as mounting barbarian pressure was a major reason 
for the removal of the overall imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople in the 
fourth century, barbarian incursions also caused the western capital to be moved from 
Rome, first to Milan, then to the Rhenish frontier. Northern Gaul from now on 
remained the political core of the West. The western emperor-general resided in Trier 
for much of the fourth century, and Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) became the capital of the 
Carolingian empire. There was thus a certain historical-territorial continuity between 
the last effective central government of the western Roman empire and its Frankish 
successor three hundred years later.  
At the same time, Germanic, Celtic and Slav barbarians gradually adopted Roman 
ways. By the fourth century barbarians formed the bulk of the Roman army, especially 
in the West. Foederati were not only trained in Roman military and administrative 
V\VWHPV EXW ZHUH DOVR H[SRVHG WR RWKHU DVSHFWV RI WKH (PSLUH¶V FLYLOLVDWLRQ
³%DUEDULDQ OHDGHUV IDYRXUDEOH WR 5RPH IRXQG WKDW WKH\ FRXOG UHDFK SUeviously 
unimaginable heights of power and influence, not by fighting against the Empire, but 
IRU LW´*HDU\5RPDQLVDWLRQDOVRDIIHFWHGWKHWULEHVDFURVVWKHOLPHVGXHWR
the considerable intercourse among all barbarian peoples, especially during periods of 
peace. When the great invasions began in the late fourth century, barbarian society had 
thus changed significantly, which eased the amalgamation of barbarians and Romans. 
The invaders-settlers were relatively few compared to the indigenous population, and 
tended naturally to assimilate the culture of the local Roman or Gallo-Roman 
aristocracy who had ruled the Romanised Celtic societies they conquered.  
However, the other side of the coin was that the Roman army itself became 
barbarised (indeed LQ WKH ODWH (PSLUH WKH ZRUG µEDUEDULDQ¶ EHFDPH LQWHUFKDQJHDEOH
ZLWK µVROGLHU¶ 7KLV DOORZHG EDUEDULDQ 5RPDQZDUULRUV WR XVH WKHLU GXDO LGHQWLW\ WR
enhance their position both in the empire and among their own people. Furthermore, 
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the fourth century army rHRUJDQLVDWLRQ WUDQVIRUPHG ³WKLVPRVW5RPDQRI LQVWLWXWLRQV
LQWR D SRZHUIXO PHFKDQLVP RI UHJLRQDOLVDWLRQ DQG EDUEDULVDWLRQ´ *HDU\  
With the decline of central government in the fourth and fifth century western part of 
the Empire, local identities, expressed in terms at once derived from Roman civil 
subdivisions and from pre-5RPDQµHWKQLF¶YRFDEXODU\FDPHWRGRPLQDWHWKHUKHWRULF
of provincial discourse.   
Still, when the last western emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed in 476, 
no one supposed that the Empire had ceased in the West. There had already for 
centuries usually been two emperors, one ruling the West from Italy, and the other the 
East from Constantinople. Now there was only one, at Constantinople, who thus 
became, at least de jure, the sole ruler of both halves of the Empire (Keen 1968: 16-
17). Thus, when the barbarians set up kingdoms in the western provinces, they did not 
question the continuing authority of the Empire in the lands where they had settled:  
Kingship denoted leadership of a barbarian people: such leaders looked to the 
eastern emperor to grant them titles which would give them authority over 
Roman citizens. Theodoric the Goth became patrician of Rome, and Clovis the 
)UDQNZDVKDLOHGDV$XJXVWXV7KH\XVHGWKHHPSHURU¶Vimage on their coins, and 
continued to enforce the Roman law, not the barbarian laws by which their own 
people were bound, on the old inhabitants of the provinces. The empire never 
exactly ended; and though its influence became progressively more remote, deep 
respect remained for the unity it was supposed to enshrine. (Keen 1968: 17)  
In the East, the imperial government co-operated with barbarian kingdoms on its 
ERUGHUV WKDWEHFDPHµEXIIHUVWDWHV¶EHWZHHQWKH(PSLUHDQG3HUVLDQVDGYDQFLQJIURP
the east and south and barbarians from the north. Among the barbarians on the Rhine-
Danube frontier, where there were no pre-existing kingdoms, the imperial strategy was 
to encourage the emergence of royal power. Chieftains turned kings could organise 
multi-tribal political units useful to the Romans. Under the kings, Germanic foederati 
were settled on Roman soil to perform the same duties as the barbarian buffer states in 
the east. Having created the German gentes as ideas, the Romans now proceeded to 
make them political realities.  
Bakka (1998: 208) however notes a distinction between the western Germanic 
gentes such as the Franks and Alamanians and the northern Germanic Scandinavians: 
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Kingship was far more entrenched as a status position among the latter. In the ninth 
century age of the Vikings, this status was the node around which the Scandinavian 
kingdoms (riki) crystallised. It is perhaps also significant that the origin (probably 
mythical) of the eastern Germanic gentes (the Goths, Vandals, Burgundians and 
Heruls) was Scandinavia. Moreover, among these peoples kingship apparently became 
more firmly entrenched than among western Germanic peoples such as the Franks and 
the Alamanians. Roman influence decreased with increasing distance from Rome.  
According to Geary (2002: 108-109), barbarian kings pursued three main 
strategies when they sought to forge a common identity in their new kingdoms. First 
and foremost, they claimed illustrious descent from ancient royal or noble families. 
Successful kings projected their faPLO\¶V LPDJLQHG SDVW RQWR WKH SHRSOH DV DZKROH
providing a common sense of origin to be shared by the whole of the military elite 
while suppressing alternative claims to legitimate authority. Second, they used religion 
to promote a sense of common identity. The royal families of the Goths, Vandals, 
Burgundians and other Arian peoples cultivated Arianism for this purpose. Third, they 
UHOLHGRQDµ*HUPDQLF¶OHJDOWUDGLWLRQVKDUSO\FRQWUDVWLQJZLWK5RPDQODZFRPSULVLQJ
a system of tariffs for offences (wergeld); the use of oaths and formal oral procedure; 
and with separate rights and responsibilities for barbarians and Romans.  
As regards their attitude to the Roman or Romanised societies they conquered, 
according to Geary barbarian kings had two options. Depending on their present, 
religion, geopolitical location and geographic-mythical origin (far from or close to the 
Roman Empire), they chose either segregation or amalgamation. Kingdoms ruled by 
eastern Germanic kings on or close to the Mediterranean ± the Vandal kingdom in 
North Africa; the Ostrogothic kingdom in the Italian peninsula; the Visigoth kingdom 
of Toulouse, later in the Iberian peninsula; the Burgundian kingdom in eastern Gaul 
and the western Alps ± sought to keep the new ruling class and the indigenous 
inhabitants separate. The Visigoths pioneered a segregated polity that was replicated 
by the Vandals and Ostrogoths. It was based on the maintenance of two communities, 
one orthodox, Roman, and civilian, the other Arian, barbarian, and military, under the 
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unified command of a barbarian king holding an imperial commission as Roman 
patricians.  
However, the failure of the segregation policy is well illustrated by the fate of the 
Ostrogothic kingdom. Odovacer, the Romano-barbarian general who deposed Romulus 
in 476, was recognised as Roman patrician with authority to rule in the name of the one 
remaining (eastern) emperor, Zeno. However, Zeno soon decided to give over the 
Italian peninsula to the Ostrogoths in order to deflect them from the eastern heartland 
of the Empire. The Ostrogothic king, Theodoric, was appointed patrician and founded 
a kingdom centred on Ravenna that lasted from 493 to 526. Theodoric was a Roman 
citizen and had held the office of consul in the East. He took his role of patrician and 
lieutenant in the West of the eastern Roman emperor very seriously. The essence of his 
policy, as had been that of Odovacer, was to preserve the civilisation of Rome.  He 
³SLFNHGXSWKHUHLQVRIWKH5RPDQJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHSDWURQDJHRIDUWVDQGFXOWXre to 
a degree unparalleled by the rulers of other Germanic kingdoms, encouraging the 
FROODERUDWLRQ RI KLV 5RPDQ DULVWRFUDWLF VXEMHFWV´ &ROLVK  -45). Since he 
wanted to maintain diplomatic contact with Constantintinople, he needed the services 
of men steeped in the classical tradition such as Cassiodorus and Boethius (see below), 
who knew Greek, court etiquette, and the operation of the late Roman bureaucracy.  
At the same time, Theodoric sought to transform his heterogeneous, mobile 
barbarian army into a stable, settled, Gothic people capable of peaceful co-existence 
within Roman Italy. His goal for his Gothic following was civilitas LH³WRFRQYLQFH
them to adopt Roman principles of the rule of law and Roman traditions of tolerance 
and consensus LQFLYLFVRFLHW\ZKLFKWKH\ZHUHWRSURWHFWZLWKWKHLUPLOLWDU\YDORXU´
(Geary 2002: 110-111). Nevertheless, Theodoric intended to maintain Goths and 
Romans as separate communities ± one military, the other civilian ± living in mutual 
dependence under his supreme authority. Gothic separateness was promoted by 
VWUHVVLQJ WKH$ULDQ IDLWK DQG 7KHRGRULF¶V DXJXVW GHVFHQW IURP WKH SUH-Hunnic Amal 
family of kings.  
As time passed, however, the boundaries between Ostrogothic warrior and 
Roman civilian blurred. Many barbarians became landowners increasingly tied to the 
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same economic and regional concerns as their Roman neighbours. The next generation 
of Goths, educated in the traditions of the Roman elite, felt even further removed from 
the warrior culture designated for them. At the same time, however, some Romans rose 
in the ranks of the military and adopted Gothic tradition even to the extent of learning 
the Gothic language and marrying Gothic women. An anti-Roman reaction emerged 
that allowed emperor Justinian to use Ostrogothic infighting as a pretext for invasion in 
535.  
7KH UHVXOWDQW µ*RWKLFZDUV¶ ODVWHGIRU WZRGHFDGHVZLWKGHYDVWDWLQJHIIHFWV IRU
the Ostrogothic kingdom and for Italy at large. By 556 Byzantine forces had recaptured 
most of the Italian peninsula (as well as northern Africa and southern Spain), but most 
was lost again to the newly invading people of the Lombards in the next fifty years. 
Only Ravenna and environs, the Patrimony of St Peter (mainly Rome and environs), 
Apulia, Calabria, Naples and Sicily remained in Byzantine hands.32 However, 
-XVWLQLDQ¶VUHFRQTXHVWZDVDUHDOWXUQLQJ-point in one sense: thereafter it seems that no 
western king sought imperial confirmation of his reign. Moreover, the devastations 
caused by the war, as well as tough imperial rule, taxation, and intervention in church 
DIIDLUV FDXVHG ORFDO UHVHQWPHQW ³7KHZHVW IURP QRZ RQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ZHQW LWV RZQ
ZD\´&DQQLQJ7KH2VWURJRWKVGLVDSSHDUHGIURPKLVWRU\DVDSHRSOHDVZHOO
as a polity. The Lombard kingdom, however, survived until the invasion by 
Charlemagne in 774, who took over the title King of the Lombards.33 
Like the Ostrogothic kingdom, the other new kingdoms ruled by Germanic 
invaders originating before the migrations in the east became fairly Romanised. The 
Visigoth king Ataulf (410-15) at one point renounced his earlier ambition to displace 
5RPHE\D*RWKLFHPSLUHDQGDOOHJHGO\GHFODUHG³WKHXQEULGOHGEDUEDULVPRIWKH*RWK
is incompatible with law, and without law there can be no state. Therefore, since I 
FDQQRWVXSSODQWKHU,KRSHWREHNQRZQWRSRVWHULW\DVWKHUHVWRUHURI5RPH´TXRWHG
                                              
 
 
32 The last Byzantine toehold in Italy, Bari, was lost in 1071. 
33 Ttwo years later he made the Lombard duchies of Spoleto and Benevento part of the papal state; see below, Section 3.7.3 
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by Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 65). In 414, attired in the garb of a Roman senator, he 
married Gallia Placida, the daughter of emperor Theodosius I.  Roman Catholic 
Christianity replaced Arianism as the official faith of the Visigothic kingdom in 589, in 
part to help overcome resistance among the local Roman and Catholic bishops and 
nobles. The subsequent anointing and consecration of Reccared as Christian king was 
modelled on the sacred kingship in the Old Testament. The ceremony was later taken 
as a model for the instalment of the Frankish king as well as the Holy Roman emperor. 
The Visigothic kingdom survived as a divisive, but relatively prosperous and 
sophisticated Roman-Gothic-Celtic polity until the Arab conquest of 711.   
The Visigoths were the first of the Germanic war-bands to receive Christianity. 
They were baptised into Arianism by bishop Ulfilas (c. 310-383) in the 340s. 
Germanist/modernist historiography has considered Ulfilas the creator of a 
GLVWLQFWLYHO\µ*HUPDQLF¶RUµ*RWKLF¶&KULVWLDQLW\UHSOHWHZLWKDµQDWLRQDO¶FKXUFKDQG
with an alphabet and script he invented when translating the Bible from Greek to 
Gothic. However, the conversion of Germanic gentes to Arianism had a Romanising 
effect too. Ulfilas was a missionary of Constantinople, as at the time of his 
FRQVHFUDWLRQDVµELVKRSRIWKH*RWKV¶WKH$ULDQFUHHGKHOGVZD\LQWKH5RPDQFDSLWDO
7KXV WR WKH 9LVLJRWKV WKHPVHOYHV µ$ULDQLVP¶ ZDV WKH WUXO\ XQLYHUsal Christianity, 
received in the glory days of the Roman Empire, the reigns of emperors Constantius II 
and Valens (P. Brown 1996: 60, 88).  
Germanic peoples from the east settled in Roman core areas on or near the 
Mediterranean. By contrast, western Germanic tribal confederations such as the 
Franks, Alamanni, Frisians, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes were able to found enduring 
kingdoms further north and with a more balanced Roman, Germanic and Celtic culture. 
Here, Roman and barbarian distinctions rapidly disappeared. Geary notes that the 
Franks and Saxons initially served as federates of the empire, but had no direct 
H[SHULHQFHRIWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQZRUOGRI&RQVWDQWLQRSOHRUHYHQ,WDO\³7KH\OLNHWKH
provincial Romans they absorbed, were far removed from the cultural and 
administrative traditions of a Theodoric or a Cassiodorus. The result was a simpler, but 
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in the long run more thorough, transformation of these peoples into new social and 
FXOWXUDOIRUPV´*HDU\ 
The Franks turned out to be the Germanic confederation that influenced the 
politico-territorial organisation and identity of future Europe most profoundly. Their 
political ideals, however, like those of other Germanic groupings, were not 
µQDWLRQDOLVW¶RUHYHQµ*HUPDQLF¶EXWFUXFLDOO\LQIOuenced by the image of the Roman 
Empire as experienced both first hand and as later transmitted and transformed by the 
Roman Church. Under Charlemagne the Frankish kingdom developed into an empire 
that united Cisalpine and Transalpine Europe in its adherence to the Roman and 
Christian tradition of universalism.  
As we have seen, the barbarian invasions began a process of amalgamation 
between the Germanic, Celtic and Slav barbarians on the one hand, and the society of 
the Christian Roman Empire on the other. Gaul, where the two societies met on more 
equal terms than elsewhere, was thus to be the centre of the process forming the 
European identity of the future. In spite of their paganism, the Franks had a longer 
tradition of association with the Empire than any of the other western Germanic 
peoples. The Salian Franks were the only of the western Germanic tribes to invade and 
establish a kingdom inside the Roman Empire. They settled on imperial territory in 
present-day Belgium and on the Lower Rhine in the middle of the fourth century. In 
the fifth century they fought as foederati of the Roman governors of Gaul against the 
Saxons, the Visigoths and the Huns. In 486 King Clovis (481-511) conquered the 
territory between the Loire and the Somme, which was the last relic of independent 
Roman Gaul, thus becoming ruler of a mixed Roman-Germanic-Gallic kingdom.  
)RU D QXPEHU RI UHDVRQV WKH )UDQNV¶ ORQJ HVWDEOLVKPHQW LQ *DXO WKHLU GHHS
LQYROYHPHQWLQLPSHULDODQGUHJLRQDOSROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHVWKHIDFWWKDW&ORYLV¶DXWKority 
had been recognised by representatives of the Gallo-Roman aristocracy since the death 
RIKLVIDWKHUNLQJ&KLOGHULFORQJEHIRUHKLVFRQYHUVLRQWR&KULVWLDQLW\HWF&ORYLV¶V
absorption of rival power centres caused much less dramatic change than had the 
conquests of earlier barbarian kings. He took over the remnants of the Roman civil 
administration, which however did not extend beyond the level of the individual 
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civitas. The stability of the Merovingian dynasty established by Clovis ± it ruled 
without interruption for two and a half centuries ± was without parallel in early 
PHGLHYDO (XURSH ,W ZDV DOVR ³WKH RQO\ G\QDVW\ LQ QRUWK (XURSHZKLFK FRXOG MXVWO\
claim to be the heirs to Roman power. The Byzantine emperor remained, in the eyes of 
the kings, their nominal sovereign. And Merovingian methods of government, even in 
WKH WLPH RI 'DJREHUW >VL[WK WR VHYHQWK FHQWXU\@ ZHUH UHFRJQLVDEO\ 5RPDQ´ -DPHV
1988: 95). 
As I have indicated, there is little evidence that the Franks had or attempted to 
create as strong and distinct a sense of identity vis-à-vis the Roman population as had 
Theodoric or other Gothic leaders. Rather than claiming ancient traditions separate 
from Rome, the Franks emphasised their communalities. Already in the sixth century, 
they claimed Trojan ancestry, thus connecting themselves genealogically to their 
Roman neighbours. The baptism by the Gallo-Roman bishop of Rheims, Remigius, of 
Clovis and his army of some 3000 soldiers in 496 showed that the Franks were 
prepared to accept also a common religion with the Romans. Clovis presented himself 
as the champion of Christian orthodoxy in his campaign against the Arian Visigoths in 
507. After his victory, emissaries of emperor Anastasius granted him imperial 
recognition. 
In the course of the next thirty years the Frankish monarchy advanced with 
extraordinary rapidity. Gaul was united once more, and eastwards its power was 
projected far beyond the old Roman frontiers. The Alamanni, the Thuringians and the 
Bavarians were conquered (and, with the assistance of the papal missionary bishop 
Boniface, converted to Roman Catholic orthodoxy) in rapid succession. The Frankish 
state that arose, Francia, has been claimed by both French and German nationalists as 
the ancestor of their states. United by a common religion and a common legend of 
RULJLQ&ORYLV¶)UDQNVDQGWKH5RPDQSURYLQFLDOVRIKLVNLQJGRPSURFHHGHGTXLFNO\WR
forge a common identity. Within only a few generations, the population north of the 
Loire had become uniformly Frankish. Roman legal traditions persisted in the south 
and Burgundian and Roman legal status endured in the old Burgundian kingdom 
FRQTXHUHG E\ &ORYLV¶V VRQV LQ WKH V %XW WKHVH GLIIHULQJ OHJDO WUDGLWLRQV GLG QRW
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come to constitute the basis of a separate social or political iGHQWLW\ ³7KH JUHDW
strength of the Frankish synthesis was the creation of a unified society, drawing from 
WKHOHJDFLHVRI5RPDQDQGEDUEDULDQVWUDGLWLRQV´*HDU\ 
Moreover, through their alliance with the Roman Church, the Franks offered 
decisive assistance to the rise to a dominant position in European Christendom of the 
other main centripetal institution of the Middle Ages, the Papacy. Whether by 
coincidence or design,34 the pontificate of Gregory the Great (590-604; see also above, 
page 129) may be considered the starting point of this path:  
:LWKHYHU\MXVWLILFDWLRQFDQ*UHJRU\EHFDOOHGµ)DWKHURI(XURSH¶,WVSDUHQWDJH
and physiognomy were Roman, and its cementing bond was the faith as 
expounded by the Roman church. A merely physical or geographical entity was to 
become an ideological body which was sustained by its own inner forces, of 
which none was more resilient than the Christian faith in its Roman ecclesiastical 
shape. In prophetic vision Gregory himself saw this European union as the union 
RID&KULVWLDQFRPPRQZHDOWKµsocietas reipublicae christianae¶WKHEDVLF
ingredient of which were of Roman and ecclesiastical provenance. (Ullmann 
2003: 55-56) 
Le Goff (2005: 18- WRRFRQVLGHUV*UHJRU\RQHRIWKH³IRXQGLQJVFKRODUV´RU
³FXOWXUDO IDWKHUV´ RI (XURSH WRJHWKHUZLWK %RHWKLXV &DVVLRGRUXV ,VLGRUH DQG%HGH
(see below).  This reluctant but highly effective Pope helped the city of Rome 
overcome a serious flooding, an epidemic and the onslaught of the Lombards. He sent 
the monk Augustine with a group of missionaries to reconvert England; in his books he 
established Job and St Benedict as great models for Christians; he composed a highly 
influential pastoral handbook for clerics; and reformed the liturgical chant, henceforth 
known as the Gregorian Chant. 
The alliance between the Frankish kingdom and the Roman Church inaugurated 
in 496 became instrumental to the transmission and extension of the Roman political 
                                              
 
 
34 8OOPDQQ¶V-FODLPWKDW*UHJRU\LQWHQWLRQDOO\WXUQHGWRWKH³\RXQJ´DQG³YLULOH´*HUPDQLFQDWLRQVRIZHVWHUQ
Europe in his alleged pursuit of universal papal monarchy is controversial and probably not tenable (Herrin 1987: 182; 
Canning 1996: 38). Gregory still retained a unitary notion of Christendom and thus considered the western barbarian 
kingdoms to be subject to the universal Roman emperor at Constantinople  In retrospect, however, Ullmann is no doubt right 
WRSRLQWRXWWKDW*UHJRU\¶VPLVVLRQWR(QJODQGSDYHGWKHZD\IRUGLVWLQFWO\ZHVWHUQRU(XURSHDQ&KULVWHQGRP 
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tradition, the Catholic faith and the classical heritage to medieval Europe. As 
barbarians converted to the Roman faith, Latin increasingly became the lingua franca 
of western Christendom. Unlike the Byzantine missionaries Cyril and Methodius,35 
who translated the Bible and the liturgy into a tongue understood by the Slavs they 
converted, western churchmen who evangelised the western barbarians stuck with the 
/DWLQ%LEOH-HURPH¶V9XOJDWHDQGOLWXUJ\8QWLO%HGH¶V2OG(QJOLVKYHUVLRQ8OILODV¶
translation of the Bible into the vernacular in the fourth century remained an exception. 
Celtic and Germanic students had to learn Latin before they could open the seals of the 
sacred books, the books of the liberal arts, and the works of the church fathers and 
transmitters.  
Just as Christianity took on the coloration of classical literature and philosophy, 
and an institutional shape based on the bureaucratic and legal system of Rome, so 
church leaders made adjustments to the Celtic and Germanic mentalities and 
value systems in their efforts to evangelise these peoples, a process that 
intensified when thinkers from these very groups became the leaders who took 
charge of the schoolrooms and pulpits. (Colish 1997: 56-57)  
The Church gradually took full control of education and thus the access to 
knowledge. One of the results was that in ex-Roman regions ruled by the Franks, 
Burgundians, Visigoths and Lombards, Latin or neo-Latinate dialects prevailed over 
and replaced the languages of the barbarian conquerors. This facilitated the adoption of 
Roman and Christian ideology while also laying the foundations of the modern 
Romance languages. The only part of ex-Roman Western Europe where Germanic 
speech struck permanent root was Britain under the Anglo-Saxons. The reason was 
probably the abrupt and thorough de-Romanisation of Britain in the fifth century, 
followed as it was by an almost complete breakdown of ecclesiastical structures in the 
sixth.  
                                              
 
 
35 Pope John Paul II proclaimed Cyril and Methodius patron saints of Europe, along with St Benedict of Nursia so 
proclaimed earlier by Pope Paul VI. 
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Germanic languages also prevailed in areas which had not been part of the 
Roman Empire, such as trans-Rhine Germany and Scandinavia, as did Slavic 
languages in post-Roman as well as entirely non-Roman territories (with the exception 
of most of present-day Romania and Moldova). However, although the Germanic 
dialects were probably mutually comprehensible, there was no common German 
µ'HXWVFK¶, or Teutonic) language in Roman or medieval times. A standard German 
ZULWRQO\GHYHORSHGLQHDUO\PRGHUQWLPHVRQWKHEDVLVRI/XWKHU¶VWUDQVODWLRQRIWKH
Bible (Schulze 1998: 16-18). 
Conversion to Catholicism thus meant adoption of Latin as the means of written 
communication in the whole of European Christendom. Latin script remained virtually 
hegemonic in official church and state correspondence as well as in scientific discourse 
until the Enlightenment, when it began to be substituted by French. Still, although by a 
declining proportion, Latin continued to be used in parallel with vernacular script in 
Europe. Universities exclusively used Latin until the eighteenth century, and in some 
cases into the twentieth. Today words of Greek or Latin origin constitute between 75 
and 90 per cent of the English vocabulary, and even 20 per cent of Swedish (Janson 
2004). The Catholic mass was held in Latin until the 1960s, and Latin is still the 
preferred means of communication in the Catholic Church. 
Arian and pagan barbarians outside of Gaul were converted to Catholicism 
primarily by monastic orders. The growth in the number of monasteries and their 
increasing importance as missionary centres from the fifth century onwards 
UHSUHVHQWHG D µUHOLJLRXV UHYROXWLRQ¶ 3 %URwn 1996: 65). It was a consequence of 
cultural, economic and demographic decline, which made the medieval West 
increasingly rural. The most important early western monasteries were established 
toward the end of the fourth century in southern Gaul, on the island of Lerins (opposite 
Antibes) and at Marseilles. Lerins came to supply most of the bishops that dominated 
southern Gaul in the fifth century. Contact with the church of southern Gaul and 
England as well as the missions of Palladius and Patrick, sent by Pope Celestine I in 
431, led to the expansion of Christianity into Celtic Ireland. Here monasteries became 
the most important units of ecclesiastical organisation.  
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The monasteries became centres not only for Roman Christianity, i.e. 
Catholicism, but, due to the influence of patristic writing, also for the study and 
transmission of essential parts of the pagan Greco-Roman heritage. Moreover, 
embracing the classical tradition boosted the claim of the Roman Church to inherit the 
Roman Empire in ecclesiastical organisation. The survival of the Greco-Roman 
heritage into medieval Europe was assured by monasteries such as that of Cassiodorus 
at Vivarium in southern Italy, of St Columba in Ionia in the Irish Sea, or of St 
Columbanus at Luxeuil in Francia, but also by influential intellectuals such as the civil 
servant and philosopher Boethius in Ostrogoth Italy and bishop Isidore of Seville in 
9LVLJRWKLF 6SDLQ /H *RII   FRQVLGHUV PHQ OLNH WKHVH ³FXOWXUDO IDWKHUV RI
(XURSH´ 
Cassiodorus (c. 490-580) descended from an old Roman senatorial family. His 
work reflected the relative cultural blossoming of Ostrogothic and Byzantine Italy in 
the sixth century (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 99-100; Colish 1997: 48-50). The 
educational philosophy he strove to realise wasLQKLVRZQZRUGV³XVLQJWKHPHWKRGV
RIWKHOLEHUDODUWVWRDLGWKHVWXG\RIVDFUHGZRUNV´7KLVLQYROYHGDQHIIRUWWRSUHVHUYH
and master all the literature of Antiquity in the service of Christian education. 
Cassiodorus translated the works of some Greek church fathers into Latin, sharing his 
FRQWHPSRUDU\%RHWKLXV¶V FRQFHUQ IRU WKH GHFOLQH RI*UHHN VWXGLHV LQ WKH:HVW/LNH
Boethius, he held a series of high offices in the Ostrogothic state. However, unlike the 
Ostrogoths, the Lombards who replaced them were uninterested in the sponsorship of 
classical education. Having retired from the civil service in 538 or 540, Cassiodorus 
drew on his own personal wealth and created a model school in the monastery he 
founded at Vivarium.  He served as head of the school for the rest of his life, devoting 
himself to building up a library of manuscripts on both secular and theological 
subjects. It was here that he produced his major work as a transmitter, the Institutes 
concerning Divine and Human Readings, an extremely detailed annotated bibliography 
covering both theology and the liberal arts. According to le Goff (2005: 16), 
&DVVLRGRUXVZDV³WKHILUVWWRSURPRWHD(XURSHRIERRNVDQGOLEUDULHVWKHILUVWWRVWUHVV
the sanctifying value of intellectual work and to suggest a new field of activity for 
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PRQNV QDPHO\ VWXG\ WKH PHDQV RI SHUIHFWLQJ RQHVHOI DQG LQIOXHQFLQJ RWKHUV´ +H
produced a veritable encyclopaedia of the profane sciences, intended for the use of 
monks.36  
Boethius (c. 480-524), like Cassiodorus, was a Roman Christian leader of 
distinguished aristocratic stock who contributed decisively to the survival of classical 
learning in the Latin West (Hoyt and Chodorow 1976: 100-101; Colish 1997: 45-48). 
He studied the ancient masters in Athens, and later joined and reached the highest 
RIILFH LQ WKH2VWURJRWKLF FLYLO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ %RHWKLXV¶VZRUN ERWK KLV WUDQVODWLRQV
from Greek to Latin and his own writings, including the classic Consolation of 
Philosophy, provided the West with much of its technical philosophical vocabulary and 
its only knowledge of Greek logic until the twelfth century. One of his staunchly 
orthodox theological works was a systematic application of Aristotelean logic to the 
problems of Christian theology. His appeal to Stoic logic proved to be immensely 
influential in the later history of medieval philosophy. In a letter to a friend he stated 
WKDWKLVSXUSRVHZDVWR³UHFRQFLOHIDLWKDQGUHDVRQ´+LVWUDQVODWLRQRIVWDQGDUG*UHHN
texts in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, labelling them the quadrivium, 
provided medieval students with their introductions to the liberal arts in Latin for many 
FHQWXULHV&ROLVKDUJXHVWKDW³WKHUROHRI%RHWKLXVDVDWUDQVPLWWHUDQGKLV
contribution to the history of medieval education were thus fXQGDPHQWDO´$FFRUGLQJ
WROH*RII%RHWKLXVFRQYH\HGWRWKH0LGGOH$JHV³DOOLWNQHZRI$ULVWRWOH´
until the mid-twelfth century and provided the earliest basis for scholasticism. He was 
also one of the creators of medieval humanism and instrumental in getting music 
UHFRJQLVHGDVD³VXSHULRUFXOWXUDOWRROLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHDQFLHQWLGHDO´LELG 
Isidore (c. 570- ELVKRS RI 6HYLOOH ZDV ³WKH JUHDWHVW LQWHOOHFWXDO RI WKH
6SDQLVKUHQDLVVDQFHRIWKHVHYHQWKFHQWXU\´+R\WDQG&KRGRURZ 104). Isidore 
                                              
 
 
36 
/H*RIILELGDGGVWKDW³IRU(XURSHWKHHQF\FORSDHGLD\HWDQRWKHUOHJDF\IURPWKH*UHHNVZDVDNH\LQKHULWDQFHIURP
WKH0LGGOH$JHV´
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contributed strongly to the revival of classical learning that resulted from the 
conversion from Arianism to Catholicism of Visigothic Spain. Like the Italian 
transmitters, Isidore spoke Latin as his native language. However, he was one of the 
shrinking number of people in his country, which had been among the most intensively 
Romanised provinces of the former Roman empire, who also knew Greek. His self-
appointed task was to cull what he thought were the best interpretations of the Greek 
fathers of the Church and to anthologise them. His chief contribution as a transmitter 
was the Etymologies, an encyclopaedic collection seeking to preserve for posterity all 
H[WDQWNQRZOHGJH³XSWRDQGLQFOXGLQJWKHNLWFKHQVLQN´&ROLVK,WEHFDPH
a standard reference work and basis for learning until the thirteenth century humanists. 
One of the most important early collections of canon law is also attributed to Isidore. 
When the Arabs conquered the Visigothic kingdom in the early eighth century, 
cultured Spanish churchmen took refuge in the Frankish kingdom and contributed to 
the so-called the Carolingian renaissance, centred on the court of Charlemagne (below, 
section 3.7.3). According to le Goff, (2005: 18) Isidore was ³WKH JUHDWHVW
HQF\FORSDHGLVW RI WKH 0LGGOH $JHV´ +LV Book of Etymologies ZDV ³DQ DWWHPSW WR
summarise the whole of human knowledge, and for the people of the Middle Ages and 
WKHLU(XURSHDQGHVFHQGDQWV´LWEHFDPHDNLQGRIVHFRQG%LEOHLQWKHILHOGRISURfane 
NQRZOHGJH´LELG 
St Columba (c. 521±97) founded several monasteries throughout Ireland. In 563, 
he left Ireland and founded an important monastery on the island of Iona. As Abbot of 
Iona, he strove to convert the Picts of northern Scotland to Christianity.  St 
Colombanus (543-615) was a nobleman turned monk from Leinster who left Ireland 
for Gaul, where he reinvigorated the Merovingian (Roman-Gallic) church. He founded 
several monasteries in Burgundy, notably Luxeuil, and later one in Bobbio in northern 
Italy. Luxeuil, with its six hundred monks, became the monastic metropolis of the 
Frankish kingdom.  
The Anglo-6D[RQPRQN%HGHWKHµ9HQHUDEOH¶-736), is regarded as the last 
of the Church Fathers. He took over from the monks who had converted England, 
bringing with them the legacy of ancient culture from Italy. His Ecclesiastical History 
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of the English people was the first attempt at a national history, and he also produced 
remarkable scientific work, notably on measuring time (le Goff 2005: 18).  Bede was 
³WKHLQWHOOHFWXDOHTXDORIWKH/DWLQ)DWKHUV´+R\WDQG&KRGRURZ+LVZRUN
clearly demonstrated that by the eighth century, Anglo-Saxon England had replaced 
Ireland at the cutting edge of Latin Christian culture (Colish 1997: 64).  Bede was one 
of the few western church leaders in the early Middle Ages with a thorough command 
of Greek. His translation of the Bible into Old English was an important contribution 
towards the creation of English literature and to the vernacularisation of the Christian 
message. 
The monasteries that dominated the Celtic church became sheltered centres for 
the study of both sacred and secular learning. The Irish missionary movement towards 
(QJODQG DQG WKH &RQWLQHQW VSHDUKHDGHG E\ 6V&ROXPED DQG&ROXPEDQXV ³LQGLcates 
how dramatically cultural leadership had shifted from the south to north. In all these 
monastic centres, the Irish provided bilingual education in Greek and Latin and 
produced a substantial secular as well as Christian literature, in connection with the 
teaching of the liberal arts, the writing of hagiography, and an extremely allegorical 
IRUP RI ELEOLFDO H[HJHVLV´ &ROLVK   &HOWLF DQG $QJOR-Saxon missionaries 
became instrumental in the diffusion into the European countryside of Christianity and 
of what they had learned from the earlier transmitters about the classical heritage.  
However, the great age of autonomous Celtic missionary activity (c. 550-650) 
petered out with the growth of papally directed, Benedictine monasticism. Gregory the 
Great, formerly a monk himself, took over the initiative in an alliance with the 
vigorous new monastic order founded by Benedict of Nursia (c. 480-550), often called 
µWKHIDWKHURI:HVWHUQPRQDVWLFLVP¶37 St Benedict, who had studied in Rome, wrote a 
rule-book for the monks at the monastery he founded at Monte Cassino in 529. His 
Rule became the guide for monastic life in the West for more than five hundred years, 
                                              
 
 
37 In 1964, Pope Paul VI named him Patron Saint of Europe. 
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and Monte Cassino the flagship monastery in the Europe-wide movement generated by 
Benedict and sponsored by Gregory.  
One of the most important results of this movement was the advancement of 
Latin literacy. Benedictine monks and nuns had to be literate in order to read the 
required books, liturgical and spiritual texts. This meant that the monastery had to have 
a school. The education it provided was made available not only to the monks or nuns 
but to people from the region who wanted to send their children to the convent to 
study, whether they intended to enter monastic life or not. The provision of education 
to the wider Christian society was thus made an important public service of the 
monastery or convent.  
The appointment of the Benedictine monk Augustine (d. 604/605) as bishop of 
Canterbury and his subsequent re-foundation of the Church of England stimulated a 
great fascination there with Rome and Greco-Roman civilisation. Anglo-Saxon bishops 
and monks became not only leaders of Christian missions to the continent, but also 
major authors of Latin literature, sacred and secular. Intellectual and cultural 
development resulted from the theological arguments between Irish monks and the 
%HQHGLFWLQHV RI $XJXVWLQH¶V 5RPDQ PLVVLRQ DQG ZDV ERRVWHG E\ LPSXOVHV IURP
Visigothic Spain. The works of Isidore of Seville and other Iberian writers were known 
in Ireland and England before the end of the seventh century. It was Northumbria, the 
mid-seventh century battleground between Celtic and Roman Christianity, that 
produced Bede, maybe the greatest scholar and literary figure of the early Middle Ages 
(see above).  
The reinvigorated Anglo-Saxon church thus not only became a pillar of Roman 
Christianity in northern Europe. After Visigothic Iberia was lost to the Umayyad 
Caliphate, it was able to take the religious and ecclesiastic leadership in the West 
generally too: 
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In fact, it was from the farthest corner of Western Europe and also the most 
recently converted region from which came the most powerful missionary 
impetus which eventually converted large parts of what was later to become 
Germany and also central Europe. Between the end of the sixth and the mid-
eighth centuries firm foundations were laid for the impressive ideological edifice 
of what was later to become Latin Western Europe. This indeed was the 
FRQVSLFXRXVDQGFRQFUHWHUHVXOWRI*UHJRU\WKH*UHDW¶VPLVVLon to England. 
Rarely can an undertaking have been crowned with such outstanding success. As 
Gibbon once remarked, while Cæsar needed six legions for the invasion of 
Britain, Gregory achieved the same purpose with 40 monks. (Ullmann 2003: 55) 
The foremost figure in the Anglo-Saxon missionary movement to the Continent 
was St Boniface (originally named Wynfrith; c. 675-754). His main sphere of activity 
ZDVFHQWUDO*HUPDQ\,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH,ULVKPLVVLRQDULHV%RQLIDFHJDLQHGWKH3RSH¶V
express support by obtaining the portfolio of roving archbishop before leaving 
England. He also sought the backing of the kings of the people he aimed at converting, 
and prepared a renewal of the alliance between the Frankish kingdom and the Papacy. 
Where his evangelisation was successful, he had the authority to ordain clergy and to 
establish diocesan and parish structures along Roman lines. As his operational basis in 
Germany, Boniface founded the monastery of Fulda. He organised the Bavarian and 
central German churches into sees, presided over a number of reforming councils in 
the Frankish kingdom, and as bishop of Mainz presided over the unification of the 
German church (James 1988: 80).  
It is difficult to overstate the effect that St. Boniface had in the forging of a 
lasting tie between the northern kingdoms and Rome. [...] The transformation that 
Boniface effected eventually involved an assimilation of Roman theology, 
Roman canon law and liturgy, but most of all, what Boniface and other 
missionaries left behind was a lasting affection and reverence for the chair of St. 
3HWHU*UHJRU\,,,FRXOGLQWKHODWHVDGGUHVV&KDUOHV0DUWHODVµDWUXHVRQRI
6W3HWHU¶DQGFDOORQKLPWRµGHIHQG3HWHU¶VFKXUFKDQGWKH3RSH¶VRZQSHRSOH¶
(La Due 1999: 74) 
These developments illustrate how north-western Europe had by now gained in 
political, intellectual and religious strength. As the wealth of northern Gaul increased 
by Frankish access to the Rhine estuary and to the new commerce of the North Sea, 
even the economic point of gravity of Western Christendom was moving northwards:  
 162 
 
 
By the eighth and ninth centuries the north was the political centre of Europe, and 
could claim to be its intellectual leader as well. The Channel and North Sea ports 
were giving the area an economic vigour it had never had in Roman times. The 
coronation in 800 of a Frank, Charlemagne, as the first northern emperor, has 
often been seen, and rightly, as symbols of this shift of balance from south to 
north which is one of the most important developments of the early Middle Ages. 
Another, still more important for the historian, is that in this period the north 
finds its own voice. In the Roman period we know about it only through the 
writings of Romans and Greeks; now, thanks to the spread of Christianity, some 
northerners themselves begin to write in Latin, Germanic, or Celtic languages. 
The north (except for Scandinavia and the lands east of the Elbe) emerges into 
the light of history for the first time. (James 1988: 63) 
According to Peter Brown, already by the mid-seventh century, northerners had 
begun to consider themselves European:  
When Gertrude, abbess of Nivelles (south of modern Brussels) died, in 658, it 
PDWWHUHGWKDWLWZDVRQ6DLQW3DWULFN¶VGD\,WLVRXUILUVWUHIHUHQFHLQD
Continental source, to Patricius. After two centuries, the eccentric Romano-
%ULWLVKELVKRSKDGEHFRPHRQHRIWKHJUHDWVDLQWVRIWKHQRUWK*HUWUXGH¶VIDPLO\
(from which, eventually, Charlemagne would descend) was spoken of as famous 
µWRDOOWKHLQKDELWDQWVRI(XURSH¶,WZDVDVelf-conscious use of an old 
geographical term to speak of a new reality ± a western world seen now, not from 
5RPHRU&RQVWDQWLQRSOHEXWIURP,UHODQGDQG)UDQFLD$Vµ(XURSH¶WKHQRUWK-
western frontiers of the old empire had come to be aware that they possessed an 
identity of their own, different from the less-familiar lands to their south and east. 
(P. Brown 1996: 166) 
According to de Rougemont (1966: 43-44), it was the canonisation of a growing 
number of Western European saints from the fifth century onwards that at last set 
µ(XURSH¶ DSDUW IURP WKH µWKH :HVW¶ DQG LQYHVWHG KHU ZLWK D GLJQLW\ FORVHU WR WKDW
KLWKHUWR HQMR\HG E\ µWKH(DVW¶ )URPQRZRQXQWLO WKH&DUROLQJLDQ HPSLUH WKHZRUG
(XURSH UHFXUUHG LQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ VROHPQ FRQWH[WV ³LQ DSRVWURSKHV WR Whe Pope, in 
HFFOHVLDVWLFDOSDQHJ\ULFVLQSURVHDQGYHUVHFKURQLFOHVDQGLQWKHOLYHVRIWKHVDLQWV´
(de Rougemont 1966: 44). Thus Colombanus about 600 addressed Pope Gregory as the 
³IORZHU RI DOO RI (XURSH´ DQG LQ  3RSH %RQLIDFH ,9 DV ³WKH KHDG RI Dll the 
FKXUFKHVRIDOORI(XURSH´,VLGRUHLQKLVHistory of the GothsVSHDNVRI³DOOSHRSOHV
RI(XURSHWUHPEOLQJEHIRUHWKHP´0RVWIDPRXVO\DVPHQWLRQHGDERYHWKHVR-called 
0R]DUDELF &KURQLFOH RI  VSHDNV RI WKH YLFWRU\ RI &KDUOHV 0DUWHO¶V ³(XURSHDQ´
  163 
VROGLHUVRYHUWKH$UDEVDW3RLWLHUVLQLELG³7KXVWKHWHUPµ(XURSHDQV¶IRU
the first time in our era, denotes a continental community, one which includes the 
nations living north of the Pyrenees and the Alps, sharing the task of defence against 
WKH FRPPRQ HQHP\´ LELG  7R%HGH (XURSH HVVHQWLDOO\ FRQVLVWHG RI*DXO DQG
Germania, Spain being added later. He did not include his own England, or 
Scandinavia (ibid: 45-$FFRUGLQJ WR OH*RII WKH IUHTXHQWXVHRI µ(XURSH¶ LQ WKH
ninth and tHQWKFHQWXULHVZDVQRWSXUHO\JHRJUDSKLFDO ,W³VLJQLILHVDFHUWDLQVHQVHRI
community that antedated Christianisation, but from the eleventh century on, although 
WKDWVHQVHRIDFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\SHUVLVWHGDQGHYHQVWUHQJWKHQHGDPRQJµ(XURSHDQV¶
a new ZRUGZDVPRVWO\XVHGWRFRQYH\LWWKHZRUG&KULVWHQGRP´OH*RII 
With the partial exception of the British isles, whose ties to Rome remained 
VWURQJ D µ(XURSHDQQHVV¶ WKXV HPHUJHG LQ WKH 1RUWK WKDW GLVWLQJXLVKHG LW IURP WKH
Roman-Greek, Mediterranean culture of the South. Northern France abandoned the 
late classical style in architecture long before Italy, and founded the Gothic style. Also 
the influence of the Latin Bible, the Vulgate, varied according to latitude. Ullmann 
(1965: 53) argues that the relative failure of the Vulgate to reach northern Europe and 
6FDQGLQDYLDDWOHDVWSDUWO\H[SODLQV³ZK\WKHUHZDVQRWUDFHRIDWKHRFUDWLF-descending 
form of government in the Scandinavian countries and Northern Europe until very 
much later than in thH 6RXWKHUQ DQG:HVWHUQ SDUWV´ 6LPLODUO\ 5RPDQ ODZ GLG QRW
influence Northern Europe to any extent comparable to that in the West and the South. 
The distinction between juristic practice based on the written legal codes derived from 
Roman models south of a line stretching from the mouth of the Gironde to the Jura 
Mountains and customary law to the north of this line remained fundamental until the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Southern 1998: 7).  
Ullmann also notes that the Latin Bible became known in Northern Europe far 
ODWHU WKDQ DQ\ZKHUH HOVH DQG DUJXHV WKDW WKLV DW OHDVW SDUWO\ H[SODLQV ³WKH GLIIHUHQW
FRPSOH[LRQV´LQ WKHVHSDUWVRI(XURSH+HDGGVWKDWWKHOHJDOUHFRUGXSRQZKLFKRXU
knowledge of matters relating to government is based reflects the divergence of 
Roman-Latin influence:  
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The thickest and densest production of legal records can be found in the very 
same regions which were subjected to the combined influence of the Latin Bible 
and the Roman law, and the less noticeable this influence was, the fewer the legal 
products were, with the consequence that, for instance, in Scandinavia legal 
records did not begin before the high Middle Ages. It is therefore significant that 
in the Scandinavian countries the ascending theory of government enjoyed a 
longevity which stood in contrast to the prevailing theocratic-descending thesis 
observable throughout Southern and Western Europe. (Ullmann 1965: 53)38 
7KH TXHVWLRQ RI WKH VSHFLILFDOO\ *HUPDQLF FRQWULEXWLRQ WR µWKH 0DNLQJ RI
(XURSH¶RU WKHGHILQLWLRQRI Europeanness, is thus a complex one. There was hardly 
DQ\ LQKHUHQWO\ µ*HUPDQLF¶ XUJH IRU QDWLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG IUHHGRP IURP5RPH
On the contrary, Germanic war leaders admired the order and sophistication of Roman 
civilisation, and sought recognition RIWKHLUµVXE-5RPDQ¶FKDUDFWHUIURPWKHXQLYHUVDO
emperor at Constantinople. The centuries between the fall of the western Roman 
empire in 476 and its resurrection in 800 may indeed be seen as an interregnum, when 
western de facto rulers affected to govern in the name of the de jure sovereign, who 
was the Roman emperor residing in the still venerable if increasingly Greek and alien 
µ1HZ 5RPH¶ RQ WKH %RVSRUXV %DNND   2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKHUH ZDV D
FHUWDLQµ*HUPDQLVDWLRQ¶RI&KULVWLDQLW\DWWKHSRSular level in the sense that the church 
Christianised many Germanic traditions, like the celebration of mid-winter. Well into 
the seventeenth century, the clergy continued both to mediate between man and God 
and to play the role formerly taken by Celtic druids or Germanic pagan priests 
(Rietbergen 1998: 98). 
However, together with vastly changed political, economic and social 
circumstances, Germanic, Roman and Christian ideas produced new political ideas and 
realities. The rise of Islam undercut ConstantinoSOH¶V VZD\ RYHU WKH :HVW LQ
Christendom and threatened the West directly from the Iberian peninsula and 
Mediterranean islands. Thus a distinctly western, or European, Christendom emerged, 
                                              
 
 
38 Here it must be added that Ullmann obviously is partial to the national-liberal notion of a Germanic Urdemokratie, which, 
as we have just seen, is now controversially debated. 
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based on a new north-south, Frankish-papal power axis. Its point of gravity was in the 
QRUWK7KH3RSH¶VFRURQDWLRQRI&KDUOHPDJQHDVQHZµ5RPDQ¶HPSHURURQ&KULVWPDV
Day 800 may be seen as the official declaration of the already effective independence 
of the new West.  
3.7.3 &KDUOHPDJQH¶V(XURSH 
For all practical purposes, the Papacy was acting independently of Constantinople 
by the middle of the eighth century. In 754 Pope Stephen II (752-757) renewed the 
alliance between the Church and the Franks by announcing his loyalty to the Frankish 
king as his temporal lord and protector. He travelled north to crown and anoint Pippin 
king of the Franks and patrician of the Romans in the cathedral of Saint-Denis. This 
may or may not have been part of a long-WHUPVWUDWHJ\WRHVWDEOLVKµSDSDOPRQDUFK\¶
but among the immediate causes were no GRXEWHPSHURU/HR,,,¶V -741) plan to 
reassert Byzantine sovereignty in Italy through stern new taxation of papal land; the 
emergence of what the Papacy considered the heresy of iconoclasm in the east; and a 
new Lombard descent on Rome. The Frankish kLQJ¶VDJUHHPHQWWRWDNHRYHUWKHUROH
of the eastern emperor as patrician of the Romans and protector of the apostolic graves 
ZDV UHYROXWLRQDU\ DV ZDV WKH 3RSH¶V JLYLQJ OHJLWLPDF\ WR ZKDW ZDV LQ HIIHFW DQ
usurpation of the Frankish throne.  
After a swift Italian campaign, Pippin took Rome, Ravenna and many regions in 
FHQWUDO ,WDO\ IURP WKH /RPEDUGV DQG JDYH WKHP WR WKH 3DSDF\ 7KH µ'RQDWLRQ RI
3LSSLQ¶ WR ZKLFK &KDUOHPDJQH ODWHU DGGHG QRPLQDOO\ %\]DQWLQH9HQHWLD ,VWULD DQG
Corsica as well as the remaining Lombard territories of Spoleto and Benevento) 
IDFLOLWDWHGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWLQRIWKH3DSDO6WDWHWKHµ5HSXEOLFRI6W3HWHU¶7KLV
creation (or confirmation) of the Pope as temporal lord was another momentous 
development in the mid-eighth century. For more than eleven hundred years hence 
(until 1870), the Pope was not only the spiritual leader of Catholic Christians, but a 
significant player in temporal European politics too. 
3LSSLQ ZDV VXFFHHGHG E\ KLV VRQ &KDUOHV , µWKH (OGHU¶ RU &KDUOHPDJQH -
814). For the first time since the fall of the Western Roman Empire, Charlemagne 
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united Cisalpine and Transalpine Europe under one ruler, with Aachen (Aix-la-
Chapelle) as the temporal capital and Rome the spiritual. By 800 he was undisputed 
ruler of Europe between the Pyrenees and the Elbe. His realm encompassed what is 
today France, Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany west of the Elbe, parts 
of Austria, and half of Italy. Parts of present-day Poland, Bohemia and Hungary were 
tributary states. With the notable exceptions of England, Ireland and southern Italy, the 
borders of the Carolingian dominion were by now practically coextensive with those of 
Western, Latin Christendom (Scandinavia and the Baltic shore had yet to be 
Christianised, and most of the Iberian peninsula was in the hands of the Saracens).  
Charlemagne has long been hailed as a great forger of European unity. His court 
H[WROOHGKLPDVµ5HFWRU>KHDG@RI(XURSH¶DQGUXOHURIµWKHNLQJGRPRI(XURSH¶+LV
conquests and cultural and religious programme reinforced the emerging sense in early 
PHGLHYDO QRUWKZHVWHUQ (XURSH RI EHLQJ VRPHKRZ µ(XURSHDQ¶ +RZHYHU *HUPDQLVW
historians have also seen in him the founder of the first Germanic Reich. Le Goff 
(2005: 29) maintains that the vision of CharOHPDJQH WKHZDUULRUZDV D ³QDWLRQDOLVW´
one, inspired by a patriotic, Frankish spirit, and that his empire was the first example of 
³DSHUYHUWHG(XURSH´GRPLQDWHGE\RQHSHRSOH%H\RQGWKLVOH*RIIDUJXHVWKHLGHDO
WKDWDQLPDWHG&KDUOHPDJQHZDVQRWµ(XURSHDQ¶XQLW\EXWWKHDQFLHQWRQHRI5RPDQ-
Christian, imperial-ecclesiastic unity. Both the Papacy and Charlemagne attempted to 
³UHVXUUHFW WKH 5RPDQ (PSLUH UDWKHU WKDQ D SURMHFW WKDW ORRNHG DKHDG WR WKH IXWXUH
destiny of Europe. When he founded his new capital, Aix-la-Chapelle, in the ancient 
WHUULWRU\RIWKH)UDQNV&KDUOHPDJQHZDVQRGRXEWGUHDPLQJRIPDNLQJLWµWKH5RPHRI
WKH IXWXUH¶ HVVHQWLDOO\ LQGHILDQFHRI µ1HZ5RPH¶QDPHO\&RQVWDQWLQRSOH´ OH*RII
2005: 32-33). 
3RSH/HR,,,¶VFRURQDWLRQRI&KDUOHVDVµHPSHURURI WKH5RPDQV¶RQ&KULVWPDV
Day 800 should thus be seen primarily in a Roman or Byzantine context. The 
immediate pretext for the papal initiative was the fact that a woman, Irene, ruled in 
Constantinople. In western eyes, that meant that the imperial throne was vacant. The 
visit of Charles to Rome provided the Papacy with a welcome opportunity to achieve 
HPDQFLSDWLRQ IURP &RQVWDQWLQRSOH DQG WR FRQVROLGDWH WKH )UDQNLVK NLQJ¶V UROH DV
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patrician of Rome. Leo by his action effectively declared that the eastern empire had 
ceased to exist as a legitimate Roman empire, and that Charlemagne himself should be 
WKH µWUXH¶ HPSHURU RI WKH 5RPDQV 8OOPDQQ  -84). According to Canning 
³WKHSDSDOO\LQVSLUHGWLWOHimperator romanorum definitely was a denial of 
WKH YDOLGLW\ RI %\]DQWLQH HPSHURUVKLS´ 7KH FRURQDWLRQ ZDV PRGHOOHG DIWHU WKH
Byzantine ceremony, but the constitutive involvement and prominence of the Pope was 
a crucial innovation. Charlemagne himself, however, most probably did not wish to 
replace the Byzantine emperor, only to obtain papal recognition as emperor of a 
renewed western Roman empire parallel to the existing eastern one:  
He wanted in effect to be a Roman emperor rather than the Roman emperor; that 
is, to be emperor in the west without supplanting the Byzantine emperor ± hence 
the wording on his seal after the coronation: Renovatio romani imperii 
(renovation of the Roman empire). He desired recognition of the position which 
he in fact held: that he ruled so much of what had once been the western Roman 
empire together with additional lands in Germany. (Canning 1996: 69)  
5DWKHU WKDQ µ(PSHURURI WKH5RPDQV¶&KDUOHPDJQH WKHUHIRUH WRRNFDUH WRFDOO
KLPVHOI HPSHURU µUXOLQJ WKH 5RPDQ (PSLUH¶ 0XOGRRQ   7R KLP ³>W@KH
heJHPRQLDO DQG 5RPDQ DVSHFWV RI &DUROLQJLDQ HPSHURUVKLS ZHUH FRPSOHPHQWDU\´
&DQQLQJ   $OVR WKH &KULVWLDQ FKDUDFWHU RI &KDUOHPDJQH¶V HPSLUH ZDV
SDUDPRXQW KLV DGYLVHU $OFXLQ FRQVLVWHQWO\ UHIHUUHG WR KLV UXOH RYHU D µ&KULVWLDQ
HPSLUH¶ imperium christianum). Thus the notions of Europe, Christendom, kingdom 
of Europe, Roman empire and Christian empire were amalgamating:  
[T]his Europe was no longer an ideologically unshaped and amorphous territorial 
mass. It was slowly being welded into a coherent ideological entity that was built 
on the foundations of the Christian faith. And this faith was of Roman papal 
provenance. The Roman Empire which he now governed as emperor (as his 
RIILFLDOWLWOHVKRZHGZDVRQO\DQRWKHUQDPHIRUµ&KULVWLDQHPSLUH¶DQGWKLV
again was the same as the kingdom of Europe. Moreover, the inscription on his 
imperial seal demonstrated that the ancient (pagan) Roman Empire was now 
reborn as a Christian empire ± in a word it was a unit which was held together not 
by ethnic or historic ties but by the cementing bond of the faith enunciated by the 
church of Petrine Rome. (Ullmann 2003: 84-85) 
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Combined with his traditional role as head of the Frankish church, the Roman 
coronation allowed Charlemagne to make the ancient imperial claim to be µNLQJDQG
SULHVW¶ ([SHFWLQJ WKH 3RSH WR SOD\ WKH VXEPLVVLYH UROH RI WKH HDVWHUQ SDWULDUFK KH
FDPHWRUHJDUGKLPVHOIDVWKHµYLFDURI&KULVW¶DQGµ5HFWRURIDOOWKH&KXUFKRI(XURSH¶
.HHQ&KDUOHPDJQHDQGKLVVXFFHVVRUV WKHHPSHURUVRI WKHµ+Rly Roman 
(PSLUH¶ WKXV EHOLHYHG WKDW WKH\ FRXOG FUHDWH DQG GLVSRVH RI SUHODWHV LQ WKH
Constantinian and Byzantine tradition. Pope Leo III, when visiting Paderborn in 798-
 KHDUG RI &KDUOHPDJQH¶V DPELWLRXV EXLOGLQJ SURJUDPPH IRU $L[ RPLQRXVO\
referred tRDV µ6HFRQG5RPH¶ZKLFK LQFOXGHGD µVDFUHGSDODFH¶ IRU WKHNLQJKLPVHOI
PRGHOOHG RQ WKH %\]DQWLQH H[DUFK¶V SDODFH DW 5DYHQQD DQG D µ/DWHUDQ¶ SDODFH
H[SUHVVO\ GHVLJQDWHG µWKH KRXVH RI WKH SRQWLII¶%\ FURZQLQJ&KDUOHPDJQH LQ5RPH
within a year from then, Leo at least averted being reduced to the level of domestic 
imperial chaplain to the new western emperor. 
8OOPDQQKRZHYHUVWUHVVHV&KDUOHPDJQH¶V OR\DOW\ WR WKH3RSHDVVXFFHVVRU WR6W
Peter and primate of the Christian church:  
it was his genuine and deep veneration for Saint Peter and his successor which 
militated against any kind of opposition on the model of Constantinople. [....] 
What Charlemagne in general conceded ± and here lay the real contrast to 
Byzantium ± was magisterial primacy, that is, primacy in matters of religion, faith 
and dogma. (Ullmann 2003: 80)  
Ullmann considers the coronation of Charlemagne a crucial step in a programme 
originally conceived by Pope Gregory I two centuries earlier to achieve papal 
independence from Constantinople and sovereignty in the West. However, according 
to Southern, the solution of one problem created another: 
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Indeed it is evident that the idea of a western empire as a means of extending 
papal authority was a mistake from beginning to end. It was a mistake primarily 
because in creating an emperor the Pope created not a deputy, but a rival or even 
a master. The theoretical supremacy implied in the act of creation could never be 
WUDQVODWHGLQWRSUDFWLFDOREHGLHQFHWRRUGHUVJLYHQDQGUHFHLYHG+HQFHWKH3RSH¶V
practical supremacy over his emperor came to an end at the moment of 
coronation. It is not surprising that the Popes of the later Middle Ages sought to 
exercise their supreme temporal lordship through other channels than the empire, 
which Pope Leo III had rashly created for this purpose on Christmas Day 800. 
This action was the greatest mistake medieval Popes ever made in their efforts to 
translate theory into practice. (Southern 1970: 99) 
Byzantium for its part steadfastly held on to the ancient view that there could be 
only one Empire as there could be only one Church. Hitherto Byzantium, new Rome, 
had been regarded unquestionably as the sole Empire which had taken over the 
inheritance of the old Roman imperium. To Byzantium, the only conceivable world 
order was a hierarchy of states, embracing the entire Christian oikoumene and 
FXOPLQDWLQJ LQ D VLQJOH (PSLUH  ³%\]DQWLXP FRXOG WKHUHIRUH RQO\ FRQVLGHU WKH
HOHYDWLRQRI&KDUOHVWKH*UHDWWREHDQXVXUSDWLRQ´2VWURJRUVN\ 
The coronation of Charles was at first ridiculed in Constantinople, later viewed as 
an arrogance without meaning. Only after Charles had made military inroads into 
imperial territory in Dalmatia, in 812, did a Byzantine embassy to Aix-la-Chapelle 
recognise him as basileus and imperator EXW ZLWKRXW DQ\ µ5RPDQ¶ GHVLJQDWLRQ
Byzantium thus accepted his political, but not any traditional Roman claim to 
emperorship. Charles responded in a friendly manner, stressing the independence and 
equality of the two empires (Canning 1996: 70). At the same time, to make clear that 
they were the only true Roman emperors and had a sole right to the Roman heritage, 
the Byzantine emperor from now on began to style themselves not simply basileus, but 
basileus ton rhomaion. 
However, the eventual disintegration of the Carolingian empire and the renewed 
vigour of Byzantium under the Macedonian dynasty (867-1025) induced later rulers of 
Constantinople to ignore the earlier recognition given to the western empire 
(Ostrogorsky 1971: 199). The eastern emperors to the very end in 1453 continued to 
see themselves as the direct successors of Cæsar and Augustus and therefore the 
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rightful rulers of the world. Theirs was, in their view, none other than the Roman 
Empire, founded shortly before the beginning of the ChristLDQHUDE\*RG¶VJUDFH WR
unify his people in preparation for the coming of his Son. In spite of their huge 
territorial losses to Arabs, Slavs and Bulgarians, they insisted that they were the 
sovereigns of all past and present imperial possessions, including those in the West. 
Seen from medieval Constantinople, the Muslims in Egypt and Syria as well as the 
barbarians in the kingdoms of the West were no more than temporary occupants of 
provinces that by rights belonged to the eternal and universal Roman Empire.  
&KDUOHPDJQH¶VVXFFHVVRUVKRZHYHUFRQWLQXHGWRGHYHORSWKH&DUROLQJLDQLGHDRI
a new western, Roman and Christian empire. The reign of his son Louis I the Pious 
(814-840) marked the high point in this regard (Canning 1996: 71). Louis, like 
Charlemagne, stressed the Frankish and Christian aspects at the expense of the Roman. 
The Papacy for its part stubbornly developed its claim to create the emperor. At the 
coronation of Emperor Louis at Rheims in 816 Pope Stephen IV thus added a highly 
symbolic new element to the ceremony: unction with holy oil, hitherto administered to 
kings only. The anointing element conspicuously distinguished the imperial coronation 
in the West from that practiced in Constantinople. In Constantinople there was no 
unction because the empire was conceived as a historical and man-PDGHHQWLW\³7KH
anointing was, on the model of the Old Testament, understood to confer divine grace 
RQWKHUHFLSLHQWLQWKHVKDSHRIUXOLQJSRZHU´8OOPDQQ-88). The Popes thus 
combined a Byzantine and Roman with a Western and Christian element when they 
henceforth both crowned and anointed the Holy Roman emperors. 
The Pope and the emperor indeed had a common interest in making the western 
emperorship more and more Roman in complexion. After the death in 855 of Emperor 
Lothar, who was also king of new Middle Francia (or Lotharingia, the zone extending 
IURP WKH /RZ &RXQWULHV WR ,WDO\ LH 5RNNDQ¶V µFLW\-EHOW¶ LWV Romanitas was 
UHLQIRUFHGZLWKWKHUXOHRI/RXLV,¶VJUDQGVRQ/RXLV,,LQ,WDO\DQGKLV patricianship of 
5RPH+RZHYHUDQHZZDWHUVKHGZDVUHDFKHGZLWK3RSH-RKQ9,,,¶VFRURQDWLRQDQG
unction of Charles the Bald in 875. This was the first time that the Pope took the 
initiative as the sole, constitutive creator of the emperor. The emperors for their part 
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tended to be most concerned with Francia. But mounting Arab attacks in south Italy 
and the islands meant that the Papacy had a strong, material interest in assuring that the 
emperor remained committed to the protection of Italy, the Church of Rome and the 
papal lands made the need for effective imperial aid all the more pressing (Canning 
1996: 72-73).   
The protection of the papal patrimony was a central concern of a document that 
probably emerged in the 750s and which was to become a legal cornerstone of the 
PHGLHYDO 3DSDF\¶V FODLP WR XQLYHUVDO VRYHUHLJQW\ WKH VR-called Donation of 
Constantine (Donatio Constantini).  Later demonstrated to be a forgery (by the 
KXPDQLVW DQG ILUVW PRGHUQ µSKLORORJLVW¶ /RUHQ]R 9DOOD LQ  WKH GRFXPHQW
purported to be a letter from Emperor Constantine the Great to Pope Sylvester I. It 
stated that when Constantine had moved his capital to Constantinople he had left the 
Lateran palace, the imperial crown, the right to wear it and other imperial insignia and 
garments, the government of Rome, all of Italy and the regions of the west, as well as 
various islands, to the successor of St Peter.  
Canning (1996: 73) emphasises that the Donation confirmed papal claims to the 
patrimony, accorded the Papacy imperial power in the west, and affirmed the primacy 
of the Pope in the Church.  Ullmann (1972: 82-83) agrees that the Papacy interpreted 
the Donation to mean that the Pope was the rightful ruler of the universal empire, i.e. 
both east and west, because Constantine had given his crown to Sylvester, who was 
thus its owner but had chosen not to wear it. In the present context, however, the most 
LPSRUWDQWSRLQWLVWKDW³>W@KHODVWLQJOHJDF\RIWKH&DUROLQJLDQHUDZDVWKHDFFHSWDQFH
of the principle that it was the Pope who cUHDWHGWKHHPSHURU´&DQQLQJ 
7KH MX[WDSRVLWLRQ RI µ&KULVWLDQ SHRSOH¶ DQG µ(XURSH¶ FXUUHQW DW&KDUOHV¶V FRXUW
provided new confirmation of the emergence of a distinctly continental Western 
European identity. It reflected not only the long-term rise of north-western Europe 
towards economic and political supremacy, but also the new cultural and intellectual 
sophistication represented by the so-called Carolingian Renaissance. Although le Goff 
FRQVLGHUV &KDUOHPDJQH¶V HPSLUH µDQ DERUWHG (XURSH¶ GXH Wo its brevity and 
HWKQRFHQWULVP DQG WKH QRWLRQ RI D &DUROLQJLDQ µ5HQDLVVDQFH¶ WR EH H[DJJHUDWHG KH
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FRQFHGHVWKDW³WKHPRGHUQ&DUROLQJLDQP\WKGRHVLQFOXGHFHUWDLQEDVLFHOHPHQWVWKDW
DUH UHOHYDQW WR WKH IXWXUH (XURSH´ OH *RII   ,Q WKLV UHJDUG Ke points to 
&KDUOHPDJQH¶V LQWURGXFWLRQRIFHUWDLQEDVLF UXOHV µFDSLWXODULHV¶ DVDFRQWULEXWLRQ WR
the legal unification of Europe; to his introduction of a monetary system based on the 
silver coin as an attempt at monetary unity; his promotion of monastic networks and 
KLVFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIDµ(XURSHRIZDUULRUVDQGSHDVDQWV¶OH*RII
33-0RUHRYHU ³WKH LQWHOOHFWXDO DFWLYLW\ RI WKH &DUROLQJLDQV SURGXFHG D OD\HU RI
(XURSHDQFXOWXUHRILWVRZQ´WKDWKDGDQLPSRUWDQWFLYLOLVLQJLQIOuence on later Europe 
(le Goff 2005: 36). Concrete examples that have survived include the Carolingian 
minuscule script, illustrated illuminated manuscripts, and architectural innovations 
VXFK DV WKH V\PEROLVPRI WKH WUDQVHSW DQG ³WKHZHVW IURQWZLWK IODQNing towers that 
PDGHWKHGRRUZD\VRI5RPDQHVTXHDQG*RWKLFEXLOGLQJVVRGUDPDWLF´OH*RII
38).   
Judith Herrin (1986: 402-403) argues that the scholarship encouraged by Charles 
at his cosmopolitan court was a vital contribution to the preservation and development 
of a distinctly European culture. She especially stresses the Carolingian efforts to 
preserve the classical Greco-Roman and early Christian legacy. Barraclough (1976) 
highlights a basic similarity of institutions and civilisation in Europe as a legacy of the 
Franks, and notably of Charlemagne. According to him, the ideal (rather than the 
reality) of a united Europe was the chief ideological legacy of Charlemagne: 
[The age] created a myth, which grew and was incorporated in the famous legend 
of Charlemagne - a legend which even today tends to overshadow the real man. 
In the second half of the ninth century, when decline was apparent on all hands, 
PHQORRNHGEDFNWRWKHµHPSLUH¶RI&KDUOHVDVDWLPHRISHDFHDQGSURVSHULW\DQG
XQLW\DµJROGHQDJH¶ZKLFKWKH\RQO\QHHGHGWRUHFRYHUIRUDOOWREHZHOO,WZDVD
legend that badly corresponded to the facts; but in history legend is often more 
potent than reality, and it created the idea (or perhaps the ideal) of the unification 
of Europe, of all the people of Europe, in one Christian community of peace, 
under one government. This idea, or ideal, remained to counteract the opposite 
tendency of diversity, which sprang from the fact of the diversity and different 
origins of the various European peoples; and although earlier the same idea of 
XQLW\KDGEHHQERXQGXSZLWKUHPLQLVFHQFHRIWKHµXQLYHUVDO¶JRYHUQPHQWRI
5RPHDIWHUWKHQLQWKFHQWXU\LWUHIOHFWHGDERYHDOOHOVHWKHµXQLW\¶FUHDWHGE\
Charlemagne. (Barraclough 1976: 56) 
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The most recent monograph on Charlemagne by a professional historian 
concludes by emphasising his religious and cultural legacy over the political and 
military feats:  
>@WKHHIIHFWRI&KDUOHPDJQH¶VHPSKDVLVRQ&KULVWLDQ/DWLQOHDUQLQJDQG
Christian orthodoxy, taken up by Franks and by peoples newly incorporated into 
the Frankish realm alike throughout his realm was to align the whole of 
Carolingian Europe to Rome. His insistence on the Roman, Christian and 
Merovingian past, in all its complexity, as the foundation for the style of 
rulership, law, communications and culture of his kingdom, was the essential 
element of the formation of the political and cultural identity of the peoples over 
whom he ruled within the present. Culture, religion, law and the written text were 
intrinsic to the exercice and maintenance of political power. As it turned out, 
these were his most lasting legacies. (McKitterick 2008: 380) 
Still, if the Carolingian empire created a long-lasting ideal of European unity, le 
Goff is right to stress its short life as a political reality. In fact, its main political legacy 
was arguably the tripartite territorial-administrative division which shaped the future 
political geography of Continental Western Europe (Bakka 1998: 250). This heritage 
was arguably far more imSRUWDQWWKDQWKDWRIWKHHDUO\PHGLHYDOµ*HUPDQLFNLQJGRPV¶
none of which except Bavaria survived the year 1000. The modern European states 
V\VWHPLVXOWLPDWHO\SUHGLFDWHGRQWKHVSOLWRI&KDUOHPDJQH¶VHPSLUHLQLQWR:HVW
East and Middle Francia. But the Carolingian intermezzo also confirmed that the 
Europe of the future would be built in the West, on a north-south axis, and that the 
point of gravity was to be north of the Alps.  
However, in the remaining Middle Ages, the concept of Europe was relegated to 
the background. Until the rise of a new common enemy, the Turks, the annals were 
dominated by stories of the struggles between the two universalist institutions of the 
West, the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire (de Rougemont 1966: 48-49). In the 
next section, I will first describe the growth of these two institutions and of the 
associated notion of Christendom. Then I will outline their conflict among themselves 
as well as with emerging independent polities, which contributed towards the political 
and confessional fragmentation of the Reformation. In between, the revival of Roman 
law as the legal glue of European Christendom and the high medieval process of 
Europeanisation in general will be discussed. 
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3.7.4 The medieval papacy and empire 
East Francia, the polity that succeeded the Carolingian empire in the east, was 
settled by four Germanic confederations: Swabians/Alemanians, Franks, Saxons and 
Bavarians. Their leaders were called dukes, from the Roman dux, and their realm 
duchies, after the Roman ducati, an administrative unit established by Emperor 
Justinian and introduced east of the Rhine by Charlemagne. Thus, according to Schulze 
(1994: 100), the name given to these units by the Germanist school of historiography, 
StammherzogtümerNQRZQLQ(QJOLVKDVµVWHP¶RUµWULEDO¶GXFKLHVLVDVPLVOHDGLQJDV
FDOOLQJ WKHP µ*HUPDQ¶(DVW)UDQFLDZDV DW ILUVWPDLQO\KHOG WRJHWKHUE\D)UDQNLVK
aristocracy. After 833, they recognised the rule of King Ludwig II, the son of Emperor 
Ludwig I. Retrospectively, Ludwig II hDVDOVREHHQFDOOHGµ/RXLVWKH*HUPDQ¶ 
Susan Reynolds (1997: 289- DUJXHV WKDW D VHQVH RI µUHJQDO VROLGDULW\¶ KDG
HPHUJHG LQ (DVW )UDQFLD E\  ZKHQ 'XNH +HQU\ , µWKH )RZOHU¶ RI 6D[RQ\
succeeded to the royal throne. Borussian historiography considered this the formative 
SHULRGRIWKHPHGLHYDOµ*HUPDQ¶NLQJGRPVRRQWREHWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRWKHµ*HUPDQ¶
Reich they so venerated.  
However, according to Schulze (1994: 100), not only is it doubtful whether there 
ZDVDQ\VHQVHRIµ*HUPDQ¶RUHYHQµ*HUPDQLF¶FRPPXQLW\LQWKHNLQJGRP,WLVDOVR
XQFHUWDLQ ZKHWKHU WKH NLQJ KLPVHOI XVHG DQ\ µ*HUPDQ¶ HSLWKHW H[FHSW SHUKDSV WKH
Roman designation Rex Germaniae, as the Romans had called the region east of the 
Rhine Germania. Being associated with Rome was what mattHUHG ³)DU LQWR WKH
eleventh century the kingdom that had emerged east of the Rhine was to be regarded as 
a Frankish realm founded on Frankish traditions that reached back via the Carolingians 
and Merovingians all the way to Rome and Troy, and this was equally the case with the 
ZHVW)UDQNLVKSDUWRIWKHHPSLUH´LELG 
Henry added significant parts of former Middle Francia ± Lotharingia and 
Burgundy ± to his kingdom, which already was multiethnic, consisting of Germanic as 
well as Avar, Slavic and Carinthian peoples. His son Otto (elected king 936) expanded 
the realm further. After defeating the Magyars at Lechfeld in 955, he began to use the 
title imperator to denote his military prowess (Muldoon 1999: 31). Otto secured control 
  175 
of the Italian crown and in 962 was crowned Roman emperor by Pope John XII. In 
return, the Papacy was once again promised imperial protection. Otto persuaded 
Byzantium to recognise him as western emperor and arranged for the marriage of his 
heir, the future emperor Otto II (r. 967-983), to a Byzantine princess, Theophano.  
Otto founded (or refounded) what became known as the Holy Roman Empire, 
uniting the German and Italian kingdoms as well as considerable parts of former 
Middle Francia (Burgundy and Lotharingia). The continued iQWHUHVW RI WKH µ+RO\
5RPDQ¶ HPSHURUV LQ ,WDO\ DQG WKH UHVW RI WKH IRUPHU 0LGGOH .LQJGRP KHQFHIRUWK
blocked what according to Borussian historians should have been the natural course of 
German history towards a nation-state (Muldoon 1999: 33). To them, this was the 
beginning of the German SonderwegRUGHWRXUIURPWKHµQRUPDO¶HYROXWLRQWRZDUGVD
nation-state. 
Otto the Great and his successors took the same theocratic line vis-à-vis the 
Papacy as Charlemagne and as the Greek emperor to the patriarch of Constantinople 
(Southern 1970: 100). They assumed that their role as vicarius Christi and rex et 
sacerdos gave them the right to appoint bishops, to have a decisive role in papal 
elections and, if necessary, to bring about the deposition of a Pope (Canning 1996: 99). 
Otto II (955-983) emphasised the Roman nature of emperorship even more strongly 
than his father. In 982 he adopted the title romanorum imperator augustus. Later, Otto 
III (996-1002) established the Roman character on a permanent basis (Canning 1996: 
76). Together with Pope Sylvester II, Otto III also prepared an eastwards shift of 
European Christendom, giving Slavs and Hungarians a more central position (le Goff 
2005: 41). His chosen official seal, renovatio imperii romanorum, indicated a vision of 
³D IHGHUDWLRQ RI &KULVWLDQ VRFLHWLHV XQGHU WKH OHDGHUVKLS RI WKH (PSHURU´ 0XOGRRQ
1999: 33-34). Conrad II (1027-1039) was the first East Frankish monarch to call 
KLPVHOIµNLQJRI WKH5RPDQV¶rex romanorum), implying a claim to the emperorship 
even before LPSHULDOFRURQDWLRQ&RQUDG¶VVHDOERUHWKHLQVFULSWLRQµ5RPHWKHKHDGRI
WKHZRUOG KROGV WKH UHLQV RI WKH HDUWK¶V URXQG RUE¶ Roma caput mundi tenet orbis 
frena rotundi).  
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If Otto the Great was the founder of the temporal medieval empire, Pope 
Nicholas I (858-867) may be considered an early architect of papal monarchy. 
According to Walter Ullmann (1972: 102), Nicholas was the first Pope to make use of 
the so-called Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals in a long-WHUPSDSDOSODQRI³ZHOGLQJ(XURSH
into a homogeneouVHFFOHVLDVWLFDOXQLWXQGHUWKH5RPDQSDSDODHJLV´Pseudo-Isidore 
ZDV D IRUJHG FROOHFWLRQ RI FDQRQ ODZ SUREDEO\ SURGXFHG VKRUWO\ EHIRUH 1LFKRODV¶
pontificate in or near Rheims. Containing also the spurious Donation of Constantine, it 
was to become a key legal basis of the Petrine argument for papal primacy and church 
independence from lay authority. The victory of Nicholas in the marriage dispute with 
King Lothar II of Lorraine was a first practical breakthrough for the vision of what 
Gollwitzer (1951: 35) FDOOVWKH³(XURSD-(FFOHVLD´ 
%XW1LFKRODV¶VRWKHUDFKLHYHPHQWVZHUHPRGHVW7KH&KXUFKRIWKHWLPHZDVLQD
bad state, fragmented, localised and dominated by the nobility. Many of the clergy 
could not read and write. The monasteries were in decay. Priests often lived in 
concubinage, or were married. The Papacy was prey of the noble families controlling 
Rome, and had little authority. From about the year 1000 there emerged a great wave 
of heresies. Also relations between Rome and Constantinople remained poor. Nicholas 
SURWHVWHGWRQRDYDLODJDLQVW(PSHURU0LFKDHO,,,¶VDSSRLQWPHQWLQRI3KRWLXVDV
QHZSDWULDUFKRI&RQVWDQWLQRSOHZLWKRXWSDSDODSSUREDWLRQ7KHVXEVHTXHQWµ3KRWLDQ¶
schism was ominous of the final schism in 1054. But, according to Ullmann (2003: 
109), it was also a formative event in the emergence of a distinct European 
&KULVWHQGRPPDNLQJ(XURSH³DQLGHRORJLFDOFRQFHSWDQGQRORQJHUDPHUHO\SK\VLFDO
WHUP´,WPD\KDYHEHHQIURPWKLVWLPHWKDWWKH3RSHVEHJDQWRFRQVLGHUWKHPVHOYHVWKH
leDGHUVRIµUHDO¶LHRUWKRGR[&KULVWHQGRPDVGLVWLQFWIURPWKHKHUHWLFDO*UHHN(DVW 
The foundation of a new Benedictine abbey in 910 at Cluny by the Duke of 
Aquitaine, William the Pious, was to greatly advance this new Western self-awareness. 
Cluny released a great movement against the corruption of the Church. It became an 
µDOWHUQDWLYH5RPH¶altera Roma) and its home region Burgundy the spiritual centre of 
Latin-cum-European Christendom (Gollwitzer 1951: 34). The movement challenged 
temporal control of the Church, and eventually led to the monumental struggle between 
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the Pope and the Emperor known as the Investiture Contest. Soon daughter houses 
were established all over Europe, strictly observing the authority of the abbot of Cluny, 
who himself recognised only the authority of the Pope. The Cluniacs slowly rebuilt the 
prestige of the Church. They were the driving force in the persecution of heresy as well 
as in the crusades (le Goff 2004: 83). In 1046, Emperor Henry III, a champion of 
Cluniac Church reform in Germany, rode into Rome in true imperial style and had 
three contending Popes replaced by a reformist German one, Clement II (1046-47). 
7KLV LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQDXJXUDWHG ³D JUHDW UHYROXWLRQ LQ SDSDO JRYHUQPHQW DQG
SROLF\´ .HHQ   +HQFHIRUZDUG a series of reformist monks-turned-Popes, 
most of them from the north of the Alps (ultramontane), promoted papal primacy and 
church independence with singular resolve. According to Canning (1996: 85), Clement 
II for the first time used the term papatus (Papacy) in 1047. The purpose was to 
emphasise his status above that of a bishopric (episcopatus). The very influential abbot 
of Clairvaux, Bernard (1090- SURGXFHG D FODVVLF GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH 3RSH¶V
PRQDUFKLFDO SRZHU RU VRYHUHLJQW\ LQ WKH IRUPXOD µSOHQLWXGH RI SRZHU¶ plenitudo 
potestatis) (ibid: 108-109).  
7KHZHVWHUQ UHIRUPPRYHPHQW¶VVWUHVVRQ WKHXQLYHUVDODXWKRULW\RI WKH3DSDF\
was incompatible with Byzantine tradition, and contributed to the final schism between 
the Latin and Greek Churches in 1054. The mutual excommunication of Patriarch 
Michael Cerularius and Cardinal Humbert in Constantinople signalled the 
abandonment of attempts to reconcile their theology. The schism was little noticed at 
ILUVW EXW ³WKH FUXVDGHVZRXOG LQWURGXFH D VSLULW RI hatred and bitterness against the 
µ*UHHNV¶WKDWEURXJKWWKHLVVXHGRZQWRWKHSRSXODUOHYHO´/D'XH 
Then, in 1059, Pope Nicholas II (1058- LQDXJXUDWHG WKH 3DSDF\¶V ILUVW
alliance with the Normans. This may have been a mainly tactical move to redirect the 
martial energies of the Normans, already present in Italy, away from possible 
expansion into papal territory and towards the expulsion of the Byzantines and 
Muslims from southern Italy and Sicily. But it was also the first time the Papacy turned 
WR DQ\RQH EXW D µ5RPDQ¶ HPSHURU IRU SURWHFWLRQ ,W WKXV FKDOOHQJHG WKH WUDGLWLRQDO
notion of the Emperor as the first protector of the Church. Nicholas at the same time 
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laid down new rules for papal elections, giving a decisive voice to the cardinals and 
barely mentioning the need for the approval of the Emperor and of the Roman nobles. 
7KLV ZDV D ³FUXFLDO VWHS LQ WKH SURFHVV ZKHUHE\ WKH 3DSDF\ ZDV WR GHYHORS DV DQ
autonomous European-ZLGH LQVWLWXWLRQ´ &DQQLQJ   $QRWKHU VWHS ZDV WKH
subsequent addition of coronation to the papal inauguration ritual, giving very concrete 
expression to the idea of papal monarchy.  
One of the first Popes elected by cardinals was Gregory VII (1073-1085), 
SUHYLRXVO\ NQRZQ DV +LOGHEUDQG :LWK *UHJRU\¶V SRQWLILFDWH ³WKH LQWHOOHFWXDO DQG
PRUDOOHDGHUVKLSRI(XURSH>«@SDVVHGLQWRWKHKDQGVRIWKH3DSDF\´8OOPDQQ
165). In his pursuit of church liberty (libertas ecclesiae), Gregory made very wide-
ranging claims for papal authority. Emphasising the Petrine interpretation of Matthew 
16:18-19 and John 21:15-KHDLPHG³WRUHLQIRUFHWKHDOO-embracing scope of papal 
MXULVGLFWLRQ ZLWKLQ &KULVWHQGRP DOO ZHUH WKH 3RSH¶V VKHHS QRQH ZDV H[FOXGHG
Gregory identified himself with St Peter whose responsibility for the Christian world 
KH VDZ KLPVHOI DV LQKHULWLQJ´ &DQQLQJ  - *UHJRU\¶V Dictatus papae 
µGLFWDWHVRI WKH3RSH¶D OLVWRI VWDWHPHQWVSUREDEO\ LQWHQGHGDVJXLGHOLQHV IRUSDSDO
ODZ\HUVGHFODUHGWKDW³WKH5RPDQSRQWLIIDORQHLVULJKWO\WREHFDOOHGXQLYHUVDO´³KH
DORQHPD\XVHWKHLPSHULDOLQVLJQLD´³KHPD\GHSRVHHPSHURUV´³KHKLPVHOIPD\EH
MXGJHGE\QRRQH´DQGSHUKDSVPRVWVLJQLILFDQWO\³WKH3RSHPD\DEVROYHVXEMHFWVRI
XQMXVWPHQIURPWKHLUIHDOW\´ 
In the Investiture Contest (1078-1122), the Gregorian reformers not only 
DFKLHYHGIUHHGRPIRUWKH&KXUFKIURPOD\LQWHUYHQWLRQEXWDOVRDJHQHUDO³VHSDUDWLRQ
EHWZHHQ WKH FOHUJ\ DQG WKH ODLW\ EHWZHHQ*RG DQG & VDU 3RSH DQG HPSHURU´ WKDW
VWRRGLQ³WRWDORSSRVLWLRQ´WRWKHF VDURSDSLVPRI%\]DQWLXPle Goff 2005: 60). The 
outcome of the controversy weakened the power and prestige of the Emperor. Emperor 
+HQU\,,,¶VIDPRXVVXEPLVVLRQDW&DQRVVDZDVWKHILUVWWLPHD3RSHZDVDEOHWRUHDOLVH
his claim of universal jurisdiction against the most powerful temporal ruler in Europe 
(Ullmann 2003: 157).  
*UHJRU\ ODXQFKHG D JUHDW µVWDWH-EXLOGLQJ¶ HIIRUW IRU WKH 3DSDF\ %HWZHHQ 
and 1150 the College of Cardinals was established as the virtual government of the 
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Holy See. It was followed by the institution of the papal Chancery (for 
correspondence) and the Chamber (financial administration). The advanced 
administrative structure and procedures of the Holy See indeed became models for 
secular polity-builders, who eagerly recruited prelates to help them. At the same time, 
papal influence was extended throughout Christendom by monastic networks such as 
WKDW FHQWUHG RQ &OXQ\ QHZ PRQDVWLF RUGHUV OLNH %HUQDUG¶V &LVWHUFLDQV DQG WKH
mendicant orders, notably the Dominicans and the Franciscans. The latter was strongly 
centralised and subject to direct papal control. Even more importantly in the long run, 
the Popes were also able to gain increasing control over the regular clergy.  
According to the papally approbated Catholic Encyclopaedia (Urquardt 1908), 
papal power reached its historical peak between the end of the Investiture Contest 
DQGWKH³JUHDWGLVDVWHU´RIWKH6HFRQG&UXVDGH-49). The Papacy had now 
EHFRPH³GHIDFWRWKHFHQWUHRIDYDVW&KULVWLDQQDWLRQ>«@,WZDVLQWKH3DSDF\WKDW
Christendom, a temporal as well as a spiritual society, found its head in temporal and 
VSLULWXDOWKLQJVDOLNH´LELG 
As it put itself on top of a centralised, hierarchical machinery governing 
Christendom, the Papacy came to acquire more and more the characteristics of a 
temporal state, in addition to its spiritual functions. Newly converted territories in 
northern and north-eastern Europe were rapidly integrated into the Church structure 
through the establishment of archbishoprics, bishoprics and parishes, the introduction 
of Roman rites, Latin alphabetisation, Christian timekeeping etc. The Papacy had its 
RZQ WHUULWRULDO FDSLWDO 5RPH DQG GRPLQLRQ WKH µ5HSXEOLF¶ RU µ3DWULPRQ\¶ RI 6W
Peter). It conducted its own foreign policy vis-à-vis non-Christian as well as other 
ChULVWLDQ SRZHUV FROOHFWHG DQG GHYHORSHG LWV RZQ µFDQRQ¶ RI ODZ FUHDWHG D SROLFH
force (the Inquisition) and its own courts (whose verdicts could be appealed directly to 
the Pope); built up a sophisticated, extensive civil service; and was able to obtain a 
fairly regularised, tax-based income. It also had its own military force, although mainly 
mercenary. 
,QDGGLWLRQLQWKHDQDUFK\RIWKHµ'DUN$JHV¶WKH&KXUFKRIIHUHGVRFLHW\PDQ\
public functions that had earlier been assured by the Roman Empire and that were later 
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again to be taken over by temporal authorities. Almost alone in feudal society, it could 
provide services such as sick and poor relief and education. In parts of Christendom, 
the Church was the only institution that prosecuted murder. In its judiciary role, the 
Church reinforced Roman traditions and law. However, it also innovated: during the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries the requirement of due process was established as a 
legal principle that was to survive into modern Europe. The most significant growth in 
WKH &KXUFK¶V MXGLFLDU\ DFWLYLWLHV DSSHDUHG LQ FHQWUDO FRXUWV GLUHFWO\ VXEMHFW WR SDSDO
control. By the time of Pope Innocent III (1198- ³WKH3DSDF\KDGEHFRPH WKH
PRVWSRZHUIXORIDOOWKH&KULVWLDQPRQDUFKLHV´OH*RII 
According to Robert Bartlett, towards the High Middle Ages, Europeans 
identified themselves more and more deeply as Christians. Christendom had come to 
resemble not only a rudimentary state, but also a nation:   
>«7@KHUHLVDVHQVHLQZKLFKWKHODEHOµ&KULVWLDQ¶FDPHWRKDYHDTXDVL-ethnic 
meaning.  It is true that Christians are made ± by baptism ± not born, but the vast 
majority of those born in Christian Europe in the High Middle ages underwent 
baptism as a matter of course.  They could easily think of themselves, not as 
voluntary recruits to a particular community of believers, but as members of a 
&KULVWLDQUDFHRUSHRSOH$V0RQWDLJQHVD\VµZHDUH&KULVWLDQVE\WKHVDPHWLWOH
WKDWZHDUHHLWKHU3HULJRUGLQVRU*HUPDQV¶7KHHWKQLFVHQVHRIµ&KULVWLDQ¶can be 
found repeatedly and perhaps increasingly in the High Middle Ages. The term 
µWKH&KULVWLDQSHRSOH¶populus christianus), which was common, implies no 
PRUHWKDQµWKHFRPPXQLW\RI&KULVWLDQV¶EXWZKHQWKH6D[RQVZHUHIRUFLEO\
converted to Christianity by Frankish arms in the decades around the year 800, 
DGRSWLRQRIWKHQHZUHOLJLRQPDGHWKHPµRQHUDFHDVLWZHUHquasi una gens), 
ZLWKWKH)UDQNV¶>«@&KULVWLDQVZHUHDSHRSOHRUDUDFHWKH\DOVRKDGWKHLURZQ
lands or regions, which could be described geographically.  The most usual term 
for this land of the Christians was Christendom, and it is striking both that there 
is an enormous increase in the use of the term in the later eleventh century and 
that its semantic range moves increasingly towards a territorial, rather than an 
abstract sense. (Bartlett 1993: 251, 252)  
3RSH 8UEDQ ,,¶V ODXQFKLQJ RI WKH )LUVW &UXVDGH DW &OHUPRQW LQ  ZDV D
VLJQLILFDQWQHZGHSDUWXUHLQWKH3DSDF\¶VSXUVXLWRIXQLYHUVDOVRYHUHLJQW\2VWHQVLEO\
the declaration was an DQVZHUWRWKH%\]DQWLQHHPSHURU¶VDSSHDOIRUKHOSDJDLQVWWKH
advancing Seljuk Turkomans. Urban most probably had a genuine wish to help fellow 
Christians in distress, but also to retake Jerusalem from the Muslims and to restore the 
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Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (it had been destroyed by the Fatimid 
Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah in 1009). Moreover, the crusades offered a possibility 
for the Church to Christianise and redirect the martial energies of feudal knights 
towards the Muslims, cast as the common enemy of Christendom. This helped pacify 
Christendom as demanded by the tenth century peace movement, which had 
campaigned against endless feudal warfare, particularly in France (Bagge 2004: 185, 
189; le Goff 2005: 46-47). But the Papacy no doubt also perceived the eastern appeal 
DVDQHZRSSRUWXQLW\³WRVHWLWVHOIILUPO\DWWKHKHDGRIWKHZKROHRI&KULVWHQGRP´OH
Goff 2005: 95). The inspiration, support, and organisation of the supranational Roman 
church under strong papal leadership was decisive for the widespread appeal and initial 
VXFFHVV RI WKH FUXVDGLQJPRYHPHQW ³7KH FUXVDGHGHPRQVWUDWHG LQGHHGZKDW D UHDO
XQLI\LQJIRUFHLQ&KULVWHQGRPWKH5RPDQ&KXUFKKDGEHFRPH´.HHQ-123).  
The First Crusade succeeded in capturing Jerusalem (followed by a massacre of 
Muslims) and also brought about the establishment of Latin kingdoms in Palestine. 
Later crusades, though, were failures. Once launched, they defied central direction and 
often became exercises in pure plunder and murder. The Fourth Crusade was especially 
disastrous, for the Byzantine Empire as well as for Christian unity under papal 
direction. Its main result was the vicious sack of Constantinople in 1204, followed by 
the establishment of several short-OLYHG/DWLQµHPSLUHV¶LQWKHheartland of the original 
empire. The Byzantines were able to recover, restoring Constantinople as the imperial 
capital in 1261, but their confidence in the West had been crushed and the back of their 
ancient Roman state broken. The last remaining Christian fortresses in the Holy Land, 
Acre and Tyre, fell into Muslim hands in 1291.  
The failure of the crusades marked the end of any idea there might yet have been 
of Jerusalem as the capital of Christendom (le Goff 2005: 97). From now until the fall 
of Constantinople, the territorial extent of Christendom and Europe were nearly 
identical. But ideologically and intellectually, the outcome of the Fourth Crusade 
widened the gap between western and eastern Europe. The crusades also caused 
increased rivalry between the emerging states of Christendom. Le Goff (2005: 97) 
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FRQFOXGHV WKDW ³WKH DSULFRW ZDV WKH RQO\ DGYDQWDJH JDLQHG IRU WKH :HVW E\ WKH
&UXVDGHV´ 
If the Holy Land eventually had to be relinquished, intra-European crusades had 
more lasting results. In the Iberian peninsula the reconquista made dramatic advances 
in the second half of the eleventh century, culminating in the capture of the old 
Visigothic capital of Toledo in 1085. Sardinia was conquered from the Arabs by the 
fleets of Pisa and Genoa in 1015/16, as was Sicily by the Normans between 1061 and 
1091.The Byzantine Empire lost its last toe-hold on the Italian mainland with the 
Norman capture of Bari in 1071. Denmark, Norway and Iceland were Christianised by 
the mid-eleventh century, and Sweden (including what is now Finland) in the course of 
the twelfth. In southern France, the thirteenth century Albigensian crusade put down 
the Cathar heresy. The Teutonic Order, transferring its operations from the 
Mediterranean to the Baltic in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, joined the 
southern Baltic shore, including Prussia, to Christendom. The last outpost of paganism 
in Europe, Lithuania, officially converted to Roman Christianity in 1386.   
The great intellectual debate stimulated by the Investiture Contest brought no 
solutions to the fundamental questions raised, particularly over ultimate sovereignty in 
WKH WHPSRUDO VSKHUH 0XOGRRQ   7KHUHIRUH WKH (PSLUH¶V FRQIOLFW ZLWK WKH
Papacy persisted. The final showdown occurred during the reign of the Hohenstaufen 
G\QDVW\FRPPRQO\FRQVLGHUHG³WKHVXPPLWDQGGHFOLQHRI*HUPDQHPSHURUV¶SRZHULQ
WKH0LGGOH$JHV´ 6FKXO]H   7KH 6WDXIHU HPSHURUV ³EURXJKW WKHPHGLHYDO
LPSHULDO LGHD WR LWV IXOOHVWGHYHORSPHQW´ 0XOGRRQ7KHUHYLYDORI5RPDQ 
ODZLQWKHHOHYHQWKDQGWZHOIWKFHQWXULHVKDGUHFRYHUHGWKH-XVWLQLDQLFSKUDVHWKDWµWKH
HPSHURULVWKHORUGRIWKHZRUOG¶dominus mundi). The Staufers extended the phrase to 
justify universal Roman imperial power without reference to the Papacy or to 
Christianity. But they also emphasised their sacred role as defenders of the Church and 
Christendom by taking the lead in several crusades. Ecclesiastical discourse saw all 
power within the Christian community as descending from the Pope, whereas the 
Roman law tradition considered the people the immediate source of power by way of 
the lex regia (Muldoon 1999: 73; see above, page 114).  
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7KHPRVW LPSUHVVLYH6WDXIHU HPSHURU )UHGHULFN , µ%DUEDURVVD¶ U -1190), 
pursued a particularly exalted vision of empire. In 1157 he added the word sacrum to 
its official name. He asserted imperial superiority over the kings of Europe, in 
FRUUHVSRQGHQFH UHIHUUHG WR WKHP DV ³SHWW\ NLQJV´ sub reguli RU ³NLQJV RI WKH
SURYLQFHV´ reges provinciarum) (Muldoon 1999: 37). The emperor was said to owe 
his position directly to God, and not to God through the meditation of the Pope. When 
representatives of the Roman senate asked Barbarossa from whom he held the empire, 
KHUHVSRQGHGµ)URP*RGDORQH¶+R\WDQG Chodorow 1975: 361).  
However, in contrast to English and French monarchs, the Holy Roman emperor 
had no opportunity to amass a block of family lands that could serve as a base from 
which to build a centralised monarchy. In the German-speaking part of the empire, the 
nobility benefited from the decline of imperial authority during the Investiture Contest, 
and in Italy the Lombard cities seized the opportunity to free themselves from the 
FRQWURORIWKHLPSHULDOELVKRSV.HHQ:LWK)UHGHULFN,¶VGeath (while on 
crusade) an irreversible decline of imperial influence in Italy began.  
7KLVZDV IDWDO IRU WKH HPSHURU¶V XQLYHUVDOLVW SUHWHQVLRQV7KH romanitas of the 
(PSLUHZDV SUHGLFDWHG RQ WKH HPSHURU¶V UROH DV SURWHFWRU RI5RPH0RUHRYHU ,WDO\
was intimately associated with the ancient Roman past and represented great economic 
and artistic wealth. Emperor Frederick II (1212-1250) inherited the powerful Norman 
kingdom of Sicily from his mother, and developed the most sophisticated system of 
secular government of the day there on combined Roman, Byzantine, Norman, and 
Arabic foundations. However, to be able to ascend the imperial throne in 1214, he had 
to concede to Pope Innocent III that Sicily was a papal fief to be separated forever 
from the empire; that the German Imperial Church should be free from royal control 
and subject to full papal jurisdiction; and that the papal states should again be subject 
WR WKH3RSH¶V DXWKRULW\:LWK WKH ORVV RI ,WDO\ WKHde facto authority of the emperor 
beyond his Central European heartland collapsed, although de jure he stuck to his 
universalist-descending guns. 
The interregnum from 1254 to 1273 undermined the authority of the emperor 
even in the imperial core. After a partial consolidation during the reign of Rudolph of 
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Habsburg (1273-1291), political and administrative links within the Empire grew 
looser. To avoid centralisation of power, the electors brought a range of rulers from the 
houses of Habsburg, Nassau, Wittelsbach, and Luxembourg to the German throne in a 
deliberately mixed succession. The Golden Bull, a constitution promulgated in 1356 by 
Emperor Charles IV of Luxembourg (r. 1355-1378), impressed on the Empire the 
federal structure it retained to the end. The Bull confirmed that emperors, unlike other 
princes in Europe, whose position had become hereditary by about 1300, should 
FRQWLQXHWREHHOHFWHG,WDOVRWRRNDZD\WKH3RSH¶VULJKWWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHHOHFWLRQ
and left him only the consecration ceremony to perform. Most importantly, the Bull 
ended the VXEMHFWV¶ULJKWWRDSSHDODJDLQVWWKHWHUULWRULDOSULQFHVWRWKH,PSHULDO&RXUW 
Still, the emperor retained the personal authority to call out the imperial forces, 
and control of common facilities such as fortresses, roads, and rivers remained in his 
hands. Moreover, about 300 secular and ecclesiastical lords, some 2000 knights, and 
µIUHH¶RULPSHULDOFLWLHVVFDWWHUHGIURPWKH%DOWLFWR6ZLW]HUODQGUHPDLQHGVXEMHFWWR
WKHHPSHURU¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDVH[HUFLVHGWKURXJKWKHLPSHULDOFRXUWVYDQ&UHYHOG: 
78-79).  
Although the emperor thus retained considerable clout in addition to his 
precedence of rank among European monarchs, in the course of the thirteenth century 
the French king overtook him as the de facto most powerful temporal ruler in European 
Christendom. The French ascendancy was inaugurated in 1214 by the victory at 
Bouvines of King Philip II Augustus (r. 1180-1223) over an English, Flemish and 
German coalition force headed by Emperor Otto IV. The victory buttressed the 
&DSHWLDQV¶ FODLP WR EH Vuccessors of Charlemagne (Keen 1968: 111). Improved 
administration of ancient royal rights and domains (much of it inspired by Holy See 
µEHVWSUDFWLFH¶KDGE\QRZPDGH(QJODQGDVZHOODV)UDQFHHIIHFWLYHO\LQGHSHQGHQW 
However, the Papacy at first appeared to triumph even against France. Pope 
Innocent III prevailed on the same Philip Augustus who was to triumph at Bouvines to 
take back the wife he had banished, Queen Ingeborg, in 1213. First King Constance of 
Sicily in 1198, then King John of England in 1213, recognised Innocent as their feudal 
ORUG ,QQRFHQW¶V YDVW GHFUHWDO SURGXFWLRQ DQG WKHCompilatio tertia contributed very 
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considerably towards the unification of the Church under the centralised control of a 
UHIRUPLQJ3RSH,QQRFHQW,,,¶VGHFUHWDOVenerabilem ³SURYLGHGWKHIXOOHVWGHYHORSPHQW
of the papal and canonistic conception of the empire and its place within Christian 
society. The Empire was a not a place but an office in the gift of the Papacy, and while 
the elected king of the Germans was the usual candidate for the office, it was open to 
DQ\ &KULVWLDQ´ 0XOGRRQ  -86). However, as we will see, such grandiose 
claims to papal monarchy failed against the French monarchy. 
Meanwhile, the Europeanisation of Latin Christendom was proceeding apace, 
advanced since the eleventh century notably by revived knowledge of Antiquity. Of 
particular significance in the present context was the already mentioned revitalisation 
of Roman law. In the search for old Church law instigated by the reform Papacy (to 
find support for its position against the emperor), scholars in the last quarter of the 
HOHYHQWKFHQWXU\FDPHDFURVVDQLQWDFWPDQXVFULSWRI-XVWLQLDQ¶VCorpus Juris in Pisa. 
The discovery led to greatly increased interest in Roman law from both imperial and 
papal scholars. Soon Bologna emerged as a great centre of legal studies. In the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, new law schools sprouted in Catalonia, Rheims, Tolouse, 
Orleans, Paris and England. All university-trained lawyers were Roman lawyers, and 
³FDPH WR VKDUH D FRPPRQ OHJDO FXOWXUH EDVHG RQ WKH VDPH WH[WV H[SRXQGHG LQ WKH
VDPH ODQJXDJH/DWLQ´ 6WHLQ 7KLVHDVHG WKHH[SRUWRI5RPDQ ODZLQ WKH
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries into areas east of the Rhineland that had never been 
part of the old Roman Empire.  
Revived Roman law thus served to increase the romanitas and homogeneity of 
Europe north of the Alps. More immediately important, however, it provided new 
ammunition to the evolving debate over temporal sovereignty. The Church became the 
main driving force in this process; to produce what became known as canon law it 
embraced Roman law as well as the dialectic logical method inspired by ancient 
authors ranging from Aristotle to Boethius. The turning point was the treatise 
Concordia discordantium canonum (Concordance of Discordant Canons), published 
about 1140 by the monk Gratian. Also called the Decretum Gratiani, this Church 
parallel to the Corpus Juris was an edited collection of nearly four thousand patristic 
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texts, conciliar decrees, and papal pronouncements touching all areas of Church life. 
Within a short time, canon law was added to civil law as a subject of study at the 
university of Bologna, and by the 1160s civil lawyers recognised canon law as a 
parallel, equally esteemed discipline to civil law. At the same time, the Papacy issued a 
growing number of new laws through regular legislation. Medieval canon law was 
completed with the publication of several additions to the Decretum, the final one in 
1334. By now civil (lay Roman) and canon (ecclesiastic Roman) law were regarded as 
a single system, which together with remnants of feudal law became a jus commune for 
the whole of European Christendom (Bellomo 1995).  
Canonists such as John of Salisbury, St Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St Victor, 
Honorius and many others spread and bolstered the image of a hierarchical and 
universal Christian polity whose ultimate arbiter was the Pope: 
[....] the standard of authority adopted by the canonists was a powerful force in 
spreading throughout Europe respect for the papal claims to ultimate directive 
control in the affairs of Christendom. The systematic mode of thought of the 
cathedral scholars now made it possible to justify these claims in terms quite 
LQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHFDQRQLVWV¶LQWHUSretation of the texts of pseudo-Isidore. In their 
writings John of Salisbury and Hugh of St Victor were able to present a 
systematic view of Christian society as a whole, based on an examination of its 
nature, its component parts, and their respective functions. The final goal of the 
Christian republic, in their analysis, was universal salvation in the next world: to 
this end all the terrestrial sphere must be functionally orientated. (Keen 1968: 99-
100) 
7KH µ5HQDLVVDQFH¶ RI WKH WZHOIWK FHQWXU\ HQFRPSDVVHG not only law, but also 
theology and philosophy, science and literature. One source of revitalised science, 
notably medicine, was Arabic learning in southern Italy and Spain (the Arabs had 
preserved and developed much of the Greek scientific heritage they had found in the 
Byzantine territories they had conquered). The literary revival was expressed in a new 
vernacular literature of epic and romance, history, biography and travel writing. It 
UHIOHFWHGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDµSROLWH¶DQGERXUJHRLVVRFLHW\LQWKHJrowing towns, and 
KDGLWVFHQWUHLQ1RUWKHUQ)UDQFH7KLVZDVDOVRWKHFHQWUHRIWKHQHZµ*RWKLF¶VW\OHRI
architecture, which soon spread to most of Christian Europe. The largest and most 
independent towns were emerging along the highly urbanised arteries of the trade 
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routes, in north Italy, on the upper Danube and Rhine rivers, in Flanders and on the 
1RUWK DQG %DOWLF FRDVWV 7UDGH DQG WKH FLWLHV EURXJKW ³SHRSOH IURP DOO RYHU
Christendom into closer and more regular communication, [promoted] a more common 
OHYHORIFXOWXUH>DQGVKDUSHQHG@PHQ¶VDZDUHQHVVWRSUREOHPVZKLFKDSSHDUHGJHQHUDO
WRWKHLUVRFLHW\´.HHQ 
Together with growing church patronage and increased security and prosperity, 
city civilisation in the High Middle Ages thus provided an environment favourable for 
intellectual life. Among the most notable results was the emergence of universities out 
of the cathedral schools. By 1200 there was not only a university for legal studies at 
Bologna in north Italy, but also one for medical studies at Salerno in south Italy and 
one for theological studies at Paris. Oxford was founded about 1200 and Cambridge 
shortly afterwards. By 1300 there were a dozen universities in Europe; by 1500 there 
were almost a hundred (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2007: 41).39 The initial purpose of 
the universities was to assimilate or reconcile the body of rediscovered Greek learning, 
QRWDEO\ WKDW RI $ULVWRWOH WR WKH &KULVWLDQ IDLWK 7KH µVFKRODVWLF¶ SKLORVRSKHUV RU
µVFKRROPHQ¶SHUIRUPHGWKLVIXQFWLRQ2QHRIWKHPRVW eminent was Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274), whose life work was a grand attempt to reconcile Christian theology with 
Aristotelean reason. He thus helped legitimise intellectual freedom at a crucial 
historical moment. By about 1300, all the diverse peoples of Europe had been  
assimilated in the Roman church, the Latin language, the common institutions of 
feudalism, monarchy, a free town life, parliamentary assemblies, and scholastic 
learning. An increasingly connected and coherent culture ran from England to 
SiFLO\DQGIURP3RUWXJDOWR3RODQG>7@KHµULVHRI(XURSH¶ZDVDQDFFRPSOLVKHG
fact.[...Europe] had a civilisation of its own. (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2007: 
46) 
As part of the same process, according to le Goff (2005: 148-150) between the 
mid-twelfth and the mid-thirteenth centuries a great change of attitudes took place, 
                                              
 
 
39 It is a sign of the marginalisation of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire, however, that the first imperial university was 
founded in Prague by Emperor Charles VI of Luxembourg only in 1348. 
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heralding the emergence of a more secular, civilisational European identity. One 
reason was the Mongol onslaught, which led to the abandonment of the crusades and 
caused Roman Christians WR EHFRPHPRUH SUHRFFXSLHG ³ZLWK WKHLU ODQG WKHLU JRRGV
DQG WKH DIIDLUV RI WKH:HVW´ OH*RII6ORZO\ WKHLU DWWHQWLRQ WXUQHG IURP
Constantinople and the Holy Land to the Atlantic and overseas territories in Africa, 
America and Asia. Another important factor was the recent inclusion of new states in 
Central and Eastern Europe into European Christendom. The conversion of Poland, 
Hungary and Bohemia to Roman Christianity was perceived as their accession to 
Europe; their leaders now expected solidarity from the West in the defence against 
Mongols as well as against pagan barbarians like the Cumans, Prussians and 
Lithuanians. King Bela IV of Hungary, in a letter to the Pope between 1247 and 1254, 
GHVFULEHG WKH0RQJROVDVD WKUHDW³DJDLQVW WKHZKROHRI (XURSH´ TXRWHGE\ OH*RII
2005: 149).  
$YLWDOSDUWRIWKLVGHYHORSPHQWDFFRUGLQJWROH*RIIZDVWKH³JUHDW
PXWDWLRQLQWKHIXQGDPHQWDOFROOHFWLRQRIYDOXHVZLWKLQ(XURSHDQ&KULVWLDQVRFLHW\´,W
was predicated on the interaction of the growth of towns, a revolution in agriculture, 
demographic expansion, the appearance of scholasticism and the mendicant orders, 
emerging states, the evolving peasantry, and new urban categories, notably the 
bourgeoisie. It revealed itself in a growing consciouVQHVVWKDWD³JUHDWVXUJHIRUZDUGV´
ZDVEHLQJPDGH/H*RIIGHILQHVWKLVSHULRGDV³WKHWLPHZKHQKHDYHQO\YDOXHVFDPH
GRZQWRHDUWK´OH*RII,WZDVQRZWKDW(XURSHDQVEHJDQWRHQWHUWDLQWKH
modern and European belief that human endeavour, creativity and progress could help 
approximate terrestrial to celestial life. According to le Goff, innovations that emerged 
as a result included the notions of economic growth, budgets and productivity; of 
purgatory; the writing of handbooks; cartography; gastronomy; courtliness and probity; 
and individuality. 
However, after the death of Innocent the power and prestige of the Papacy, 
linchpin of universalist European Christendom, began to decline. The failure of the 
crusades demonstrated the limits of papal power, the disastrous Fourth Crusade 
UHIOHFWLQJ EDGO\ RQ ,QQRFHQW SHUVRQDOO\ 0RUHRYHU ,QQRFHQW¶V KLJKKDQGHG GHDOLQJV
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with temporal princes had left much negative feeling against Rome. In Italy, the 
Papacy became entangled in conflicts with increasingly independent-minded city-
states, with the Emperor and, eventually, with the King of France. The growing wealth 
and involvement in temporal affairs of the Roman Church seemed to widen the gap 
between what it preached and what it practiced.  
The distance between the Church apparatus and ordinary people tended to grow 
also due to the centralisation, institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the Church. 
By contrast, at the popular level, the mendicant orders and heretical movements such 
as the Cathars demonstrated an increasing religiousness, spirituality and individualism 
in society. In this new religious climate regional distinctions that foreshadowed the 
UHOLJLRXV JHRJUDSK\ RI WKH5HIRUPDWLRQEHJDQ WR DSSHDU ³EHWZHHQ WKH HFFOHVLDVWLFDO
outlook of France and Italy, where loyalty to the Popes was strongest, and of England 
and Germany, where popular pietism was turning away from the outward union of the 
5RPDQ&KXUFKWRWKHLQQHUXQLRQRIEURWKHUO\ORYHDQGWKHVSLULW´.HHQ 
Moreover, even if European Christendom was becoming more economically, 
culturally and intellectually homogeneous, in political terms it was falling apart. 
Increased rivalry between emerging territorial rulers as well as between them and the 
Empire and the Papacy, together with improved military technology led to more 
frequent and violent wars. Europe was militarised; by the fifteenth century most 
European powers had standing armies. But it also stimulated an intensifying scholarly 
GHEDWHRYHUµMXVWZDU¶DQGZKRXOWLPDWHO\VKRXOGbe responsible for enforcing peace, 
justice and the common good generally. The experts on Roman civil law, the 
Glossators, where in no doubt that imperium mundi rested with the emperor, whereas 
the canonists continued to propagate papal plenitudo potestatis.   
However, in Italy there was rivalry not only between the Emperor and the Pope, 
but also between them and increasingly assertive city-states. When imperial influence 
in Italy declined after about 1200, the city-VWDWHV¶VWUXJJOHIRU WKHµOLEHUWLHV¶ WKH\ had 
acquired from the Empire turned against the prospect of papal hegemony. Their claim 
to autonomy was developed by the so-called Commentators, at first Marsilius of Padua 
(1275/80-1342/3). In his Defensor Pacis (Defender of the Peace), Marsilius questioned 
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the temporal jurisdiction of the Papacy and held forth instead the Roman republican 
vision of a civil commonwealth regulated by self-imposed laws (Canning 1996: 154-
158). Thus Marsilius also led an intellectual movement away from the ancient Roman 
Empire towards the Roman republic, and from Cæsar to Cicero, as models for early 
modern political theory and practice. In the course of the fifteenth century, when 
absolutist signori usurped power in most Italian city-states, the humanists reinforced 
this dissident republicanism. Marsilius however supported the Emperor in his struggle 
with the Pope. His ideas came to fruition when he witnessed his employer, King Louis 
IV of Bavaria, being crowned Roman emperor by delegates of the people, not the 
Pope, in Rome in 1328, and when Louis went on to appoint an anti-Pope.  
Similarly, Dante Aligheri (1265-1321) made his famous call for a renovatio 
imperii in the context of widespread city-state opposition to papal hegemony (Skinner 
1978a: 18). Baldus de Ubaldus (c. 1327-1400) saw emperorship and kingship as 
institutions whose primary function was serving their temporal communities rather 
than assuring passage into eternity (Canning 1996: 163-166). Bartolus of Sassoferato 
(1313/14-1357) elaborated a theory of popular sovereignty to accommodate the 
political reality of autonomous, republican city-states. To him, the consent of the 
people could act as a complete alternative to the will of the superior in the creation of 
law (Canning 1996: 169). In their endeavours to undermine the authority of the 
emperor, the canonists had already suggested that the king is emperor within his 
territory (rex in regno suo est imperator). But it was Bartolus and Baldus who 
LQWURGXFHG WKLVGRFWULQH LQWRFLYLO ODZ³WKXVPDNLQJ WKH ILUVWGHFLVLYH move towards 
DUWLFXODWLQJWKHPRGHUQFRQFHSWRIWKHVWDWH´6NLQQHUD 
In this achievement the Italian Commentators received vital assistance from the 
ODZ\HUV RI .LQJ 3KLOLS ,9 µWKH )DLU¶ RI )UDQFH -1314). The conflict between 
Philip and Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) was a crucial juncture in the transition 
from medieval universalist Christendom to modern particularist Europe, inaugurating 
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as they did the decline of the Papacy as a temporal power.40 French interests had 
arrived in Italy with Charles of Anjou, who had won control of Sicily and Naples after 
the death of Emperor Frederick II in 1250. Philip IV won a dispute over the control 
and taxation of the French clergy as well as a controversy regarding the jurisdiction 
over a Languedoc bishop, Bernard Saisset. A response by Boniface, the bull Unam 
Sanctam (1303), made the most extreme claim for a theocratic world order of any 
medieval Pope. Boniface defended the universal primacy of the Pope in a way that 
amounted to an assertion that all secular power was derived from, and exercised at the 
will of, the priesthood. However, when he suffered a French attack and died shortly 
afterwards, the Papacy came under heavy French influence. In 1309 the papal 
residence was moved from Rome to Avignon, where it remained until 1377.   
7KH3DSDF\¶V µ%DE\ORQLDQFDSWLYLW\¶ LQ$YLJQRQZDV WRSURYHDQ LQVSLUDWLRQRI
WKH *DOOLF KLVWRULRJUDSKLFDO VFKRRO WKDW HPHUJHG LQ WKH 5HQDLVVDQFH DQG VDZ ³WKH
FKLOGUHQ RI *DXO E\ ELUWK DQG FKDUDFWHU´ DV ³D QDWLRQ GHVWLQHG WR Ee the European 
DVVHPEO\ SRLQW DQG WKH VWDUWLQJ SRLQW IRU PRGHUQ FLYLOLVDWLRQ´ WKH )UHQFK QDWLRQDO
historian Victor Martin writing in 1864, quoted by Kelley 2003: 203). Kelley 
VXPPDULVHVWKH*DOOLFYLHZRIKLVWRU\DVµDFWVRI*RGWKURXJKWKH)UHQFK¶Gesta Dei 
per Francos WKH WLWOH RI *XLEHUW¶V KLVWRU\ RI WKH )LUVW &UXVDGH ³)UDQFH KDG VDYHG
Europe from Islam, crushed the papal theocracy, become the birthplace of Catholicism 
and philosophy and the cradle of liberty and equality, and now was taking on a new 
PLVVLRQIRUWKHEHQHILWRI(XURSHDQFLYLOLVDWLRQ´.HOOH\ 
Naturally, the defenders of French territorial sovereignty also referred to Roman 
ODZ ZKLFK ZDV DGDSWHG LQ SDUDOOHO ZLWK WKH H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH )UHQFK NLQJ¶V UHDOP
Assisted by the Church and an emerging burgher class in the cities, King Philip II 
                                              
 
 
40 This is at least the conventional view. James Muldoon however rightly points out that the modern concept of the state 
EHFDPHIXOO\IRUPHGPXFKODWHUWKDQXVXDOO\DVVXPHG³UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJVLPSO\WKHKLVWRU\RIWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHVWDWH
the history of political thought and institutions from 1500 to 1800 (or, perhaps, 1300 to 1800) can be more fruitfully 
understood as a conflict between two forms of government, a comparatively new one, the emerging nation-state, and an old 
IRUP LQ WKH SURFHVV RI WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ LPSHULDO JRYHUQPHQW´ 0XOGRRQ  .LQJGRPV VXFK DV )UDQFH DQG(QJODQG
tended to become empires before they became nation-VWDWHV LQWHUQDOO\ WKH\ ZHUH µFRPSRVLWH PRQDUFKLHV¶ RU µSRO\JORW
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Augustus had managed to extend the royal territory from the Île de France to most of 
northern France. He had changed his title from King of the Franks to King of France a 
few years into his reign. In the latter part of the thirteenth century, French royal 
lawyers had begun promoting Roman law-LQVSLUHGQRWLRQVVXFKDVµWKHNLQJLVHPSHURU
LQKLVUHDOP¶DQGµZKDWSOHDVHVWKHNLQJKDVWKHIRUFHRIODZ¶,QWKHQH[WFHQWXU\WKH
French king adopted the title rex christianissimus (Most Christian King) and even 
DSLQJ &KDUOHPDJQH µ9LFDU RI &KULVW¶ FKDOOHQJLQJ FODLPV WR &KULVWLDQ KHDGVKLS
hitherto monopolised by the East Frankish/German emperor and the Pope.  
It is probably in this context that we should consider the plan of Pierre du Bois (c. 
1250-FIRUµ(XURSHDQ¶XQLRQ'X%RLVSURSRVHGWKDWWKH3RSHVKRXOGIRUVDNHDOO
his temporal power. Moreover, due to the weakness of the Empire, the imperial dignity 
should be transferred to the king of France, who should lead a joint new attempt to 
reconquer the Holy Land. In 1308, du Bois indeed proposed to King Philip IV to put 
himself forward for the imperial election (de Rougemont 1966: 62).  
Du Bois and other publicists between 1280 and 1315, Dante as well as Boniface 
VIII and Giles of Rome, are often considered early advocates of European union (e.g. 
by Heater 1992: 7-14). However, the discourse still remained fundamentally Christian-
universalist. None of the plans used the word Europe or European (de Rougemont 
1966: 72). The pretext of the calls for unity was the perceived need to mount an 
effective new crusade against the infidel occupying Jerusalem, and later, to defend 
Christian Europe against the Ottomans. The context was the fragmentation of 
Christendom due to growing quarrels involving not only the Empire and the Papacy, 
but now also the French monarchy and the Italian city-states (de Rougemont 1966: 54).  
'X%RLVKRZHYHUDGGHGµPRGHUQ¶XQLYHUVDO-ascending elements by proposing a 
representative council (to be convoked by the Pope) and a standing court to adjudicate 
disputes within the Christian federation he envisaged. In 1463, Antoine Marini, in the 
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
HPSLUHV¶RIGLVSDUDWH WHUULWRULHVDQGH[WHUQDOO\ WKH\DFTXLUHGRYHUVHDVHPSLUHV0XOGRRQHYHQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
µLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶WKDWHPHUJHGLQWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\VKRXOGEHPRUHSURSHUO\FDOOHGµLQWHU-LPSHULDOODZ¶ 
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QDPH RI WKH NLQJ RI %RKHPLD -LĜL 3RGƟEUDG SURSRVHG D VLPLODUO\PRGHUQ SODQ IRU
continental federation to resist the Ottomans. A federal assembly of the states of 
Christendom should be convened at Basle and elect the King of France as emperor of 
WKH:HVW -LĜLZRXOG DVVXPH WKH WLWOHV RI(PSHURU LQ WKH(DVW DQG RI*HUPDQ\7KH
federal assembly should vote by simple majority and there should be a joint court of 
justice, international arbitration, a common armed force and a budget financed by the 
Church tithe (de Rougemont 1966: 66-72; Heater 1992: 13-14). 
Nevertheless, in 1313, a French Pope, Clement V, issued the earliest legal 
confirmation of territorial sovereignty in the decree Pastoralis cura. It was also the 
ILUVW SULQFLSOHG GHQLDO RI WKH XQLYHUVDOLW\ RI WKH HPSHURU¶V UXOH 8OOPDQQ-
198). Clement thus ruled in favour of his nominal vassal, the Norman King Robert of 
Sicily, and against Emperor Henry VII, who had charged Robert with high treason for 
LQFLWLQJDQGDEHWWLQJ,WDOLDQLPSHULDOFLWLHVWRUHEHODJDLQVWKLP5REHUW¶VODZ\HUVKDG
advanced the same arguments for royal territorial sovereignty as the French royal 
lawyers had long done. This was a significant change of heart on the part of the 
Papacy. As late as ten years earlier, Boniface VIII in his Unam sanctam had upheld the 
traditional notion that the French king, like every king, was de jure subject to imperial 
authority (Ullmann 1965: 198).  
However, the French monarchy did not yet propagate modern territorial 
sovereignty. A deeply rooted and pervasive idea of imperial kingship had lingered in 
West Francia since Roman and Carolingian times (Canning 1996: 78-79). The early 
west Frankish kings had deliberately sought to legitimise and bolster their authority by 
using imperial epithets and formulae in their official documents and by evoking the 
Carolingian imperial inheritance. Professing to be the legitimate descendants of the 
Frankish kings and emperors, the Capetian kings had also asserted a right to inherit 
their role as defender of the Roman Church. Adopting the epithet rex christianissimus, 
they had managed to impose a certain unity on their feudal territories and had taken 
YLUWXDO FRQWURO RI WKH *DOOLFDQ &KXUFK KHQFH µ*DOOLFDQLVP¶ 3UHVXPLQJ WKDW WKH
)UHQFK NLQJGRP DV µWKH HOGHVW GDXJKWHU RI WKH &KXUFK¶ ZDV XQLTXHO\ &DWKROLF DQG
Christian, the Most Christian King was claimed to be 
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µFKRVHQE\WKH/RUGDQGEOHVVHGDERYHDOORWKHUNLQJGRPVRIWKHZRUOG¶DV3KLOLS
WKH)DLU¶VPLQLVWHU1RJDUHWLQVLVWHG>@7KLVFODLPWREHDµSHFXOLDUSHRSOH¶GLG
not remain merely royal or ecclesiastical; rather it was mediated by the clergy to 
the people as a whole providing one of the most enduring roots of French 
nationhood and nationalism, but its justifying grounding remained a royal one. A 
FHQWXU\ODWHUDSHDVDQWJLUOIURP&KDPSDJQH>-HDQQHG¶$UF@FRXOGKDYHQRGRXEW
WKDWµDOOWKRVHZKRILJKWDJDinst the holy kingdom of France fight against the 
/RUG-HVXV¶>@7KHXQLW\RIWKH)UHQFKQDWLRQGHSHQGHGRQWKHP\VWLTXHRILWV
PRQDUFK\LQDZD\WKDWRI(QJODQGQHYHUGLGDQGWKHPRQDUFK\¶VP\VWLTXHZDV
an intensely Catholic one (Hastings 1997: 98-99) 
Already in the tenth century Adso, the abbot of Moustier, had claimed the 
imperial dignity for the western rather than the eastern Frankish kingdom (Gollwitzer 
1951: 33). This demand was embraced by the western Frankish king from the end of 
the twelfth century, if not earlier. His cause was greatly assisted by the great prestige 
the French monarchy and Franco-Norman civilisation had now achieved. Franks or 
Normans had conquered England and Southern Italy; led the crusades; and had helped 
the Papacy to victRU\RYHU WKH(PSLUH3DULVKDGDGYDQFHGWREHFRPH&KULVWHQGRP¶V
main centre of learning and there was Frankish-Norman-Burgundian leadership in 
architecture, in courtly and knightly customs, fashions and manners, in painting, music, 
vernacular literature and language. French was spoken nearly as widely as Latin. Both 
the Valois and the Bourbon dynasties, like the Habsburgs, claimed descent from the 
Trojan Aenas via Charlemagne.   
In 1519, King Francis I put himself forward as a candidate to the imperial 
election, but lost to King Charles I of Spain, the Habsburg who subsequently became 
HPSHURU&KDUOHV9$FFRUGLQJWR+LQVOH\³LWLVKDUGO\DQH[DJJHUDWLRQWR
say that from the same date there was no French king for nearly four hundred years 
whose foreign policy was unaffected by the ambition to be elected to the imperial 
WKURQHWRMRLQWKHLPSHULDO&URZQWRWKH&URZQRI)UDQFH´3DJGHQZULWHV
RI³FRQWLQXLQJ>LPSHULDO@ELGVIURP&KDUOHV9,,,WR/RXLV;,9´+LQVOH\-
70) sees the French imperial ambitions as part of the struggle between the House of 
Valois and the House of Habsburg over an office that offered the opportunity to be 
³WKHVROHDUELWHURI(XURSH´ 
According to John Hale, by the fifteenth century 
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the imperial role had dwindled from being the widely acknowledged secular 
SURWHFWRURI&KULVWHQGRPWRWKDWRI(XURSH¶VVHQLRUFKLHIWDLQORDGHGZLWK
honours and associations reaching back to the empire of antiquity, but implying 
direct rule only within family lands and a wider influence limited to the extent to 
which other German princes and cities found it useful to them. It is, all the same, 
a significant comment on the non-domestic self-image of monarchs that on the 
death of Maximilian I of Habsburg in 1519, not just his territorial heir, his 
grandson Charles, but both Henry VIII of England and Francis I of France put 
themselves forward as candidates. For a foreigner to become Emperor would 
bring prestige, a source of patronage through the bestowal of imperial titles 
(count, marquis, duke), and a special diplomatic relationship with the Papacy, the 
HPSLUH¶VVSLULWXDODOWHUHJR,WZRXOGDOVRLPPHUVHKLPLQDWKULYLQJLPEURJOLRRI
FHQWUDO(XURSHDQSROLWLFDOGLVFRUGV<HWWRFDOO+HQU\¶VDQG)UDQFLV¶VHQWU\LQWR
the electoral competition irresponsible would be to overestimate the degree to 
which rulers thought of themselves simply as national leaders. (Hale 1993: 77) 
The fourteenth century was disastrous for Christendom/Europe not only due to 
the exile of the Papacy to Avignon. The Hundred Years War between England and 
France began in 1339, and increasing famines and plagues reached a climax with the 
Black Death of 1348-49. Europe had become overpopulated and about one third of its 
inhabitants died. Subsequent economic decline caused widespread destitution and 
distress. The great peasant insurrection known as the Jacquerie followed in 1358; there 
were risings in England and France in 1381-2, etc. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 
PD\EHFRQVLGHUHGWKHILQDORIWKLVVHULHVRI³(XURSHDQGLVDVWHUV´6FKXO]H-
28).  
The Papacy had hardly returned from Avignon to Rome before another calamity 
hit the Church. The Great Schism from 1378 to 1417, beginning with the nomination 
of two competing Popes, caused new loss of prestige and conclusively punctured the 
PHGLHYDO3DSDF\¶VFODLPWRFRQWUROVHFXODUORUGV,WDOVRH[DFHUEDWHGHPHUJLQJQDWLRQDO
animosities: France supported the French Pope, England the Pope of Rome; because 
England preferred the Pope of Rome, Scotland favoured Avignon; and so on (Hay 
1957: 69). In an attempt to overcome the problem, a general council of the church was 
called. Meeting at Constance in 1417, the council managed to have all contenders 
withdrawn and to elect a single new Pope, Martin V. The council also instituted a 
conciliar church structure. The subsequent debate between conciliarists and the Pope 
over sovereignty in the Church dominated the subsequent councils of Pavia-Siena 
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(1423-4) and Basel (1431-49). A leading conciliarist, Nicholas of Cusa, envisaged a 
Christian world ruled jointly by the Pope and the Emperor (Muldoon 1999: 108). 
Temporal rulers supported the conciliarists because a conciliar type of church 
government would have increased royal influence in ecclesiastical affairs.  
However, the Papacy eventually prevailed. The conciliar movement came to an 
end with the dissolution of the Council of Basel, and in 1450 a great Jubilee was held 
to celebrate the papal triumph. The defeat of the conciliarists confirmed the principle 
of universalist-descending, absolutist rule within the Roman Church as far as doctrine 
was concerned. The price the Papacy paid was the so-called Pragmatic Sanction of 
%RXUJHV LQ  ZKLFK HVWDEOLVKHG D µ*DOOLFDQ¶ )UHQFK FKXUFK WKDW ZDV
administratively autonomous of Rome, but under heavy royal influence. Eventually 
widespread anti-papal feeling allowed also other secular rulers to obtain greater control 
over national churches. They subsequently reinforced the practice of lay investiture, 
usually choosing nationals of their own country for bishops. Royal governments also 
took steps to gain control of the transnational orders of the church.   
Even the Papacy itself began to look more and more national. The mitre now 
passed to the so-called Renaissance Popes, materially minded men whose main 
concern was to re-establish their control of Rome and the papal states in Central Italy. 
Struggling for survival in Italian power politics, the Holy See began to seem just one 
more Italian state. For almost half a millennium hence (until Karol Wojtyla), all Popes 
except one (Adrian VI, 1522-1523) were Italian. At the same time, the curia lost most 
of its supranational character. Mainly French before 1378, it became overwhelmingly 
Italian from the fifteenth century onwards (Hay 1957: 62).  
But the Renaissance Popes also undertook a programme to enhance the prestige 
and power of Rome with extravagant spending on art and architecture. Pope Julius II 
(1464-1471) rebuilt the city as a centre of magnificent neo-classicism. It was he who 
started the consWUXFWLRQRI6W3HWHU¶V%DVLOLFDGHVLJQHGE\%UDPDQWHDQGGHFRUDWHGE\
Raphael and Michelangelo, which proved so expensive that ruthless fundraising for it 
triggered the protest of Martin Luther. 
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7KH +XQGUHG <HDUV¶ :DU WRR GHPRQVWUDWHG WKH LQFUHDVLQJ KROORwness of the 
universalist-descending notion of Christendom. When it began, the kings of both 
England and France as well as of Burgundy were dreaming of recapturing the Holy 
Land for Christendom. Throughout the conflict (except during the Great Schism), 
Popes laboured to reconcile the belligerents so the unity of Christendom could be 
restored and its joint power be redirected into crusade. However, their efforts were 
fruitless. The drawn-out conflict taught the respective kings to give priority to their 
own lands, which in the process became territorially contiguous and administratively 
more centralised. Indeed, the war may be said to have turned from a dynastic or 
imperial into a national struggle, thus proving a milestone in the development of 
national feeling (Keen 1968: 244).  
After the war, English kings became increasingly preoccupied with domestic 
GHYHORSPHQWV ³6HSDUDWHG DW ODVW IURP FRQWLQHQWDO GRPLQLRQV WKHLU NLQJGRP ZDV
English in language, outlook and customs, with a pride in its purely native history. 
(QJODQGZDVEHJLQQLQJKHUFDUHHUDV WKHLVODQGUHDOPRIIXWXUHKLVWRU\´.HHQ
256). As for France, the hard-fought success of the House of Valois in securing the 
French crown helped ensure that it would not become a realm in name only, partitioned 
DPRQJ QXPHURXV LQGHSHQGHQW SULQFHV -HDQQH G¶$UF VWLPXODWHG WKH VDPH QDWLRQDO
consciousness in France as was emerging in England. Towards the end of the conflict, 
)UHQFK UR\DO DEVROXWLVP ³JDLQHG VWUHQJWK LQ VWHS ZLWK PLOLWDU\ VXFFHVV DQG WKH
awakening of national spirit. [...] What [Kings Charles VII and Louis XI] built was at 
the core of the power of France, as it endured to the end of the Ancien Régime´.HHQ
1968: 258).  
However, the sense of community in European Christendom was to some extent 
revitalised when the Eurasian empire established by Batu, the grandchild of Genghis 
.KDQ FROODSVHG LQ WKH ILIWHHQWK FHQWXU\ DQG WKH 2WWRPDQV WRRN RYHU DV (XURSH¶V
FRPPRQQHZµ2WKHU¶7XUNRPDQ0XVOLPHQFURDFKPHQWRQWKH%\]DQWLQH(PSLUHKDG
begun already with tKH6HOMXNV¶YLFWRU\DW0DQ]LNHUW LQDQGZDVFRQFOXGHGE\
the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. It eventually confined Christendom 
to the territory of Europe, a fact highlighted by maps produced by the emerging science 
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of cartography. In the first half of the fifteenth century Byzantine refugees fleeing the 
Turks introduced the term respublica christiana to the West as more ancient and 
authentic than the medieval notion of christianitas (Hay 1957: 87). At the same time 
they advanced the usage RI µ(XURSH¶ ZKLFK ZDV D PRUH IDPLOLDU ZRUG WR WKHP DV
Greeks than it had been in the Latin West.  
It was thus probably in part their achievement that Pope Pius II (1458-1464; 
formerly known as Silvio Piccolimini, an outstanding humanist scholar) called for the 
defence of the respublica christiana and of Europe in the same breath (Hay 1957: 94, 
Hale 1993, 3; den Boer 1995: 34-3LXVIUHTXHQWO\XVHGWKHWHUPµ(XURSH¶ZKLFKKH
FDOOHG³RXUIDWKHUODQGRXUKRPH´+HDOVRFRLQHGWKHDGMHFWLYHeuropaeus, European, 
ZKLFKKHXVHG LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ZLWK µ&KULVWLDQ¶ GH5RXJHPRQW+D\
87). Against the backdrop of the advancing Ottoman-Muslim empire, the Byzantines 
and other Orthodox Christians in Eastern Europe now appeared as devout Christians 
and good Europeans.  
0RUHRYHU WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH µ2FFLGHQW¶ ZDV QRZ VLPSO\ FRQIODWHG ZLWK
&KULVWLDQLW\ DQG (XURSH ZKHUHDV WKH µ2ULHQW¶ GRPLQDWHG E\ WKH 2WWRPDQ (PSLUH
came to be seen as un-Christian and non-European. As Delanty (1995: 37) argues, the 
new EuURSHDQLGHQWLW\WKDWHPHUJHGLQWKHILIWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZDVWKXV³DGYHUVDULDO´WR
the extent that it defined itself against the Ottoman Muslim enemy. But as le Goff 
indicates, there was no doubt also an element of pride and sense of superiority, to 
which not only progress in Europe, but also the discovery of previously unknown 
µVDYDJHV¶ RYHUVHDV DGGHG0RUHRYHU OH*RII   ULJKWO\ SRLQWV RXW WKDW WKH
2WWRPDQV¶FRQTXHVWRI&RQVWDQWLQRSOHLQWKHORQJUXQUHOHDVHG³(XURSHDQXQLW\IURPD
KDQGLFDS´)XWXUe Greek Orthodox Christians could identify with Europe without the 
³REVWDFOH´RIDVHSDUDWHSROLWLFDODQGUHOLJLRXVFHQWUHRQWKH%RVSRUXV 
However, the decline in the temporal power and prestige of the two universal 
authorities of European Christendom and the rise of independent territorial rulers in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not mean wholesale rejection of the notion of 
supranational law and order. According to Hinsley (1986: 171-175), the Pope and the 
Emperor were instead increasingly regarded as exercising powers similar to those of a 
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³PRGHUQ-GD\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO WULEXQDO´ QRW DV XQLYHUVDO H[HFXWLYH DXWKRULWLHV EXW DV
general supervisors who possessed judicial supremacy and emergency executive 
powers. They continued to be held in special reverence. There was still general 
recognition of their function of representing Christendom against the infidel and the 
outer world; of their power to depose kings and to appoint rulers to new provinces; and 
of their role of princeps pacis whose approval could alone make a war just. Kings 
sought the sanction of the Emperor and the Pope for their wars until the sixteenth 
century.   
Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) made one last grand gesture of papal monarchy 
when he, in the Bull Inter caetera of 1493, conferred to Spain the Indian (American) 
isles and mainland beyond a line running one hundred leagues to the west of the Cape 
Verde islands. According to the official papal version (Smith 1910), the decision was 
made at the explicit solicitation of the sovereigns of Castile in order to avoid war 
between Spain and Portugal. According to Nussbaum, it was meant to establish the 
QHZ WHUULWRULHV DV D IHXGDO YDVVDODJH XQGHU WKH RYHUORUGVKLS RI WKH3RSH ³7KH+RO\
6HH¶V SOHQLWXGH RI SRZHU KDG QHYHU EHHQ VHW IRUWK LQ VXFK challenging terms as was 
GRQHE\WKLVPRVWXQZRUWK\RFFXSDQWRIWKH+RO\6HH´1XVVEDXP 
Thus towards the end of the Middle Ages, the universalism informing the notion 
of unitary, hierarchical Christendom was waning and the particularism associated with 
the modern idea of disparate, anarchical Europe was waxing. The Reformation may be 
seen as the watershed event of this process. Obviously, the Catholic Church with Rome 
at its centre survived, and with it also universalist/Europeanist ideology. However, 
ascending versions of both universalism and particularism eventually replaced the 
previously so predominant descending paradigms of governance. 
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3.8 Modern Europe 
The Renaissance, the Discoveries, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and, most 
momentously, the French and Industrial Revolutions, were the major stages in the 
µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶RI(XURSH7KHJHRJUDSKLFDO FHQWUHRI WKHSURFHVV DW OHDVW IURP WKH
seventeenth century onwards, was northwestern Europe. The material and intellectual 
achievements of notably the Dutch, French and British polities made them pioneers 
and models of modernity. Modern/European/Western civilisation mainly ± but of 
course not exclusively (Davies 1996) ± expanded from a circle centred on Paris with a 
radius of some 500 miles. AV D SRSXODU WH[WERRNRQPRGHUQ KLVWRU\ DUJXHV ³,WZDV
within this zone that a secular society, modern natural science, a developed capitalism, 
the modern state, parliamentary government, democratic ideas, machine industry, and 
much else originated or receLYHG WKHLU ILUVW IXOO H[SUHVVLRQ´ 3DOPHU &ROWRQ DQG
Kramer 2006: 145).     
While the emergence of a Europe of states facilitated law, order and economic 
JURZWKZLWKLQWHUULWRULDOERUGHUVDQGWKHUHE\XOWLPDWHO\UDGLFDOO\LPSURYHG(XURSHDQV¶
standard and quality of life, it also exacerbated the problem of anarchy, war and 
competition across borders. European progress was impeded by increasingly frequent 
and violent wars, starting with the long pan-European civil and religious war from the 
Reformation to the Westphalian settlement of 1648. This was a problem of great public 
concern, and further stimulated the already ongoing debate on how to preserve peace 
and avoid unjust wars. It was no coincidence that proposals for European peace and 
unity tended to be published near the end of, or just after, great and bloody wars 
(Kennedy 2006: 21). Among the consequences were the emergence of a law of nations, 
or international law, and of distinct theories, ideologies, and discourses concerning 
international relations and European governance. The reality of multi-state Europe was 
a common starting point, but as we will see, theorists and practitioners approached it 
variously according to their intellectual baggage and social position, and political, 
economic, religious and territorial context.  
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The resulting ideological trends, as far as they are relevant to post-1945 European 
governance, may all be related to the 2x2 table of polity-ideas outlined in Figure 1 of 
the Introduction (see above, page 11). The remaining discussion will therefore be 
organised according to the ideological categories defined by that table. For 
chronological reasons, I will begin with the transformation and decline of the 
medieval, universalist-descending discourse on Christendom and its replacement by 
modern, particularist discourse on Europe (see Section 3.8.1). This will also serve as a 
general background for the later sections. Second, I will consider particularist-
descending ideology, already nascent since at least the thirteenth century (Section 
3.8.2). Then the evolution of the properly modern approaches, particularist-ascending 
ideology (Section 3.8.3) and Europeanist-ascending ideology (Section 3.8.4) will be 
outlined.41  
Incidentally (or not), these ideologies, discourses or paradigms coincide closely 
ZLWK 0DUWLQ :LJKW¶V  DQG +HDGO\ %XOO¶V  WKUHH ³WUDGLWLRQV´ RI
international theory: Universalist-descending and universalist/Europeanist-ascending42 
with what Wight calls Revolutionism and Bull (even more confusingly) Kantianism, 
particularist-GHVFHQGLQJ ZLWK :LJKW¶V 5HDOLVP DQG %XOO¶V 0DFKLDYHOOLDQLVP DQG
particularist-ascending with respectively Rationalism and Grotianism. More 
importantly in the present context, particularist-descending discourse can be seen as 
the antecedent of the European integration theory called intergovernmentalism; 
                                              
 
 
41 , DP XVLQJ µ(XURSHDQLVW-DVFHQGLQJ¶ KHUH UDWKHU WKDQ µXQLYHUVDOLVW-DVFHQGLQJ¶ EHFDXVH , DP IRFXVVLQJ RQ GLVFRXUVHV
advocating supranational, federal government for Europe. We will see that some schemes had potentially a universalist, or 
global, scope, but that most were implicitly or explicitly meant to cover Europe, at least as a starting point for global union. 
Most notably, the Roman Church has retained a universal outlook, but has emphasised unification of Europe as the originally 
Christian continent.   
42 &RQWUDU\WR:LJKW,GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQDGHVFHQGLQJDQGDQDVFHQGLQJYHUVLRQRIµ5HYROXWLRQLVP¶RUXQLYHUVDOLVPDV
the acceptance of popular sovereignty by the chief proponents of European union ± the Roman Church and, more to the 
point, the Christian Democratic parties ± in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century represented a historical, 
qualitiative change within the universalist paradigm. I will also argue that after 1648, if not before, the Holy Roman Empire 
became federalised and practiced an ascending, cosmopolitan type of government, even if not based on representative 
democracy. Therefore I discuss its post-1648 relevance to the current research question in the section on Europeanist-
ascending ideology (Section 3.8.4). The same applies to some extent to the Habsburg monarchy, which did produce 
multinational and multiconfessional parliamentary assemblies at the supranational level. In both cases, however, the emperor 
remained a supranational focal point of governance and loyalty.  
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particularist-ascending ideology of functionalism and neofunctionalism; and the 
Europeanist-ascending paradigm of federalism.  
3.8.1 Universalist-descending ideology 
The fortunes of the Roman-Christian universalist legacy continued to be closely 
linked to the fate of its two main agents, the Pope and the Holy Roman/Habsburg 
Emperor. For both, the Reformation was a disaster. The confessional fragmentation of 
Christendom meant that a large number of Europeans, notably in northwestern Europe, 
did not any more look to Rome for spiritual guidance. For many of them, notably 
German Lutherans, the nation-state became a demi-god and nationalism a political 
quasi-religion (see below, Section 3.8.2). Others, notably Calvinists, liberals and 
political pragmatists in Britain, the Netherlands and France became less nationalist (see 
below, Section 3.8.3). But for economic (development of capitalism, trade and 
industry), political (state consolidation, international competition) and theological (see 
below) reasons, the nation-state became a nearly unquestioned frame of reference in 
northwestern Europe.  
Thus, if the ancient East-West antagonism within Europe paled after first 
Jerusalem, then Constantinople, fell to Muslims, the confessional split caused by the 
Reformation greatly reinforced divisions between North and South. This as well as the 
expansion of Christianity overseas after the Discoveries and the further westwards 
advance of the Ottomans, gradually undermined the equation of Christendom and 
Europe.  
But the demise of tKH GLVFRXUVH RI µ&KULVWHQGRP¶ZDV VORZ 7KH 5HIRUPDWLRQ
UHYLWDOLVHG UHOLJLRXV IHHOLQJ DPRQJ 3URWHVWDQWV DV ZHOO DV &DWKROLFV &KULVWLDQLW\¶V
claim to sui generis legitimacy only became seriously undermined in the second half of 
the nineteenth century (Gaukroger 2006: 11-12). Adherents of all confessions 
continued to nurture the notion of a common respublica christiana (Hay 1957: 98ff). 
The signatories of the peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648 still conceived of 
themselves as members of Christendom. DelegaWHVFDOOHGWKHLUPHHWLQJWKHµVHQDWHRI
WKH&KULVWLDQZRUOG¶DQGWKHWUHDWLHVLQFOXGHGIUHTXHQWXVHRIWHUPVVXFKDVrespublica 
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christiana, chrétienté, orbis christianum, and Christenheit (Hay 1957: 114; Philpott 
2001: 82-83). According to Hinsley, in international legal discourse the idea that 
Christendom constituted a single polity survived well into the eighteenth century (on 
the emergence of international law, see below, Section 3.8.3). Hinsley even argues that 
IRU³PRVW(XURSHDQV´&KULVWHQGRPXQWLOWKHQFRQWLQXHGWREHVHHQDV 
a system in which the majority decisions of the members were valid and in which 
the natural law and the jus gentium imposed a network of common legal rights 
and duties. In Catholic Europe this image was sustained by papal and imperial 
ideologists, who kept on insisting after the Reformation and the Peace of 
Westphalia that separate governments had come into the world through the 
corruption of human nature, and thus that the Pope had a direct power over 
secular rulers, including the emperor, or, respectively, that the Emperor possessed 
the imperium mundi. They all asserted that the Romans had given Christendom a 
system of international rules in the shape of the jus gentium. (Hinsley 1986: 182) 
The Roman Church, the principal mouthpiece of the discourse on Christendom, 
was thoroughly reformed by the Council of Trent (1545-1563). As we have seen, the 
&RXQFLO¶V GHFLVLRQV UHLQIRUFHG LWV XQLYHUVDOLVW-descending, supranational organisation 
dominated by the Pope. Thus the conciliarist or episcopal attempt to introduce 
ascending, federal Church government, which may in time have led to entirely national 
churches, failed. Moreover, as sources of Catholic faith, Trent put scripture and 
tradition on an equal footing, UHMHFWLQJ WKH3URWHVWDQWV¶FODLPWR ILQGWUXHIDLWKLQWKH
Bible alone. Latin was retained as the language of religious worship, a requirement that 
was only abolished by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).  
3RSH 3DXO ,,,¶V VDQFWLRQLQJ LQ  RI WKH QHZ Jesuit order was another 
significant event, not only in the revival of Catholicism, but also in the formation of 
modern, continental Europeanness and Europeanism. Through their scholarly and 
educational work, the Jesuits came to contribute most importantly to the transmission 
to modern Europe of the legacy not only of the Christian Middle Ages, but also of 
classical and humanist learning. By their ardent educational efforts they forged a new 
Catholic élite on the Continent. They taught not only the Catholic faith and theology, 
but also the full humanistic programme from the Renaissance and classical era ± Latin 
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and Greek letters, logic and metaphysics, ethics, science and mathematics, music, even 
DFWLQJDQGIHQFLQJ7KHREMHFWLYHZDVWRGHYHORSDVFKRODUO\³VROGLHURI&KULVW´ 
a morally disciplined, liberally educated, critically intelligent Christian man 
capable of outwitting the Protestant heretics and furthering the great Western 
tradition of Catholic learning. Hundreds of educational institutions were founded 
by the Jesuits throughout Europe, and were soon replicated by Protestant leaders 
similarly mindful of the need to educate the faithful. The classical humanistic 
tradition based on the Greek paideia was thereby broadly sustained during the 
following two centuries, offering the growing educated class of Europeans a new 
source of cultural unity just as the old source, Christianity, was fragmenting. 
(Tarnas 1991: 246-247) 
$WWKHVDPHWLPH-HVXLWDQG'RPLQLFDQMXULVWVDQGWKHRORJLDQVRIWKHµ6FKRRORI
SalDPDQFD¶ WKH PRVW QRWDEOH RI ZKRP ZHUH )UDQFLVFR 9LWRULD 'RPLQJR GH 6RWR
Robert Bellarmine, Luis de Molina, Juan de Mariana and Francisco Suaréz) attempted 
to adapt Catholic universalist-descending theory to the new reality of a Europe of 
states. They now saw the worldly authority of the Pope as being of a limited, 
emergency nature (Smith 1910; Hinsley 1986: 96, 183-184). According to them, the 
Pope retained a universal moral and spiritual authority that curtailed the external and 
internal sovereignty of the state, but he could exercise no authority in the secular world 
and over non-Christians.  
7KXVWKH6DODPDQFDQVFKRODUVFULWLFLVHG3RSH$OH[DQGHU9,¶V%XOOInter caetera 
of 1493 (Pagden 1995: 47; above, Section 3.6.4). They aOVR UHMHFWHG WKH (PSHURU¶V
claim to be dominus mundi, i.e. lord of the whole world, but conceded his pre-
eminence among rulers and his right to dominium within his historically acquired 
territory. They saw the Empire as just another res publica (Pagden 1995: 55). They 
argued that kings had limited powers too, shared with higher and lower authorities. 
The Salamancan scholars thus were pioneers of subsidiarity, which remains a core 
principle of modern Catholic social and political thought.43 
                                              
 
 
43 7KHSULQFLSOHRIVXEVLGLDULW\ZDVGHYHORSHGE\3RSH/HR;,,,¶VHQF\FOLFDORerum novarum of 1891, formalised in Pope 
3LXV;,9¶VHQF\FOLFDOQuadregesimo Anno of 1931 and confirmed by the Vatican II council (1962-65). 
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The establishment of the Jesuit order was just one of the means the post-
Reformation Papacy adopted to win back Protestants. As the Church became 
increasingly centralised, for the first time, in the later sixteenth century, Rome itself 
was made the centre of Church reform and renewal. New Roman seminaries produced 
large numbers of clergy dedicated to reconversion, to the Roman tradition, and to the 
Pope. The Popes, notably Gregory XIII, rebuilt churches and streets in Rome, 
³FUDPPHG ZLWK ODYLVK LPDJHU\ H[SUHVVLQJ WKH QHZ G\Qamic spirit of orthodoxy, 
OR\DOW\ DFWLYLW\ IRU*RG´ 'XII\  7KXV WKH\ DOVR FRQWLQXHG WKH3DSDF\¶V
crucial contribution to preserving and developing the European cultural legacy. At the 
same time the Papacy created a diplomatic network; nuncios, or papal ambassadors, 
EHFDPH WKH 3RSH¶V ³KDQGV H\HV DQG HDUV DOO RYHU (XURSH´ 'XII\  
Moreover, with its promotion of the imposing Baroque style, the Church attempted to 
counter the popularity of Protestantism and the power of absolutist monarchies with its 
own appeals to the emotions of common people. 
The Papacy of the Counter-5HIRUPDWLRQRUµ&DWKROLF5HYLYDO¶LQ5RPDQ&KXUFK
terms, scored notable international successes. It encouraged the Christian league 
between Spain and Venice that led to the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto 
WRGD\¶V 1DISDNWRV RQ 3HORSRQQHV *UHHFH LQ  OLPLWLQJ LWV GRPLQDWLRQ WR WKH
eastern Mediterranean. It raised and paid for the army that broke the Turkish hold on 
Hungary in the 1590s. It poured huge subsidies into Catholic armies in the early Thirty 
Years War. The outcome of that war confirmed the reconversion of much of central 
and eastern Europe. Such triumphs encouraged the continued papal belief that secular 
princes should pursue Catholic/Christian policies in all things, that the Papacy was the 
divinely chosen instrument for shaping such policies, and that they held universal 
jurisdictional powers (Duffy 1997: 224-225). 
However, the increasing centralisation and self-glorification of the Catholic 
Revival Papacy mirrored a similar tendency among contemporary monarchies, and led 
to clashes that the popes were bound to lose. The Concordat of 1516 with France had 
already resulted in a practically autonomous Gallican church dominated by the king. 
During the Thirty Years War, the Roman See singularly failed to negotiate peace 
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among the Catholic belligerents, with the French king even joining forces with 
Protestant Sweden and the Muslim Ottoman empire against his fellow Catholic 
Habsburgs. The Westphalian settlement of that war in 1648 confirmed the 1555 Peace 
RI$XJVEXUJ¶V VSOLW RI:HVWHUQ&KULVWLDQLW\ LQWR SROLWLFDOO\ DQG WHUULWRULDOO\ FRQILQHG
confessions. But now Calvinism was recognised too, alongside Lutheranism and 
Catholicism. In the next century, concordats were successively concluded in every 
Catholic country, making the Church virtually a department of state (Duffy 1997: 236).  
The kings at the same time deliberately sponsored theological ideas that 
undermined the position of the Pope. Even the College of Cardinals and papal 
elections became increasingly controlled by secular princes. In 1773, Pope Clement 
XIV gave in to pressure from the rulers of Spain, Portugal, France and Austria, and 
dissolved the Jesuit order, which the monarchs saw as a fifth column undermining 
royal authority (Duffy 1997: 245). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a 
persistent strain of Jansenist dissent also weakened the Church.   
If we turn now to the Holy Roman Empire, the chief temporal champion of 
universalist-descending and proto-Europeanist discourse, a major characteristic of the 
modern era was that the House of Habsburg virtually monopolised the imperial dignity 
IURPXQWLOWKHHQGLQ7KH+DEVEXUJVZHUHWKXVWKH3DSDF\¶VPDLQVXSSRUW
in the Counter-ReformDWLRQDQGWKH7KLUW\<HDUV¶:DU 
From humble origins in the Swiss canton of Aargau, the Habsburgs greatly 
expanded their possessions in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In 
Europe, their modus operandi was mainly marriage and inheritance, whereas overseas 
territories were acquired through exploration and conquest. Emperor Charles V in 1519 
took over a global empire on which, famously, the sun never set. At its late sixteenth 
century zenith, the Habsburg dynasty ruled three quarters of continental Europe ± the 
Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Portugal, the Low Countries, Burgundy, Austria, Naples, 
Milan ± and various overseas territories, especially in the Americas, but also in Africa 
and Asia. In 1522, however, Charles assigned the Austrian lands to his brother 
Ferdinand, to whom he also bestowed the responsibilities for the Empire when he 
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UHWLUHGLQ)HUGLQDQGIRUPDOO\REWDLQHGWKHLPSHULDOGLJQLW\RQ&KDUOHV¶VGHDWKLQ
1558. Previously, in 1526, he had acquired also the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia.  
The death of Charles V signalled the eclipse of the political ideal of a Europe 
united under the crown of the Holy Roman Empire (de Rougemont 1966: 77). 
However, the unity of purpose and common vision of the Habsburg clan remained 
throughout (Wheatcroft 1995: 143- &KDUOHV¶V VXFFHVVRU WR WKH 6SDQLVK WKURQH
Philip II (r. 1556-1598) continued to pursue the imperial idea with great energy. As 
just king of Spain, however, he came to describe his ambition as monarchia universalis 
rather than imperium, which remained with Ferdinand I. Its massive military 
capabilities and great financial resources made Habsburg Spain the only viable 
candidate for European hegemony. Even with the decline of Spanish power after the 
loss of the Armada and northern Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century, the 
pursuit of universal monarchy remained part of Spanish royal rhetoric at least until the 
second half of the seventeenth century (Pagden 1995: 43). But it was pretence only; the 
drying up of the stream of bXOOLRQIURPLWV$PHULFDQHPSLUHVRRQXQGHUPLQHG6SDLQ¶V
international power. After the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, died childless in 
1700, the French House of Bourbon inherited the throne. Their possession was 
confirmed after the War of Spanish Succession (1701-13).  
The Holy Roman Empire did not lose its feudal character to the same extent as 
other western European monarchies. Its corporate nature persisted into the eighteenth 
century; the personal ties to the Emperor linked the territorial princes in a common 
framework of allegiance while preserving their autonomy (Wilson 1999: 36-40). 
+RZHYHU:LOVRQDUJXHVWKDWWKHJUDGXDOHURVLRQRIWKH(PSLUH¶VIHXGDOFKDUDFWHUZDV
DOVRDVVRFLDWHGZLWK µGHVDFUDOLVDWLRQ¶RI WKH LPSHULDO WLWOH7KHFRURQDWLRQULWXals lost 
their potency during the sixteenth century. The last papal coronation of an emperor 
(Charles V) occurred in Bologna in 1530. After 1562, coronations always took place in 
)UDQNIXUW 7KH 5HIRUPDWLRQ DOVR XQGHUPLQHG WKH HPSHURU¶V WUDGLWLRQDO SRVLWLRQ as 
defender of the Catholic Church, particularly as later Habsburg foreign policy often 
dictated alliances with Protestant states. The crusading element of the defence against 
WKH2WWRPDQVDOVRGHFOLQHGLQLPSRUWDQFHDIWHU7KHGHIHDWRIµWKH7XUN¶Rutside 
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Vienna inaugurated the decline of the Ottoman Empire, but also its integration into the 
(XURSHDQ VWDWHV V\VWHP 7KH UHFHGLQJ WKUHDW PRGLILHG WKH (XURSHDQV¶ LPDJH RI WKH
Ottomans (Quataert 2000: 8). By about 1700, the Ottoman Empire was almost 
universally perceived as a European state (Goffman 2002: 18). 
0RUHRYHU WKH(PSHURU¶VSRVLWLRQDVILUVW LQ WKHGLSORPDWLFRUGHURISUHFHGHQFH
was eroded by the assumption of an imperial title by other rulers (Wilson 1999: 39-40). 
The sultan had used one from 1606, claiming to be the successor of the Byzantine 
emperors. Peter the Great adopted one for Russia in 1721 after his victory in the Great 
Nordic War, claiming the same Greek heritage that had been invoked by Ivan the 
Terrible when he declared himself tsar (Cæsar) in 1547. The French king had long 
disputed the pre-eminence of the Emperor in the European diplomatic hierarchy. He 
was supported by his English colleague as the doctrine of territorial sovereignty gained 
ground. The fact that in 1648 foreign powers obtained a right to interfere in imperial 
DIIDLUV IXUWKHU VWLPXODWHG WKH GHFOLQH RI WKH µ+RO\ 5RPDQ¶ (PSHURU¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO
status. The Peace of Westphalia not only gave virtual sovereignty to the princes within 
the empire, but the kings of France and Sweden also received imperial principalities 
that gave them votes in the imperial diet. The peace settlement moreover confirmed the 
independence of Switzerland (a fact since 1499), of the northern Low Countries (the 
Netherlands) and of a number of principalities in Italy. Furthermore, Muldoon argues 
WKDWWKH:HVWSKDOLDQVHWWOHPHQW³FRPSOHWHGWKHSURFHVVZKHUHE\WKH*HUPDQVVHYHUHG
WKH +RO\ 5RPDQ (PSLUH IURP WKH 3DSDF\ >«@ )URP WKH SDSDO SHUVSHFWLYH
Westphalia undid the knot that had joined the Empire to the Papacy since the 
FRURQDWLRQRI&KDUOHPDJQHHLJKWFHQWXULHVHDUOLHU´0XOGRRQ 
Henceforth, imperial interests became increasingly intertwined with the dynastic 
interests of the Austrian Habsburgs. The Danube monarchy solidified initially as a 
FHQWUH RI UHVLVWDQFH DJDLQVW WKH 2WWRPDQV (XURSH¶V ODVW OLQH RI GHIHQFH DIWHU WKH
Balkan kingdoms and Hungary had succumbed (Quataert 2000: 5). Interference from 
imperial institutions in the Habsburg lands largely ceased after 1635, allowing the 
emperor to impose more absolutist rule there than in the old empire. In addition, an 
LQWHQVLILHG SXUVXLW RI WKH HPSHURU¶V IHXGDO ULJKWV LQ ,WDO\ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH
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Habsburg diplomatic system; of the Viennese court as the hub of an extensive 
patronage network; and military expansion after 1683 (conquest of Ottoman Hungary 
by 1699; further acquisitions in the Balkans 1716- WDNHRYHU RI 6SDLQ¶V IRUPHU
Italian and Netherlands possessions during the War of the Spanish Succession), made 
possible the rise of Austria to the status of a Great Power with an identity distinct from 
WKDW RI WKH (PSLUH µ$XVWULD¶ ZDV FUHDWHG DV D VRYHUHLJQ VWDWH E\ WKH 3UDJPDWLF
6DQFWLRQ RI  EXW VLJQLILFDQWO\ OLNH PXOWLQDWLRQDO µ3UXVVLD¶ UHPDLQHG ZLWKRXW
any distinct territorial or µQDWLRQDO¶QDPH(PSHURU&KDUOHV9,-40) envisaged it 
³DV WKHFHQWUHRID UHYLWDOLVHG+RO\5RPDQ(PSLUHZLWKLQQHZERUGHUV´ +HHU
244).  
The Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy became increasingly 
preoccupied with their internal affairs, and in the case of the Habsburgs, with the 
affairs of Central and Eastern Europe. They lost most of their universalist allure 
outside their own borders. On the other hand, they retained the universalist-
cosmopolitan discourse internally and adopted quasi-federal governmental practices, 
with the Kaiser as focal point. The further significance of the Holy Roman and 
Habsburg empires for the emergence of Europeanist federalism will be discussed in 
Section 3.8.4 below.  
The weakeniQJ RI WKH +RO\ 5RPDQ (PSLUH DIWHU WKH 7KLUW\ <HDUV¶ :DU
encouraged the King of France, Louis XIV, to reemphasise his role as Most Christian 
King and his claim to leadership in Christendom. Although epitomising particularist-
descending, absolutist rule withLQ )UDQFH VHH QH[W VHFWLRQ µWKH 6XQ .LQJ¶ DOVR
pursued French universalist-descending hegemony in Europe. Alan Watson (1992: 
GHVFULEHVKLPDV³D)UHQFK+DEVEXUJ´PXFKLQIOXHQFHGE\KLV+DEVEXUJPRWKHU
Anne of Austria; supporting Catholic causes and persecuting Huguenots; his court 
reflecting the style of Habsburg Spain; and marrying the daughter of the Habsburg king 
of Spain. Louis set out to bring the Holy Roman Empire under his sway, scheming 
with pro-French electors, notably Catholic Bavaria and Cologne. He considered 
allowing Alsace and Lorraine, ceded to France in 1648, to remain within the Empire to 
enable his candidature to the imperial throne. When his bid failed, he continued to 
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interfere actively in domestic imperial affairs. With the help of financial subsidies and 
other means he was indeed able to establish effective dominion over much of Europe. 
The quest of Louis XIV for European hegemony however eventually foundered on 
combined Dutch, English and imperial opposition. 
The differentiateG XVDJH RI µ&KULVWHQGRP¶ DQG µ(XURSH¶ LQ WKLV FRQWH[W LV
noteworthy. In his struggle with Protestant Holland and England at the end of the 
VL[WHHQWKFHQWXU\WKHµYHU\&DWKROLFHPSHURU¶&KDUOHV9KDGVSRNHQRIµ(PSLUH¶µWKH
&KULVWLDQ IDLWK¶DQGµWKHG\QDVW\¶QRWRI µ(XURSH¶ GHQ%RHU:KHQ/RXLV
;,9GHVFHQGHGRQWKH8QLWHG3URYLQFHV³WKH)UHQFKSURSDJDQGDPDFKLQHFRQVWDQWO\
represents the Sun King as the most powerful Christian prince and the great defender 
of the respublica christiana´LELG42). By contrast, the Dutch Stadholder, William of 
2UDQJHSUHVHQWHGKLPVHOIDV WKHµSUHVHUYHURI WKHOLEHUWLHVRI(XURSH¶,QGLSORPDWLF
exchanges, the French brandished the term chretienté, whereas William and the 
(QJOLVK VSRNH RI µ(XURSH¶ :LOOLDP¶V ODQding in England and the grand alliance 
DJDLQVW/RXLV;,9DVZHOODVWKH*ORULRXV5HYROXWLRQKDGDVWKHLUVORJDQµWKH
IUHHGRPVRI(XURSH¶LELG:KDWZDVPHDQWZDVUHOLJLRXVDQGSROLWLFDOIUHHGRPIURP
the Catholic centres of power, be they Rome, Madrid, Vienna or Paris. Whoever 
thwarted plans for European hegemony, and notably William of Orange, was 
DSSODXGHGDVWKHJUHDWHVWDQGEHVWµ(XURSHDQ¶*ROOZLW]HU 
µ(XURSH¶ ZDV WKXV QRZ HPHUJLQJ DV WKH QDPH RI D WHUULWRU\ ZKLFK LGHDOO\
represented freedom and diversity, notably of states, just as much as Christianity. As 
VXFK LWZDVEHFRPLQJ³WKHXQFKDOOHQJHGV\PERORI WKH ODUJHVWKXPDQ OR\DOW\´ZKLOH
µ&KULVWHQGRP¶ VORZO\ HQWHUHG ³WKH OLPER RI DUFKDLF ZRUGV´ +D\   7KH
humanist/Renaissance notion of the respublica christiana was already less unitary and 
more cosmopolitan than the medieval idea of Christendom, christianitas.  
7KHDVVRFLDWLRQRIµ(XURSH¶ZLWKIUHHGRPDQGGLYHUVLW\ZDVSUHVXPDEO\VWURQJHU
in the Protestant north than in the mainly Catholic centre and south, where the Roman 
Church, and partly also the Holy Roman Empire, retained authority and loyalty. The 
VORJDQRI WKHµOLEHUWLHVRI(XURSH¶PD\DOVRKDYHIRXQGSDUWLFXODUUHVRQDQFHLQµFLW\-
EHOW(XURSH¶ZLWK LWVQHWZRUNRI Oargely autonomous and often trade-based cities. As 
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Rokkan stresses, the unitary, modern state and its associated particularist ideology 
made limited progress there. The old Empire still offered some joint protection against 
internal as well as external aggression, and the traditional veneration of the 
universalist-descending Emperor persisted. Moreover, this north-south, Central 
European corridor was mainly Catholic or Calvinist and thus more resistant to 
nationalism than Lutheran or Anglican parts (see below). And, not least, the emerging 
µ*UHDW 3RZHUV¶ KDG D FRPPRQ LQWHUHVW LQ SUHYHQWLQJ DQ\ RI WKHLU RZQ IURPJDLQLQJ
hegemony, or a centralised state from emerging, in the middle of Europe. They wanted 
the Empire and Central Europe generally to remain weak and divided. A lacking 
appreciation of this fundamental fact, related to international rather than comparative 
SROLWLFVLVRQHRIWKHWZRPDMRUIODZVLQ5RNNDQ¶VQRWLRQRIWKHFLW\-belt. The other is 
neglect of the Holy Roman Empire as a significant polity in its own right. 
,QVFKRODUO\GLVFRXUVHWKHQRWLRQRIµWKHOLEHUWLHVRI(XURSH¶EHFDPHDVVRFLDWHG
with increasingly abstract ideas of self-contained, rational states acting in a balance of 
power system (with the fragmented centre as pivot). Mechanical, µ5HDOLVW¶WKHRULHVRI
international relations arguably reflected not only the emergence of centralised, 
territorial states north of the Alps, but also that northwestern Europe was the engine of 
the scientific revolution. Modern international relations theory was greatly influenced 
by the mathematical, rationalist and deductive epistemology of Descartes and Newton. 
Except in hard-core, ultramontane/universalist Catholic discourse (see below), 
the eighteenth century Enlightenment generally meant the final vicWRU\ RI µ(XURSH¶
RYHUµ&KULVWHQGRP¶7KHWUHDWLHVRI8WUHFKWVHWWOLQJWKH:DURI6SDQLVK6XFFHVVLRQLQ
1713/14, were the last international treaties in which the term Christendom was used, 
and the first explicitly recognising a secular, multi-state Europe based on balance of 
power (Hay 1957: 118; Osiander 1994: 110). The preambles of the treaties contain 
references to the orbis christianus and to the respublica christiana, but the less 
FRQWURYHUVLDO µ(XURSH¶ ZDV XVHG PXFK PRUH IUHTXHQWO\ DV D FRPPRQ GHQRPLnator. 
According to Osiander (1994: 110- LQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GLVFRXUVH µ(XURSH¶ ZDV
becoming synonymous with the common interest of the European states in peace and 
stability. Moreover, as Bödeker points out in an analysis of the texts of the emerging 
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German Staatswissenschaft in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the main 
objective of foreign policy had become  
WRHQVXUHDUHDVRQDEOHEDODQFHEHWZHHQ(XURSHDQSRZHUV>«@WKHFRQFHSWRI
balance came out of a sense of unity of the European community of states. This 
community was no longer understood as a unity within the framework of the 
µFRUSXVFKULVWLDQXP¶ organised primarily by moral and legal principles. Instead it 
was regarded as the political community of necessity and interests. (Bödeker 
2003)   
This interest-based notion of a states-system was arguably one half of the modern 
concept of Europe that replaced the idea of Christendom. The Enlightenment 
philosophes provided the other, ideological part: the idea of Europe as a cultural and 
commercial society ± a civilisation rather than a religious community. Thus, the legal 
scholar Éméric de Vattel (1714-GHVFULEHG(XURSHDV³DSROLWLFDOV\VWHPLQZKLFK
WKHQDWLRQV>«@DUHERXQGWRJHWKHUE\WKHLUUHODWLRQVDQGWKHLUYDULRXVLQWHUHVWVLQWRa 
VLQJOHERG\ ,W LV>«@DVRUWRIUHSXEOLFZKRVHPHPEHUV± each independent but all 
bound together by a common interest ± united for the maintenance of order and the 
SUHVHUYDWLRQRIOLEHUW\´TXRWHGE\+LQVOH\9ROWDLUHDOVRVSRNHRI(XURSH
(³JLYH RU WDNH 5XVVLD´ DV D VRUW RI JUHDW FRPPRQZHDOWK ³une espèce de grande 
république´5RXVVHDXIRUKLVSDUWODPHQWHGWKHODFNRISDWULRWLVPLQ(XURSH³WRGD\
there are no more any French, Germans, Spanish, even English, there are only 
(XURSHDQV´ TXRted by Gollwitzer 1965: 90). Like Voltaire he thought that Europe, 
XQOLNH$VLDDQG$IULFDZDV³DUHDOFRPPXQLW\ZLWKDUHOLJLRQDQGDPRUDOFRGHZLWK
customs and even laws of its own, which none of the component nations can renounce 
without causing a shoFN WR WKHZKROH IUDPH´TXRWHGE\+HDWHU (GPXQG
Burke (1729-1797), in his Three letters on the proposals for peace with the Regicide 
Directory of France (1796), argued that religion, laws and manners were essentially 
the same throughout Europe: 
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The writers on public law often called this aggregate of nations a commonwealth. 
They had reason. It is virtually one great state having the same basis of general 
law, with some diversity of provincial customs and local establishments. The 
nations of Europe have had the very same Christian religion, agreeing in the 
fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the subordinate 
doctrines. The whole of the polity and economy of every country in Europe 
derived from the same sources. (Burke 1796, quoted by den Boer 1993: 67)   
An important reason behind this Enlightenment enthusiasm for Europe was the 
fact that ancient, secular Greek and Roman civilisation was now again celebrated as 
µFODVVLFDO¶LHDVDPRGHOLQVSLULQJDVXUJHRIQHR-classical architecture, visual art and 
theatre. The rise of classical scholarship had been initiated by the fifteenth century 
Italian humanists (notably Lorenzo di Valla and Politian). In the Renaissance the 
classical style of architecture overtook the medieval, Gothic style; Moliére and others 
had tried to replicate the classical Greek drama in French classicist theatre; Monteverdi 
had invented the opera in the belief that the Greeks had originally chanted or recited 
their plays to music44 (EB 2007a); painting and sculpture had turned from religious to 
human and natural subjects, also often depicting scenes from Greek and Roman 
literature and mythology (EB 2007b); and so on. Both Erasmus and Luther were 
outstanding Greek scholars. French Huguenot scholars such as Joseph Justus Scaliger 
(1540-1609) and Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614) greatly advanced classical studies 
(notably of Greek; they conceded the revival of classical Latin to the Italians), but 
French classical scholarship declined after Henry IV converted to Catholicism in 1593.  
Indeed, the Counter-Reformation stifled classical scholarship in Catholic Europe 
generally (EB 2007c). Whereas the Roman See had earlier encouraged the recovery of 
classical learning and science, the religious revolt of the north caused strictly orthodox 
OLPLWVWREHLPSRVHGRQ&DWKROLFV¶SXUVXLWRINQRZOHGJHFIHJWKHVXSSUHVVLRQRIWKH
heliocentric world view). Jesuit education continued to promote the forms of the 
classical heritage, but suppressed the rationalist spirit of humanism.  
                                              
 
 
44 Opera mostly revolved around themes from classical Greek and Roman literature for the next 300 years. 
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However, classical scholarship continued to develop in England. Here Richard 
Bentley (1662-1742) made a great contribution, which also inspired scholars in the 
Netherlands. The leadership of not only classical scholarship, but science generally, 
passed to QRUWKHUQ(XURSH2ISDUWLFXODULQWHUHVWLQWKHSUHVHQWFRQWH[WLVWKDWWKHµQHZ
KXPDQLVWV¶ RI /XWKHUDQ *HUPDQ\ QRWDEO\ DW WKH XQLYHUVLW\ RI *|WWLQJHQ GHYHORSHG
archaeology as a science. This led to excavations in Greece and Rome that provided 
more exact knowledge, especially of the ancient civilisation of Greece. Combined with 
a reaction against the ornate Baroque style promoted by the Roman Church, this 
inspired a wave of Romantic neo-classicism in architecture, art and literature, 
particularly in Protestant Europe, from about 1750 to 1830 (EB 2007d). Protestant 
Northern Europe thus developed a particular identification with Greco-Roman 
$QWLTXLW\DQGQRWDEO\V\PSDWKLVHGZLWKWKHµIUHHGRP-ORYLQJ¶DQFLHQW*UHHNVLQWKHLU
VWUXJJOHVZLWKWKHµGHVSRWLF¶3HUVian and Roman imperialists (see also above, Section 
3.4.3, and below, Section 3.8.2).  
At the same time, Enlightenment Europe was becoming more culturally, 
normatively and intellectually united on a secular basis now that the religious struggles 
of the previous centuries were resolved and the Westphalian order was settling down. 
3KUDVHV OLNH µ(XURSHDQ WUDGH¶ µ(XURSHDQ SROLWLFV¶ µ(XURSHDQ VWDWHV¶ µ(XURSHDQ
SKLORVRSK\¶ HWFZHUHEHFRPLQJSRSXODU &XUcio 1958, I: 352). The educated classes 
travelled and intermarried across national boundaries, and sponsored a common high 
FXOWXUH RI PXVLF OLWHUDWXUH DUFKLWHFWXUH HWF 7KH µ*UDQG 7RXU¶ WR WKH VLWHV RI WKH
ancient civilisation of Greece and Rome became something of a compulsory 
pilgrimage for the well-to-do.  
%XLOGLQJRQ WKH DVVRFLDWLRQRI µ(XURSH¶ DQG µIUHHGRP¶ WKDW KDGHPHUJHG LQ WKH
previous century, and more aware of the rest of the world, Enlightenment intellectuals 
cast Europe as a historically favoured, uniquely advanced civilisation at the cutting 
edge of human progress. By common consent, France was its essence: French thought 
and literature, French classical theatre, French neoclassical architecture, French styles 
in clothes, cooking and etiquetWHHWFEHFDPHWKHXQLYHUVDOVWDQGDUGIRUµSROLWHVRFLHW\¶
everywhere in Europe. The salons Paris were the gathering places for the discussions 
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RIWKH(XURSHDQµUHSXEOLFRIOHWWHUV¶2QHRIWKHPRVWSRSXODUVDORQVRI(QOLJKWHQPHQW
3DULV ZDV %DURQ G¶+ROEDFK¶V &DIp GH O¶(XURSH. Virtually every member of the 
European nobility, including Russian aristocrats, as well as diplomats and scientists, 
communicated in French. French thus replaced Latin and Italian45 as the European 
lingua franca SURYLGLQJ ³D QRQUHOLJLous sense of normative community to rulers 
WKURXJKRXW(XURSH´0DQQ 
$FFRUGLQJWRGHQ%RHUWKHDVVRFLDWLRQRIµFLYLOLVDWLRQ¶DQGµ(XURSH¶
became common in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. The expression 
civilisation européenne was used for the first time in 1766, and had a clear and positive 
connotation: it expressed a growing feeling of European superiority. The influential 
GLFWLRQDU\SXEOLVKHGE\-&KU$GHOXQJ LQGHILQHG(XURSHDV³WKHQDPHRI WKH
smallest, but mRVW HQOLJKWHQHG DQG FLYLOLVHG FRQWLQHQW´ *ROOZLW]HU   P\
translation). For Montesquieu, as for Aristotle and Machiavelli earlier, Europe 
represented progress and liberty, Asia stagnation and despotism (Hay 1957: 122). 
0RQWHVTXLHXDUJXHGWKDW³(XURpe is nothing more than a big nation made up of many 
small nations. France and England need the prosperity of Poland and Russia, just as 
DQ\RIWKHLUSURYLQFHVWKHRWKHUV´TXRWHGE\%|GHNHU 
However, politically, it was constitutional Britain rather than absolutist France 
that was the great ideal of the French philosophes8QLTXHO\LQ(XURSHWKHµ*ORULRXV
5HYROXWLRQ¶RI-89 had made Parliament the centre of power. Moreover, British 
scholars such as Newton, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Adam Smith made crucial 
contributions to the scientific and intellectual ferment of the Enlightenment. All of this, 
FRPELQHG ZLWK WKH .LQJGRP RI *UHDW %ULWDLQ¶V WKXV QDPHG DIWHU WKH XQLRQ RI WKH
English and Scottish crowns in 1707) rising commercial and naval power, made a great 
impression on Montesquieu and Voltaire. They conveyed their enthusiasm for British 
liberty, parliamentary government and empiricism to France and the Continent.   
                                              
 
 
45 Italian was widely used throughout Europe as a literary language in the sixteenth century. 
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The most radical philosophes however thought in universalist or cosmopolitan 
rather than narrowly European terms. They believed in the unity of humankind, indeed 
LQ³WKH VXSHULRULW\RI WKHXQLYHUVDO ULJKWVRIKXPDQLW\DVDZKROHRYHU WKHFROOHFWLYH
HJRLVPRIDSDUWLFXODUVWDWH´+DPSVRQ7KHFDPSDLJQWRDEROLVKWKHVODve 
trade was one expression of this vision. The trans-continental revolutionary Thomas 
Paine (1737-1809) famously wrote in his Rights of Man WKDW³P\FRXQWU\LVWKH
ZRUOG DQG P\ UHOLJLRQ LV WR GR JRRG´  7KH )UHQFK UHYROXWLRQDULHV VKDUHG WKHVH
cosmopolitan ideas:  
It is almost as if, in the revolutionary mentality, there was hardly any place for 
(XURSHLQEHWZHHQFLWL]HQVKLSRIWKHZRUOGDQGRQH¶VRZQQDWLRQ>@7KHLGHD
of Europe and the realisation of belonging to a European community were much 
more clear among those who attempted to resist the revolution [such as Burke] 
than among its supporters. (Den Boer 1995: 66)  
Arguably, it was the modern tendency of radicals to think in abstract, secular, 
cosmopolitan and global terms and of conservatives to favour more explicitly historical 
Christian and European ideals that was emerging. The quarrel was greatly advanced by 
the French Revolution and the figure of Napoleon.  
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) may be seen as a transitional figure between 
the universalist-descending pretensions of Louis XIV and modern, Europeanist-
ascending federalism. In fact, his empire caused a briefly revived advocacy of 
universal monarchy in continental Europe, and not least in Germany (Gollwitzer 1964: 
147). Elevating himsHOIWRWKHSRVLWLRQRIµ)LUVW&RQVXO¶LQ1DSROHRQHVWDEOLVKHG
the most effective European union since Charlemagne. Moreover, he was a great 
Europeaniser. Even if his European Grande empire eventually collapsed, the Corsican 
contributed massively to modernising continental Europe according to the 
cosmopolitan ideas of the Enlightenment. In the process, he greatly reduced its 
administrative and legal diversity.   
At the same time, invoking the imperial legacy of Alexander the Great, the 
Roman emperors and Charlemagne, he rebuilt Paris as the capital of a modern 
(XURSHDQHPSLUH UHSOLFDWLQJ WKHJUDQGHXURI DQFLHQW5RPH -XVWLQLDQ¶VCorpus juris 
was a major inspiration of the Code napoléon.  Napoleon took Roman models for his 
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titles of consul and emperor and of the eagles of his legions. He proclaimed his son the 
µ.LQJRI5RPH¶DQG5RPHWKHVHFRQGFLW\RIKLVHPSLUH+HLPLWDWHG&KDUOHPDJQHE\
bringing the Pope to Paris for his imperial coronation (but in conscious contrast to 
Charlemagne, he took care to put the crown on his head himself). He sought legitimacy 
and Roman-universal aura among fellow European monarchs by marrying a Habsburg 
princess. Fear that Bonaparte might usurp the Roman emperorship caused Emperor 
Leopold II to lay down the crown of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.  
Moreover, Napoleon promoted an integrated continental economy with France as 
the pivot. The attendant embargo on trade with Great Britain was designed to destroy 
the international basis for British commercial and naval supremacy, and to encourage 
the resentment many continentals felt against British power.  
In his memoirs, Bonaparte claimed that what he had tried to realise was the Abbé 
Saint-3LHUUH¶VSURMHFWIRU³D(XURSHDQDVVRFLDWLRQ´RU³FRPPRQIDWKHUODQG´GHQ%RHU
1993: 68; see below, page 268). He said he had looked forward to the day when his 
VRQ WKH .LQJ RI 5RPH ZRXOG ³UHXQLWH (XURSH LQ LQGLVVROXEOH IHGHUDO ERQGV´ DQG
KRSHG WKDW WKH $PHULFDQ V\VWHP ZRXOG EH LQWURGXFHG LQWR WKH DIIDLUV RI ³WKH Jreat 
(XURSHDQ IDPLO\´ +H LQVLVWHG WKDW KLV RZQ REMHFWLYH KDG EHHQ WR DFKLHYH WKLV E\
SHDFHIXO PHDQV RQO\ (QJODQG¶V UHIXVDO WR FROODERUDWH KDG IRUFHG KLP WR UHDOLVH
(XURSHDQIHGHUDWLRQE\ZDU³6LQFHP\IDOODQGWKHGLVDSSHDUDQFHRIP\V\VWHP,GR
not think that any system has been possible in Europe except the agglomeration and 
confederation of its chief peoples. The first sovereign who will embrace the good 
cause of the peoples will find himself at the head of all Europe and will be able to 
attempt all hHZLVKHV´TXRWDWLRQVIURP+LQVOH\ 
$V ZH ZLOO VHH 1DSROHRQ¶V QRWLRQ RI WKH ³FKLHI SHRSOHV RI (XURSH´ LV TXLWH
representative of the liberal internationalist ideas that were emerging in the wake of his 
wars. Industrialisation, revolutionary turmoil and Napoleonic occupation caused a 
nationalist and Romantic-historicist reaction in both Protestant and Catholic parts of 
Europe. Together with the emergence of historiography as a scientific discipline this 
FRQWULEXWHGWRPDNLQJµ(XURSH¶DFRQWHVWHG FRQFHSW³7KHLGHDRI(XURSHEHFDPHPRUH
significant, but there was no question of a version that commanded general agreement. 
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9DULRXVJURXSLQJVKDGWKHLURZQLGHDVRIZKDW(XURSHKDGEHHQDQGRXJKWWREH´GHQ
Boer 1995: 69).  
For the Papacy, paradoxically, the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon 
PHDQW D FKDQJH RI IRUWXQHV 7KH )UHQFK UHYROXWLRQDULHV¶ PLOLWDQW SROLF\ RI GH-
Christianisation caused a widespread reaction, especially in the rural population. 
0RUHRYHUE\1DSROHRQQHHGHGWKH3RSH¶s support in pacifying France and the 
parts of Europe he had occupied. He had already acknowledged that the Pope was a 
³OHYHU RI RSLQLRQ´ DQG KLV PRUDO DXWKRULW\ ³HTXLYDOHQW WR D FRUSV RI PHQ´
(quoted by Duffy 1997: 262). The concordat of 1801 restRUHG PXFK RI WKH 3RSH¶V
authority over the church in France, inaugurating a new era (ibid: 264-265). According 
to Duffy (ibid: 267), the presence of Pope Pius VII (1800- DW 1DSROHRQ¶V
coronation in 1804 did more to underpin the standing of the Pope than that of the new 
HPSHURU1DSROHRQ¶VODWHUVSDWVZLWK3LXVKDGWKHVDPHHIIHFW7KH&RQJUHVVRI
Vienna restored Rome and almost all the lands it had lost during the Napoleonic wars 
to the Holy See. Thus the Pope obtained a territorial base from which he was able to 
build unprecedented popular support (and, incidentally, to obstruct Italian unification 
until 1870).  
The Holy See, by nature a deeply conservative institution, subsequently became 
closely allied to the Restoration monarchies. New concordats with eventually all 
Catholic states again gave control of the appointment of bishops to temporal rulers. 
But the same reaction against Enlightenment rationalism that inspired the Romanticist 
movement enhanced the prestige of the Pope personally (Duffy 1997: 276; see below, 
Section 3.8.3). In 1819, the Sardinian ambassador to St. Petersburg, Count Joseph-
Marie de Maistre (1753-1821), published a book, Du Pape, which advocated the 
revival of a European Christendom under papal leadership. His work helped inspire an 
µXOWUDPRQWDQLVW¶PRYHPHQWIRUFKXUFKFHQWUDOLVDWLRQDQGSDSDODEVROXWLVP7KLVZDVLQ
SDUWDUHDFWLRQWRWHPSRUDOLQWHUIHUHQFHLQ&KXUFKDIIDLUVVXFKDV)UHQFKµ*DOOLFDQLVP¶
DQG$XVWULDQµ-RVHSKLVP¶8OWUDPRQWDQLVWVDOso argued that the increasing power of the 
state threatened the independence of the national churches, which therefore needed to 
be backed up by a strong, supranational Papacy.  
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Moreover, a conflict between the Papacy and the King of Prussia in the 1830s 
sWLPXODWHGWKHIRUPDWLRQRID³QHZDQGOHVVGRFLOH&DWKROLFLGHQWLW\>@DURXQGOR\DOW\
WR SDSDO GLUHFWLYHV´ 'XII\   $OVR JURZLQJ SDSDO FRQWURO RI &DWKROLF
FRQJUHJDWLRQVRYHUVHDVQRWDEO\ LQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDGGHGWR³WKHJURZLQJIRFXVRI
ChXUFK OLIH RQ 5RPH´ LELG  7KH URPDQWLF LGHDOLVDWLRQ RIPHGLHYDO WKHRFUDF\
voiced by de Maistre contributed to an increased interest in ancient Roman liturgy, in 
plainchant, and sacramental symbolism. At the same time, the blossoming cults of 
Mary and of the Sacred Heart of Jesus reflected growing popular reverence for the 
3RSH³>,@QWKHDJHRIFKHDSSRSXODUSULQWDQGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHPDVVPHGLDWKH
3RSHKLPVHOIEHFDPHTXLWHOLWHUDOO\DSRSXODULFRQ´LELG 
A number of other Catholic romantic authors defended the universalist-
descending tradition of medieval Christendom too. Most influential were Friedrich von 
Hardenberg (Novalis; 1772-1801) and François-Renée de Chateaubriand (1768-1848). 
Novalis in his Christenheit oder Europa (1799) attacked Protestantism for disrupting 
Christendom and called for the revival of a Christian-Germanic Europe on the 
Charlemagne model. Similarly, in his Génie du christianisme (1802), Chateaubriand 
³VDQJ WKH SUDLVHV RI WKH LQIOXHQFH RI &KULVWHQGRP RQ SRHWry, literature, music, 
DUFKLWHFWXUH WKHRORJ\ DQG IRUPV RIZRUVKLS´ZLWK JUHDW HIIHFW GHQ%RHU  
:ULWLQJVOLNHWKHVHJDYHWKHLGHDRI(XURSH³DFOHDUO\GHILQHGDQGGHYHORSHGKLVWRULFDO
perspective, which had been lacking even as late as the late HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\ >«@
The concept of Europe was therefore not only historicised, but also politicised; in other 
words, it was seen more and more in historical terms, with contemporary political 
GHEDWHIRUPLQJWKHIUDPHRIUHIHUHQFH´LELG 
The tracts of de Maistre, Novalis, Chateaubriand, Schlegel, Görres and other 
Catholic romanticists espoused a historicist thinking according to which true European 
civilisation had been built progressively on the ruins of the Roman Empire (the Latin 
element), the barbarian peoples and the Carolingian empire (the Germanic element), 
and on Catholicism (the Christian element). The Papacy represented the single most 
important institution of continuity. Medieval Christendom was advanced as the ideal 
Europe, an ideal that alas had fallen into decay under the influence of atheism and 
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revolution. At the same time the neo-Gothic style emerged in a romantic reaction 
against classicism in architecture. The Gothic novel represented a similar effect in 
literature, as did natLRQDOURPDQWLFLVP¶VFHOHEUDWLRQRIIRONFXOWXUHDQGGUDPDWLFQDWXUH
LQ SDLQWLQJ DQGPXVLF:RUGV OLNH µ5RPDQWLFLVP¶ DQG µRoman¶ *HUPDQ IRU QRYHO
LQGHHGGHULYHGIURPWKHSRSXODUµURPDQFH¶OLWHUDWXUHRIPHGLHYDOµ*HUPDQLF¶)UDQFH
Similarly, romantic nostalgia for the imagined peace and order of the Middle Ages 
LQIOXHQFHG7VDU$OH[DQGHU¶V LQLWLDWLYH RI WKH µ+RO\$OOLDQFH¶ VLJQHG LQ E\ WKH
absolutist monarchs of Russia, Prussia and Austria (den Boer 1995: 69-70).  
The restoration and reaction represented by the Holy Alliance was a major reason 
why post-Napoleonic liberals were resurrecting the old distinction between West and 
(DVW RU µ2FFLGHQW¶ DQG µ2ULHQW¶ 7KH:HVW QRZ H[WHQGLQJ DV IDU DV $PHULFD ZDV
identified with ascending and constitutional government, and the East, represented 
PRVW GDUNO\ E\ 7VDULVW 5XVVLDZLWK GHVFHQGLQJ RU µGHVSRWLF¶ UXOH *ROOZLW]HU 
220; den Boer 1995: 71). Until the Congress of Vienna, Russia had been considered 
PRUHQHXWUDOO\DVDµQRUWKHUQ¶SRZHU%|GHNHU 
In a related development, the French historian and statesman François Guizot 
(1787-1874) made a momentous contribution to the national-liberal, secularised or 
Protestant interpretation of European history. Guizot identified the progress of Europe 
with the growth of freedom and diversity. The uniqueness of Europe was that 
throughout its history, no agent, institution, tradition or idea had been able to gain 
hegemony. There had always been dynamism and competition; at first, in the Middle 
Ages, between spiritual and temporal authority; later, in modern times between 
confessions, states, companies and individuals. For the Huguenot Guizot, the 
Reformation was the historical élan de liberté WKDW VHSDUDWHG WKH WZR DJHV ³DQ
enormous step forward towards freedom of thought and the emancipation of the human 
VSLULW´GHQ%RHU 
The Lutheran A.H.L. Heeren (1760-1842), historian at the Göttingen university, 
DOVR LQWHUSUHWHG WKH 5HIRUPDWLRQ DV WKH MXQFWXUH ZKHQ ³(XURSH EHFDPH (XURSHDQ´
(Gollwitzer 1951: 102). In his Handbook of History of the European State System, 
+HHUHQVWDWHGWKDWWKHJHQHUDOFKDUDFWHURIWKHVWDWHV\VWHPLV³LWVLQQHUIUHHGRPZKLFK
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LV WKH DXWRQRP\ DQG LQWHUDFWLYH LQGHSHQGHQFH RI LWV PHPEHUV´ 7KH V\VWHP LV D
³ZKROH´ZLWKLQ LW WKHQDWLRQVRI&KULVWLDQ(XURSH ³PRUDOO\FRQVWLWXWHGDQDWLRQ WKDW
ZDV RQO\ SROLWLFDOO\ GLYLGHG´ TXRWHG E\ %|GHNHU  +HHUHQ REVHUYHG WKDW WKH
stability of the system depended on the situation in Central Europe, and notably in 
Germany. 
The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 signalled the growth of radical democratic 
ideas according to which ordinary people, and not just the meritocratic or aristocratic 
best, should hold political power. According to den Boer, popular culture was now 
recognised as deserving scientific and political attention. He argues that the French 
historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874)  
made the common people the driving force of history and the primary factor in 
the development of civilisation. This popular culture was placed largely in the 
context of tKHQDWLRQDQG>«@IRXQGOLWHUDU\DQGPXVLFDOH[SUHVVLRQLQQDWLRQDO
romanticism. The concept of civilisation, which until then had been synonymous 
with Europe in general, was now eagerly aligned with national borders; European 
civilisation was subdivided into various national cultures. (Den Boer 1995: 73)   
0LFKHOHWKRZHYHUZDVD)UHQFKµHQOLJKWHQHG¶ W\SHRIQDWLRQDOLVWSURSRXQGLQJ
the universal mission of France in showing other nations the way to a particularist-
ascending and eventually universalist-aVFHQGLQJ µ(QG RI +LVWRU\¶ 3RVW -1848 
µSURJUHVVLYH5RPDQWLFLVWV¶ LQVSLUHG E\ WKLV YLVLRQ QRWDEO\*LXVHSSH0D]]LQL -
1872), formulated a national-liberal discourse on Europe advocating human rights at 
the individual level and equality and fraternity of all peoples (i.e. nations) at the 
collective level. Den Boer thus argues that, in contrast to what had been the case in 
1789, the concept of Europe had a very prominent place in the mentality of the 
revolutionaries of 1848:  
The liberation of the citizen is to take place within the nation and vast layers of 
the population are to take part in the national culture: the country should 
reconcile the social classes with one another. Subsequently, however, these 
reborn nations should become part of the brotherhood of European peoples. 
Democrats therefore see Europe not as a balance of powers according to the view 
of political realism, but as a federation of nations; there was no place for hatred 
among the individual nations, the ultimate aim being fraternisation. (Den Boer 
1995: 74)  
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The prevailing view of emerging national-liberal historiography was that 
µ(XURSHDQ¶ KLVWRU\ KDG EHJXQ ZLWK WKH GHPLVH RI WKH 5RPDQ (PSLUH DQG WKDW WKH
DQFHVWRUVRIPRGHUQQDWLRQVKDGEHHQERUQRXWRIWKHVXEVHTXHQWµ'DUN$JHV¶$VZH
have seen (above, Section 3.4.3), it also praised the Germanic tribes as the originators 
of European freedom and democracy.  
However, in his bestselling History of Greece the British banker, liberal and 
historian George Grote (1794-1871) introduced the idea that properly European 
political history had begun not with Germanic, but with Greek GHPRFUDF\³*URWHZDV
the first to point out the political significance of Athens as the cradle of democracy. 
>«@ ,W ZDV HPSKDVLVHG WKDW WKH highest achievement of the Greeks was to have 
established political freedom in a type of democracy which had for centuries been 
XQVXUSDVVHG´GHQ%RHU 
'HQ %RHU DUJXHV WKDW µ(XURSH¶ QRZ KDG FRPH IXOO FLUFOH +DYLQJ EHJXQ DV D
Greek geographical LQGLFDWRU LWKDGEHHQVXEVXPHGE\µ&KULVWHQGRP¶ZKLFKLQ WXUQ
had been replaced by a notion of European civilisation encompassing ancient Greek 
and Roman as well as medieval Christian and uniquely modern ideas. As the call for 
democratisation grew louder in the course of the nineteenth century, the national-
OLEHUDOFRQFHSWRIµ(XURSH¶UHWXUQHGWRLWV*UHHNURRWVZKRVHGHPRFUDF\ZDVQRZIRU
WKH ILUVW WLPH JORULILHG RQ D SDU ZLWK RWKHU *UHHN DFKLHYHPHQWV :LWK *URWH¶V
contribution, the national-liberal discourse on Europe was complete. European history 
was the story of the progress of freedom, diversity, prosperity and democracy, now 
realised in the framework of the modern polis, the nation-state. (For more on 
particularist-descending ideology, see below, Section 3.8.3.)  
However, at the same time the ground was being prepared for the twentieth-
century Christian-democratic discourse on Europe. Catholicism and the Roman Church 
were becoming transnationalised and Europeanised, with Pope Pius IX (1846-78) as 
the driving force (Kaiser 2007: 12). Pius used the Catholic revival after Napoleon to 
encourage ultramontanist tendencies, streamline religious practice, centralise the 
formulation of doctrine, and to strengthen and increasingly control the bureaucracy and 
hierarchy of the Church. Centralisation was also assisted by religious orders, notably 
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the Jesuits, whose society had been refounded in 1814. In 1870 these trends came 
together when a general church council, Vatican I, adopted a decree declaring the Pope 
to be infallible when speaking in an especially solemn form (ex cathedra). Thence until 
Vatican II (1962-65), ultramontanist, universalist philosophy ± called papism by its 
detractors ± dominated official Catholic doctrine.  
Ironically, Piedmontese troops shortly afterwards invaded and stripped the Pope 
of his temporal sovereignty over Rome, which was declared capital of united Italy. A 
ODZDGRSWHGE\WKHQHZ,WDOLDQSDUOLDPHQWOLPLWHGWKH3RSH¶VWHPSRUDOVRYHUHLJQW\WR
the tiny Vatican territory (he also kept the Lateran palace and the country retreat Castel 
Gandolfo). In Italy proper, church and state were separated. Pius from now on 
considered himself a prisoner, and forbade Catholics to vote or stand in Italian 
elections. The Church only came to terms with the secular Italian state in 1929, when it 
signed a concordat with the government of Mussolini. The law of 1870 however also 
gave the Pope the right to appoint all Italian bishops, which hugely increased his 
control of the Italian Church (Duffy 1997: 302).  
In Germany too Catholics clashed with centralising national authority. The 
Catholic Centre Party, established in 1870, protested the exclusion of Austria from the 
new German Empire, which was thus predominantly Protestant. In what became 
NQRZQDVµWKHVWUXJJOHRYHUFXOWXUH¶Kulturkampf), Bismarck in conjunction with the 
National Liberal Party sanctioned the German Catholic Church and the Centre Party 
for their transnational loyalties. This effort to reinforce Prussian and Protestant 
hegemony in the German Reich added significantly to the already critical Church 
attitude to nationalism and the nation-state. However, it also stoked fears among 
politically aware Catholics that they would be seen as insufficiently national-minded 
and that transnational party co-operation would be perceived as an unpatriotic and 
GDQJHURXVµEODFNLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶.DLVHU7KHVDPHIHDUFDXVHGD&DWKROLF
nationalist over-compensation in late nineteenth century France, as expressed notably 
in the Dreyfus affair between 1894 and 1900 (Thorsen 2008: 27).  
In his 1891 encyclical Rerum novarum, Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) committed 
the Church to the social and educational advancement of Catholic workers. Catholic 
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trade unions established a transnational network already in 1908, whereas Catholic 
parties did so only after World War I (Kaiser 2007: 25). Even this happened without 
Church support, as the new secretariat in Zürich was inter-confessional, including also 
Protestant trade unions. 
Pope Leo FRQWLQXHGKLVSUHGHFHVVRU¶VSROLF\RIFKXUFKFHQWUDOLVDWLRQDQGSDSDO
absolutism, reinforcing the spiritual stature of the Papacy even as its temporal basis 
disappeared. Generally, however, the Papacy and therefore most of the Catholic 
establishment everywhere remained politically conservative, opposing liberalism, 
socialism and communism. Papal ultramontanism stigmatised liberal and radical 
Catholics inside the Church and inflamed the latent anti-Catholicism among 
Protestants. National integration in Europe was generally achieved against Catholic 
opposition. E.g. the Dutch Catholics, representing about a third of the population, 
ZKHUHORQJNQRZQDPRQJ3URWHVWDQWVDVWKHµ6SDQLVK-5RPDQSDUW\¶7KXVLQFRQWUDVW
to what happened in the Church itself, nationalist pressures and the minority status of 
Catholics in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland prevented any 
transnationalisation of political Catholicism and Catholic parties. Besides, after the 
loss to Germany of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, French Catholics became virulently 
nationalistic and anti-German. Potential European party co-operation was also 
hampered by the fact that neither Italy nor France had a Catholic party until after the 
Great War (Kaiser 2007: 27-36).  
The outbreak of World War I however caused the Holy See to reconsider its 
attitude to transnational Catholic party networking. Pope Benedict XV (1914-22) from 
his first pronouncements in September 1914 consistently condemned the war. In the 
supranational Roman Catholic perspective, the war appeared as a family feud that 
WKUHDWHQHG WR EULQJ GRZQ QRW RQO\ WKH 3DSDF\¶V SULPH WHPSRUDO DOO\ LQ (XURSH WKH
Habsburg monarchy of Austria-Hungary, but also European-cum-Christian civilisation 
in general (Kaiser 2007: 40). In the hope of advancing peace and understanding, the 
Vatican strongly encouraged the first transnational meeting of German, Austro-
Hungarian, Italian and French Catholic politicians. The International Catholic Union 
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(ICU) was launched in Switzerland in February 1917, but met only once again, in 
January 1918, before the armistice made it irrelevant.  
0XFKGXH WR WKHHQWUHQFKPHQWRIFRPPXQLVPLQ5XVVLDDQG6WDOLQ¶VUHSUHVVLYH
regime, from the late 1920s the Catholic Church became increasingly associated with 
right-wing authoritarianism. ,WZDVWKH9DWLFDQ¶VDFFRUGZLWK+LWOHULQWKDWXQGLG
the German Centre Party, just as its concordat with Mussolini in 1929 had destroyed 
the pro-&DWKROLF 3DUWLWR 3RSXODUH G¶,WDOLD 33, 0RVW ,WDOLDQ FOHUJ\ HQFRXUDJHG
Catholics to vote Fascist, and in Germany the Centre Party helped Hitler come to 
power before it was outlawed. The tolerance shown by Pope Pius XI (1922-1939) 
towards emerging fascism, just as the social reforms he advocated in his encyclical 
Quadragisimo anno of 1931 and his encouragement of Franco-German reconciliation, 
was informed by his abhorrence of atheist communism and socialism. Moreover, the 
9DWLFDQ¶VPDMRUSUHRFFXSDWLRQZDVWRVHFXUHDOHJDOEDVLVIRUWKH&KXUFKZKDWHYHUWKH
regime (Duffy 1997: 341).  
But Pius had no illusions about the anti-Christian nature of Nazism. In 1937 he 
issued the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge LQZKLFK KH ³GHQRXQFHG WKH µLGRODWURXV
FXOW¶ WKDW UHSODFHG EHOLHI LQ WKH WUXH*RGZLWK D µQDWLRQDO UHOLJLRQ¶ DQG WKH µP\WKRI
UDFHDQGEORRG¶+HFRQWUDVWHG this perverted ideology with the teaching of the Church 
LQZKLFK WKHUHZDV DKRPH µIRU DOO SHRSOHV DQGDOO QDWLRQV¶´ LQFOXGLQJ -HZV 'XII\
1997: 344). Beginning in 1929, a number of German Catholic bishops denounced the 
1DWLRQDO6RFLDOLVWSDUW\¶VUDFLDOand religious teachings. 
After World War II, continued anti-communism made Pope Pius XII (1939-1958) 
pour money into the 1949 election campaign of the newly (re)founded Christian 
Democratic party of Italy. The post-war Roman Church remained persistently critical 
of nationalism, materialism and capitalism. However, eventually it came to accept the 
modern state, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In the encyclical Mater et 
Magistra, Pope John I (1958-³EURNHZLWK9DWLFDQVXVSLFLRQRI OXUNLQJVRFLalism 
E\ZHOFRPLQJ WKHDGYHQWRI WKHFDULQJVWDWH´'XII\7KHVHFRQGJHQHUDO
council of the Church, Vatican II (1962-ZDV³WKHPRVWUHYROXWLRQDU\&RXQFLOHYHU
VLQFH WKH 5HIRUPDWLRQ´ DQG ³FRPSOHWHO\ RYHUWXUQHG´ HDUOLHU GHQXQFLDWLRQV RI WKH
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µ0RGHUQ:RUOG¶LELG,QDQRWKHUKLVWRULFDOPRYH3RSH3DXO9,-78) 
together with Patriarch Athenagoras in 1964 lifted the mutual excommunication of the 
Latin and Greek Churches dating from 1054. The advent of the modern and 
charismatic, but still very much universalist-descending Papacy was confirmed by the 
long reign of John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla; 1978-2006), the first non-Italian Pope since 
1522.   
(YHQLIWKH9DWLFDQ¶VSHUVSHFWLYHKDVEHFRPHHYHUPRUHJOREDOSRVW-war Popes 
have not concealed their conviction that Europe should unite and close ranks behind 
European-Christian values. Pius XII vocally supported post-war efforts towards 
European federation (de Molènes 1971: 343-4). Kaiser notes that the Church broadly 
backed Europe integration and thus helped legitimise the policy of Franco-German 
reconciliation in the immediate post-war years. In June 1950, the French cardinals and 
bishops called upon all Catholics to work for European integration (Kaiser 2007: 180-
181). In the apostolic exhortation Ecclesia in Europa of 28 June 2003, Pope John Paul 
II extensively restated the attitude of the Catholic Church to Europe. Paragraph 26 is 
particularly relevant in this regard: 
The Church's concern for Europe is born of her very nature and mission. Down 
the centuries the Church has been closely linked to our continent, so that Europe's 
spiritual face gradually took shape thanks to the efforts of great missionaries, the 
witness of saints and martyrs, and the tireless efforts of monks and nuns, men and 
women religious and pastors. From the biblical conception of man Europe drew 
the best of its humanistic culture, found inspiration for its artistic and intellectual 
creations, created systems of law and, not least, advanced the dignity of the 
person as a subject of inalienable rights. The Church, as the bearer of the Gospel, 
thus helped to spread and consolidate those values which have made European 
culture universal. With all this in mind, the Church of today, with a renewed 
sense of responsibility, is conscious of the urgency of not squandering this 
precious patrimony and of helping Europe to build herself by revitalizing her 
original Christian roots (John Paul II 2003; emphasis in original) 
We will revisit the crucial role of transnational Christian democracy in advancing 
Europeanist-ascending ideology and forging post-war European integration in Section 
3.8.4 and, in more detail, in Part 4 below. Now I will turn to the rise and decline of 
particularist-descending ideology, propounded most notably by absolutist France and 
  227 
Protestant Prussia. In France, the descending part of the equation was most prominent, 
whereas in Prussian-dominated Germany particularism prevailed. 
3.8.2 Particularist-descending ideology 
As we have just seen, medieval notions of Christendom survived to influence the 
modern European debate over the scope of sovereignty. However, as the acceptance of 
the territorial and eventually the national state grew, the locus of sovereignty became 
the overshadowing political issue of modernity. In Aristotelian terms, state-building 
rulers and their apologists tended to favour monarchy (on the Continent) or aristocracy 
(in Britain), whereas liberals and radicals advocated democratisation. Particularist-
descending discourse came WR GHIHQG DEVROXWLVP LQ GRPHVWLF DQG µ5HDOLVP¶ LQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDODIIDLUV µ5HDVRQRIVWDWH¶ WKHNH\ORJLF LQERWKUHVSHFWVZDVDUWLFXODWHG
notably by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) 
in the context of the city-state rivalry of Renaissance Italy. Guicciardini pioneered the 
associated, Realist notion of balance of power too.  
Particularism grew as embattled Protestants after the Reformation increasingly 
came to imagine themselves as the Chosen People of ancient Israel (Hale 1993: 98; 
Smith 2003). Dutch and English Protestants embraced the concept of balance of power 
to protect the independence of their states, their faith and their commercial interests 
against imperialist Spanish Habsburg and French Bourbon encroachment. Thus, as we 
have seen, the balance of power doctrine became closely associated with the Protestant 
FDXVH DQG LWV FU\ IRU µWKH OLEHUWLHV RI (XURSH¶ ,Q HIIHFW WKLVZDV D FU\ IRU QDWLRQDO
sovereignty against Roman-Catholic universalism and imperialism as represented by 
the Pope, the Emperor and, to some extent at least, the Most Christian French king. As 
time passed and the balance shifted, any government which found itself on the 
defensive, whether Protestant or Catholic, would inevitably take up the advocacy of 
(XURSHDQ µHTXLOLEULXP¶ RU µUHSRVH¶ DQG RI WKH µOLEHUWLHV RI (XURSH¶ DV WKH EHVW
guarantee for their political, economic and religious self-determination. Thus 
particularistic discourse advanced towards hegemony. 
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The prime institutional vanguard of particularist-descending praxis (as opposed 
to the universalist-descending tendencies of its discourse; see above) was sixteenth to 
eighteenth century France, notably during the reigns of First Minister, Cardinal 
Richelieu (1624-42) and King Louis XIV (1661-1715).  
When the religious upheavals struck France, they became mixed up with the 
regionalism of the nobility and resulted in a savage civil war (1562 -1598). The central 
government almost collapsed, but the monarchy eventually survived with Gallican 
Catholicism as a bedrock of central power. However, according to Leah Greenfeld, the 
Reformation  
dealt an irreparable blow to the Catholic self-image of the country. French 
Catholicism grew more and more idiosyncratic for centuries, and the kings, while 
flaunting the title of rex christianissimus, did everything possible to separate 
themselves from the Universal Church and its head in Rome. Yet this determined 
decatholisation was never made explicit; if anything it was the Pope who was 
accused of being not Catholic enough. (Greenfeld 1992: 106) 
French particularism was advanced by the secularised pragmatism that resulted 
from the religious and civil struggles. It was further stimulated by the menace 
represented by the growing power of Habsburg Spain. To restore peace and order in 
France and to resist Habsburg universal monarchy, pragmatic Huguenot and Catholic 
politiques sought to build a feeling of joint Frenchness to replace the now divided 
Christian identity. The Huguenot leader, Henry of Navarre, converted to Catholicism 
to become king as Henry IV (1594-1610). He was the first of the centralising, Bourbon 
OLQHRINLQJV WKDW ODVWHGXQWLO WKH)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQ+HQU\FDOOHGRQKLVSHRSOH³DV
)UHQFKPHQ´WROLYHLQSHDFH³QRWEHFDXVHWKH\DUHRIWKH)DLWKEXWLnasmuch as they 
KDYHEHHQOR\DOVHUYDQWVWRPHDQGWRWKH)UHQFKFURZQ´TXRWHGE\*UHHQIHOG
107). In 1598 he issued the Edict of Nantes, which gave individual and territorial rights 
to Protestants, thus recognising them as good Frenchmen. 
Theoretically, the way for Henry IV had been prepared by the jurist and political 
philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-1596), who was a Huguenot politique too. In his Six 
livres de la republique (1576), Bodin developed the theory of absolute and indivisible 
political sovereignty, based on the Roman notion of summum imperium (Keene 2005: 
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103; see also above, page 114+HGHILQHGVRYHUHLJQW\DV³WKHDEVROXWHDQGSHUSHWXDO
SRZHUYHVWHGLQDFRPPRQZHDOWK´DUJXLQJWKDWDOHJLWLPDWHUXOHUPD\QRWEHUHVLsted, 
as he is ab solutus ± above positive law (but still subject to divine and natural law). 
Pierre de Belloy in his 'HO¶DXWRULWpGXURL (1588) added the theory of Divine Right, 
WKXVXOWLPDWHO\DGYDQFLQJ³WKHGHLILFDWLRQRIWKH)UHQFKSROLW\´*UHHQIHOG1992: 111). 
$W+HQU\,9¶VEHKHVW3LHUUH3LWKRXIRUKLVSDUWZURWHDGHIHQFHRI WKHOLEHUW\RI WKH
Gallican Church vis-à-vis Rome. The Catholic politique Richelieu in turn implemented 
WKLVSURJUDPPH IRU ³WKH VXEVWLWXWLRQRI WKHZRUOGO\ DOOHJLDQFH IRU WKH Wranscendental 
(and of the earthly patrie IRU WKH FHOHVWLDO´ *UHHQIHOG  5LFKHOLHX¶V UXOH
was symbolic of the alliance of throne and altar that since Capetian times had been the 
mainstay of political stability in France but had been rocked by the Reformation (le 
Goff 2005: 73).  
,QFLGHQWDOO\WRZDUGVWKHHQGRIWKH7KLUW\<HDUV¶:DUWKH)LUVW0LQLVWHURI+HQU\
IV, the Huguenot Duke of Sully (Maximile de Béthune; 1560-1641), produced 
DUJXDEO\WKHILUVWµPRGHUQ¶VFKHPHIRU(XURSHDQIHGHUDWLRQ,WZas modern in the sense 
that it envisaged a voluntary union of sovereign and equal states to avoid war and 
promote joint prosperity, based on fixed borders, intergovernmental deliberation, 
EDODQFHRISRZHUUHOLJLRXVWROHUDWLRQDQGIUHHWUDGH6XOO\¶Vgrand dessein may have 
EHHQ D ³SODQ IRU WKH ZHDNHQLQJ RI WKH +DEVEXUJV DQG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI )UHQFK
KHJHPRQ\ LQ (XURSH´ +HDWHU   EXW PXFK RI WKH WHUPLQRORJ\ UHPDLQHG
traditional. Sully termed the union a Christian commonwealth (respublica christiana), 
DQG WKH LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO ERG\ WKDW VKRXOG JXLGH LW ³WKH9HU\&KULVWLDQ&RXQFLO RI
(XURSH´0RUHRYHUKHH[FOXGHGµ$VLDWLF¶0XVFRY\IURPWKH(XURSHDQIHGHUDWLRQKH
envisaged (Hale 1993: 140). The core should be Protestant Europe, but Sully envisaged 
a reorganisation of all of Europe as the ultimate goal. The Council would meet in 
GHVLJQDWHG FLWLHV LQ µ/RWKDULQJLDQ¶ (XURSH FORVH WR WKH5KLQH GH5RXJHPRQW 
100-101). 
As we have seen, the universalist, Catholic-Carolingian tradition remained 
influential in France. This may have encouraged the cosmopolitanism that 
FKDUDFWHULVHG DVVLPDWLRQDOLVW )UHQFK FRORQLDO SROLFLHV µFLYLOLVLQJ¶ QDWLYHV LQWR JRRG
 230 
 
 
French citizens) as well as the French Enlightenment and Revolution. The French and 
Catholic concept of national identity and citizenship remained open and inclusivist, 
whereas that of Lutheran states, and notably Prussia, became closed and exclusivist 
VHH EHORZ 0RUHRYHU /RXLV ;,9¶V µDEVROXWLVP¶ ZDV ³SUHVFULEHG E\ QXPHURXV
restrictions and obstacles rooted in the multiplicity of customary rights, legal systems, 
DQG VR RQ WKDW WKHPRVDLF QDWXUH RI KLV GRPLQLRQV KDG NHSW LQ SODFH IRU FHQWXULHV´
(Muldoon 1999: 63).  
As Muldoon furthermore points out, the late medieval and early modern 
µWHUULWRULDOVWDWHV¶ZHre in effect empires struggling among themselves to become states 
in the European context while they at the same time were turning into global empires. 
Pagden concurs that the nineteenth century Great Powers were empires both due to 
their overseas possessions and to their still composite, or cosmopolitan, domestic 
QDWXUH,QGHHGWKH\KDG³FUHDWHGLQWKHVKDGRZRIDQDQFLHQWDQGPHGLHYDOOHJDF\RI
XQLYHUVDOLVPRIDSUHVXPHGULJKWRIORUGVKLSRYHUWKHHQWLUHZRUOG´3DJGHQ
Pagden views Queen VictoULD¶VFRURQDWLRQDV(PSUHVVRI,QGLD LQDV³WKHPRVW
fully elaborated attempt the modern world has ever witnessed to recreate the ancient 
Roman imperium´LELG 
I therefore submit that in the formation of modern particularist-descending, 
nationalist ideology, Lutheranism was a more significant influence than French 
absolutism and patriotism. Although religiously individualist, the submissive attitude 
to temporal authority advocated by Luther encouraged authoritarian, top-down 
governance. Martin Wight (1991: 245) indeed classifies Luther morally as a Realist, 
and Cargill Thompson (1966: 43) notes that his view of government has much in 
common with that of Hobbes.  
An Augustinian monk who lived all his life in what is today northeastern 
Germany, Martin Luther (1483-WKRXJKWWKDW³PHQZHUHMXVWLILHGE\*RG¶VJUDFH
alone and that all that was necessary was to have faith in the saving power of His 
PHUF\´&DUJLOO7KRPSVRQ:KDWPDWWHUVLVWKHP\VWLFDOXQLRQEHWZHHQPDQ
and God; the Pope or his clergy have no role to play as intermediaries. Thus Protestants 
ZHUH IUHHG IURP ³WKH &DWKROLF ZRPE RI JUDQG FHUHPRQ\ KLVWRULFDO WUDGLWLRQ DQG
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VDFUDPHQWDODXWKRULW\´7DUQDV:KHUHDV&DWKROLFVFRQWLQXHGWREHWROGDV
Montaigne put it, thaW³LW LVQRWE\UHDVRQLQJRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWZHKDYHUHFHLYHG
RXUUHOLJLRQLWLVE\DXWKRULW\DQGFRPPDQGIURPDERYH´TXRWHGE\.HQQ\
/XWKHU DGYRFDWHG ³WKH GRFWULQH RI WKH 3ULHVWKRRG RI $OO %HOLHYHUV - the belief that 
there was no essentiaO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SULHVWV DQG OD\PHQ´ &DUJLOO 7KRPSVRQ
1966: 36). Catholics continued to belong to a supranational Church and owe loyalty to 
its universal leader, the Pope, whereas Luther decreed that the Bible ± and thus 
XOWLPDWHO\ RQH¶V RZQ LQWHUSUHtation of it ± was the one and only source of Christian 
truth.  
However, their liberation from Rome also exposed Protestants more to the 
influence of temporal powers-holders. In Lutheran and Anglican Europe, the religious 
sphere was absorbed by the state aV VHFXODU SULQFHV EHFDPH JXDUGLDQV RI µVWDWH¶
FKXUFKHV $FFRUGLQJ WR &DUJLOO 7KRPSVRQ D VWDWH FKXUFK ZDV QRW /XWKHU¶V RULJLQDO
intent, but it followed from his view that government was both a consequence of the 
sinfulness of human nature and a divine instLWXWLRQ ³)RU /XWKHU SULQFHV DQG
PDJLVWUDWHV DUH LQ D OLWHUDO VHQVH*RG¶V µLQVWUXPHQWV¶´ &DUJLOO7KRPSVRQ
Rebellion had to be resisted at all cost. Although Luther himself would most likely 
KDYH UHMHFWHG DQ\ ZRUVKLS RI WKH VWDWH PDQ\ µQHR-ConsWDQWLQLVW¶ /XWKHUDQV
particularly in future Prussia, came to see the state as a quasi-sacred institution.  
Renée Rémond argues that also internal church organisation and majority or 
minority status within the state had a significant impact on the political thought of the 
different Christian denominations:  
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7KHSULQFLSOHRIWKHFKXUFKHV¶LQWHUQDORUJDQLVDWLRQZDVDIXUWKHUGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJ
factor, depending on whether it was rather hierarchical or made room for a 
certain democratic expression. As well as leading to a conception of the 
organisation of civil society, the type of discipline shaped behaviours, created 
customs, moulded sensibilities. In this regard Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism 
and Lutheranism, which all preserved the episcopal hierarchy, differed 
profoundly from the Presbyterian denominations, Calvinist or Scottish, whose 
IXQFWLRQLQJUHOLHVRQWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHLUIROORZHUVLQWKHIDLWK¶V
administration. The first group were more naturally disposed to accept all higher 
authority and to show it reverence and submission; the second, who practiced 
collective deliberation, were predisposed to accept democratic operation, and 
more likely to challenge the decisions of authority. To that difference must be 
added their relative situation within the state, according to whether they were 
associated with the ruling power and enjoyed a privileged position or, if in 
minority, whether they were persecuted or merely tolerated. Thus the Church of 
England had close links with the crown and its sympathies lay with the Tories, 
whereas the Whigs, Radicals and, later, Labour always recruited from the 
dissenters, among the Methodists or Baptists. (Rémond 1999: 24) 
$FFRUGLQJ WR'XII\/XWKHU¶VVXFFHVVIXOSURWHVWUHIOHFWHGLQSDUWDQDQWL-Roman 
tradition in the GermaQ ODQGV ³IXHOOHG E\ PHPRULHV RI WKH VWUXJJOH RI )UHGHULFN
Barbarossa with the twelfth-century Papacy, by the ideas of the Conciliar movement, 
by the example of the Hussite schism in Bohemia, and by the financial and 
jurisdictional demands of the Papacy in *HUPDQ\´'XII\ 
+RZHYHU WKHZRUG µQDWLRQ¶ UHWDLQHG LWVPHGLHYDOQRQ-national meaning until at 
least the seventeenth century. Before that it was hardly ever used to refer to all 
inhabitants of a country, but rather signified the estates that KHOGSROLWLFDOSRZHU³:H
DUHQRWGHDOLQJKHUHZLWKµSHRSOH¶VQDWLRQV¶EXWZLWKQDWLRQVRIDULVWRFUDF\´6FKXO]H
1994: 104). Particularist-descending nationalism emerged in Germany, notably among 
Lutheran and Prussian Germans, only in the nineteenth century. The reasons then were 
many: nationalism was a reaction to the rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the 
(QOLJKWHQPHQW DQG WR )UHQFK RFFXSDWLRQ *HUPDQ\¶V ORQJ H[SHULHQFH DV KHOSOHVV
battlefield for the Great Powers encouraged a unifying sense of being a victim of dark 
foreign forces; the German mystic tradition played a role; so did the success of France 
as model, invader and rival; industrialisation gave Germany the means to project power 
and at the same time encouraged or required national integration; and so on.  
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Significant was also the establishment of the humanities, notably philology and 
historiography, as university disciplines, first at Göttingen. Building on the humanism 
of the Renaissance, Gianbattista Vico (1668-1744), often seen as the first ethnologist, 
had argued that human nature was not universal, but a product of historical, 
geographical and social context, and particularly language. French philosophes such as 
Montesquieu, Pascal, Bayle and Rousseau took up his argument, but it was most 
systematically advanced by the German scholar Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-
,Q*HUPDQ\+HUGHUKDGEHHQSUHFHGHGE\WKHµSUH-URPDQWLF¶LQWHOOHFWXDOVRIWKH 
Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) movement, such as Möser, Klopstock and 
Wieland, who from tKHV³UDOOLHGWRWKHGHIHQFHRI*HUPDQFXOWXUH´+DKQ
60). This contributed to a new interest in old Germanic literature and mythology and to 
the foundation of Germanistik, German studies. Folktales and ballads of all types were 
collected and preserved, and an imagined Germanic past, not least the struggle against 
the Roman imperialists, eulogised. The epic Niebelungenlied, rediscovered in 1748 and 
ODWHUGUDPDWLVHGLQ5LFKDUG:DJQHU¶VRSHUD-76), soon became the national poem 
RI*HUPDQ\³DVVociated with a pugnacious anti-Western attitude, advocating a return 
to Germanic barbarism and to pre-&KULVWLDQWUDGLWLRQV´+DKQ 
The human sciences in Germany were dominated by Protestant scholars 
preoccupied with the genealogy of the German nDWLRQ 7DFLWXV¶ Germania, 
rediscovered by the humanists about 1500, was embraced as incontrovertible evidence 
of German ancestry and freedom-loving greatness (as discussed above, Section 3.7.2). 
At the same time, in a nationalist parallel to the Catholic Romantic medievalism of de 
Maistre, Novalis and Chateaubriand (see previous section), the new, mainly Lutheran 
historians embraced the medieval Holy Roman Empire as a model of glory and power 
for the new Reich WKH\LPDJLQHG³*HUPDQ\¶VIXWXUHWKHQZDVWREHIRXQGLQKHUSDVW
in the middle ages. [....] The history of the German middle ages became something like 
DQDWLRQDOREVHVVLRQ´6FKXO]H,QKLVHistory of the German Imperial 
Age (1855), Wilhelm Giesebricht ZURWHWKDWWKHDJHRIWKHPHGLHYDOHPSHURUVZDV³WKH
period during which our nation, strong in its unity, enjoyed its greatest power and 
influence, not only governing its own destiny, but also holding sway over other 
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nations: it was an age when the German counted for most in the world, and an age 
ZKHQ WKH*HUPDQ QDPH KDG WKH VWHUQHVW ULQJ WR LW´ TXRWHG E\ 6FKXO]H  
Historians like him thought that the early medieval period had been a Germanic, or 
µ*RWKLF¶JROGHQDJH 
In a parallel and related development, a significant revival of pietism affected 
Germany between about 1740 and 1780. Modern German pietism had been founded a 
century earlier by Philipp Jacob Spener, who drew on a mysticist tradition originating 
in the fifteenth century if not earlier. Moreover, as we have seen (above, Section 
3.4.2:LQFNHOPDQQ¶VµGLVFRYHU\¶RIWKH*UHHNVLQWKHVOHGWRDQDVVXPSWLRQRID
QDWXUDO DIILQLW\ EHWZHHQ DQFLHQW *UHHNV DQGPRGHUQ*HUPDQV ³+DG QRW WKH*UHHNV
and Romans been in classical times what the Germans and the French now were? Had 
not then, as now, an overbearing and powerful state dominated the West ± rational, 
HIILFLHQWO\JRYHUQHGDQGRUJDQLVHGFLYLOLVHGEXWODFNLQJWUXHFXOWXUHDQGVSLULWXDOLW\"´
(Schulze 1994:  6FKXO]H LELG DGGV WKDW ³LWZDV QRPHUH FKDQFH WKDW WKH ILUVW
PDMRU*HUPDQQDWLRQDOPRQXPHQWWKHµ9DOKDOOD¶QHDU5HJHQVEXUJZDVFRQVWUXFWHGLQ 
VSLWHRILWVQHEXORXV1RUGLFQDPHLQWKHVKDSHRIWKH$WKHQLDQ3DUWKHQRQ´ 
Such and other impulses came together in German national romanticism and 
historicism. Inspired by Rousseau, Herder argued that language and cultural traditions 
created and defined the Volk, or nation, as the most fundamental unit of human society. 
Polities not corresponding to a Volk, like the European empires of the day, were 
artificial creations.  
However, although both Rousseau and Herder were pioneers of a nationalist-
romanticist-historicist reaction against Enlightenment rationalism, they formulated two 
fundamentally different conceptions of nationhood (Brubaker 1992). That of Rousseau 
was informed by the Roman law tradition of jus soli (right of the soil) and destined to 
be accepted by most modern liberals and by France and the United States (and Canada, 
Australia, Argentina, Romania etc.) in their citizenship laws (EB 2007e). Jus soli 
means that individuals acquire the citizenship of the territory where they are born or 
naturalised, regardless of ancestral citizenship. The citizenship law adopted by the 
post-revolutionary French republic, inspired by Rousseau and Ernest Rénan, was 
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essentially civic, based on the notion of the people as a political unit made up of 
citizens who freely accept a common constitution. Even the natives of the French 
colonies became French citizens and could sit in the French National Assembly. As 
early as the seventeenth century, First Minister &ROEHUW¶V-1683) explicit goal for 
the first French colonies had been to create a single, cultural as well as legal 
community with France (Pagden 1995: 149). This reflected the French universalist 
tradition and its historic antecedents. 
%\ FRQWUDVW +HUGHU¶V DQG ODWHU )LFKWH¶V VHH EHORZ FRQFHSWLRQ ZDV RUJDQLF
based on history, tradition and culture, expressed essentially in language. Its legal 
expression is the jus sanguinis (right of blood) tradition. Jus sanguinis means that to 
obtain nationality or citizenship of a state, individuals must have an ancestor who is or 
was a citizen or national of that state (even if living as ethnic minorities abroad, like 
the Volga Germans or the Banat Hungarians). The German Reich established in 1871 
adopted the Prussian citizenship law that was based on jus sanguinis. This principle 
continues to inform German nationality law, although elements of jus soli were 
introduced in 2000. Brubaker (1992) calls the French notion of citizenship political and 
assimationalist, and the German conception ethnocultural and differentialist. Other 
terms often used are civic vs. ethnic, subjective vs. objective, and non-essentialist vs. 
essentialist national identity (see e.g. the discussion in Sicakkan 2006: 129-159). 
Gollwitzer (1951: 211) contrasts the related concepts of popular sovereignty and 
popular integrity (Volkssouveränität vs. Volksintegrität).  
However, as Schulze (1994: 156-158) points out, the probably most important 
reason for the conceptual difference between what he calls respectively the political 
view of the French Revolution and the cultural view of German Romanticism was that 
a French state, around which the nation could rally, already existed when nationalism 
emerged. It had not yet appeared in Germany and the rest of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Here, nationalism therefore had to be linguistic and ethnocultural first and 
political later. 
In any case, Napoleonic occupation encouraged a non-political German 
nationalism hailing the unique virtues and mission of the German nation. Initially, 
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German national feeling as espoused by Herder, Fichte and many others was national-
liberal, but it would later be co-opted by authoritarian Prussia when German 
unification was deemed favourable to its goals. In his famous Addresses to the German 
nation (1806), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) argued that the mission of the 
Germans was to regenerate European culture and morality (Hahn 1995: 69). Fichte 
thus was able to reconcile Enlightenment Europeanness with emerging German 
QDWLRQDO URPDQWLFLVP ³:KLFK LV WKHQ WKH IDWKHUODQG RI WKH WUXO\ HGXFDWHG&KULVWLDQ
European? Generally, it is Europe. In particular, it is the European state that at any 
WLPHLVPRVWFXOWXUHG´TXRWHGE\*ROOZLW]HU,QVSLUHGE\+HUGHUDVZHOODV
5RXVVHDXLQ*ROOZLW]HU¶VIRUPXODWLRQ)LFKWH 
identified the Germans with the Urvolk or Normalvolk; he spoke of the unique 
originality and authenticity of the German language family and assumed from its 
spiritual purity a singular political creativeness; he praised the Germans as 
liberators from the oppression by ancient imperial and papal Rome. He 
FKDUDFWHULVHV*HUPDQ\DVWKH(XURSHDQSHDFHHPSLUHWKHµLQFDUQDWLRn of the 
ZKROHRI&KULVWLDQ(XURSHRQDVPDOOHUVFDOH¶*ROOZLW]HU-208; my 
translation)  
$FFRUGLQJWR)LFKWHLWZDVWKXV*HUPDQ\¶VKLVWRULFDOPLVVLRQWRSLRQHHUDQGOHDG
a European federation of free peoples. 
Generally, after the French Revolution, as Schulze affirms, the idea of the nation 
has had quasi-UHOLJLRXVRYHUWRQHV³VLQFHDQDWLRQKDVQRYLVLEOHSK\VLFDOSUHVHQFHLW
has to be believed in. Nationalism is the secular faith of the industrial age. The new 
state was not sanctioned by god, bXWE\WKHQDWLRQ´6FKXO]H,Q*HUPDQ\
the religious connotations of nationalism were reinforced by the continued influence of 
Pietism. Protestant clergy and nationalist intellectuals, sometimes the same persons, 
MRLQHG IRUFHV ³>7@KH SROLWLFLVation of religion paralleled the sacralisation of politics 
DQGGLYLQHDWWULEXWHVZHUHLQFUHDVLQJO\DVFULEHGWRWKHQDWLRQ´%XUOHLJK 
Thus the one-time Lutheran minister Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) wrote: 
³/HDYHDOOWKHOLWWOHUHOLJLRQVDQGperform the great duty to the single highest, and unite 
yourselves in it to one belief high above the Pope or Luther. That is the ultimate 
religion, to hold the Fatherland more dearly than lords and princes, than father and 
PRWKHU WKDQ ZLYHV DQG FKLOGUHQ´ (quoted by Burleigh 2005: 154). All the German 
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µLGHDOLVW¶ SKLORVRSKHUVZHUH HLWKHU IRUPHU VWXGHQWV RI WKHRORJ\ ± Fichte at Jena and 
Leipzig (1780-84), Schelling and Hegel at the Tübingen seminary (1788±95) ± or the 
sons of Protestant pastors (EB 2007f). AUQGWZDVIURP5JHQWKH³UHJLRQRI/XWKHUDQ
Baltic Sea culture and the Nordic-3URWHVWDQW UHYLYDO RI WKH HLJKWHHQWK FHQWXU\´
(Gollwitzer 1951: 211; my translation).  Most of these perceived Europe as being 
fundamentally split between good and bad forces: the former represented by the 
*HUPDQLF DQG 3URWHVWDQW SDUW DQG WKH RWKHU E\ µ:HOVK¶ 5RPDQ/DWLQ)UHQFK DQG
Catholic Europe (Gollwitzer 1951: 213). Due not only to her history, but also to her 
central position, Germany was destined to lead Europe beyond the traditional power 
politics that had proved so destructive (and so detrimental to the German nation).  
Given the powerful French and British models, it was but a small step from 
German cultural nationalism to the argument that Germany needed its own national 
state to fulfil its unique world mission. The state should represent the collective, 
imagined nation (Volksintegrität); democracy, accountability and individual rights 
(Volkssouveränität) were secondary. Schleiermacher (1768-1834), often seen as the 
father of modern Protestant theology (EB 2007g), thus believed in the regenerative 
power of Volk and Staat, and gave both priority over the individual. According to 
Hahn, Hegel (1770- GHILQHG WKH *UHHN SROLV DV D ZRUN RI DUW VLQFH LW ³KDG
achieved a harmonious totality between its individual members, overcoming any 
distinctions between human beings as individuals and human beings as citizens, 
EHWZHHQ SULYDWH DQG SXEOLF PDWWHUV´ +DKQ  -70). To Hahn, Hegel was the 
most distinguished representative of the secularised Prussian brand of Protestantism, 
³ZKR LQWHUSUHWHG WKH/XWKHUDQEHOLHI LQDXWKRULW\DVXQTXHVWLRQHGREHGLHQFH WRZDUGV
WKH6WDWH´+DKQ 
Furthermore, Schulze stresses the role of Lutheran historians in the emergence of 
nineteenWKFHQWXU\*HUPDQQDWLRQDOLVP³$ZKROHJHQHUDWLRQRISROLWLFDOO\FRPPLWWHG
historians now occupied chairs in German universities: Dahlmann in Bonn, Häuser in 
Freiburg, Duncker and Treitschke in Berlin, Droysen in Jena, Sybel in Munich ± all of 
them liberaOVDQGDOORIWKHPFRQYLQFHGRI3UXVVLD¶VKLVWRULFPLVVLRQDQGWKHSHUQLFLRXV
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LQIOXHQFH RI 6RXWK*HUPDQ µDQWL-QDWLRQDO¶&DWKROLFLVP´7KHVH KLVWRULDQVZHUH QRZ
VKDSLQJ*HUPDQV¶LPDJHRIKLVWRU\ 
They differed from liberals in Western Europe in that they saw the state not just 
as the product of natural forces, but also as the embodiment of ethical values, 
without which culture and social morality would not be possible. And those 
values were nowhere as clearly manifested as in Prussia. [....] Droysen drew the 
conclusion that the realisation of the German national state through the agency of 
3UXVVLDZDVSDUWRIWKHµGLYLQHFRVPLFRUGHU¶6FKXO]H 
However, in the first half-FHQWXU\ DIWHU 1DSROHRQ¶V GHIHDW WKH *UHDW 3RZHUV
managed to keep the brewing nationalism in Germany and in the smaller European 
nationalities within bounds. The Napoleonic experiment in European union was 
followed by the re-establishment of the particularist-descending balance of power 
system, inaugurated by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and reconfirmed by the 
Treaties of Utrecht in 1713-14. But the Congress of Vienna in 1815 realised that the 
balance of power does not operate automatically, and introduced a much more active 
management of European affairs than had been attempted earlier. According to 
Kissinger (1994: 82), the Congress System, the classical period of which was 1815-
FDPHFORVHWRFRQVWLWXWLQJ³D(XURSHDQJRYHUQPHQW´ 
The System set the precedent, later continued by the League of Nations and 
United Nations Security Council, for an intergovernmental body with some 
supranational power to interfere in the affairs of other states. The initial members were 
Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, but already in 1818 France was readmitted as an 
equal partner. It was these five states that subsequently became known as Great 
Powers, and their diplomatic co-operation until 1914 as the Concert of Europe.  
However, both because a prime objective of the Congress System was to defend 
the restored, pre-Napoleonic order and thus absolutist monarchy (however 
enlightened), and because of its incipient federative tendencies, Britain soon began 
distancing itself. Kissinger argues that Great Britain was the Great Power least 
interested in permanent alliances and in European unity. Its main interest was 
commercial: freedom of the seas and free trade. In Europe, Britain refused to make 
long-WHUPFRPPLWPHQWVIRUDQ\WKLQJEXWWKHEDODQFHRISRZHU³7KHPRUHWKHDOOLDQFHV
  239 
approached a system of collective security and European government, the more Great 
%ULWDLQIHOWFRPSHOOHGWRGLVVRFLDWHLWVHOIIURPLW´.LVVLQJHU 
By contrast, it was the multinational, extensive Austro-Hungarian empire with its 
universalist-imperial legacy and Central European location that had the keenest interest 
in joint European governance. According to Kissinger (1994: 86), the linchpin of the 
Congress system was the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Klemens von Metternich, 
ZKRVH ³FRQVXPPDWH VNLOO ZDV LQ LQGXFLQJ WKH NH\ FRXQWULHV WR VXEPLW WKHLU
disagreemHQWV WRDVHQVHRIVKDUHGYDOXHV´0HWWHUQLFKZURWH WR:HOOLQJWRQLQ
³)RU D ORQJ WLPH QRZ (XURSH KDV KDG IRU PH WKH TXDOLW\ RI D IDWKHUODQG >patrie@´
(quoted by Kissinger 1994: 86). According to Gollwitzer (1951: 226), Metternich did 
not think in terms of a großdeutsch national state in Central Europe. Rather, in the 
Austrian-universalist-imperial tradition he envisaged a federal organisation of 
Germany and Europe. Thus Metternich, as well as a number of contemporary Austrian 
and German publicists, was pioneering Mitteleuropa ideas that would be more 
explicitly espoused by Central European intellectuals in the following century 
(Gollwitzer 1951: 230-246; see below, Section 3.8.4). 
The outbreak of bourgeois revolution and liberal nationalism in 1830 affected 
mainly France and the Low Countries. The main results were the particularist-
DVFHQGLQJµ-XO\0RQDUFK\¶LQ)UDQFH-1848) and Belgian independence from the 
1HWKHUODQGV 7KH µ6SULQJRI WKH3HRSOHV¶KDGJUHDWer long-term effects, 
notably in Germany. Here absolutist resistance by the various princes as well as 
Prussian-Austrian antagonism prevented the revolutionaries of the Paulskirche from 
achieving the national-liberal unification they sought. Still, by military prowess and the 
political ingenuity of Otto von Bismarck (prime minister of Prussia 1862-73, of 
Germany 1873-1890), over the next two decades Prussia was able to eliminate Catholic 
Austria from German politics (in 1866) and establish its own, predominantly 
Protestant, particularist-descending Reich.   
Piedmonte played a similar role in Italian unification as Prussia in the German 
case, but here an outside power, France, took a more active part. The particularist-
descending, but populist Napoleon III (elected president of France from 1848 until 
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1852, when he made himself emperor in a FRXSG¶pWDWFRQVHQWHGWRKHOS3LHGPRQWH¶V
prime minister Cavour, and ejected the Austrians from Italy in 1859. A particularist-
ascending Kingdom of Italy was declared in March 1861 with Victor Emmanuel II of 
Piedmonte as king. However, when Napoleon III took on Prussia in 1870, the French 
army was routed. The emperor resigned, and a Third French Republic was declared. 
The new German Reich was announced as a great national tULXPSKIURP/RXLV;,9¶V
Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in January 1871.  
The German unification of 1871 constituted a revolution in the European states 
system, permanently disrupting the previous relative stability. The balance of power 
was further disturbed by the growing influence of Italy (fully united after the inclusion 
of Rome in 1870), of the United States after the end of the Civil War in 1865, and of 
-DSDQDIWHUKHUGHIHDWRIWKH5XVVLDQIOHHWLQ,WZDVPDLQO\%LVPDUFN¶VSUXGHQW
foreign policy that preserved European peace in the period from 1871 to 1890. After 
his resignation, nationalist and populist forces took over (Evans 2003). Emperor 
:LOKHOP,,³LOO-starred in every respect, modelled himself on the Saxon emperor, Otto 
the Great (912-73) HPEUDFHG WKH ODWWHU¶V SROLF\ DQG UHJDUGHG WKH FODLPV RI KLV
medieval predecessor to universal authority as the justification of German imperialism 
DWWKHVWDUWRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\´6FKXO]H 
The Wilhelmine Reich, dominated by Protestant Prussia, began a frantic search 
IRUDµSODFHLQWKHVXQ¶DOORZLQJLWDSDUWLQZRUOGSROLWLFVLQFOXGLQJDFRORQLDOHPSLUH
commensurate with its self-proclaimed greatness and universalist mission. In military 
terms, this translated into a huge naval construction programme aiming at wresting 
control of the seas from Britain (which was not impossible since Germany had by now 
RYHUWDNHQ %ULWDLQ DV (XURSH¶V JUHDWHVW LQGXVWULDO SRZHU 0XOWLODWHUDO GLSORPDF\
increasingly gave way to a pursuit of national security through bilateral treaties and 
unilateral armament. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899, devoted mainly to 
disarmament, was unable to do more than state that the restriction of military budgets 
ZDV³JUHDWO\WREHGHVLUHG´$WWKHVDPHWLPHVRFLDO-darwinist, anti-semitist and racist 
ideas in general were gaining momentum, and not only in Germany. The loss to 
Germany of Alsace and Lorraine gave a great boost to French nationalism. From now 
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on, German, French, British and other nationalisms reinforced each other in a process 
that eventually spiralled out of control.  
In the subsequent course of events, the deliberate promotion of national identity 
and nationalism from above by still largely descending-locus governments was crucial. 
National historiography was sponsored by the establishment of professorships and 
institutes of history at the universities, and curricula of national history were 
introduced in the expanding basic education systems. In Germany the new Humboldt 
University in Berlin, the capital of Prussia and now also of the united Reich, became a 
centre of particularist historiography. The pioneering German historian, Leopold von 
Ranke (1795- GHFODUHG WKDW HYHU\ QDWLRQ ³KDG EHHQ HQGRZHG E\*RGZLWK LWV
own special character, and [that] the courVHRIKLVWRU\ZDVPDUNHGE\µHDFKQDWLRQ¶V
independent development of its own specific character in the manner ordained by 
*RG¶´TXRWHGE\6FKXO]H,Q)UDQFHWKH5DGLFDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLFLHVRQ
education (suppression of regional languages, compulsory education), mandatory 
military service, and control of the working classes eliminated internal dissent and 
regionalism. 
$V , KDYH LQGLFDWHG HDUOLHU WKH IDFW WKDW )UDQFH ZDV WKHPDLQ µ2WKHU¶ DJDLQVW
which German nationalism emerged and solidified, resulted in a German identification 
with the struggle of the ancient Greeks as well as the Germanic barbarians against 
Rome. Thorsen (2008: 11) notes that both the French and the German national 
GLVFRXUVHV³ZHUHPDUNHGE\DFRPPRQ WHQGHQF\ WR VDFUDOLVHQDtional politics, i.e. to 
make the nation a quasi-VDFUHG REMHFW RI FXOW´ +RZHYHU KH DOVR REVHUYHV WKDW WKH
³JRVSHOV´GLVFRXUVHVDWWDFKHGWRWKHWZRQDWLRQVLQWKHHDUO\WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\ZHUH
distinctly different. The universalistic Catholic tradition meant that the republican 
rhetoric of France advanced a civic form of nationalism, whereas the particularistic 
political inclination of Lutheranism helped ethnic nationalism predominate in 
Germany. 
$V LQ *HUPDQ\ D SHUVLVWHQW ³DEKRUUHQFH RI 5RPDQLVP´ LQ (QJland was 
intensified by historical studies (Kelley 2003: 227).  Partly due to the influence of 
German historiography and partly to anti-1DSROHRQLF UHDFWLRQ ³WKH LGHD RI WKH
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µEDUEDULDQ¶DQG*HUPDQLFRULJLQVRIWKH(QJOLVKQDWLRQ´JDLQHGLQFUHDVLQJDFFHSWDQce 
(Kelley 2003: 230). The legal historian Frederic William Maitland emphasised how 
England had resisted the reception of Roman law. For James Anthony Froude, 
³EUHDNLQJ WKH ERQGV RI 5RPH DQG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI VSLULWXDO LQGHSHQGHQFH
represented the greatHVW DFKLHYHPHQW RI (QJOLVK KLVWRU\´ .HOOH\    %\
contrast, the historian Lord Acton was an insistent critic of nationalism. As a Catholic, 
he was prevented by law from attending any English university. Acton and similarly 
minded scholars saw the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a model state due to its 
multinational and decentralised, federal nature. Twentieth-century historians like 
(UQHVW%DUNHUZKRVDLGWKDW³KLVWRU\LVDFKRLFHRIDQFHVWRUV´FDUULHGRQWKLVWUDGLWLRQ
(Kelley 2003: 247-253). 
Nations indeed largely had to be constructed retrospectively. For instance, French 
was spoken in only 15 of the 83 départements created after the Revolution. In the rest 
various forms of patois or dialects were spoken, and south of the Garonne a totally 
different language, the ODQJXH G¶RF prevailed. The situation was similar in Britain, 
Spain and Italy. At the first national Italian assembly, in 1860 in Turin, the participants 
spoke French. It took the publication in Tuscan Italian of the great historical novel by 
Alessandro Manzoni, I Promesi Sposi (The Betrothed; 1840), to achieve a 
breakthrough for a national language. 
1DWLRQDOFXOWXUHVZHUHQRWLQIDFWDV+HUGHU¶VGLVFLSOHVEHOLHYHGFROOHFWLYH
entities that had surged up spontaneously from the primeval depths of the popular 
VRXOWKH\ZHUHODUJHO\WKHZRUNRIDKDQGIXORIµUHYLYDOLVWV¶± intellectuals, poets, 
philosophers, historians and philologists ± who acted as godfathers to their 
nations, frequently in distant exile, in Paris, London or Vienna. [...] the majority 
of national languages that are now so firmly rooted in the cultural soil of Europe, 
were not standardised until the nineteenth century, dredged from the obscure 
recess of colloquial speech, cast in the mould of a grammatically standardised 
literary language, and, in some cases, largely invented. And what philologists 
could not do, the poets did for them, for it was the poets who thought they could 
detect the spirit of the nations in their epics, fairy stories and folksongs. What 
they in fact produced was an artificial kind of literature adapted in theme and 
style to the taste of a middle-class readership. (Schulze 1996: 162) 
German nationalist ideas came to inspire nationalists also in the Habsburg, 
2WWRPDQDQG5XVVLDQHPSLUHV ³+HUGHU¶VYLHZ WKDt states and constitutions mattered 
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less than culture and language, reflected the continuing disparity between states and 
peoples that obtained in Central and Eastern Europe. Herder was subsequently 
regarded by the Slavs as the prophet of their national idHQWLW\´ 6FKXO]H
But whereas in Germany and Italy the primary nationalist goal had been national unity, 
in Eastern Europe, the pursuit of national sovereignty had to be secessionist, aiming to 
destruct existing multinational polities. And indeed, in the hundred years after 1830, a 
whole belt of east European states, from Finland, through the Baltic states, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and Serbia came into existence 
by leaving the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian empires (Schulze 1996: 207).  Like 
Germany, many of these eventually obtained authoritarian and nationalist 
(particularist-descending) governments.  
In this Central and Eastern part of Europe, the patterns of conquest, settlement, 
and migration from the Middle Ages until the eighteenth century had rendered 
PXOWLQDWLRQDO WKH IRUPHUO\ LQGHSHQGHQW IHXGDO µQDWLRQV¶ OLNH WKH NLQJGRPV RI
Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland-Lithuania, as well as the empires that had swallowed 
them (Johnson 1996: 135). In the nineteenth century Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and 
Croats kindled their nationalism from the precedents of their medieval independent 
SROLWLHVZKHUHDV µXQKLVWRULFDO QDWLRQV¶ VXFK DV WKH 6ORYDNV8NUDLQLDQV5RPDQLDQV
and Slovenes had to create some kind of national awareness or autonomous cultural 
identity more or less from scratch.  
As in the West, an important part of Central European nation-building was the 
construction of national languages out of regional dialects. Johnson argues that Central 
European nations imitated the paradigm Herder and the German romantics had 
HVWDEOLVKHG ³LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR RXW-German the Germans by making their national 
WUDGLWLRQVDWOHDVWDVJORULRXVDQGFKDXYLQLVWLFDVWKRVHRIWKH*HUPDQV´-RKQVRQ
134). Hungarian nationalists resurrected the old idea of a feudal nation, the natio 
Hungarica, to legitimise the new idea of a linguistic nation as the basis for a modern 
state.  However, over half the population was not Hungarian, but German, Slovak, 
Ukrainian, Serb, Croat, etc. Because they were part of a multinational empire, 
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linguistic standardisation within the individual polities of the Habsburg empire thus 
reproduced the old problem of a dominant language on a smaller scale.   
It was no coincidence, then, that until the eighteenth century and, in some cases, 
WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ LQ DOO IRXU RI &HQWUDO (XURSH¶V KLVWRULFDO QDWLRQV 3RODQG
Hungary, Bohemia and Croatia), the literary and administrative vernacular of public 
life ± politics, government, and education ± was Latin (Johnson 1996: 137). The 
Hungarian nobility protested vigorously when in 1788 emperor (and king of Hungary) 
Joseph II issued an imperial decree that replaced Latin with German as the language of 
state administration and higher education. As the self-perceived representatives of the 
old natio Hungarica WKH\ VDZ WKLV DV D YLRODWLRQ RI WKHLU µKLVWRULFDO ULJKWV¶ DQG
successfully insisted on the restoration of Latin. Meetings of the Hungarian Diet, the 
NLQJGRP¶VSDUOLDPHQWRIQREOHVDQGOHFWXUHVDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI%XGDSHst were held 
in Latin until 1840 and 1844, respectively, when it was replaced by Magyar (Johnson 
1999: 139).  
The further fate of particularist-descending-cum-authoritarian nationalism in 
Germany and Central and Eastern Europe is well-known (but see also Section 3.8.4 
below). With some variations, it took two world wars in the twentieth century, both 
instigated by Germany, to overcome it. Due to their falling under Soviet sway, Central 
and Eastern European countries, including the eastern part of Germany, had to endure 
a Cold War too until they could institute (or reinstitute) ascending-type government. 
They were then faced with the challenge of reconciling celebration of national 
sovereignty with preparation for EU membership. They had a long tradition for 
particularism, but less for Europeanism, from whose post-war realisation the 
communist interlude moreover had insulated them. 
3.8.3 Particularist-ascending ideology 
Particularist-ascending, or national-liberal, government was pioneered by 
(QJODQG ³WKH SURWRW\SH QDWLRQ-VWDWH´ +DVWLQJV  ORQJ EHIRUH WKH )UHQFK
Revolution and the rise of mass nationalism. The crucial difference from France and 
Germany was that in Britain, the particularist and the ascending aspects of governance 
  245 
developed in parallel and tended to reinforce each other. National-liberal identity 
therefore became all the more entrenched and stable.  
%HGH¶VHLJKWKFHQWXU\Ecclesiastical History of the English People indicates that 
there was some sense of a particularist English identity already before the Norman 
invasion (Hastings 1997: 36-44; Smith 2003: 117-118). The Anglo-Saxon period laid 
important institutional bases for the relatively strong, but accountable, monarchy 
introduced by William the Conqueror and further strengthened by Henry II (1154-89). 
The Magna Carta of 1215 confirmed the willingness of the English king to share 
power with the nobility. Englishness became more pronounced in consequence of the 
thirteenth to fourteenth century wars against Wales, Scotland and France (on the 
+XQGUHG<HDUV¶:DUVHHDERYH6HFWLRQ3.7.4), the rise of English literature in the age 
of Chaucer and Shakespeare, and the use of the English language in administration and 
in the courts (Smith 2003: 118).  
However, the Henrician Reformation of the sixteenth century was the event that 
gave English national identity the crucial early boost (Greenfeld 1992: 51; Smith 2003: 
119). Adapting a central tenet of Roman law, in the 1533 Act of Appeals the House of 
CRPPRQVGHFODUHGWKDW³WKLVUHDOPHRI(QJORQGLVDQ,PSLUH´LHDVRYHUHLJQSROLW\
LQGHSHQGHQW RI ERWK WKH+RO\ 6HH DQG WKH+RO\ (PSLUH 6XEVHTXHQWO\ 3DUOLDPHQW¶V
1534 Act of Supremacy pronounced the king (Henry VIII; 1509-µ3URWHFWRUDQG
Only SuprHPH +HDG RI WKH &KXUFK DQG &OHUJ\ RI (QJODQG¶ -RKQ )R[H¶V KXJHO\
popular Book of Martyrs (1563) was particularly important in crystallising the 
Protestant English identity. In the words of Greenfeld, Foxe argued that England, like 
ancient Israel, was  
in covenant with God, had remained faithful to the true religion in the past, and 
now was leading the world in the Reformation, because it was favoured in his 
sight. Being English in fact implied being a true Christian; the English people 
was chosen, separated from others and distinguished by God; the strength and 
glory of England was the interest of His Church; and the triumph of Protestantism 
was a national triumph. (Greenfeld 1992: 62) 
By seizing the extensive monastic lands and passing them out to numerous 
followers in his Reformation, Henry VIII recreated the landed aristocracy that had been 
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seriously weakened by the 1455-85 War of the Roses. The new gentry, in Parliament 
and elsewhere, remained firm supporters of the House of Tudor and of the Church of 
England. From the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), monarchy was increasingly 
tempered by constitutionalism. The messianic impulse of the English was first 
H[SUHVVHG LQ (OL]DEHWK¶V VXSSRUW IRU1HWKHUODQGV LQGHSHQGHQFH IURP 6SDLQ DIWHU WKH
Dutch revolt of 1566. In 1588 the Spanish great Armada, the armada católica, on its 
way to invade England, was practically wiped out, partly by a great storm (the famous 
µ3URWHVWDQWZLQG¶SDUWO\E\WKHQDVFHQW(QJOLVKQDY\7KLVSURYHGDKLVWRULFDOVHWEDFN
for Habsburg attempts at re-HVWDEOLVKLQJ D &DWKROLF (XURSHDQ HPSLUH RU µXQLYHUVDO
PRQDUFK\¶ (QJODQG¶V QDWLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH ZDV SUHVHUYHG DQG WKH 3URWHVWDQW DQG
anti-papal character of English identity and constitutionalism increased. The victory 
also opened the seas for British expansion outside Europe, setting the stage for the 
growth of England into a Great Power and national-liberal model nation.  
:KDW /LQGD &ROOH\   FDOOV ³D FXOW RI 3DUOLDPHQW´ KHOSHG FHPHQW WKH
uniquely ascending aspect of English national identity. During its struggles with the 
Catholic King James I (1603-3DUOLDPHQWFHDVHGWRFDOO(QJODQGµKLV0DMHVW\¶V
UHDOP¶ LQVWHDG VSHDNLQJRI µRXUQDWLYHFRPPXQLW\¶ LQ WKH VHQVHRIDFRPPRQZHDOWK
(Greenfeld 1992: 39). The republican interlude (1642-1661), when the Puritan Oliver 
Cromwell dominated British politics, further bolstered constitutional and national 
government. When Cromwell called English warfare against the United Provinces to a 
halt, it was partly because he objected to fighting fellow Calvinists. The Protestant 
(QJOLVKDQG'XWFKMRLQHGIRUFHVDJDLQVWµ0RVW&KULVWLDQ¶&DWKROLF.LQJ/RXLV;,9
Anti-Catholicism has remained a strong element in English nationalism ever since. 
(QJOLVK FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP ZDV FRQILUPHG E\ WKH µ*ORULRXV 5HYROXWLRQ¶ RI 
Uniquely in Europe, government remained strong even as it came under parliamentary 
control. Henceforth, as Anthony Smith argues, the Puritan myth of missionary election 
helped diffuse English and later British nationalism: 
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This myth of English Protestant election was carried over into the constitutional 
VHWWOHPHQWDIWHUDQGWKHULVHRIµ%ULWLVK¶QDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\LQWKHHLJKWHHQWK
century. Despite the unevenness of religious affiliation and conviction across 
Britain, and much resistance to the idea of British political and religious unity, 
WKHGRPLQDQWFXUUHQWUHPDLQHGµ3URWHVWDQW¶RUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\$QJOLFDQDQGLW
greatly reinforced the sense of national exclusiveness that expressed itself, not 
only in anti-Popery riots at home, but also in colonial attitudes of cultural (and 
much later, racial) superiority and paternalism overseas. One strand of the growth 
of an expansionist and imperial British nationalism, with its mission of conquest, 
civilisation, and Christianisation, can be traced back to the effects of this 
Protestant belief in English missionary election. (Smith 2003: 122) 
The other European pioneer of particularist-ascending government was the 
Netherlands. The revolt against Spain (c. 1555-1609) was a formative event in the 
growth of Protestant-inspired Dutch proto-nationalism (Gorski 2000: 1436-50, cf. 
Zimmer 2003: 16-17). Dutch Calvinists rebelled against the Spanish Habsburgs and 
Catholicism as two aspects of the same universalist-descending, foreign rule. Like in 
England the model of ancient Israel was invoked to justify national self-determination. 
According to Gorski, initially the Dutch revolutionary discourse was thus couched in 
WKHWHUPVRIµKRO\¶RUµ+HEUDLF¶QDWLRQDOLVP,QWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\DPRUHVHFXODr 
DQGUHSXEOLFDQµ%DWDYLDQ¶QDWLRQDOLVPHPHUJHGWKDWHPSKDVLVHGSROLWLFDOVRYHUHLJQW\
By the 1670s the two discourses ± the Hebraic and the Batavian ± had become closely 
intertwined and widely dispersed.  
The Netherlands case raises the interesting question of the role of Calvinist 
Christianity in the promotion of respectively particularist-ascending and universalist-
ascending discourse. In the Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, the United States and 
elsewhere Puritans, or Calvinists, and their offspring, the Quakers, have been 
vanguards both of liberal internationalism, including its legal expression, the law of 
nations, and of federalism (see also next section). The reasons are probably related to 
individual ideology as well as social structures. 
At the individual level, after the crisis of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, 
ZKHQSROLWLFDODXWKRULWLHVLQ)UDQFHDQG6FRWODQGWKUHDWHQHGWRH[WLQJXLVKWKHµKHUHWLF¶
Calvinists, Calvinist theoreticians developed a theological justification for the right to 
resist tyrannical and idolatrous (Counter-Reformation) government. Radical Calvinists 
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like the Scots John Knox and Christopher Goodman argued that in certain 
circumstances citizens might legitimately engage in political revolution. Goodman 
reinterpreted WKH NH\ 3DXOLQH VWDWHPHQW WKDW ³WKHUH LV QR DXWKRULW\ EXW RI *RG´ LQWR
UHIHUULQJRQO\WRWKRVHSRZHUV³DVDUHRUGHUO\DQGODZIXOO\LQVWLWXWHGE\*RG´6NLQQHU
E   7KLV KHOSHG OHJLWLPLVH DOVR WKH )UHQFK+XJXHQRWV¶ DSSHDO IRU SRSXODU
rebellion agaiQVW WKH FHQWUDOLVLQJ9DORLVPRQDUFK\ DIWHU WKH6W%DUWKRORPHZ¶VQLJKW
massacre in 1572. Thus, the political context in which Calvinists lived combined with 
&DOYLQLVW GRFWULQH WR SURGXFH WKH ³&KULVWLDQ VSLULW PRVW LPSHUYLRXV WR QDWLRQDOLVP´
(Hastings 1997: 205). Most European Calvinists today live in multinational or 
multiconfessional states.  
%DVHG RQ :HEHU¶V IDPRXV WKHVHV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ FDSLWDOLVP
rationalism and Protestantism (Weber 1930), one could further speculate that the 
Reformation heOSHG GLIIXVH WKH SXULWDQ LGHRORJ\ FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI µWKH VSLULW RI
FDSLWDOLVP¶WRWKHVSKHUHRISROLWLFV,IVRLQKDELWDQWVRISUHGRPLQDQWO\&DOYLQLVWSDUWV
of Europe could be assumed to more dispassionately than others assess the costs and 
benefits of various polity-LGHDV%XW:HEHU¶VWKHVLVUHPDLQVFRQWURYHUVLDO 
Part of the structural explanation may be, as Rémond (1999: 24; see Section 3.7.2 
above) indicates, that in contrast to Lutherans and Catholics, Calvinist ecclesiology 
inclined towards ascending government. In addition, the fact that in the Empire as well 
as in England, France, Poland, and Hungary Calvinists remained an unofficial minority 
arguably predisposed them towards an oppositional, cosmopolitan and republican 
outlook. In the controversy oYHU :HEHU¶V WKHVHV (UQVW 7URHOWVFK  
moreover claimed that Calvinists were influenced by the fact that their capital, Geneva, 
was a commercial republic in which the church was autonomous of the state. 
&DOYLQLVPZDVIRU7URHOWVFKWKH³3URWHVWDQWLVPRIWKHSURJUHVVLYH(XURSHDQSHRSOHV´
the doctrine of the liberal, commercial middle class (Troeltsch 1966: 142-149). Trevor-
Roper for his part observed that many capitalist entrepreneurs of northern European 
cities were refugees of Counter-Reformation Europe, especially of Flanders and 
northern Italy, where capitalism was well on its way long before the Reformation: 
³%HWZHHQ WKH &DWKROLF SULQFHV RI WKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ DQG%XUJXQG\ ILJKWLQJ IRU WKH
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preservation of an old supremacy, and the Lutheran princes of Germany, placing 
themselves at the head of a national revolt, arose that slender dynamic force of the 
VXUYLYLQJIUHHFLWLHVRI(XURSH WKH&DOYLQLVW,QWHUQDWLRQDO´7UHYRU-Roper 1967: 33). 
In Rokkanian terms, a contributing factor to the cosmopolitanism of entrepreneurs 
FRXOGWKXVEHWKHLUEHORQJLQJWRµFLW\-EHOW¶RUµWUDGH-EHOW¶(XURSH 
The argument above may also help explain why Calvinists appear to have played 
a particular role in the development of the modern law of nations. The Dutch Calvinist 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is often considered the founder of international law. But the 
Spanish scholastics of the sixteenth century (see above, page 204) anticipated many of 
his basic ideas, which moreover built on well-established Christian and Roman 
tradition. As we will see, also Lutherans and Anglicans contributed. For all, the notion 
of Christendom as a commonwealth ruled by Christian ethics, Roman law (notably the 
jus gentium) and natural law, in addition to customary law, was the common frame of 
reference. What the Protestants did not accept any more after the Reformation, was the 
Pope as ultimate arbiter of Christendom. On the other hand, the Holy See had great 
trouble acknowledging an international law that did not recogniVH WKH3RSH¶V UROH LQ
this regard. Therefore international law was largely developed as a Protestant 
jurisprudence. 
The role of natural law in the development of international law is significant in 
the present context. Natural law is universalist, applying to all nations and individuals, 
and has had a major influence on both the particularist-ascending, or national-liberal, 
paradigm and the universalist-ascending, Christian-democratic and federalist one. 
Natural law jurisprudence assumed that justice exists outside and above all people and 
is discovered by the natural reason that all human beings are endowed with.  
As we have seen (above, Section 3.4.1), the philosophy of natural law originated 
in Greek philosophy and permeated Roman law. After the fall of the western empire, 
Roman law survived in the Byzantine Empire, in the Roman Church as well as, in 
remnants at least, in some Germanic codes (e.g. the Visigothic law). In the Middle 
Ages, canon lawyers and theological scholasticists, notably St Thomas of Aquinas, 
conflated the natural law ideology inherent in Roman law with the theocratic idea of 
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divine law. The resultant jus naturale ZDVSUHVHQWHGDV³DVHWRIHWKLFDOUXOHVRIGLYLQH
origin to which the reason of Christian men cRPPDQGHG REHGLHQFH´ +LQVOH\ 
165). The Roman Church accommodated this philosophy to its notion of Christendom, 
promoting the Pope as ultimate interpreter of the divine law of nature and arbiter in 
disputes between princes. 
Rediscovered in the eleventKFHQWXU\-XVWLQLDQ¶VCorpus juris was embraced and 
propagated by the Holy Roman emperors as still effective in Christendom (and useful 
in their disputes with the medieval Popes; see above, Section 3.7.4). It was introduced 
into the law of the empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In Holland, the result 
was Roman-Dutch law, an amalgam of Roman, Germanic (Frankish, Frisian, Saxon), 
6SDQLVKDQG%XUJXQGLDQOHJLVODWLRQ*URWLXV¶VOn the Laws of War and Peace (1625) 
retained important elements of Roman-Christian, universalist-descending discourse:  
,I*URWLXV¶VERRNZDVLQRQHUHVSHFWDVKDVEHHQVDLGDVWDWHPHQWRIWKH5RPDQ
law of property and contract written especially for princes, it was also a statement 
written for princes who were seen not as independent rulers but as associated 
agents in the governing of Christendom. It was a set of rules for the conduct of 
war and the transfer of provinces within a single civitas. (Hinsley 1963: 165-166)   
Grotius based himself notably on the jus gentium (see above, page 111 ff.), which 
he equated with natural law (jus naturale +LQVOH\ VWUHVVHV WKDW ³DOO VR-called 
international law writings after Grotius went on drawing scarcely any distinction 
between ethics or Natural Law on the one hand and international law on the other until 
WKHHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\´+LQVOH\1XVVEDXPIRUKLVSDUWDUJXHVWKDW*URWLXV
saw the jus gentium as a law of reasonableness and adapted it to the new international 
realities as a law inter civitates, i.e. between states. By removing international law 
from theology he prepared the ground for positive legislation and codification 
(Nussbaum 1954: 108-109).  
*URWLXV¶VZRUNZDVVRLQIOXHQWLDOWKDWDIWHUWKH3HDFHRI:HVWSKDOLDit served as a 
European code of international law. However, since the Pope immediately placed the 
Laws on his Index of Forbidden Books (where it remained until 1899), Grotius had less 
impact in the Catholic world (except France) than in Protestant countries (Nussbaum 
1954: 114). Nussbaum notes that all the leading authors of international law until the 
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first decades of the nineteenth century were Protestants. This fact caused Carl von 
Kaltenborn, the first historiographer of international law, in 1848 to declare 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ³D3URWHVWDQWVFLHQFH´1XVVEDXP 
Natural law was further developed by the Lutheran Samuel Pufendorf (1632-
1694). According to Nussbaum (1954: 147), Pufendorf came to be considered the true 
founder of a secular law of nature. Not only was his work placed on the papal Index, 
but it was also severely censured by orthodox Protestants. Christian Wolff (1676-1756) 
and Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1741) were later theorists of natural law of Protestant 
provenance. In contrast to Pufendorf, they took a particular interest in international 
law.  
9DWWHO¶VDroit de gens attained a circulation second only to Grotius (Nussbaum 
2QXIUHJDUGV9DWWHODVWKHFHQWUDODXWKRURIZKDWKHFDOOVµ$WODQWLF
UHSXEOLFDQLVP¶FRQWUDVWLQJLWWRWKHWUDGLWLRQRIµ&RQWLQHQWDOUHSXEOLFDQLVP¶WRZKLFK
Wolff belonged. Basing himself on the natural law notion of a common interest (res 
publicaRULQ:ROII¶VWHUPWKHcivitas maxima) above the individual nations or states, 
Wolff argued that natural law imposed binding, or necessary, restrictions on state 
behaviour in international relations. Vattel disagreed, insisting that compliance with 
international law was voluntary. There was no binding authority or law limiting 
national sovereignty (Onuf 1998: ch. 3). According to Onuf, this difference of opinion 
LV DPDMRU GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µ$WODQWLF¶ DQG µ&RQWLQHQWDO¶ UHSXEOLFDQLVP$ULVWRWOH
Plato, Cicero and Polybius being common inspirations, Onuf classifies Machiavelli, 
Giuccardini, Grotius, James Harrington (1611-1677), Vattel, Locke, Hume, Smith, 
Madison etc. as Atlantic republicans, and Pufendorf, Althusius, Leibniz, Wolff and 
Kant as Continental republicans. 
%RWK:ROIIDQG9DWWHOZHUHLQVSLUHGE\-RKQ/RFNH¶V-1704) ideas of man 
DV³D UHDsonable creature who has a God-JLYHQ ODZRIQDWXUH WRJRYHUQKLP´LQ WKH
words of Knutsen 1997: 119). According to Locke, the law of nature gives every 
LQGLYLGXDO FHUWDLQ µQDWXUDO¶ ULJKWV QRWDEO\ WR OLIH OLEHUW\ DQG SURSHUW\ 7KLV QRWLRQ
proved the basis for the definition and eventual codification of individual human 
rights. Locke indicated that he saw a state of nature between sovereign polities, but did 
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not elaborate. A small, but influential number of legal writers inspired by Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-167ZHUHPRUHH[SOLFLW7KH\³WXUQHGDOWRJHWKHUDJDLQVWWKHQRWLRQRI
D OHJDO ERQG EHWZHHQ QDWLRQV´ 1XVVEDXP   +REEHV ZDV DQ $QJOLFDQ
apologist of absolutist monarchy, but also emphasised the idea of an original social 
contract between rulers and ruled.  
This particularist-descending opposition to the notion of a law-based 
international society however soon faded away. According to Nussbaum, the 
HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\(QOLJKWHQPHQWDJUHHGWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZZDVUHDO³1RWXQWLOWKH
nineteenth, or more definitely the twentieth, century were doubts regarding the 
H[LVWHQFHRIVXFKDODZUHYLYHG´1XVVEDXP+RZHYHUDVQDWXUDOODZZDV
secularised, a reaction emerged, notably among British empiricists. The legal 
positivism that resulted emphasised treaties and custom, eventually pushing the law of 
nature into the background (ibid: 135). A notable British positivist was Richard 
Zouche (1590-1661). His basic approach was still Romanist, but he referred much 
more to Grotius than to the Corpus juris (ibid: 167). The Dutchman Cornelis van 
Brynkershoek (1673-1743) also subscribed to the positivist programme. He eschewed 
theological discourse in favour of treaties and other widely accepted precedents (ibid: 
+RZHYHU³DVDMXGJHKHLVTXLWHQDWXUally influenced by the Corpus juris which 
was then the general law of the Netherlands, as of other civil-ODZ FRXQWULHV´ LELG
169).  
As legal positivism grew towards the end of the eighteenth century, its point of 
gravity shifted to Germany. Here Johan Jakob Moser (1701-1785) and Georg Friedrich 
von Martens (1756-1821) were its main advocates. According to Nussbaum (1954: 
³OLNHVRPDQ\LPSRUWDQWILJXUHVLQWKHHDUO\KLVWRU\RIWKHODZRIQDWLRQV´0RVHU
was deeply religious. A faithful Pietist, Moser¶V 
peculiar point of view [was] a complete surrender of judgment [in favour of 
positivism]. One has to take into account a German conception, which was later 
termed beschränkter Unterthanenverstand (the limited comprehension of the 
common man) ± a conception deepened by Lutheran-Pietist ideas, which in 
worldly matters stand for indulgence of, and subordination to, the government. 
(Nussbaum 1954: 179)  
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Thus, at least in the German context, legal positivism arguably reflected and 
facilitated particularist-descending attitudes. 
Positivist legal practice however expanded everywhere alongside the nation-state. 
Indeed, it was a vital means of state- and nationbuilding. The development of 
international law also of course basically reflected the evolution of a Europe of nation-
VWDWHV 7KH 3HDFH RI:HVWSKDOLD KDG WKXV EHHQ D ³ODQGPDUN LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ 1XVVEDXP   +HQFHIRUWK *URWLDQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
doctrines, such as the freedom of the seas or the immunity of ambassadors, were 
accepted in European diplomacy as reasonable and mutually beneficial. Agreements 
between governments, certain kinds of admiralty and maritime law, and the terms of 
treaties such as Westphalia, Utrecht, and others were acknowledged as positive 
international law (Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2007: 251).   
7KHHPHUJLQJ*HUPDQµVFLHQFHVRIVWDWH¶Staatswissenschaften) saw the unity of 
Europe as a common body of laws and the sum of various similar legal elements and 
causes. Called the jus publicum Europaeum ± European public law ± it included the 
law of nations. At the end of the eighteenth century, a professor of international law at 
Göttingen, Georg Friedrich von Martens saw this law as demonstrating the 
³LQQXPHUDEOHFRQQHFWLRQVRIHDFKRIWKHVWDWHVZLWKPRVWRIWKHRthers, the similarity 
RIPRUHVDQGRILQWHUHVW´7KLVPHDQWWKDW³&KULVWLDQ(XURSHVKRXOGEHYLHZHGQRWRQO\
in geographic, but also in political and legal considerations as a whole that is different 
from the other nations of Europe, as if it were a Volk comprised of states that has its 
RZQODZVFXVWRPVDQGEHOLHIV´TXRWHGE\%|GHNHU7KLVUHIOHFWHGWKHDOUHDG\
noted Enlightenment idea of Europe as a civilisation as well as a states-system.  
After the 1815 Congress of Vienna, European public law expanded greatly. The 
Congress of Paris in 1856, which ended the Crimean War, wrote more international 
law, creating an International Commission of the Danube to match the Commission of 
the Rhine established by Vienna, and also instituted the Universal Telegraph Union. In 
1874, the General Postal Union (later the Universal Postal Union) followed. In 1863 
the International Red Cross was established as the first officially recognised 
international non-governmental organisation. Conferences in Berlin in 1878 and 1884-
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5 prevented conflagrations over the Eastern and African questions. There were also 
attempts to introduce strictly legal procedures and bilateral arbitration treaties to 
resolve international conflicts. The Hague conference of 1899 established a Court of 
International Arbitration, albeit with highly circumscribed powers. International law, 
notably the law of treaties, spread to new domains. Important new treaties were 
concluded in the fields of commerce, consular affairs, extradition, monetary matters, 
postal, telegraphic, and railway communications, fishing at sea, copyrights and patents 
(Nussbaum 1954: 196).  
During the eighteenth century, the increasingly precise ideas of international law 
were complemented by the formulation of a particularist-ascending theory of 
international relations. National-liberal internationalism was a functionalist ideology 
favouring bottom-up co-operation and amalgamation of free and democratic nation-
states. It too was significantly influenced by Calvinist thought, notably of the 
British/Scottish variety (in the next section we will see that continental Calvinists 
tended towards federalism).  
The Calvinist Englishman William Godwin (1756-1836) emphasised the key late-
(QOLJKWHQPHQWLGHDWKDW³GHPRFUDFLHVDUHLQKHUHQWO\SHDFHIul because the vast majority 
RIFRPPRQSHRSOHZLOODOZD\VVWULYHWRDYRLGZDU´.QXWVHQ7KLVLGHDZDV 
also fundamental to Kant (see below). Montesquieu (1689-1755) had already stressed 
the peaceful effect of international trade. David Hume (1711-1776) averred that 
³QRWKLQJ LVPRUH IDYRXUDEOH WR WKH ULVHRISROLWHQHVV DQG OHDUQLQJ WKDQDQXPEHURI
QHLJKERXULQJ DQG LQGHSHQGHQW VWDWHV FRQQHFWHG WRJHWKHU E\ FRPPHUFH DQG SROLF\´
(quoted by Onuf 1998: 242). Even earlier, Émeric Crucé (1590-1648) in his peace plan 
Le nouveau Cynée (1683), had advocated the free circulation of persons and goods, 
standardisation of weights and measures, and even a common currency (de Rougemont 
1966: 96-97). As we have seen (above, Section 3.8.1), the notion of Europe as a 
FRPPHUFLDO µVRFLHW\¶ RU µUHSXEOLF¶ ZDV FRPPRQ LQ WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW ,W GUHZ
inspiration from French physiocrats such as François Quesnay as well as from Dutch 
republican philosophes such as Grotius, Corvinus, Wassenaer, de la Court, Spinoza 
and Mandeville. Free and peaceful circulation of not only goods, services, capital and 
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labour, but also of beliefs, customs and ideas between individuals and nations was its 
fundamental precept (Blom 2002; Pagden in Pagden, ed., 2002: 32).  
Adam Smith (1723- LV RIWHQ VHHQ DV WKH UHDO IRXQGHURI µ$WODQWLF¶ OLEHUDO
internationalism, with its emphasis on  laissez-faire economic policies, free trade and 
non-intervention as the best way to promote joint peace and prosperity. However, 
Walter  DUJXHV FRQYLQFLQJO\ WKDW 6PLWK¶V SROLWLFDO WKRXJKW UHPDLQHG VWDWH-
centred and should be seen as transitional between Hobbesian Realism/absolutism and 
Lockean Liberalism. More representative in this regard, in addition to the publicists 
and international lawyers mentioned above, are Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and, perhaps, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
Bentham and Mill formulated liberal schemes for European and international 
peace and order, foreshadowing the arguments of functionalist integration theory (and 
liberal/interdependence IR theory). They thought that the propensity of states to fight 
each other could be overcome by promoting common economic interests, international 
law, communication and understanding among peoples. Bentham called his a Plan for 
Universal and Perpetual Peace (1843). He proposed the establishment of a Congress 
of States, but saw no reason for supranational coercive power. Instead, Bentham would 
UHO\IRUVDQFWLRQVRQµWKHWULEXQDORISXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶.QXWVHQ0LOOIRUKLV
part considered international commerce the best antidote to war (Pinder 1991: 105-
106).  
,PPDQXHO.DQW¶VPerpetual Peace (1795) is more radical. Kant lived his whole 
life in the cosmopolitan Hanse city of Königsberg, and considered himself more of a 
world citizen than a Prussian (Talbott 2008: 97, referring to Kuehn 2001). Like 
Bentham and Mills, he believed in the integrative power of commerce. However, he 
put much greater emphasis on the political preconditions of international peace than 
the British philosophes. It required first, a republican (democratic) constitution in 
every state; secondly, a law of nations founded on a federation of free states; and third, 
DFRVPRSROLWDQRUZRUOGODZUHTXLULQJµXQLYHUVDOKRVSLWDOLW\¶LHIULHQGO\WUHDWPHQWRI
foreigners as individuals endowed with reason and natural rights (Wight 1991: 74-75; 
Williams and Booth 1995: 89).  According to Talbott, Kant was the first political 
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theorist to explicitly state that the individual is soverHLJQ ³,Q .DQW¶V YLHZ WKH
legitimacy of a governing authority flowed upward, not just from the citizenry as a 
ZKROH EXW IURP HDFK FLWL]HQ´ 7DOERWW  -99). In international affairs he 
DGYRFDWHG ³D FRQWLQXRXVO\ JURZLQJ VWDWH FRQVLVWLQJ RI YDULRXV QDWions (civitas 
gentiumZKLFKZLOOXOWLPDWHO\LQFOXGHDOOWKHQDWLRQVRIWKHZRUOG´.DQW$UW
3).   
While Kant was pessimistic regarding the propensity of states to go to war 
against each other, he also thought that since humanity as a whole is reasonable, this 
propensity may eventually be overcome. However, such progress requires political will 
and ceaseless effort, in addition to open communication and trade. Kant thus stressed 
the volitional aspect of international relations and the effect of history on human 
society more than the British liberal thinkers. He explicitly rejected the faith many of 
them had in the balance of power as a self-regulating, extra-human mechanism 
guaranteeing peace (Knutsen 1997: 126).  
Kant was much influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who in 
.QXWVHQ¶VIRUPXODWLRQKDGDUJXHGWKDW³LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHFDQQRWRFFXUXQWLOKXPDQ
reason is transformed, educated, un-alienated by a good society and developed to its 
fullest potential. [...] Instead of embracing the faith in reason and self-equilibration, 
which was expressed by so many Atlantic authors, [Kant and Rousseau] stressed the 
UROHSOD\HGE\SROLWLFDOZLOO´.QXWVHQ.QXWVHQDUJXHVWKDWWKLVHPSKDVLV
on human will was characteristic of the continental humanist tradition and diverged 
from the rationalism and empiricism of the Anglo-French Enlightenment. Similarly, 
Onuf (1998) regards Kant as a prime, but also the final, advocate of Continental 
republicanism. However, Rousseau concluded that European union required a 
UHYROXWLRQDQGFRXOGRQO\EH LPSRVHGE\IRUFH,WZRXOGWKHUHIRUH³SHUKDSVGRPRUH
KDUPLQDPRPHQWWKDQLWZRXOGJXDUGDJDLQVWIRUDJHV´5RXVVHDXTXRWHGE\+HDWHU
1992: 84).  
In the following century the ardent free trader Richard Cobden (1804-1865) was 
perhaps the most effective public champion of national-liberal internationalism, i.e. a 
particularist-ascending, functionalist ideology favouring bottom-up co-operation and 
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amalgamation of free and democratic nation-states. In the words of Knutsen, Cobden 
VWUHVVHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPRGHUQFRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQVSLQQLQJ³KXPDQLW\LQWRDZHE
of wealth and understanding ± parliaments, international conferences, the popular 
press, compulsory education, the public reading room, the penny postage stamp, 
railways, submarine telegraphs, three-funnelled ocean liners, and the Manchester 
FRWWRQ H[FKDQJH ZHUH DOO IRUFHV IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ SHDFH DQG KDUPRQ\´ .QXWVHQ
1997: 172). Cobden and Victor Hugo (see below) were the principal figures of the 
Third Universal Peace Congress held in Paris in 1849, which was devoted to the 
creation of the United States of Europe. 
The growth of international law and institutions, combined with the expansion of 
international industry, trade, finance, communications and the gold standard (1870s-
1913) contributed to an European economic and social integration in the later 
nineteenth century that was not to be matched until the 1990s. From the 1860s to 1914, 
tariffs were progressively reduced as trade continued to grow. The freedom to seek 
work and to establish businesses in other countries was greater in this period than in 
any other period of European history (Strikwerda 1997: 54). Between 1900 and 1909, 
119 new international organisations were founded, and 112 more between 1909 and 
1914. In the years before World War I, the leading social reformers, labour activists, 
and government administrators met frequently in international congresses on the eight-
KRXU GD\ KRPH SURGXFWLRQ ZRPHQ¶V HPSOR\PHQW DQG FKLOG ZHOIDUH 7KH ZHOIDUH
states that were beginning to take shape in these years formed part of an ongoing 
international discourse that embraced most of Europe and the United States (ibid.: 61).  
The growth of international organisation and law reflected not only the needs of 
an increasingly globalised, capitalist economy, but also the growth of ascending-locus 
governance. The franchise was expanded, popular opinion found expression in 
increasingly vociferous media, and the influence of social movements, labour unions, 
non-governmental organisations etc. grew. Associations with the most diverse aims 
and objects sprouted. Together with the emerging mass-circulation press, such 
societies contributed crucially to the advancement of national consciousness and 
nationalism (see previous section).  
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However, also emerging were civil society groups actively seeking to influence 
foreign policy in favour of international peace, amity and co-operation (see next 
section). As in the nationalist movement, the pioneers were academics, intellectuals 
and other middle class opinion leaders. Indeed, at this stage few if any saw any 
inherent contradiction between nationalism and internationalism. Liberals and radicals 
generally perceived popular sovereignty as a precondition to a federation or 
confederation oI QDWLRQV D µ8QLWHG 6WDWHV RI (XURSH¶ +HUGHU DV ZHOO DV )LFKWH
subscribed to this notion, expecting there to be a gradual extinction of national 
character.  
Moreover, according to Hobsbawm (1992: 31-45), in spite of the ideas of 
Rousseau and Herder, the prevailing opinion in the nineteenth century was that the 
µSULQFLSOH RI QDWLRQDOLW\¶ VKRXOG RQO\ DSSO\ WR QDWLRQDOLWLHV RI D FHUWDLQ VL]H LH WR
nations that were economically and culturally viable. National movements were 
expected to be movements for unification or expansion. The emergence of large-scale 
states ± *URȕVWDWHQ ± were seen as a necessary stage in the natural transition to world 
unity. The word Kleinstaaterei was deliberately derogatory, and most people saw the 
multinationality or multilinguality or multiethnicity of old well-established nation-
states such as Britain, France and Spain as inevitable:  
From the point of view of liberalism, and ± as the example of Marx and Engels 
GHPRQVWUDWHVQRWRQO\RIOLEHUDOLVPWKHFDVHIRUµWKHQDWLRQ¶ZDVWKDWLW
represented a stage in the historical development of human society, and the case 
for the establishment of any particular nation-state, irrespective of the subjective 
feelings of the members of the nationality concerned, or the personal sympathies 
of the observer, depended on whether it could be shown to fit in with or to 
advance historical evolution and progress. (Hobsbawm 1992: 41)  
It may be added here that by *URȕVWDWHQ was probably meant *URȕPlFKWH, the 
balanced pentarchy of Great Powers to which intellectuals such as Ranke ascribed a 
leading role in Europe and the world. However, the argument that national sovereignty 
applied only to big nations, and not to small ones, was obviously not tenable in the 
long run. As we will see, particularist-ascending ideology broke through at the 
Versailles peace conference after World War I. 
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3.8.4 Europeanist-ascending ideology 
In the previous section, I discussed the growth of national-liberal international 
law, theory and ideology. The proponents advocated various degrees of ascending-
locus sovereignty in domestic affairs and µIXQFWLRQDO¶LQWHJUDWLRQRIGHPRFUDWLFQDWLRQ-
states at the international level. In this section, the theme will be the emergence of a 
more radical, federalist discourse favouring the transfer of some sovereignty to the 
European level, i.e. European governance. I will argue that its core advocates, 
Catholics in continental Western Europe, were significantly influenced by medieval 
universalist-descending ideology. However, since the argument now became more 
FRQVFLRXVO\ IRFXVVHG RQ (XURSH DV WKH FRPPRQ µKRPHODQG¶ WKDW JUDGXDOO\ UHSODFHG
Christendom as modernity progressed, I call this ideology Europeanist-ascending. As I 
have indicated, the key difference between the earlier universalist discourse and the 
ODWHU (XURSHDQLVW RQH LV WKH ODWWHU¶V LQVLVWHQFH RQ Gemocratic/ascending governance 
both at the national and the European level. 
+RZHYHUDVWKHYDULRXVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI.DQW¶VVFKHPHLOOXVWUDWHWKHGLIIHUHQFH
between internationalist and federalist plans for European peace and unity was not 
always very clear. It was arguably only with the American Federalist Papers that an 
elaborate, modern federalist ideology emerged. Moreover, federal models for the 
international level have remained contested. It is also not easy to delineate 
unambiguous territorial or confessional distinctions between advocates of particularist 
and universalist/Europeanist ascending ideas. The interpretation below is therefore 
particularly open to further discussion and research.  
Generally, however, I think there is solid evidence for the following reading. As 
argued in the previous section, at the country level, Britain and the Netherlands, and at 
the individual level Calvinists and otherwise Reformed Protestants, tended to be the 
pioneers of national-liberal internationalism. I submit that the main advocates of 
(XURSHDQLVW IHGHUDOLVP WHQGHG WR EH &DWKROLFV IURP µFLW\-EHOW¶ RU LPSHULDO (XURSH
although there was also a significant number of Calvinist federalists. Again, the 
reasons were structural and material as well as ideological. 
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Federalist thought and practice was structurally inherent in the Holy Roman 
Empire, the Netherlands and Switzerland (the latter two were de jure part of the former 
until 1648, although de facto independent much earlier). These polities were more or 
less federally organised, multiconfessional and, at least in the Swiss and imperial 
cases, multinational; they had many Calvinists in addition to a Catholic majority, and 
they contained most of city-belt Europe.  
But also Northern Italy was Catholic and part of the city-belt. Most of Italy came 
under the dominion of the Spanish branch of the Habsburg dynasty in 1530, but was 
again divided, between Spanish, French and Austrian allegiance, after the death of the 
last Spanish Habsburg led to the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1713). Italy 
throughout remained split into various kingdoms, duchies, republics, and principates, 
including those of the Pope. Thus Italy, like Germany (as well as Spain and even 
France, for that matter), has a strong regionalist tradition. This combined with their 
location made both polities particularly prey to European power politics, war and 
conflict. This background has probably added to the receptivity of Italians as well as 
Germans to the idea of European federation.  
Both Daniel Elazar (1987: 123) and Stein Rokkan (1999: 210) emphasise the 
pioneering role of the commercial towns and cities of the Empire in the establishment 
of federalist practice when they formed leagues for mutual defence and assistance. 
They refer to the Hanseatic and Lombard leagues, but Switzerland and the Netherlands 
were in fact more enduring cases in point. Both emerged as federations of city states or 
republics within the Empire. Rokkan, while otherwise excessively reducing the Empire 
to a city-belt characterised by the absence of central authority (see above, Chapter 2.5),  
interprets federalism as a general characteristic of Central Europe (Rokkan 1999: 210). 
Oskar Halecki too places the city leagues firmly in the context of a proto-federal Holy 
Roman Empire: 
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In its restored, Christian form, the empire itself can be considered some kind of 
federation, and it is perhaps because of that federal constitution that it lasted so 
long, notwithstanding so many imperfections. It is true that the lack of unity 
within the empire was a source of weakness, but only because federalism was not 
well enough organised in that early and unusually difficult case, and contained no 
guarantees of equality among the component members. This was precisely the 
reason why within the empire local federations were formed, which come much 
nearer to our present conception of federalism than the general structure. The two 
most striking examples are the League of Lombard cities in the twelfth century 
and the Swiss Confederation in the thirteenth. (Halecki 1957: 166-167) 
However, there was federal practice also outside the city-belt. In the Iberian 
peninsula, the fuero system among the Christian states established during the 
Riconquista was continued by the kingdom of Aragon. The unification of Spain under 
a multiple monarchy in 1469 left most of these federal elements intact for the next two 
and a half centuries. Moreover, after the conversion to Christianity of Lithuania and 
Polish-Lithuanian union in 1385, a multinational, federal system developed there 
which culminated with the adoption of the first modern European constitution, that of 
the Commonwealth of Two Nations of 3 May 1791. 
Due to the debate over the nature of church unity caused by the Great Schism, 
even the late medieval Roman Church was affected by a movement towards federal 
organisation. The early Christian idea of the church as a mystical union of all 
Christians returned and found expression when the Council of Constance passed 
legislation that instituted a conciliar church structure. The conciliar movement was 
supported by temporal rulers as the federal church structure it advanced would have 
increased their influence in church affairs through national churches. This was also a 
major reason why it was resisted by the Papacy, which successfully disputed and 
LQYDOLGDWHGWKHGRFWULQHRIFRQFLOLDUVXSUHPDF\DQGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOQRWLRQVRIDµPL[HG
JRYHUQPHQW¶IRUWKH&KXUFK+D\-97; see above, Section 3.7.4). 
The federal tendencies of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire have already 
been described (see above, Section 3.7.4). In addition to its fragmented sovereignty, 
the Empire continued to be characterised by imprecise boundaries; a cosmopolitan and 
diverse linguistic and national composition; the elective character of the imperial title; 
DQG E\ WKH HPSHURU¶V SDQ-European pretensions (Wilson 1999: 3). After 1512, the 
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(PSLUH FDPH WR FDOO LWVHOI WKH µ+RO\ 5RPDQ (PSLUH RI WKH *HUPDQ 1DWLRQ¶ RU
significanWO\µQDWLRQs¶LQ/DWLQLQUHFRJQLWLRQRILWVQRZOLPLWHGWHUULWRULDOVFRSH 
However, the federal features and the degree of authority that its constitutions 
continued to give the Emperor prevented total disintegration. Outside powers, 
constantly involved in imperial affairs and fighting their wars on imperial territory, 
knew that the existence of the Empire was vital to the balance of power. Various post-
Reformation emperors not only overcame critical challenges from outside, but were 
also able to introduce a number of reforms that preserved and even reinforced the 
imperial structure, gradually entrenching its federal characteristics (Wilson 1999: 47-
49). In a first period of reform, from about 1495 to 1556, the Reichstag was 
consolidated as the forum for national debate; more manageable regional subdivisions 
were created within the Empire by grouping the territories into ten Kreise (circles); and 
two imperial courts of law, the Reichskammergericht and the Reichshofrat, were 
established.  
As I have mentioned, at the same time Roman law was introduced as the jus 
publicum (common law) of the whole Empire. This initially met with proto-nationalist 
opposition, particularly among Lutherans. However, after some wavering, even 
influential Lutheran figures such as Philipp Melanchton embraced the gemeines Recht 
as standing above petty factionalism and representing the only impartial law of peace 
and order (Stein 1999: 92). Confessional tensions were defused through 
µMXULGLILFDWLRQ¶ZKHUHE\SROLWLFDOGHEDWHZDVLQFUHasingly conducted in the language of 
the law. Especially lesser territorial princes and the free imperial cities continued to 
rely on the institutions and laws of the Empire for their legitimacy and security.  
Although the Reformation and the religious upheavals encouraged further 
fragmentation, the religious peace of Augsburg (1555) demonstrated that emperors 
were able to deal with structural stress through consensus politics, facilitation and 
power brokering (Wilson 1999: 26). The settlement, which legalised Protestantism 
along with Catholicism and became one of the fundamental laws of the Empire, was 
largely the work of archduke Ferdinand of Habsburg (Emperor 1558-64). Catholic as 
well as Protestant princes backed imperial institutions and the Emperor. The common 
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view was still that the Holy Roman Empire was the most eminent of the European 
monarchies as successor of the Roman Empire and the last of the four universal 
monarchies prophesied by Daniel in the Old Testament  (Asch 1997: 18-19).  
In the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, imperial and Habsburg 
weaknesses advanced what Wilson (1999: 26) calls aristocratic federalism, i.e. a 
VWUHQJWKHQLQJRI WKHQRELOLW\¶VSRVLWLRQYLV-à-vis that of the Emperor. The Bohemian 
revolt in 1618 and a subsequent constitutional crisis triggered the Thirty Years War. 
The outcome reinforced the federalising tendency, reason of state (Staatsräson) 
increasingly replacing faith and tradition as the chief logic of political thought and 
action even within the Empire. The 1648 Westphalian constitution, re-designed to deal 
with the confessional tensions of the preceding centuries, imposed an institutional 
rigidity that largely resisted subsequent reform (Asch 1997: 194). Still, Asch (ibid: 
192) argues that due to insufficient sovereign resources, even the Hohenzollerns of 
3UXVVLD³IRXQGLWH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOW WRHVWDEOLVKWKHLUPRQDUFK\DVDPDMRU(XURSHDQ
SRZHU´LQGHSHQGHQWRIWKH(PSLUH 
Wilson (1999: 27) emphatically rejects the traditional interpretation, established 
by Borussian historiography, that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was the end of the 
Empire in all but name. He points out that there was in fact an imperial recovery 
roughly from 1658 to 1740, i.e., during the reigns of Leopold I, Joseph I and Charles 
VI :LOVRQ7KHLPSHULDOFRXUWVDVZHOODVWKH(PSLUH¶VV\VWHPRIFROOHFWLYH
security, which obliged each territory to contribute a contingent to a common imperial 
army, were reinforced. The final demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 due to 
Napoleon has already been described (see above, section 3.8.1).  
In concluding his analysis of the Empire, Wilson (1999: 72) emphasises 
decentralised federalism and a non-aggressive foreign policy (of which, I would add, 
Europeanism was a chief characteristic) as traditions surviving from the Holy Roman 
Empire to later German polities. The German Confederation of 1815 re-established 
Austrian pre-eminence within a framework exhibiting many similarities with the old 
Empire, including a federal diet and a system of collective security. These and other 
features reappeared in modified form in both the Prussian-led successors to the 
 264 
 
 
Confederation; the North German Confederation (Norddeutscher Bund) of 1867 and 
the German Empire, or Second Reich of 1871. Wilson finds it striking that both the 
constitution of the Weimar Republic and that of the Federal Republic of (West) 
Germany incorporated a federal system of checks and balances, and devolved power to 
states (Länder) that were the direct sucFHVVRUVRIWKHROGFRQVROLGDWHGWHUULWRULHV³,WLV
equally striking that these later federal Germanies, like the old Empire, are associated 
with non-aggressive foreign policies, unlike the centralising governments of 
nineteenth-century Prussia and the Nazi Third Reich, which both ended in disastrous 
ZRUOGZDUV´LELG 
After 1806, the Emperor remained head of the universalist-cosmopolitan 
Habsburg monarchy, whose Austro-Hungarian Empire and Kingdom (Kaiser- und 
Königsreich) survived the Holy Roman Empire by more than a hundred years. Since 
the Counter-Reformation, Catholicism had been the main binding element of the 
diverse peoples of the monarchy, and it remained a critical source of legitimacy for the 
emperor (Rémond 1999: 87).  
Charles Ingrao (2000) suggests that the multinational, composite nature, central 
geopolitical location, and universalist ideology of the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Habsburg dynasty made them structural forces for peace, stability, diversity, 
rationality, and humanity in Europe. He indeed indicates that the Habsburg and Holy 
Roman imperial-federal model could have offered a peaceful, cosmopolitan and 
potentially also democratic alternative to the nationalist stampede instigated by the 
French Revolution. Against the national-liberal tendency to see the predominance of 
the German language and Austro-German imperialism as the cause of nationalism in 
Central Europe, Ingrao argues that about the time of the French Revolution the 
+DEVEXUJ PRQDUFK\ ZDV OD\LQJ WKH IRXQGDWLRQV IRU D µFRUSRUDWH VRXO¶ WKDW ZRXOG
transcend different regions and language groups:  
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After centuries of secundogenitures and split inheritances, the Pragmatic Sanction 
KDGILQDOO\YLVXDOLVHGDVLQJO\VRYHUHLJQHQWLW\7KHDEUXSWHQGRIWKHG\QDVW\¶V
hegemony in the Holy Roman empire [1740-45] had helped Maria Theresa, her 
sons, and their German-speaking subjects to distinguish between their German 
roots and their loyalty to a separate Habsburg commonwealth. The massive 
bureaucratic and military establishment that they created to defend it served as a 
SRZHUIXOYHKLFOHIRULQWHJUDWLQJWKHPRQDUFK\¶VRWKHUHWKQLFJURXSVLQFOXGLQJ
the Magyar nation, which had readily begun dispatching its forces to conflicts 
DQGIRXJKWZHOOEH\RQGLWVRZQIURQWLHUV7KDWWKHPRQDUFK\¶VPLOLtary 
commanders, civil officials, merchants, and public affairs journals communicated 
in German did not overly concern the other language groups, which accepted its 
utility as an instrument of communication and social mobility. The evolution of a 
common elite culture that leaned heavily on German did not forestall the parallel 
development of other national cultures. Thus, the Baroque monarchy that had 
been forged by an alliance of crown, church and aristocracy was now supported 
by a much broader constituency that included an educated elite, a professional 
bureaucracy, and an imposing military establishment that literally spoke the same 
language. (Ingrao 2000: 218)  
Ingrao maintains that on the eve of the Napoleonic wars, the Habsburg monarchy 
in fact had fewer unresolved problems than at any time before or later. For instance, its 
systems of education and justice were models for the rest of the continent. Not 
insurgent nationalism, but the effect of the French Revolution and the subsequent wars 
proved fateful IRU WKH µFRUSRUDWH FXOWXUH¶ RI WKH +DEVEXUJ PRQDUFK\ ,W IRUFHG WKH
emperor and his government to suspend controversial domestic reforms and generally 
to repudiate progressive Enlightenment ideas (Ingrao 2000: 230-231).  
Alan Sked (2001), another iconoclastic historian, criticises Ingrao for being too 
timid in his rehabilitation of the Habsburg monarchy. Sked is particularly concerned to 
reject the view that the Austro-Hungarian empire of Francis I and Metternich 
represented a period of stagnation or reaction. He argues instead that the Metternich 
system was a continuation of the enlightened absolutism of Emperor Joseph II 
µ-RVHSKLQLVP¶7KH$XVWUR-+XQJDULDQ HPSLUH DW WKLV WLPH ³GHVSLWH LWV UHVLVWDQFH WR
democracy, was a progressive state by contemporary standards. In short, it was not in a 
VWDWHRIGHFOLQH´LELG1RVHULRXVSROLWLFLDQVFDOOHGIRULWVGLVVROXWLRQDQG³HYHQ
those who wanted reforms, wished to see them carried out within the framework of 
+DEVEXUJUXOH´LELG 
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Local nationalisms did indeed represent challenges to the integrity of the 
PRQDUFK\EXW6NHGILQGVQRHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH\SRVHG³DYLWDOWKUHDWE\´6NHG
+HDUJXHVWKDWZKLOHWKHQDWLRQDOLW\TXHVWLRQ³PLJKWKDYHOHGLQWKHORQJ
run to the downfall of the Monarchy, this did not happen before 1914; moreover, there 
is no reason to assume that if war had not broken out, more progress could not have 
EHHQPDGHWRZDUGVVROYLQJLWDIWHUWKDWGDWH´LELG6NHGFRQFOXGHVWKDWOLNHWKH
two other European empires, Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia,46 the Habsburg 
monarchy eventually succumbed mainly because it lost the First World War: 
The only conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that Austria-Hungary, 
Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia in 1914 were all completely viable states, 
quite similar to one another and not too unlike the states of Western Europe. 
Certainly, they faced many problems, yet most of the big issues were being 
tackled, just as western politicians in western countries found they had similar 
problems to tackle ± social inequality, industrial unrest, electoral and 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUP,WLVLQGHHGµPLVSODFHGGHWHUPLQLVP¶WKDWKROGVLW
impossible for these empires to have reformed successfully had peace been 
maintained in 1914. And for a historian this is philosophically unacceptable. 
Besides, it conflicts with the available evidence. (Sked 2001: 323) 
Seen against this background, it is not surprising that between 1848 and 1918, 
Habsburg lands proved particularly fertile ground for authors of projects for 
multinational federation (Bugge 1995). After the violent nationality conflict of 
Hungary in 1848-49, József Eötvös advocated federalism as a more appropriate 
solution for multinational states than a centralised nation-state according to the French 
UHYROXWLRQDU\ PRGHO 7KH &]HFK KLVWRULDQ )UDQWLãHN 3DODFNê SURSRVHG FUHDWLQJ D
federation out of the eight autonomous cultural national groups of the Habsburg 
Empire (Bóka 2003: 14-15). At its 1899 congress at Brno, the Pan-Austrian Socialist 
Party adopted a resolution demanding that Austria be transformed into an autonomous 
and multinational federal state with several official languages. The two leading Social  
                                              
 
 
46 Sked may here have added the Ottoman Empire, which like the Holy Roman and Habsburg Empires represented an 
imperial-cosmopolitan alternative to nationalism. 
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Democrat thinkers of Austria, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, later elaborated the federal 
argument in a number of publications (Zimmer 2003: 114-117). After the collapse of 
the Habsburg monarchy, Renner favoured European federation and joined 
Coudenhove-.DOHUJL¶V 3DQ-European Union movement (Bóka 2003: 16).47 The 
German national-liberal Friedrich Naumann, in a book called Mitteleuropa (1915), 
proposed a modernised, German-dominated version of the Holy Roman Empire of the 
*HUPDQ 1DWLRQ 7RPiã 0DVDU\N LQ KLV The New Europe (1918) countered with a 
scheme for a confederation of smaller Central European peoples as a stepping-stone 
towards eventual pan-European union.  
Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972), the indefatigable inter-war 
advocate of European federation and founder of the Pan-Europa movement, had an 
Austro-Hungarian diplomat as father and spent his pre-WWI years in Bohemia and 
Vienna. For Coudenhove, Switzerland was the best model for European federation. 
The fact that even the propagandists of the German Nazi party resorted to Europeanist 
discourse can be seen as an indication of its appeal on the continent.48 Otto von 
Habsburg, son of the last Habsburg emperor and member of the European Parliament 
for the Bavarian Christian-Social Union party from 1979 to 1999, has remained an 
ardent advocate of European union (and eastern EU enlargement). He headed the 
International Paneuropean Union, originally established by Coudenhove-Kalergi, from 
1986 to 2004.49 
As far as earlier proposals for European federation are concerned, we have 
already noted (above, page 229) the plan advanced by the Huguenot Duke of Sully in 
the early seventeenth century.  The increasingly frequent and ferocious wars in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries stimulated the publication of a growing number 
                                              
 
 
47 However, Austrian socialists and federalists like Renner and Bauer saw themselves as part of the German cultural nation 
and advocated unification with Germany. In 1911 the multinational Pan-Austrian Socialist Party split into separate national 
parties (Zimmer 2003: 117). 
48 +RZHYHULWRIFRXUVHVD\VQRWKLQJDERXWWKHYDOXHRIµWKH(XURSHDQLGHD¶DVVXFKFRQWUDU\WRZKDW/DXJKODQGDQG
other anti-EU authors imply. 
49 See http://www.paneuropa.org/intl/en/, accessed 15 March 2008. 
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of similar schemes for European federatiRQDVDJXDUDQWHHIRUµSHUSHWXDOSHDFH¶7KH
most notable plans were issued by William Penn in 1693, John Bellers in 1710, and by 
the abbot of Saint-Pierre (Charles-Irénée Castel) in 1713-17. Penn and Bellers were 
Quakers, and Saint-Pierre had been educated by Jesuits. Penn took the Dutch union as 
his model federation, while Bellers added Switzerland and his own United Kingdom 
(Heater 1992: 60).  
These democratically inclined thinkers envisaged a federation of constitutionally 
governed states. In his Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693), 
Penn proposed an elaborate parliamentary structure and procedure for Europe 
1XVVEDXP7KHYRWHVRIWKHGHOHJDWHVRIZKDWKHFDOOHGµWKHVRYHUHLJQRU
imperial diet, parliament or estate of EXURSH¶ ZHUH WR EH GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH \HDUO\
revenues or the foreign trade of the member states. Among the benefits accruing from 
unity and peace would be the saving of many lives, much money and considerable 
physical infrastructure, safer and easier travel, the improvement of the reputation of 
&KULVWLDQLW\ ³LQ WKH VLJKW RI WKH LQILGHO´ DV ZHOO DV JUHDWHU VHFXULW\ DJDLQVW the 
Ottomans (de Rougemont 1966: 111).  
Penn wished to include the Russian and Ottoman empires in the federation he 
proposed. Such ideas had been foreign to Sully and remained so to most later peace 
theorists. To them, the Muscovites and Turks were aliens. Saint-Pierre in his Projet 
pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe, invited only sovereigns of Christian Europe 
west of Russia to join a permanent alliance that would ensure joint peace and 
prosperity. Each member state would have one vote, and conflicts would be resolved 
by arbitration, the results of which would be adopted by majority voting (Heater 1992: 
73-74). It was however Rousseau who made Saint-3LHUUH¶V VFKHPH IDPRXVZLWK KLV
elaborate critique (see previous section). 
Elazar (1987: 115) argues that Calvinists were particularly inclined to support a 
federal type of government, calling the Calvinist theorists of modern federalism 
³IHGHUDOWKHRORJLDQV´$FRUHLGHDOZDVWKH-HZV¶FRYHQDQWZLWK*RG,QWKHVL[WHHQWK
FHQWXU\ ³WKH ELEOLFDO JUDQG GHVLJQ IRU KXPDQNLQG´ZDV ³UHFUHDWHG E\ WKH 5HIRUPHG
wing of Protestantism as the federal ideology from which Johannes Althusius, the 
  269 
Huguenots, the Scottish Covenanters, and the English and American Puritans 
GHYHORSHG SROLWLFDO WKHRULHV DQG SULQFLSOHV RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO GHVLJQ´ LELG 
Radical Calvinists and Zwinglian Protestants in Switzerland, Scotland, the 
Netherlands, England and parts of France and Germany, began to apply federalist 
SULQFLSOHVIRUVWDWHEXLOGLQJSXUSRVHV³7KH6ZLVVDQGWKH'XWFKFUHDWHGIHGHUDOVWDWHV
the Scots a national covenant; and the Puritans created the federal theology and 
organised their New England colonies and FKXUFKHVRQIHGHUDOSULQFLSOHV´LELG
Elazar notes that the French term for Protestant was Huguenot, which is a corruption of 
the German Eidgenossen, literally members of an oath-based association, or federation.   
Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) was a German Calvinist who lived, studied and 
worked in the border regions between what is now Germany and the Netherlands, as 
well as in Switzerland. His main work, Politica Methodice Digesta (1603), contained a 
universalist-ascending polemic against Jean BRGLQ¶V DEVROXWLVW SDUWLFXODULVW-
descending concept of sovereignty (Bóka 2003: 7). Onuf (1998: 129) argues that the 
µ&RQWLQHQWDO UHSXEOLFDQ¶ $OWKXVLXV ZDV WKH ILUVW H[SOLFLW DGYRFDWH RI SRSXODU
sovereignty. To Elazar, Althusius was the most articulate spokesman and systematic 
early theorist of federalism:  
Althusius was strongly influenced by the federal theology that had become the 
intellectual foundation of the Reformed wing of Protestantism during the course 
of the sixteenth century. It can hardly be a coincidence that the federal theology 
sprouted from the four intellectual centres of Switzerland, Basel, Bern, Geneva, 
and Zurich, in the very first days of the Reformation. It achieved its fullest 
theological and political expression in the last two, through John Calvin in 
Geneva and Ulrich Zwingli and his successor Heinrich Bullinger in Zurich. Both 
city-states became covenanted republics under the magistries of those figures and 
their colleagues. The writings of Calvin and Bullinger not only contributed 
dLUHFWO\WRWKH³QHZIHGHUDOLVP´RI$OWKXVLXVEXWLQVSLUHGDQHQWLUHSROLWLFDO
thought that strongly influenced modern republicanism and shaped the two 
federal polities of the time, Switzerland and the Netherlands, both of which were 
dominated by Reform Protestants. (Elazar 1987: 139) 
Also Burgess (2000: ch. 1) identifies early Calvinist and federal theorists like 
Heinrich Bullinger and Johannes Althusius, as well as the Puritan-inspired American 
federalist fathers, as intellectual ancestors of the post-1945 European integration 
PRYHPHQW +RZHYHU LW UHPDLQV XQFOHDU WR ZKDW H[WHQW WKHVH µIHGHUDO WKHRORJLDQV¶
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advocated European federation or just federal government in general. It seems prudent 
to assume that their Europeanism was latent and implicit, a logical upshot of their 
general federalist argument that turned explicit only if and where European union 
became a salient political issue. That was certainly more the case on the European 
continent, and especially in the imperial or city-belt core, than in the Atlantic 
periphery. 
Also the polymath Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) presented plans for European 
peace and unity. Although a Lutheran, Leibniz untiringly advocated Christian unity, 
working with both Lutheran and Catholic princes as well as the Habsburg, Holy 
Roman emperor. In 1677 and again in 1715 he called for a Dantean Reich Europa 
centered on a reinforced Roman-German empire, with a common religion and 
governed by a council or senate whose members would represent the member states 
(Gollwitzer 1951: 49; Heer 1968: 223-225).  Leibniz considered himself a citizen of 
WKHZRUOGZKR³ZDQWHGWRVHUYHDOORIPDQNLQG´TXRWHGE\GH5RXJHPRQW 
A more important early inspiration of modern Europeanism on the Continent was 
the eccentric French Count Henri de Saint-6LPRQ¶VDe la Réorganisation de la Societé 
(XURSpHQQHRXGHODQpFHVVLWpHWGHPR\HQVGHUDVVDPEOHUOHVSHXSOHVGHO¶(XURSHHQ
un seul corps politique en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale (1814). 
According to Hinsley (1963: 102), Saint-6LPRQ¶V -SODQ³ZDVDPRUHIDU-
reaching proposal for the federal reorganisation of Europe than anyone had ever 
SURSRVHG´,WFDPHWRLQIRUPPRVWRIWKHSHDFHSODQVSURGXFHGLQFRQWLQHQWDO(XURSH
in the next generation, all involving federation ± a single government ± for Europe. 
Saint-Simon insisted on parliamentary government and that the European federation he 
proposed should be a league of peoples rather than of governments.  
Saint-6LPRQ¶V LGHDVZHUH WDNHQXSE\$XJXVWH&RPWH-1857) and also by 
other radicals, such as Guiseppe Mazzini (1805- )RU0D]]LQL ³KXPDQLW\ZDV
not a cosmopolitan world split into immutable nation-states but a whole, created by 
God, that united peoples in the awareness of a common origin and an common future´
G¶$SSRORQLD$IWHUKLV<RXQJ,WDO\DQGRWKHUQDWLRQDOLVWPRYHPHQWVKDG
foundered on the co-ordinated resistance of the anciens régimes in 1830, Mazzini 
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founded Young Europe, an international association of progressive nationalists 
advocating the equality and fraternity of all peoples. In its statutes, a European 
IHGHUDWLRQZDVGHILQHGDV³DXQLW\WKDWZLOOEHIUHHVSRQWDQHRXVVXFKDVZRXOGH[LVWLQ
D UHJXODU )HGHUDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK DOO WKH SHRSOHV VLW LQ FRPSOHWH HTXDOLW\ >«@ HDFK
remaining mastHURILWVRZQLQWHUHVWVLWVORFDODIIDLUVLWVVSHFLDOIDFXOWLHV´TXRWHGE\
Hinsley 1963: 103).  
%\WKHVWKHWHUPµ8QLWHG6WDWHVRI(XURSH¶KDGEHFRPH³FRPPRQOLQJXLVWLF
FXUUHQF\´ +HDWHU   $PRQJ FRQWLQHQWDO SHDFH VFKHPHV LQVSLUHG E\ 6DLQt-
6LPRQ +LQVOH\   PHQWLRQV 3LHUUH /HURX[¶V Organon des vollkommenen 
Friedens  *XVWDYH G¶(LFKWDO¶V 'H O¶8QLWp (XURSpHQQH (1840); Victor 
&RQVLGpUDQW¶VDe la Politique générale et du rôle de la France en Europe (1840); and 
Constantin PecquerHXU¶VDe la Paix (1841). The founder of the Geneva Peace Society 
of 1830, the Count of Sellon, instituted the prize of a gold medal for the best essay 
outlining practical suggestions for realising the Grand Dessein of Henry IV. When 
French economists formed a Free Trade Society in 1847, their discussions soon led to 
the advocacy of a United States of Europe. Victor Hugo, welcoming the delegates to 
the third Universal Peace Congress in 1849 as president of the Congrés des Amis de la 
Paix, looked forward to the day when  
we shall see those two immense communities, the United States of America and 
the United States of Europe, holding hands across the sea. [...] A day will come 
when you, France ± you, Russia ± you, England ± you, Germany ± all of you, 
nations of the Continent, will, without losing your distinctive qualities and your 
glorious individuality, be blended into a superior unity and constitute a European 
fraternity [...] by the universal suffrage of the nations, by the venerable arbitration 
of a great sovereign senate, which will be to Europe what the Parliament is to 
England, what the Diet is to Germany, what the legislative Assembly is to France. 
(quoted by Hinsley 1963: 103-4) 
From the 1860s a considerable literature on federalism in the fields of history, 
SROLWLFVDQGODZHPHUJHGDOVRLQ%ULWDLQEHJLQQLQJZLWK-60LOO¶VConsiderations on 
Representative Government (1861). The Federalist Papers published by Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay between 1787 and 1788 were a main 
inspiration (Pinder 1991). The American Founding Fathers for their part were steeped 
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in British political philosophy, notably that of John Locke. But they were also inspired 
by e.g. Montesquieu, who advocated a confederal republic as an alternative to empire 
(Montesquieu 1990 [1743]: Book IX, Ch. 1). Most British federalists sympathised with 
the Liberal Party, whose ideology was strongly influenced by Locke. Its successor, the 
Liberal-Democratic Party is still the most Europeanist ± but now also the smallest ± of 
the major British parties. The idea of transforming the European overseas empires into 
confederations of nations, united by commercial ties and a common civilisation, was 
widespread in the Enlightenment. According to Pagden  (1995: 198-199), authors like 
Mirabeau, Turgot, Condorcet, Diderot, Aranda, Campomanes, Andrew Fletcher, 
Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, James Madison, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant 
advocated the replacement of the model of the Roman imperium by that the ancient 
Greek Achaean League. But only in British North America was this project for an 
µ(PSLUHRI/LEHUW\¶UHDOLVHG 
Organised movements, as opposed to individual authors, promoting liberal and 
radical schemes for European unity began emerging in the early nineteenth century. 
The extent to which these organisations were dominated by Reformed Protestants and 
Catholics is notable. So, however, is the divergence that gradually evolved within their 
ranks between the national-liberal internationalist ideology of the Anglo-Saxon world 
and the federalist discourse on the European Continent.  
The Anglo-American peace movement was centred on a number of Quaker or 
pacifist Peace Societies in England and America, and had ideas close to those of 
%HQWKDP DQG 0LOO 7KH 4XDNHUV ³KDG ORQJ JRQH EDFN RQ 3HQQ¶V advocacy of 
international organisation and now relied for progress entirely on a religious, moral 
DQGSDFLILVWDSSHDOWRWKHJRRGQHVVRIKXPDQQDWXUH´+LQVOH\$FFRUGLQJWR
Nussbaum (1954: 239), the first peace society was the New York Peace Society, 
founded in 1815 by the Quaker David L. Dodge. Quakers also founded the British 
Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace in 1816 (Hinsley 1963: 
7KH$PHULFDQ3HDFH6RFLHW\¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQGUDZQXSE\:LOOLDP/DGGLQ
was dirHFWO\ LQVSLUHGE\0LOO¶VHVVD\/DZRI1DWLRQV$NH\HOHPHQWRI/DGG¶VSODQ
ZDVD&RQJUHVVRI1DWLRQVEXW WKLV³ZDVQRPRUH WKDQZKDW%HQWKDPDQG0LOOKDG
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had in mind, international meetings to make possible the establishment of an 
international court for the settlement of such few genuine disputes as remained 
EHWZHHQFLYLOLVHGQDWLRQV´LELG 
The first Universal Peace Conference was organised by the British and American 
Peace Societies in London in 1843. These international conferences were instituted as 
a means of spreading the peace movement to the continent. However, Hinsley argues 
that the fact that delegates from the United Kingdom and the United States consistently 
outweighed those from the continent in the international peace congresses from 1843 
WR  LOOXVWUDWHV WKH JXOI WKDW KDG H[LVWHG ³EHWZHHQ (XURSH DQG WKH $QJOR-Saxon 
ZRUOG RQ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI SHDFH DQGZDU VLQFH WKH1DSROHRQLFZDUV´ +LQVOH\ 
100). Moreover, Anglo-Saxon, national-liberal internationalism was set on a 
³SHUPDQHQWO\ GLIIHUHQW FRXUVH´ WKDQ WKH FRVPRSROLWDQ-cum-federalist thinking on the 
Continent, at least from the middle of the eighteenth century (ibid.). In contrast to 
continental democrats and radicals, Anglo-Saxon liberals saw European political 
LQWHJUDWLRQDV³QRWVRPXFKXQDWWDLQDEOHDQGXQGHVLUDEOHDVXWWHUO\XQQHFHVVDU\´LELG
81). Hinsley elaborates:  
What shaped the attitude of England and America to the problem of peace and 
ZDUIURP%HQWKDP¶VGD\ZDVWKHULVHRIWKHHPSKDVLVRQPDWHULDODQGHFRQRPLF
as opposed to political, ends; the rise of conceptions of nation and society in 
antithesis to the conceptions of government and the state; and the rise of the 
conviction that, whereas there was a natural disharmony between governments 
and states, there was a natural harmony between nations and societies. These 
factors produced the belief that progress was destined to replace inter-
governmental relations by the free play of enlightened public opinion between 
societies. And when that day dawned ± when international relations became 
relations between nations or peoples ± war, which was materially profitless and 
absurd and morally wrong, would be replaced by free and peaceful economic 
competition, and such sources of dispute as still remained would easily be settled 
by judicial procedure.  (Hinsley 1963: 110-111) 
The wars of the third quarter of the nineteenth century (the Crimean war, the 
Franco-German war and the American civil war) were major setbacks for the Anglo-
American peace movement. Its members were surprised that national public opinion in 
IDFWVXSSRUWHGWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWV¶ZDUSROLFLHV,WVHHPHGWKDW³GHPRFUDF\± at least in 
the shape of the extension of the suffrages ± and nationalism were producing war 
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LQVWHDG RI SHDFH´ +LQVOH\   7KLV FDXVHG WKH peace societies to lose 
confidence in public opinion and to increase their lobbying of governments. At the 
same time Anglo-American liberals came to accept more international organisation as 
well as more domestic government. In 1864 the British Peace Society denounced 
QDWLRQDOLVPDV³DSRRUORZVHOILVKXQ-Christian idea [....], fatal not only to peace but 
WRDOOSURJUHVVLQOLEHUW\DQGJRRGJRYHUQPHQW´TXRWHGE\+LQVOH\ 
In 1867 a federalist International League of Peace and Liberty, publishing the 
journal /HV eWDWV 8QLV GH /¶(XURSH, was set up in Geneva under the presidency of 
Guiseppe Garibaldi. Its guiding spirit was the veteran Saint-Simonian Charles 
Lemonnier. Thirteen countries were represented at its first annual conference in 1868, 
which called for the United States of Europe on a republican basis. The call was 
repeated by the next conference, in 1869 (Hinsley 1963: 121). Hinsley further reports 
that 1876 saw the appearance of the Universal Parliamentary Peace Union, consisting 
of parliamentarians from many European countries. Arbitration and Peace societies 
were founded in Denmark, Sweden and Norway in 1882-3.50 In 1889 the Inter-
Parliamentary Conference for International Arbitration was founded, and in 1892 the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Inter-Parliamentary Bureau. These new groups in 
turn contributed to the foundation of peace societies in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Italy.  
Still according to Hinsley, growing nationalism and imperialism in the 1880s and 
1890s led to a resumption of peace congresses. The first Universal Peace Congress 
since the 1850s was held in 1889. The Universal Peace conference in Rome 1891 
invited the European Peace Societies to make the United States of Europe the chief 
aim of their propaganda.  The Universal Peace Congress of 1892 called for the 
confederation of Europe on the lines laid down earlier by Lemonnier, and established a 
permanent secretariat, the International Peace Bureau. Four distinct kinds of peace 
                                              
 
 
50 The Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel, who instituted the Nobel Peace Prize still awarded annually in Oslo, became a 
prominent supporter. 
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societies were represented: Anglo-American religious pacifists; secular pacifist 
OHDJXHV RUJDQLVDWLRQV PRGHOOHG RQ /HPRQQLHU¶V IHGHUDOLVW *HQHYD /HDJXH
international law associations and the International Arbitration and Peace Associaton 
of Great Britain and Ireland, founded by Hodgson Pratt in 1880. Arbitration was the 
only subject they could agree on (Hinsley 1963: 131).  
Agreement on setting up a Permanent Court of Arbitration was indeed the main 
result of the intergovernmental First and Second Peace Conferences at The Hague in 
1899 and 1907 respectively. Disappointed, the peace movement again turned to more 
radical federalist schemes (Hinsley 1963: 140). Now British liberals took over the 
initiative. Sir Max Waechter (1837-1924), a businessman and art collector born in 
Stettin, Germany (now Poland), embraced the idea of the United States of Europe in 
1909 and founded a European Unity League in 1913. The British Peace Society 
concurred, advocating a complete merger of sovereignties. The British Quakers 
approved of the United States of Europe in 1910, as did the British National Peace 
League in 1911.  
However, at the same time as parts of British opinion became more favourable, 
continental European radicals were turning against the unification of Europe. The 
major stumbling block was the question of whether tsarist Russia should be part of it. 
Non-German democrats and radicals found it impossible to include the Russian 
empire, which they identified with eastern despotism. At the same time, European 
pacifism was radicalised as the socialist movement embraced its tenets. The Second 
Socialist International accepted the Marxist view of imperialism and militarism as 
creatures of capitalist competition and warned that if the bosses provoked a war, 
workers would refuse to take part. Jean Jaurès defined the SUROHWDULDW DV ³PDVVHV RI
PHQZKR FROOHFWLYHO\ ORYH SHDFH DQG KDWHZDU´ 7KH %DVHO&RQIHUHQFH RI WKH
6HFRQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO GHFODUHG WKH SUROHWDULDW ³WKH KHUDOG RI ZRUOG SHDFH´ DQG
SURFODLPHG ³ZDU RQZDU´&RQWLQHQWDO&DWKROLF VRFLDOLVWV DQGDQDUFKLVWV, inspired by 
French intellectuals like Charles Fourier, Philippe Buchez and Joseph Proudhon, 
specifically advocated a decentralised, federal Europe. However, the Second 
International broke up in 1914 due to its inability to unite against the outbreak of the 
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war. Instead most of its individual member parties rallied to the nationalist cause of 
their respective governments.  
By now, nationalism had acquired racist overtones, in part influenced by the 
scientific ideas of Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, Sigmund Freud 
and others. The idea that not only individuals, but also races, nations, classes and 
civilisations struggle for survival and that only the fittest survive became enormously 
influential. War, eugenics, racial hygiene etc. were widely celebrated as necessary 
mechanisms for natural selection among such collectivities. Europe was assumed to be 
WKHELRORJLFDOO\IDYRXUHGFLYLOLVDWLRQWKH*HUPDQVWKHJUHDWHVWQDWLRQDQGµ$U\DQV¶WKH
superior race. In the interest of the progress of mankind, all of these had the right or 
even duty to suppress inferior people. Notably in Germany, but also in other countries 
WKDW FRXOG EH KDLOHG DV µ*HUPDQLF¶ %ULWDLQ 6FDQGLQDYLD WKH1HWKHUODQGV DQG HYHQ
France), social-darwinist and bio-political ideology eventually fomented extreme 
SDUWLFXODULVW LGHDV RI WKH VXSHULRULW\ RI WKH µ$U\DQ¶ UDFH DQG LWV ULJKW WR DFTXLUH
Lebensraum and to ethnic cleansing (extermination of Jews and Gypsies, in addition to 
homosexuals). More charitably, in the still relatively liberal British context Walter 
Bagehot translated the idea of natural selection into international affairs as the notion 
of progress through peaceful competition and best-practice learning among nations.51  
The outbreak of war in 1914 at first provoked a renewed demand from the peace 
PRYHPHQWIRUDIHGHUDO(XURSH)XUWKHUFDOOVZHUHUDLVHGDIWHU WKHZDUZKHQ3HQQ¶V
essay and extracts from Saint-Pierre and Rousseau were republished in London (Heater 
1992: 116). But the ardour soon cooled. The peace movement came to support the 
pragmatic idea of a post-war intergovernmental league rather than a European 
federation. By January 1917 most European governments had expressed their 
DJUHHPHQWZLWK86SUHVLGHQWDQGSURIHVVRURISROLWLFDOVFLHQFH:RRGURZ:LOVRQ¶V
proposal that a League of Nations should be established. The creation of the League 
                                              
 
 
51 A national-liberal discourse still much cherished by the magazine he edited, The Economist, and now institutionalised in 
WKH(8¶V/LVERQVWUDWHJ\ZKLFKZDVLQVWLJDWHGEy the UK under the premiership of Tony Blair. 
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ZDVFHQWUDOLQ:LOVRQ¶V)RXUWHHQ3RLQWVIRU3HDFHQRWDEO\WKHILQDOSRLQW³$JHQHUDO
association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great 
DQGVPDOOVWDWHVDOLNH´ 
7KH/HDJXHZDVIRXQGHGLQE\WKHDGRSWLRQRIDµFRYHQDQW¶DZRUGFKRVHQ
E\:LOVRQDVKHVDLG³EHFDXVH,DPDQROG3UHVE\WHULDQ´(%KThe Covenant 
ZDV HPERGLHG LQ WKH 9HUVDLOOHV DQG RWKHU SHDFH WUHDWLHV 7KH /HDJXH¶V LQVWLWXWLRQV
established in Geneva, consisted of an Assembly, in which each member country had a 
veto and an equal vote, and a smaller (Security) Council of four permanent members 
and four (later six, then nine) temporary members chosen by the Assembly.  
French statesmen such as Éduard Herriot and Aristide Briand, whom 
Coudenhove-Kalergi engaged for the pan-European cause, found the League too weak 
and heterogeneous. As Bugge notes, the Great War had been fought in large part on 
)UHQFKWHUULWRU\DQGKDG³KDGDSURIRXQGLPSDFWRQ)UHQFKQRWLRQVRI(XURSH´%XJJH
1995: 101). The French government became preoccupied with finding durable means 
to maintain peace in Franco-German relations. Herriot in 1925 made a speech in favour 
of a United States of Europe within the larger framework of the League of Nations. 
%ULDQGIROORZHGXSLQDQDGGUHVVWRWKH/HDJXHLQFDOOLQJIRU³DVRUWRIIHGHUDO
OLQN´EHWZHHQ(XURSHDQQDWLRQV$ERXt a year later, he presented his famous Briand 
PHPRUDQGXPZKHUH KH FDOOHG IRU D (XURSHDQ ³PRUDO XQLRQ´ KRZHYHU ZLWKRXW DQ\
supranational power. But even this modest proposal (modest because Briand wanted 
British participation) came to nothing, mainly due to British opposition (Bugge 1995: 
101- 7KH /HDJXH HVWDEOLVKHG D ³&RPPLVVLRQ RI (QTXLU\ IRU (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ´
which discussed the plan from 1930 to 1932 without concluding on any next steps 
(Kaiser 2007: 106). 
The League of Nations was the first permanent and general intergovernmental 
organisation. It scored both notable successes and conspicuous fiascos, but failed the 
ultimate test of preventing another world war. In 1946 it was replaced by the United 
Nations, a truly universal organisation. The UN has a similarly national-liberal 
structure as the League of Nations, but the UN Security Council received a stronger 
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mandate and has been better able to launch peacekeeping operations than the League 
of Nations Council.  
The Europeanist-ascending character of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
established in 1952, was far clearer. The reason was not only the lessons drawn from 
the debacle of the toothless League and from World War II, but also, crucially, that it 
was founded by mainly Christian-democratic governments from core Europe. The rise 
of Catholic-oriented political parties and their tentative initiatives towards 
transnational party co-operation between the two World Wars are therefore of the 
greatest significance in the present context.   
I discussed the evolution of Catholic thought on Europe until World War I in 
Section 3.8.1, and role of Christian democrats in the establishment of the European 
Union will be the focus of Part 4. However, it was in the early interwar years that 
Catholics got increasingly engaged in secular politics and that political Catholicism 
developed a Europe-wide sense of shared purpose and common identity (Kaiser 2007: 
42). Catholic parties scored notable successes, not least in Belgium. In Germany, the 
Centre Party formed part of government throughout the Weimar Republic. Pope 
Benedict XV encouraged Catholic party mobilisation, primarily to thwart the progress 
RI WKH OHIW ,Q  KH OLIWHG WKH EDQ RQ &DWKROLFV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQ ,WDOLDQ SROLWLFV
giving his blessing to the new Catholic-dominated, but non-confessional PPI. The 
party had been established the year before by the left-leaning Sicilian priest Luigi 
Sturzo.  
The participation of Catholics in World War I had boosted their national 
credentials, easing the acceptance of Catholic-dominated parties in post-war national 
politics. Increased competition with internationally oriented, class-based socialist and 
communist parties encouraged greater co-operation between such parties and the 
growing Catholic trade union and social reform movement. Catholic unions and 
ZRUNHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVSOD\HGDFUXFLDOUROHLQWKHDWWHPSWWRELQG&DWKROLFZRUNHUVWR
&DWKROLF SDUWLHV &UXFLDOO\ WKHVH XQLRQV DQG DVVRFLDWLRQV SURYLGHG D ³VRFLDO DQG
LGHRORJLFDO EULGJH´ EHtween Catholic parties and moderate socialist and left-liberal 
parties, preventing an exclusive orientation towards co-operation with conservative 
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and fascist forces (Kaiser 2007: 48). Left- or liberal-leaning Catholics also began to 
contemplate European party co-operation and policy formulation. With the 
establishment of a French Catholic-dominated party in 1924, the Parti Démocrate 
Populaire (PDP), a crucial precondition for this was put in place.  
At the same time transnational contacts between Catholic trade unions, 
industrialists and intellectuals developed. In 1920, the International Federation of 
Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) was established. It held seven congresses until the 
outbreak of World War II. Regular contacts between Catholic workers associations led 
to the founding of a Catholic Workers International (CWI) in 1928 (Kaiser 2007: 64-
65).  
In December 1925 the Sécretariat Internationale des Partis Démocratiques 
G¶,QVSLUDWLRQ&KUpWLHQQH6,3',&ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQ3DULVE\WKH&DWKROLF-dominated 
parties of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Poland (ibid: 86). Many Catholic 
politicians, e.g. Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi, were involved in several of 
WKHVHQHWZRUNV7KH33,¶V6WXU]RZDVDGULYLQJIRUFH LQ WKHFUHDWLRQRI WKLVµSRSXODU
intHUQDWLRQDO¶ ZKLFK KH VDZ DV D VWHS WRZDUGV WKH ORQJ-term goal of a political 
federation in Europe (ibid.: 79). Also the leader of the German Centre Party, Joseph 
Joos, supported by Konrad Adenauer, denounced nationalism and propagated 
European federalism. .DLVHU VHHV WKLV DV UHIOHFWLQJ ³WKH WUDGLWLRQDO SUHIHUHQFH RI
Rhenish-Westfalian Catholicism for a more federal organisation of Germany with the 
aim of overcoming Prussian-3URWHVWDQWKHJHPRQ\´LELG6,3',&ZDVGRPLQDWHG
by left-leaning or liberal Catholics, but some conservatives also played a role. Robert 
Schuman was one of them (ibid.: 97; see below, page 292). The Catholic parties, 
notably the PDP, the PPI and the Centre Party, supported the Europeanist Briand 
initiative. TKHDQQXDOFRQJUHVVRIWKH3'3LQGHFODUHGWKDW³(XURSHDQ8QLRQKDV
QHYHUEHHQPRUHHVVHQWLDO´TXRWHGLELG 
When the Briand Plan came to nothing, SIPDIC devoted its annual congress of 
1932 to the theme of European economic integration. It adopted a resolution calling for 
D µFRPPRQ PDUNHW¶ IRU WKH SURGXFWLRQ DQG WUDGH RI JRRGV DQG IRU OLEHUDOLVLQJ
HFRQRPLF SROLFLHV LQ IDYRXU RI  D ³IUHHU  H[FKDQJH RI JRRGV FDSLWDO DQG SHRSOH´
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(quoted ibid: 107). It also advocated Europe-wide measures to stabilise the income of 
farmers. However, SIPDIC lost much of its momentum and rationale when Hitler 
dissolved the Centre Party. It continued as a forum of discussion but without national 
congresses until January 1939 (ibid: 111).  
According to Kaiser (ibid.: 117-118), the long-term significance of SIPDIC was, 
firstly, that it succeeded in establishing a transnational network of Catholic parties 
outside the direct control of the Vatican. Secondly, it facilitated a collective learning 
process, notably in the sense of realising that European co-operation among Catholic 
parties had to be pro-democratic and share some core strategic objectives. Thirdly, it 
was realised that a main such objective had to be European reconciliation and 
integration, and, significantly in view of post-war developments, that integration 
should start with the economy. 
3.9 Conclusion 
In Part 3, I have identified the Roman Empire, the Roman Church and the Holy 
Roman/Habsburg empire as the main institutional sources of proto-Europeanist 
discourse in the pre-1945 history of Europe. They represented a mainly top-down, or 
descending, form of government, but generally both the Roman and the Christian ethos 
IDYRXUHG D EHQLJQ DWWLWXGH WR GLYHUVLW\ LQ µWKH EURWKHUKRRG RIPDQNLQG¶ WKRXJK WKH
Roman Church became increasingly intolerant of religious dissidence). The Roman 
legacy indeed incorporates a powerful memory of early Roman republicanism as well 
as of Greco-Roman cosmopolitanism. The Holy Roman and Habsburg empires were so 
diverse and decentralised as to be federal in all but name. Christian ideology is of 
course also fundamentally universalist and egalitarian.  
The ascendancy of particularist, or nationalist, discourse resulted mainly from the 
fragmentation of unitary Christendom into a Europe of autonomous polities. Absolutist 
rulers propagated the notion of territorial sovereignty, which eventually turned into the 
hegemonial, particularist-ascending idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the 
Protestant states of north-western Europe were the pioneHUVWKHLUNLQJV¶FRQWURORIWKH
church being an important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was 
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particularly conducive to particularism, which in the German context turned 
exclusivist, ethnic and eventually racist. Two cataclysmic showdowns in the twentieth 
century in which nationalism was a major factor discredited racism, but did not 
conclusively wreck the particularist paradigm. The question of whether a supranational 
authority with some real powers would be erected or sovereignty would stay fully with 
the individual states of Europe remained open. As we will see immediately, attitudes to 
this question turned out to be territorially differentiated according to the pattern already 
outlined. National-liberal, Protestant Britain and Scandinavia advocated the latter 
solution and the Catholic Christian-democrats of continental and southern Europe the 
former, with Calvinist and/or republican city-state Europeans taking a cosmopolitan 
middle course.  
The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis postulated at the end of Part 2 has held up well 
in the historical discussion. Its territorial, centre-periphery perspective is relevant, as is 
its emphasis on the confessional differentiation brought about by the Reformation. The 
fragmented political structure of city-belt Europe, its role as buffer area and 
battleground for the centralising states around it, and the growth of trade and 
capitalism (as well as Calvinism) indeed facilitated the growth of cosmopolitan 
Europeanness and Europeanism, notably among the emerging middle class and liberal 
intellectuals. Similarly, the emergence of varieties of Protestantism that tended to 
identify with the nation-state in northern Europe (England, Scandinavia, Prussia) 
facilitated particularist attitudes.  
But such an explanation of the Europeanisation of the city-belt creates the 
impression that it happened by default, without any ideologically conscious and 
resolute institutional agents. The role the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires and notably 
of the Papacy/Roman Church as historical-institutional agents of universalist, proto-
Europeanist ideology in all parts of Europe under their sway therefore need to be more 
strongly emphasised. Rome, represented by the Roman Church as well as by 
successive Roman empires, is a more important territorial and historical source of 
Europeanism than city-studded Central Europe. The Christian Democratic parties of 
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Western continental Europe were to give its legacy a new lease of life after World War 
II.   
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4. Present Sources of European Union 
4.1 Introduction  
In the context outlined in Part 2 above, I defined interest as a mainly short-term, 
material concern and ideology and identity as ideational products of historical 
experience and interpretations of the past. Then in Part 3, I extensively discussed 
historical sources of Europeanist and nationalist ideology, arguing that they have 
created a territorially and politically differentiated potential for European union in 
geographical Europe. In this final part of the study, I will explore the interplay between 
these past and present sources of European union, or between political-ideological and 
economic-material motivations for and against integration after 1945. I will not 
rehearse the history of European integration in any detail, nor engage in 
interpretational polemics. The focus remains the territorial distribution of 
Europeanism, which after the war became politically salient and determined the nature 
and scope of the first pan-European institutions. I will emphasise the early history of 
European integration because that was when the historically defining framework as 
well as the basic pattern of support and opposition emerged.  
The scholarly debate over post-1945 European integration has been marked by 
similar cleavages as the political debate. As I indicated in Part 2, the field was first 
dominated by American political scientists who presented a liberal internationalist 
interpretation, neofunctionalism (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold 
1970; etc.). They held that integration is basically driven by the needs of an 
increasingly interdependent international economy and transnational economic agents, 
DLGHGE\VXSUDQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDODJHQFLHVDQGµVSLOORYHU¶IURPRQHSROLF\VHFWRUWR
another. Later federalist interpretations (Lipgens 1982; Pinder 1995; Burgess 2000; 
etc.) emphasise the role of individuals and pressure groups explicitly or implicitly 
pursuing a federalist political vision. Against the supranational or transnational 
emphasis of these writings, intergovernmentalist interpretations (Taylor 1983; Milward 
1984, 1992; Dedman 1996; Moravcsik 1998; etc.) insist that member states and their 
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national interests have remained decisive. According to Alan Milward, European 
integration, far from signalling the end of the nation-state, was in fact devised in order 
WR³UHVFXH´LWIURPFROODSVHDIWHU:RUOG:DU%RWK0LOZDUGDQG$QGUHZ0RUDYFVLN
see the European Union as mainly an economic policy device, arising from a 
coincidence of national material interest.  
However, as I have indicated (above, Chapter 2.3), Moravcsik in his historical 
analysis of the five treaty negotiations from Messina to Maastricht takes care to 
highlight the significance of federalist and nationalist ideological predispositions. 
Although he concludes that usually their influence was secondary, he admits that in 
some instances they were primary and that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain which 
was more important. In one place he even concedes that in eight out of fifteen British, 
French and German policy stances over the forty years he has studied, geopolitical 
LGHRORJ\SOD\HGDVHFRQGDU\³RUSDUDOOHO´UROH0RUDYFVLN 
<HW 0RUDYFVLN¶V FODLP WKDW FRPPHUFLDO DGYDQWDJH UHODWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU
and the credibility of commitments are sufficient rather than just necessary conditions 
of post-ZDU(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQLVSUREOHPDWLF:KLOHDQ\DVVLJQPHQWRIµVXIILFLHQW¶
UDWKHUWKDQµQHFHVVDU\¶VWDWXVWRIDFWRUVFDQEHFRQWHVWHGZLWK:ROIUDP.DLVHU,
will argue that such rather short-term materialist and rationalist explanations would be 
insufficient if ideologically Europeanist Christian-democratic parties had not been in 
power in the six founding states in the crucial period. Thus ideological as well as 
territorial variables rooted in the past must be added before we can claim to have a 
µVXIILFLHQW¶ DFFRXQW RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ VXFK DV LW LV UDWKHU WKDQ RI HJ ()7$
Moravcsik in fact practically admits as much: 
If the fifty-year post-war boom in trade and investment among industrialised 
nations rendered a measure of trade liberalisation, regulatory harmonisation, and 
monetary stabilisation inevitable, it is nonetheless likely that the EC would have 
evolved differently in the absence of a parallel set of geopolitical preferences for 
and against European integration. The likely outcome absent the impact of 
geopolitical concerns would have been a trade arrangement closer to the free 
trade area repeatedly proposed by Britain, backed by a series of bilateral and 
global agreements on multilateral trade and investment. (Moravcsik 1998: 477)   
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With his groundbreaking historical research, Kaiser has brought agency, partisan 
advocacy, political leadership, and ideology back to centre stage of the theoretical 
debate over European integration. Like the neofunctionalists and federalists, he 
highlights the significance of transnational and supranational networks and actors, but 
he is much more empirically specific as to the causal mechanisms involved than them. 
He agrees with historical institutionalists that the original design of the European Coal 
and Steel Community of 1952 was decisive for the later development of the EU, but 
avers that they have insufficiently specified the human agents and networks involved. 
To Kaiser, transnationally organised Christian democratic parties represent the missing 
link between the federalist heroes identified by Lipgens and the entrenchment of 
federalist principles in European institutions.  
The key to understanding why the present-day European Union was launched on 
a supranational path in 1952, is the fact that Christian democratic parties dominated the 
foreign policies of the six founding states for close to twenty years after the war, and 
that they were able to formulate and realise a joint Europeanist policy largely through 
WKHLU WUDQVQDWLRQDO SDUW\ QHWZRUN .DLVHU FULWLFLVHV WKH LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVWV¶ VWDWH-
FHQWULVPDVZHOODV WKHLU³H[WUHPHRYHU-UHOLDQFHRQJRYHUQPHQWDOVRXUFHV´ZKLFKKH
WKLQNV ³KDV EOLQGHG WKHP WR WKH FUXFLDO DJHQGD-setting role of partly transnationally 
constituted political forces in western European democracies after 1945, and their 
shared norms and policy ideas for initiating and driving the integration process 
IRUZDUG´.DLVHU 
I agree with Kaiser that the European Union is neither an inevitable by-product of 
a globalising economy nor the feat of heroic entrepreneurship by individual federalists. 
It is a contingent political construction launched by transnationally networked agents, 
strategically placed both in governments and parties in key countries. They saw and 
acted upon a historically unique window of opportunity when the balance between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces in Europe favoured union. Structurally enabling 
factors were related to economic interest, political ideology, reason and learning, as 
well as territorial context. There was a long and venerable tradition of universalism 
and/or cosmopolitanism as well as of federalism in continental Europe; the six most 
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Europeanist states were contiguous not only territorially but also historically, 
economically and culturally; they represented the highest degree of European cultural 
unity and thus the deepest sense of Europeanness; and the idea of a United States of 
Europe had been discussed with increasing intensity and publicity since at least the 
seventeenth century, especially in core, i.e. Carolingian-Lotharingian, Europe (see 
notably Section 3.8.4 above).  
More short-term, contingent factors included first of all the devastating learning 
experience of World War II, which had demonstrated more patently than any previous 
war the destructive potential of nationalism and inter-state rivalry when combined with 
modern technology, industry and communications. This helped give the European 
federalist movement a considerable boost after the war. Moreover, Carolingian-
Lotharingian core Europe now shared key national interests, notably economic 
integration and political unity vis-à-YLV WKH 6RYLHW µ2WKHU¶ (XURSHDQ XQLRQ FRXOG
reconcile the West German interest in regaining sovereignty to the interest of France 
and others in limiting that sovereignty by sharing some of it at the European level. The 
foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949 confirmed previous lessons learned that 
unity with some effective supranational elements would not be possible with Britain as 
a member. In addition, the international environment (U.S. support of European union 
after 1947; the Cold War; the Korean war) was propitious, as was the general trend 
towards interdependence in the international economy as well as in technology and 
communications.  
However, in spite of all this, the European Union such as it is would most likely 
not exist today had not transnationally networked, Christian democratic parties held 
³KHJHPRQ\E\GHIDXOW´LQWKHVL[VWDWHVRI³FRUH(XURSH´IRUDERXWWZHQW\\HDUVDIWHU
the war. The Europeanist cause had sympathisers across the political spectrum, but it 
ZDV WUDQVQDWLRQDO &KULVWLDQ GHPRFUDF\ WKDW SURYLGHG LWZLWK µVXIILFLHQW¶ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
momentum and legitimacy in post-war Europe. Thus the Christian democratic parties, 
GHILQLQJWKHPVHOYHVDVWKHµSDUWLHVRI(XURSH¶HPEUDFHGWKHXQLYHUVDOLVW-Europeanist 
legacy previously espoused by the twin institutions of the Roman Church and the 
Roman Empire, and gave it a modern, secular expression.  
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However, this passing of the baton meant that the universalist discourse now 
definitely changed from advocating descending to defending an ascending locus of 
sovereignty. Thus the promotion of a supranational, democratically elected European 
Parliament, controlling a constitutionally constrained European government, became a 
key element of the post-war Christian democratic discourse on Europe.  
4.2 Postwar patterns of Europeanism 
Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the interwar Paneuropan Union, 
returned to Europe from American exile in 1946.52 Coudenhove perceived an essential 
change in attitudes and thought the wave of nationalism that had caused two world 
wars, had at last exhausted itself.  The people were now ready for federation, he 
gathered, but their governments were still beset by pre-war ultra-nationalism.  Kalergi 
hence wrote to the about 4000 national 
parliamentarians in Western Europe, asking them 
ZKHWKHURUQRW WKH\IDYRXUHG³WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of a European federation within the framework 
RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV´ +H UHFHLYHG DOWRJHWKHU
1735 answers, only 52 of which contained a 
µ1R¶ 7KH SURSRUWLRQ RI µ<HDV¶ RXW RI WKH WRWDO
membership of the national parliaments is 
reported in Table 1. 
7KHUHVXOWRI.DOHUJL¶s enquiry represents a 
pattern of Europeanism that has largely persisted 
throughout the post-war period, at least until the 
enlargement of 2004. In their discourse analysis 
of the attitudes of French, German and British 
                                              
 
 
52 In the U.S, together with Rudolf and Otto von Habsburg, he had toyed with the idea of a resurrected Habsburg empire 
(Kaiser 2007: 183). 
Table 1: Percentage of 
3DUOLDPHQWDULDQV¶<HDVWR
Coudenhove-.DOHUJL¶V/HWWHURQ
European Federation in 1946 
Italy 64% 
Greece 58% 
Luxembourg 56% 
Netherlands 53% 
Belgium 50% 
France 50% 
Switzerland 50% 
Britain 26% 
Ireland 25% 
Scandinavia 12% 
 
Source: Lipgens, W. (1982), A 
History of European Integration, i, 
1945-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press): 439-440. 
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political parties to European polity ideas from 1950 to 1995, Jachtenfuchs, Diez and 
Jung (1998) found a clear continuity over time. The diagram below, showing a 
³(XURSHDQLVP ,QGH[´EDVHGRQ WKH0DQQKHLP(XUREDURPHWHU7UHQGV ILOH-2002 
ed. 2.0, illustrates that Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece (the latter after some initial 
hesitation) have had a more Europeanist public opinion than the EU average and that 
the publics of Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Norway have been the most negative. 
However, as also appears, Danish public opinion has turned considerably more 
favourable since the 1990s. Greece and Ireland too represent interesting cases, having 
gone from more negative to more positive attitudes than the average. 
This pattern of public and parliamentary opinion coincides quite closely with 
government policies towards European integration after the war. Most obviously, it 
was the six states with the most favourable public opinion that launched the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community in 1958. 
The United Kingdom joined reluctantly, having unsuccessfully advanced 
intergovernmentalist alternatives such as the OEEC (OECD), the Council of Europe 
and EFTA. The UK and other northern latecomers generally also continued to resist 
attempts by the original six to federalise and extend the policy ambit of the EU. The 
UK, Denmark and Sweden remain outside the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
and Denmark maintains three other opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty too. The UK 
RQO\ MRLQHG WKH6LQJOH(XURSHDQ$FW¶V6RFLDO&KDSWHUZKHQ7RQ\%ODLU WRRNRYHUDV
prime minister. The UK and (therefore) Ireland are not part of the Schengen area. 
Denmark has held six controversial referenda on EU issues (on membership, on the 
SEA, twice on the treaty of Maastricht, on the treaty of Amsterdam, and on EMU). 
Norway has two times rejected EU membership after obtaining negative majorities in 
highly divisive referenda, and remains the only country not having joined after 
completing accession talks. 
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However, as we will see below, even if at the national level of analysis the six 
founding states have represented the Europeanist core of the European integration 
process, there have been important gradations of Europeanism at the sub-national 
levels. At each stage, transnationally minded and organised Christian democracy has 
constituted the core of the core. 
4.3 The Council of Europe 
During the war the idea of European federation was chiefly nurtured by the 
continental non-Communist resistance, notably in Italy (Lipgens 1982). However, 
Altiero Spinelli drew largely on pre-war British federalist literature (see above, page 
271) when he drafted the Ventotene Manifesto and founded the Italian movement for 
European federation (Movimento Federalista Europea) while interned on the island of 
Ventotene (Dedman 1996: 17, 20). Also the Czechoslovak, French, Dutch, Polish and 
Yugoslav resistance published tracts favouring some kind of federal organisation of 
post-war Europe. But it was Italian activists who took the initiative to a meeting of 
resistance fighters in neutral Switzerland in 1944. The participants adopted a 
declaration advocating a federal Europe to which only Norwegian and Danish 
participants appear to have objected (Urwin 1995: 8-9). On 22 November 1944, the 
French Consultative Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the 
JRYHUQPHQWWR³SUHSDUHDQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQZKLFKZLOOOHDGWKHFRPPXQLW\RI
states towards a federation of free peoples within which the regional unions will not be 
LQGDQJHURIJLYLQJULVHWRKRVWLOHEORFNV´TXRWHGE\/LSJHQV1982: 217).  
However, the hopes of the continental resistance that after the war, Britain 
together with France would take the lead towards a federal Europe were dashed. 
Churchill and the Conservatives lost the 1945 election to the Labour Party and its 
leader Clement Attlee, who proved decidedly lukewarm on European union. Moreover, 
newly installed democratic governments in western continental Europe were too busy 
with regrouping and reconstruction to pay much attention to the Europeanist cause. But 
ChurchilO¶V  6HSWHPEHU  VSHHFK LQ =ULFK IRU ³D NLQG RI 8QLWHG 6WDWHV RI
(XURSH´&KXUFKLOOLQDXJXUDWHGDQLGHRORJLFDOUHYLYDOZKLFKZDVIDFLOLWDWHGE\
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the continuing economic problems in Europe as well as a radical change of U.S. policy 
in favour of (XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ7KH$PHULFDQVKLIWWRZDUGVµHPSLUH¶E\LQWHJUDWLRQ
(Lundestad 1998) in 1947 was a reaction to the policies of Stalin, and also led to the 
declaration of the Truman doctrine and to the Marshall Plan. Further conducive factors 
were the emerging division of Germany into a western democratic and an eastern 
communist part, and the domination also of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Romania by the Soviet Union.  
Britain, supported by Ireland and the Scandinavian countries, initially opposed 
WKH IRUPDWLRQ RIZKDW EHFDPH WKH&RXQFLO RI(XURSH IDYRXULQJ LQVWHDG ³OLWWOHPRUH
WKDQDQHIIHFWLYH LQWHUORFNLQJV\VWHPRI WUHDWLHV´ 8UZLQ)RUHLJQPLQLVWHU
(UQHVW%HYLQLVIDPRXVO\VXSSRVHGWRKDYHVDLGRIWKHLQLWLDWLYH³,GRQ¶WOLNHLW,GRQ¶W
OLNH LW :KHQ \RX RSHQ WKDW 3DQGRUD¶V ER[ \RX ZLOO ILQG LW IXOO RI 7URMDQ KRUVHV´
(quoted by Hewstone 1986: VI). To forestall more federalist schemes, Bevin took the 
initiative to the Treaty of Brussels, concluded with France, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg in 1948. The treaty was a fifty-year pact for collaboration in 
economic, social and cultural matters, and for collective self-defence. However, the 
Hague congress of the European Movement and U.S. as well as Belgian, French and 
Italian government support led to the foundation of the Council of Europe on 10 May 
1949 by ten states ± Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. At the last minute Britain defeated a French 
and Italian proposal that the new body should be named the European Union (Urwin 
1995: 34). Britain also made sure that although the Council had a wide remit, it did not 
impinge on national sovereignty. Europeanist proposals adopted by majority vote in the 
parliamentary Consultative Assembly had no purchase with the unanimity-bound 
Committee of Ministers.  
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4.4 The European Coal and Steel Community 
+RZHYHU WKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH¶VSDUOLDPHQWDU\DVVHPEO\SURYHGDQ LPSRUWDQW
forum for transnational party co-operation and joint European policy formulation, 
notably for the Christian Democratic parties (Kaiser 2007: 179-180). Moreover, the 
experience with the Council of Europe and the debates in its assembly strengthened the 
conviction of the core Europe governments, dominated by Christian Democratic 
parties, that they had to proceed towards union without Britain. On 9 May 1950 the 
French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, proposed a pooling and joint administration 
RIFRDODQGVWHHOUHVRXUFHV³DVDILUVWVWHSLQWKHIHGHUDWLRQRI(XURSH´53 The plan had 
been formulated by Jean Monnet, who had been deputy secretary general to the League 
of Nations 1919-1923.  
Monnet was a well-connected pragmatist without party affiliation, but with a 
strong liberal internationalist and Europeanist persuasion. He came from a traditional 
Catholic background in Cognac, France, and married a devoutly Catholic wife, but was 
apparently not very religious himself  (Duchêne 1994: 56). Schuman came from 
Alsace-Lorraine and was a pious Catholic. Luxembourgish was his first language and 
German the second; he had fought in the German army 1914-1918; and only became a 
French citizen in 1919 (Dedman 1996: 57).  
Walter Lipgens, who was an active member of the German Christian Democrat 
Party (CDU) and also of the German federalist movement (Kaiser 2007: 5), argues that 
Europeanist advocacy by federalists in the resistance and in the immediate post-war 
years gave crucial momentum to the European integration process. In 1946 
Europeanist associations in Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland were amalgamated into the Union of European 
Federalists. Their membership doubled to 200,000 between 1947 and 1950 (Dedman 
1996: 11). In May 1948 some 750 delegates representing 16 countries and most 
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political persuasions met in The Hague to discuss European union. Among them were 
Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, Harold Macmillan, François 
Mitterrand, and Altiero Spinelli. Most conspicuous was the absence of a strong 
delegation from the British Labour Party (Urwin 1995: 30). In October the same year 
the international European Movement was founded, with Duncan Sandys (the son-in-
law of Churchill) as president and Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, Alcide de Gasperi 
and Paul-Henri Spaak as honorary presidents.  
Kaiser (2007) however reminds us that the decisions to institutionalise 
supranationalist European integration had to be made by politicians, and that in this 
respect the driving role of the Christian democratic parties was crucial. Not least due to 
widespread fear of Soviet-sponsored communism, Catholic-dominated parties scored 
great electoral successes after the war, notably in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and 
West Germany. Even in France, where the Christian democratic PDP had received only 
about 3 per cent of the vote in the interwar years, its successor, the newly created 
Mouvement Républican Populaire (MRP) achieved a breakthrough by polling 28.2 per 
cent in June 1946. Even if electoral support declined later, at least in France, Catholic 
parties remained the major partner or one of the major coalition partners in the 
JRYHUQPHQWVRIµFRUH(XURSH¶IRUDERXW WZHQW\\HDUVDIWHUWKHZDU$V.DLVHU
FKSXWVLWWKH\KHOG³KHJHPRQ\E\GHIDXOW´ 
A decisive difference between pre-war and post-war Catholic-dominated parties 
was that the latter were fully committed to parliamentary democracy. No non-
democratic party from the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe were tolerated in their 
transnational network, nor was membership of the ECSC or the EEC for authoritarian 
VWDWHVOLNH6SDLQVHULRXVO\DGYRFDWHGE\&KULVWLDQ'HPRFUDWVIURPµFRUH(XURSH¶7KLV
marginalised Catholic traditions influenced by nationalism and authoritarianism 
(Kaiser 2007: 170, 178).  
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
53 http://europa.eu/aBC/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm, accessed 13 January 2008. 
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The heyday of the Christian democratic influence on the foreign and European 
policies of core Europe was the period from 1945 until about 1965. This singular era of 
reconstruction, growth and Cold War presented them with a window of opportunity to 
develop and implement, with cross-party support where necessary, their own concept 
for European cooperation and integration (Kaiser 2007: 179). Through transnational 
party networks, European supranational institutions as well as intergovernmental 
contacts Christian democracy LQFRUH(XURSHFDPHWRGHILQHLWVHOIVLPSO\DVµWKHSDUW\
RI(XURSH¶ 
¶(XURSH¶EHFDPHXSJUDGHGLQWKHFRXUVHRI&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDWLFSDUW\
networking and intergovernmental decision-making in the first decade after 
World War II to their main collective policy instrument. In the face of the 
external Soviet and domestic communist challenge in the Cold War, their 
evolving European policy was designed to simultaneously overcome the legacy of 
nationalism and national conflict and find common European-level solutions to 
domestic socio-HFRQRPLFLVVXHVµ(XURSH¶WKXVEHFDPHDFRUHHOHPHQWRIWKH
&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDWLFSDUWLHV¶SRVW-war identities, contributing in a major way to 
their distinctiveness in domestic party competition. As Étienne Borne claimed for 
the MRP at WKHQDWLRQDOSDUW\FRQJUHVVDW/LOOHLQµ:HDUHWKHSDUW\RI
(XURSH(XURSHLVRXUIRUPRIUHIXVLQJDUHWXUQWRWKHSDVW¶´.DLVHU 
Kaiser identifies three important traditions of political Catholicism that facilitated 
the new European vRFDWLRQ RI WKH &KULVWLDQ GHPRFUDWLF SDUWLHV 7KH ILUVW ZDV ³WKH
quintessentially continental European, not global, orientation of political Catholicism 
as opposed to the ideologically and organisationally pan-European and internationalist 
VRFLDOLVP´6HFRQGO\WKH³XQLI\LQJPLVWUXVWRIWKHFHQWUDOLVHGDOPLJKW\QDWLRQ-state ± a 
mistrust rooted in the collective European experience of liberal-dominated national 
integration and the culture wars in the nineteenth century and accentuated by the 
shared fear of thH 6WDOLQLVW YHUVLRQ RI FHQWUDOLVDWLRQ´ 7KH WKLUG FORVHO\ OLQNHG
tradition was  
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the strong regional anchoring and identity of political Catholicism ± from the 
south-eastern provinces of Limburg and North Brabant in the case of the KVP, 
Flanders in the case of the CVP, the Rhineland and Bavaria in the case of the 
CDU and CSU, Alsace-Lorraine, Britanny and Savoy in the case of the MRP, and 
Trento [Trentino/South Tyrol], Lombardy and Sicily in the case of the DC. The 
MRP actually debated in 1950 to what extent its own political traditions ± despite 
its post-revolutionary republican programme ± had roots in Burgundian 
clericalism and provincialism going back to the eleventh century. (Kaiser 2007: 
189)  
Moreover, according to Kaiser, 
The overlapping Catholic and strong regional identity and ± in the case of many 
leading Christian democrats like Schuman and de Gasperi ± experience of cross-
ERUGHUFRQWDFWVEHWZHHQWKHGLIIHUHQWµpetite patrie¶DV6FKXPDQFDOOHGKLV
Lorraine region, largely account for the interest in some kind of supranational 
solution for continental western Europe as a guarantee of subnational regional 
identity and autonomy. In contrast ± with the partial exception of the Benelux and 
French parties ± European socialists were committed to the national road to 
VRFLDOLVPLQRQHFRXQWU\$V'RQDOG6DVVRRQKDVHPSKDVLVHGµ7KHLGHDWKDW
post-war reconstruction would require a growing economic and political 
LQWHUGHSHQGHQFHH[SUHVVHG>«@WKURXJKDµFRPPRQPDUNHW¶FRXOGQRWKDYH
FRPHIURPWKH/HIW¶´.Diser 2007: 190).  
A transnational Christian democratic network was established with the 
foundation of the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI) in Lucerne, Switzerland, on 
2 March 1947 (ibid.: 205ff). The inclusion of the German CDU/CSU was momentous. 
However, the NEI initially embraced parties from countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that were coming under the influence of the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
reconciliation with Germany was still too contentious to be discussed by French 
politicians in public. MRP leader and foreign minister Georges Bidault therefore took 
the initiative in establishing secret meetings of the so-called Geneva Circle in 
November 1947.  
Here, from 1947 to 1955, a more limited group from Western Europe regularly 
discussed the German-Saar-Rhineland-Ruhr questions as well as European and foreign 
policy more generally, contributing crucially to the definition of a joint Christian 
democratic stance in favour of European union. Adenauer and Bidault were regular 
participants. But also the European Movement and Union of European Federalists 
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brought Christian democrats together. Adenauer and Schuman met for the first time 
after World War II at the launching of the European Movement in The Hague in May 
1948. But they had probably become acquainted in SIPDIC meetings in the early 
1930s, if not earlier (ibid.: 212-214).  
8QGHUWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHSUHGRPLQDQWµIDUPHU-ERXUJHRLVDOOLDQFH¶WKHLQWHUZDU
SIPDIC had leaned towards the left. By contrast, the NEI, the Geneva Circle and the 
post-war Christian democratic parties generally were heavily dominated by middle-
class liberal and conservative Catholics such as Adenauer, de Gasperi and Bidault. The 
Vatican refrained more and more from direct political interventions after the death of 
Pope Pius XII in 1958, but provided moral support that added to the legitimacy of 
Catholic party mobilisation and transnational co-operation (ibid: 173-174, 187-188).  
$GHQDXHU VXEVFULEHG WR WKH LGHDRI µWKH WZR*HUPDQLHV¶ZKLFKKH VKDUHGZLWK
many Catholic politicians, both in West Germany and in France (ibid: 215-220). In an 
improvised speech at the NEI congress in Luxembourg in early 1948, Adenauer 
emphasised the role of Christians in the resistance against national socialism. He 
praised his own Rhinelanders, who, contrary to the eastern Germans, had always been 
filled with the spirit of liberty, and cited the fact that the Nazi party had recorded its 
worst result in the last Weimar elections in the heavily Catholic constituency of 
Cologne-Aachen.  
In a report to the same congress, the Belgian trade unionist Petrus Serrarens 
argued that Germany west of the river Elbe had been first under the civilising influence 
of the Roman Empire, then of the Carolingian Empire, and, later of democratic and 
liberal ideas. The alienation of the German east from civilised Europe had begun with 
the destruction of Christian unity by Luther and the Reformation. The Protestant fight 
against the Roman Church had later culminated in Bismarck establishing Prussian-
Protestant hegemony over Catholic Austria in 1866 and in the Prussian-liberal 
Kulturkampf  in the 1870s. This Prussification of Germany had led straight to national 
socialism and World War II ± ³DQGFUXFLDOO\JUHDWHUVXSSRUWIRUERWKQDWLRQDOLVPDQG
Marxism as derivatives of Protestant-influenced materialism in Soviet-occupied 
HDVWHUQ*HUPDQ\DIWHU´LELG 
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6LPLODUO\WKH6ZLVVGHSXW\.DUO:LFNKDLOHGWKHµ(XURSHDQ¶UHJLRQEHWZHHQWKH
Loire and the Rhine as a mediator between Germany and France and as the 
Lotharingian core of a reconstituted, but democratic Carolingian Europe. He was 
supplemented by the Luxembourger Pierre Frieden, who described the archetypical 
Protestant-Prussian German as a loud, self-important exhibitionist espousing a 
dangerous romanticism and idealism that could easily be exploited by somebody like 
+LWOHU7KH1(, FRQJUHVV HDVLO\ DJUHHG WR UHMHFW WKHQRWLRQRI D FROOHFWLYH µ*HUPDQ¶
guilt, and discerned instead between a guilty Protestant-Prussian east that was lost for 
Western civilisation, and the Catholic-Roman west, which should be rehabilitated and 
integrated into the new Europe (ibid.: 215).54   
7KHGLVFRXUVHRQWKHµWZR*HUPDQLHV¶SURYLGHG$GHQDXHUZLWKYLWDOVXSSRUWIURP
NEI allies against internal party competitors. Domestic attacks on him for failing the 
cause of national unity only raised his credibility abroad, which by feedback through 
the transnational party networks strengthened his position in the CDU. Moreover, 
³UDWKHU FRQYHQLHQWO\ WKLV FRQVHQVXDO &KULVWLDQ GHPRFUDWLF YLHZ RI UHFHQW (Xropean 
history not only absolved the western Germans from confronting their past, but also 
Catholic Europe from discussing its crucial role in the evolution and stabilisation of 
IDVFLVWFOHULFDODQGFROODERUDWLRQLVWUHJLPHVXQWLO´LELG 
The division of Germany and Europe that emerged in the late forties thus not only 
helped advance Franco-German reconciliation, but also to make Christian democratic 
parties the hegemonic political force in Western continental Europe. Kaiser however 
emphasises that Adenauer had held the idea of the two Germanies since long before 
the war. He quotes from an internal report to Bidault in 1951, which stated that:  
                                              
 
 
54 However, as Kaiser (2007: 215) recalls, this Manichean image had its limitations. Fascism first succeeded in Catholic Italy 
and had considerable support among Catholic German-speakers in Czechoslovakia and Austria. Hitler was born in Braunau, 
Upper Austria, and socialised in Vienna. Prussia under social democratic leadership remained the bastion of the democratic 
Weimar Republic. 
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Chancellor Adenauer aims at the creation of a European federation. His entire 
foreign policy is essentially based on this objective. He considers the Franco-
German entente as the cornerstone of his grand design which can only be realised 
in a wider western European context. Chancellor Adenauer thus sacrifices 
deliberately the question of German unity. He believes that the integration of 
western Germany is more important than the restoration of the unity of the former 
Reich. (quoted by Kaiser 2007: 219) 
Already at the congress of SIPDIC in 1932, European Christian democrats had 
agreed that economic integration and a common market would be an appropriate 
starting point for European union (see above, page 279). However, to them, economic  
integration was a means towards political union, not an end in itself. In the Geneva 
Circle, Bidault and others pushed hard for economic integration. When France, Britain 
and the Benelux countries entered into a loose economic co-operation on the basis of 
the Brussels Pact in 1948, Bidault linked his proposal for a European assembly of 
national parliamentarians to the objective of creating a customs and economic union.  
/DWHURQ&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDWVVDZWKH(&6&DV³WKHSURWRW\SHIRUWKH(XURSHDQ
FRPPRQPDUNHW´ 7KH\ DJUHHG WKDW HFRQRPLF LQWHJUDWLRQ VKRXOG IXOO\ LQFOXGH:HVW
Germany, that it should enhance European security more generally, and that it must be 
market-based, but with a strong social dimension. It was thought that Europe needed to 
find a third way between liberal capitalism and Soviet communism. Nationalisation 
was accepted in some cases, but the main strategy would be Europeanisation of the 
economy combined with redistributional policies (ibid: 221-223).  
Starting with the strategically important coal and steel sector was a natural policy 
choice. As early as 1923, Adenauer had suggested introducing some form of joint 
control of the coal and steel production in the Ruhr. He again advanced this proposal in 
conversations with French officers in 1945, and then repeatedly espoused it in the 
context of the NEI and the Geneva Circle (ibid: 223). The integration of basic 
industries was discussed at the Luxembourg congress of the NEI in 1948, where 
Adenauer may have suggested joint control for the first time in a transnational forum.  
Adenauer raised the idea at a meeting in October 1948  with Robert Schuman, 
who had now taken over after his MRP colleague Bidault as foreign minister of 
France, and again in a subsequent letter to him. The West German foreign minister, 
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+HLQULFK YRQ %UHQWDQR SXVKHG $GHQDXHU¶V LGHD DJDLQ LQ WKH *HQHYD &LUFOH LQ
November 1949. Finally, Adenauer in a letter dated 22 March 1950 to Bidault (now 
prime minister) suggested the integration of the French and German coal, steel and 
chemical industries as a first concrete step towards close Franco-German relations after 
the conflicts over the Saar Conventions and the conditions for the membership of the 
Federal Republic in the Council of Europe (ibid: 225). Kaiser thinks these approaches 
IDFLOLWDWHG %LGDXOW¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI IRUHLJQ PLQLVWHU 6FKXPDQ¶V SODQ IRU D (XURSHDQ
Coal and Steel Community when it was launched on 9 May 1950, even if Schuman had 
not consulted him beforehand. 
Schuman stated that, if necessary, France would go ahead with only the newly 
established Federal Republic of Germany as ECSC partner. In terms of French 
µPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWV¶WKH6FKXPDQSODQFRXOGEHVHHQDVDUHVSRQVHWRWKHFULVLVULGLQJ
the coal and steel sector as well as a means to keep a check on the political, military 
and economic potential of the new West German state (Urwin 1995: 44-45). For the 
FRG, it offered both a means for economic development and for regaining national 
sovereignty. However, according to Kaiser, to the Catholic founding fathers, the ideal 
of European union and Franco-German reconciliation were far more important than 
narrowly conceived national interests:  
the Christian democrats developed their core Europe concept before the first 
signs of a continental Europeanisation of trade patterns became visible for 
bureaucrat experts. Moreover, Adenauer, Schuman and de Gasperi were neither 
interested in specific trade implications of integration nor deferential of 
bureaucratic policy-making by national administrations which is the focus of 
economic explanations of French and continental European policies. (Kaiser 
2007: 250-251)  
Not all Christian democrats were initially keen on the supranational nature of the 
incipient European union. Still, a broad consensus in favour of delegating sovereignty 
to the ECSC emerged. According to Kaiser, the main reasons were confessional and 
ideological and thus specific to transnational Christian democracy: 
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First, the political concept of supranationalism had an intriguing parallel in the 
quasi-supranational authority of the Pope and the Catholic hierarchy. Despite the 
post-war rhetoric of secularism and inter-confessionalism, this still seemed the 
natural order of things not only for stout Catholics like Schuman. Secondly, the 
widespread discursive cultural rationalisation of integration as the emergence of a 
kind of democratic Carolingian Empire also made supranationalism appear 
almost like the natural order of European history destroyed by modern 
QDWLRQDOLVP>«@7KH&DUROLQJLDQWUDGLWLRQZDVHYRNHGDJDLQDQGDJDLQDV
exemplary for post-war Europe. This medieval order was defended against 
external enemies of Christendom as the emerging post-war world had to be 
protected against the Soviet threat. At the NEI congress in Bad Ems in 1951, for 
example, von Brentano spoke of the common defence of the European Abendland 
in what he presented as a tradition reaching from Charlemagne to the battle of 
DJDLQVWWKHKHDWKHQ0DJ\DUVWKHµOLEHUDWLRQ¶RI*UDQDGDLQDQGWKH
victory of the multinational army led by the Polish King Johann III Sobiesky 
against Ottoman troops in 1683, ending their siege of Vienna. Importantly, this 
was not merely a rhetorical construct to rally the Christian democratic troops 
behind the EDC project. Instead, it was the widely shared world-view of 
transnational Christian democracy. (Kaiser 2007: 228) 
In addition, Kaiser (2007: 230-231) points to three pragmatic or contingent 
arguments in favour of supranationalism. First, the notion of a federal Europe could be 
presented to young Europeans as an attractive alternative to communism, which was 
why the youth sections of the Christian democratic parties pushed hard for a 
supranational design.  
A second pragmatic advantage of supranational institutions and majority voting 
was that it would deprive domestic interest groups of easy access to political parties 
and ministries in areas of Europeanised policy-making. Thirdly and most importantly, 
insisting on supranational forms of integration was a conscious choice to exclude 
Britain from core European integration. The creation of a core Europe without Britain 
had become a central objective of transnational Christian democracy by May 1950. 
Adenauer, Bidault and Schuman were totally agreed on this. To them the choice 
DSSHDUHG FOHDU ³HLWKHU D FRQWLQHQWDO (XURSH XQGHU VWURQJ &KULVWLDQ GHPRFUDWLF
influence and with a German government directed by [Adenauer] or a larger socialist 
Europe with Britain governed by the Labour Party and the German government run by 
6FKXPDFKHU´.DLVHU-233). 
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Kaiser (ibid: 237-249) argues that the transnational cooperation of Christian 
democrats fulfilled a number of important functions in the creation of core Europe 
without Britain between 1947 and 1951. First, it allowed them to build trust in each 
other, even to the extent of shoring each other up transnationally if domestic pressures 
threatened to put them off track. This was especially important in relations between the 
CDU/CSU and the MRP. Second, transnational networking facilitated the coordination 
of policy objectives, and notably the Schuman plan.  
Third, it helped socialise individuals into the consensus of building a core Europe 
without Britain, and to marginalise dissenters. E.g. the Italian prime minister, de 
Gasperi, initially was Atlantically disposed, but gradually became an ardent supporter 
RIFRUH(XURSHVXSUDQDWLRQDOLVP%LGDXOW¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH6FKXPDQSOan had been 
prepared through his participation in discussions in the Geneva Circle. Fourth, the 
transnational networks provided opportunities for party politicians of one country to 
intervene strategically into the governmental apparatus of another and to secure inter-
state negotiation outcomes consistent with joint Christian democratic objectives. Jean 
Monnet was a key go-between in this regard, even if he held no party membership.  
Fifth, their European network allowed Christian democratic parties to calibrate 
their policies and approaches to other parties in a way that could secure the necessary 
governmental and parliamentary majorities for the Schuman plan. Although Christian 
democrats had the largest parties and were in government in all six core states after the 
Belgian elections of June 1950, entrepreneurial coalition-building was necessary, 
HVSHFLDOO\ LQ )UDQFH DQG ZLWK VRFLDOLVWV ,Q )UDQFH WKH FHQWULVW µ7KLUG IRUFH¶
government depended on close cooperation between the MRP and the socialist party, 
SFIO. Initially, there was considerable scepticism against the Christian democratic 
advocacy of core Europe in the SFIO. In its Executive Committee, Guy Mollet and 
-XOHV0RFKUDLVHG³WKHDQWLFOHULFDOVSHFWUHRIWKH9DWLFDQGRPLQDWLQJ(XURSH´.DLVHU
2007: 244). In West Germany, the nationally inclined SPD leader Kurt Schumacher 
stoked similar fears. According to Kaiser, some argued that the Christian democrats 
were not trying to create the United States of Europe, but to recreate the Holy Roman 
Empire:  
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This fear was accentuated by frequent reference by Catholic conservatives in 
particular to the need to recreate some kind of Christian Abendland, and the more 
widespread idea among Christian democrats like de Gasperi, for example, of core 
Europe as a Christian democratically updated version of a Carolingian res 
publica christiana. The socialist fears were also strongly reinforced by similar, 
although more confessionally motivated, perceptions of the Christian democratic 
core Europe project among Scandinavian socialists. (Kaiser 2007: 244)  
While on the one hand leading socialists like André Philip, Salomon Grumbach 
and Guy Mollet were more federalist than many in the MRP, there was also a 
widespread desire in the SFIO to have Labour-led Britain join the ECSC. However, 
this dilemma was resolved after the British Labour Party issued a sharply anti-
Europeanist statement on 12 June 1950. Labour rejected the Schuman Plan, arguing 
notably that it was inimical to democratic socialism in Britain. Prime Minister Attlee 
reiWHUDWHGLQWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQVWKDWLWZRXOGEHLPSRVVLEOHIRU%ULWDLQ³WRDFFHSW
the principle that the most vital economic forces of this country should be handed over 
WRDQDXWKRULW\ WKDW LVXWWHUO\XQGHPRFUDWLFDQG LV UHVSRQVLEOH WRQRERG\´TXRWHGE\ 
Urwin 1995: 46). Urwin (ibid: 47 )adds that there may have been economic arguments 
IRU%ULWDLQWRVWD\RXWEXWWKHGHFLVLRQZDV³TXLWHFOHDUO\WDNHQRQSROLWLFDOJURXQGV´
+H DOVR QRWHV WKDW LW ZDV HYHQWXDOO\ WKH VDPH VL[ FRXQWULHV ³LQ ZKLFK DJLWDWLRQ IRr 
closer political and economic integration had been strongest in the 1940s, with political 
VXSSRUWDWWKHKLJKHVWOHYHO´WKDWIRXQGHGWKH(XURSHDQ&RDODQG6WHHO&RPPXQLW\ 
Shortly after the Labour declaration, the SFIO came out strongly in favour of core 
Europe sectoral integration. The statement also strengthened the federalists in the 
Belgian socialist party, who were led by Paul-Henri Spaak. The Belgian chamber of 
deputies, including the socialists, hence voted overwhelmingly for ratification of the 
ECSC treaty. In the Netherlands too, many social democrats were convinced 
federalists. The PvdA parliamentarians there resigned themselves to British self-
exclusion and voted for the treaty. The joint Christian democratic position that the 
treaty should not to allow coal and steel cartels was crucial for garnering socialist 
support (Kaiser 2007: 246). 
In Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was in principle favourable to 
European union. On 11 May 1946, its first annual congress approved a political 
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prRJUDPPH VWDWLQJ WKDW ³*HUPDQ 6RFLDO 'HPRFUDF\ DLPV WR EULQJ DERXW D 8QLWHG
States of Europe, a democratic and Socialist federation of European states. It desires a 
6RFLDOLVW*HUPDQ\LQD6RFLDOLVW(XURSH´TXRWHGE\/LSJHQV 
However, under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher and against the background 
of growing east-west division, the SPD turned increasingly towards national unity and 
traditional balance of power thinking, as expressed notably in the idea of a united, 
neutral Germany as mediator between east and west. In contrast to the CDU/CSU, the 
SPD insisted that Germany should have equal rights in all international fora from the 
outset. SPD parliamentarians voted against German participation in the Council of 
Europe and against ratification of the Paris Treaty founding the ECSC. The Social 
Democrats charged that rearmament of the Federal Republic and participation in 
Western European integration were incompatible with German reunification and the 
recovery of the Saar from France, that Germany would have an inferior status in the 
(&6& FRPSDUHG WR WKH RWKHU PHPEHU VWDWHV DQG WKDW WKH (&6& µ/LWWOH (XURSH¶
excluded the progressive British and Scandinavian nations.  
All of this played into the hands of Adenauer and the Christian democrats. 
AccordinJWR.DLVHU6FKXPDFKHU¶V 
nationalist rhetoric was aggressive and loud, and he had an idealised vision of a 
unified Germany and its mediating role in Europe. The more Schumacher and the 
63'VHHPHGWRLQFDUQDWHWKH&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDWV¶LPDJLQHG*HUPDQ(DVW, the 
more the Christian democrats and even many continental socialists saw Adenauer 
as the only hope for the German West in an integrated Europe embedded in larger 
Western structures. (Kaiser 2007: 221) 
Internal dissent in the SPD and tacit trade union support for the Schuman Plan 
ZHDNHQHG6FKXPDFKHUDQGLQSUDFWLFH$GHQDXHUFRXOGGLFWDWHWKH)HGHUDO5HSXEOLF¶V
European policy 1950-6FKXPDFKHU¶VSROLF\ FDPHXQGHUJURZLQJDWWDFN IURP WKH
63'¶V Bürgermeisterflügel (mayoral wing), and the German trade union congress 
DGB adopted a resolution in favour of the ECSC (ibid: 245).  
The contrast between the territorial and cultural backgrounds of Adenauer and 
Schumacher is interesting in the present context:  
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Kurt Schumacher was born at Kulm near Danzig [on the Baltic coast], in the area 
NQRZQDVWKHµ*UHQ]GHXWVFKHQWXP¶ and traditionally associated with national 
consciousness in Germany.  His place of origin has also been accounted a reason 
for his marked anti-clericalism, which made him very suspicious of the motive of 
the three Allied High Commissioners, McCloy, François Ponçet and Kirkpatrick, 
who were all Catholics. In this connection, he stood in direct contrast to Konrad 
Adenauer, his main political rival, who was the scion of an old Rhenish Catholic 
family, and the inheritor, therefore, of an explicitly Catholic French oriented 
strain in German policy. (Patterson 1974: 7) 
3DWWHUVRQLELGPRUHRYHULQGLFDWHVWKDWWKH63'¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUQDWLRQDORYHU
Western European unification can in part be explained by the very high proportion of 
eastern refugees in the party. Fifty out of the 131 SPD deputies in the first Bundestag 
were refugees. The Lutheran areas east of the Elbe had been the strongholds of the 
party before the war, consistently returning a 34 percent plurality for the SPD. During 
the whole period of post-war German division comparatively more Protestants than 
Catholics voted SPD. Hanrieder (1967: 97) moreover observes that SPD criticism of 
the ECSC met with some sympathy among CDU Protestants.  
HowevHU DIWHU 6FKXPDFKHU¶V GHDWK LQ  DORQJVLGH WKH Wirtschaftswunder 
that paralleled the rise of the ECSC and German division, SPD European policy came 
to a complete turnaround (Patterson 1974: 130). Contributing to this development was 
-HDQ0RQQHW¶VLQWLmate contacts with German trade unionists in his Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe. After 1957, the main concern of German Social 
Democrats became to democratise European institutions, in particular by increasing the 
power of, and directly electing, the European Parliament. Establishment of macro-
economic, Keynesian planning at the European level was another SPD priority.  This 
SUDJPDWLF DGMXVWPHQW ZDV FRQILUPHG E\ WKH SDUW\¶V DGRSWLRQ RI WKH UHIRUPLVW %DG
Godesberg programme of 1959. 
Similar FRQVLGHUDWLRQVZHUHSUREDEO\EHKLQGWKH,WDOLDQ6RFLDOLVWSDUW\¶VFKDQJH
of heart on Europe, following the dissolution of their alliance with the communists in 
1956 (Timmermann 1982: 84-85). The Italian Communist Party (PCI) itself went 
through a comparable shift from opposition to principled support after 1963. At the 
same time and for basically the same reasons, French Communists also changed from 
outright hostility to conditional acceptance of economic integration and French EC 
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membership. In contrast to the PCI, however (Spinelli was elected to the European 
Parliament on the PCI ticket), the PCF never became federalist, but remained 
intergovernmentally inclined in its European policies.   
Kaiser concludes his discussion of the key role of transnationally organised 
Christian democracy in the preparation and adoption of the European Coal and Steel 
Community as follows: 
Crucially, [the] core objectives of transnational Christian democracy derived 
from a shared set of norms and policy ideas with a strong confessional dimension. 
The Christian democrats attempted to build a Catholic Europe ± not in the culture 
war sense of Vatican rule, as Mollet and Schumacher alleged with their 
anticlerical rhetoric, but as a decentralised federation in the making based on the 
principle of subsidiarity and excluding Protestant-socialist Northern Europe in its 
formative phase. It is this shared set of norms and policy ideas combined with the 
political hegemony of the Christian democratic Centre-Right in continental 
western Europe around 1950 that largely account for what the socialist Pineau 
KDVULJKWO\UHFDOOHGDVWKHVWDUWRILQWHJUDWLRQµLQDYHU\&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDWLF
PDQQHU¶.DLVHU 
Ernst B. Haas too, in his classic account of the early moves towards European 
uniILFDWLRQ QRWHV ³WKH JHQHUDO &DWKROLF LGHRORJLFDO LPSHWXV WRZDUG (XURSHDQ XQLW\´
(Haas 1958: 143).  By comparison, the Dutch Anti-Revolutionaries and the Christian 
Historical Union - as well as the liberal VVD ± ³FHUWDLQO\IDYRXUWKHNLQGRIHFRQRPLF
integration that will lead to a unified common market. However, they are suspicious of 
supranational institutions, though willing to grant the need for them during the 
WUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRG,QQRVHQVHRIWKHWHUPFDQWKHVHSHRSOHEHFRQVLGHUHGIHGHUDOLVWV´
(ibid: 150). Still, ECSC support turned out to be near unanimous in the Benelux 
countries. The Liberals here stressed in particular the free trade aspects of the 
Community, but also criticised it as insufficiently federalist. 
Liberal and radical parties, as well as other parties in the non-Catholic centre and 
right, had at first been wary of the dirigiste appearance of the ECSC, while 
industrialists often cautioned against the disastrous foreign competition it could entail. 
In France there were numerous evocations of the French nation and warnings against 
resurrected German imperialism. However, according to Haas, most parties came down 
in favour of the ECSC for such instrumentalist-materialist reasons as the prospect of 
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controlling German enterprises, access to coke for the Lorraine coal and steel industry, 
new markets for steel, and exemption from ECSC control over French investments in 
/RUUDLQHDQGSURWHFWLRQRI)UHQFKFRDOSURGXFWLRQ³2SSRUWXQLVWDUJXPHQWUHODWLQJWR
immediate French political and industrial aims characterised the Centre. Of 
commitment to principle²for or against integration²WKHUHZDVOLWWOHHYLGHQFH´+DDV
1958: 117).55  
Haas observes that the German liberal party, FDP, at first was only concerned 
ZLWK WKH µ*HUPDQ¶ LQWHUHVWV LQYROYHG LQ WKH (&6&  ³,GHQWLILHG ZLWK LQGXVWULDOLVWV
Protestant - and therefore anti-Adenauer - middle class elements as well as former 
1D]LV´WKH)'3RSSRVHGUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH(&6&WUHDW\XQWLOIRXUZHHNVSULRUWRWKH
vote in parliament (Haas 1958: 130). According WR+DQULHGHU³WKH)'3ULJKWZLQJ¶V
efforts to attract frankly nationalistic elements in Northern Germany led the party as a 
whole to champion national independence and sovereignty much more stridently and 
LQIOH[LEO\WKDQWKH&'8&68´+DQULHGHU.  The nationally minded Refugee 
Party (BHE) and German Party were equally ambivalent, but also in the end voted in 
favour of the ECSC together with their allies, the CDU/CSU. 
Not even the non-Catholic Italian centre and right-wing parties were unanimous 
in their support. Italian industry was flatly opposed to the ECSC as it feared ruinous 
competition, and only the party whips brought centre parliamentarians to a favourable 
vote. Yet, all but the communist, Nenni-socialist, monarchist and neo-fascist Italian 
parties were firmly committed to European union (Haas 1958: 140-1).   
The difference between the ECSC and the Nordic Council, established by 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 1953 (Finland joined in 1956), is 
instructive. Like the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council was and has remained 
HVVHQWLDOO\ LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO ³1RQH RI WKH WKUHH >IRXQGLQJ@ VWDWHV GHVLUHG DQ\WKLQJ
WKDWZRXOGHYHQVPDFNRIVXSUDQDWLRQDOLVP´8UZLQ 
                                              
 
 
55 Needless to say, this statement is incorrect at least as far as the MRP is concerned. 
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Britain too consistently favoured intergovernmentalism. As Urwin states, the 
advance towards the founding of the European Economic Community and Euratom in 
 WRRN SODFH ZLWKRXW %ULWLVK SDUWLFLSDWLRQ ³VLQFH %ULWDLQ FRXOG QRW DFFHSW WKH
fundamental supranational principle. In fact, in many ways Britain disapproved of the 
ZKROH YHQWXUH WKRXJK FRQWLQXLQJ WR OHQGYRFDO HQFRXUDJHPHQW WR WKH LGHDRIXQLW\´
(Urwin 1995: 90). Churchill as leader of the opposition advocated British participation 
in the European Defence Community and in the ECSC, and strongly criticised the 
negotiation policies of the Attlee government. However, when the Conservatives 
replaced the Labour government in 1951, they refused to join the ECSC as well as the 
European Defence Community.  
4.5 The European Defence Community 
The 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea by the communist North, assisted by 
WKH6RYLHW8QLRQFDXVHGQHZFRQFHUQIRU(XURSH¶VGHIHQFHV7KHLGHDRID(XURSHDQ
army had already been suggested by Churchill in March 1950. On 11 August 1950 the 
&RXQFLO RI (XURSH¶V&RQVXOWDWLYH$VVHPEO\ E\ D ODUJH majority passed a resolution, 
SURSRVHGE\&KXUFKLOOFDOOLQJIRU³WKHLPPHGLDWHFUHDWLRQRIDXQLILHG(XURSHDQDUP\
under the authority of a European minister of defence, subject to European democratic 
FRQWURO´ TXRWHG E\%XUJHVV   7KH&KULVWLDQ democrats voted massively in 
favour. There were only five contrary votes, but 29 German, British and Scandinavian 
socialists abstained (Kaiser 2007: 271-272). Two weeks later Jean Monnet wrote to 
5HQp 3OHYHQ WKH 5DGLFDO 3DUW\¶V SULPH PLQLVWHU RI )UDQFH urging him to take the 
RSSRUWXQLW\ WR ODXQFK ³WKH IHGHUDWLRQ RI (XURSH´ XQGHU ZKRVH MRLQW VRYHUHLJQW\ WKH
European army could be governed. In October, Pleven proposed the establishment of a 
European Defence Community (EDC), including a substantial German contingent, 
which would however have an inferior status. 
The Pleven Plan was welcomed by the NATO Council in October 1950, and 
received the support of West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and eventually 
also the Netherlands, which had been waiting in vain for a positive British response 
(Burgess 2000: 68-69). Burgess (ibid.) adds that at the behest of Prime Minister de 
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*DVSHUL WKH ,WDOLDQ JRYHUQPHQW ³WRRN WKH OHDG LQ DGYRFDWLQJ D IHGHUDOPRGHO >IRU D
European Political Community that would complement the EDC] with a fully-fledged 
European Assembly directly elected by European citizens and having powers of 
taxation in a joint decision-PDNLQJVWUXFWXUH´'H*DVSHULZDVDFRPPLWWHGIHGHUDOLVW
and many other federalists were heavily involved in drafting and lobbying for the EPC-
EDC proposals. However, a procedural vote on 30 August 1954 in the French National 
Assembly torpedoed the draft Treaty.  
The direct reason for the debacle was the decline of the Europeanist MRP and the 
rise of the intergovernmentalist Rally of the French People (RPF) headed by general 
&KDUOHV GH*DXOOH ,Q WKH OHJLVODWLYH HOHFWLRQVRI -XQH WKH053¶V VKDUHRI WKH
votes had fallen to 12.6 per cent, and it had lost its controlling influence on French 
European policy. The RPF had scored 22.4 per cent of the vote. In January 1953, the 
Europeanist centre-OHIW µ7KLUG IRUFH¶ FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW WKDW KDG UXOHG VLQFH 
had been replaced by a centre-right government without the SFIO, but including the 
RPF. In June 1954, the intergovernmentally inclined Pierre Mendès-France had 
become prime minister. The MRP had gone into opposition, which further eroded their 
chances of influencing the fate of the EDC (Kaiser 2007: 258).  
While the communists, most Gaullists and a slight majority of socialists and 
radicals voted against the EDC, all but two Christian democratic representatives voted 
in favour. Opinion polls showed that a clear majority of French voters supported the 
EDC. Even most Gaullist voters were favourable (ibid: 255). Earlier, the parliaments 
of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic had ratified it, and 
the Italian parliament, which was clearly positive, was just waiting for the French vote. 
Christian democrats constituted the core of the large majorities in all these parliaments. 
Towards the end of 1954, the MRP reluctantly supplied the necessary majority in the 
National Assembly for a intergovernmentalist and Atlanticist substitute for the EDC, 
based on the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. Its support was mainly due 
to bilateral and transnational advocacy by Adenauer (ibid: 280).  
The EDC proposal was originally not a product of transnational Christian 
democratic policy formulation and sponsorship. However, leading Christian 
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democratic politicians rapidly mobilised to provide it with supranational features 
according to designs discussed in their transnational fora since early 1950. Schuman 
proposed a political authority for the future EDC on 20 September 1951. De Gasperi 
took this up and together with his close collaborator Paolo Emilio Taviani formulated a 
proposal that was inserted as article 38 into the EDC treaty during the 
intergovernmental negotiations in December 1951. It charged the future EDC 
parliamentary assembly with submitting proposals for a European Political Community 
(EPC) within six months after its constitution (Kaiser 2007: 283).  
When the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC was established in 1952, 
Christian democrats assured that it had a solidly federalist majority. Two regular 
participants in the Geneva Circle, the lawyers Heinrich von Brentano from the CDU 
and Pierre-Henri Teitgen from the MRP, played a crucial role in drafting a detailed 
(3& SURSRVDO LQ WKH $VVHPEO\¶V &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RPPLWWHH 7KH $VVHPEO\
subsequently passed the proposal with a large majority, the Christian democrats voting 
unanimously in favour. The plan foresaw a bicameral system with two parliamentary 
chambers, one consisting of national parliamentarians and the other directly elected 
(Kaiser 2007: 284-285).DLVHUVHHVWKHSURSRVDODVD³IHGHUDOLVWVLJQSRVW´OHJLWLPLVLQJ
a strong parliamentary dimension of integration for the future. This made it more 
difficult for less federalist-minded coalition partners to retreat towards 
intergovernmentalist solutions. The subsequent intergovernmental negotiations indeed 
left the proposal for a directly elected European Parliament intact. It was eventually 
realised in 1979. 
 310 
 
 
4.6 The European Economic Community 
The British thought the failure of the EDC signalled the end of supranational 
VFKHPHV LQ (XURSH ZKLFK ZDV REYLRXVO\ ³D PDMRU PLVFDOFXODWLRQ´ 'HGPDQ 
92). Negotiations for closer economic integration would probably have started much 
earlier without the EDC obstacle. But according to Dedman (ibid.: 94-95), 
henceforZDUG WKH ZRUG µIHGHUDOLVP¶ ZDV QHYHU DJDLQ PHQWLRQHG LQ RIILFLDO (&(8
discourse.   
Kaiser argues that the failure of the EDC allowed transnational Christian 
democracy to shift the integration process back to the economic path they had 
continued to discuss and favour throughout the EDC ordeal. The NEI congress of 
September 1954 was devoted to economic integration. It demanded the creation of a 
³(XURSHDQHFRQRPLFVSDFH´ZLWK³WKHFRPSOHWHIUHHGRPRIH[FKDQJHDQGFLUFXODWLRQ
of citizens and ideas, the liberalLVDWLRQRIWKHH[FKDQJHRIJRRGVVHUYLFHVDQGFDSLWDO´
(quoted by Kaiser 2007: 293). At the same time, the NEI reiterated its dual support of a 
strong supranational executive authority and of a directly elected parliament. These 
positions were repeated by the 1955 and 1956 NEI congresses. The EDC debacle 
indeed only strengthened the federalist resolve of the western European Christian 
democrats. It now appeared even more important than before to restrict integration to 
core Europe in order to avoid intergovernmentalist dilution. They fully realised that the 
common market and customs union they advocated would be incompatible with 
%ULWDLQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH&RPPRQZHDOWKSUHIHUHQFHV\VWHPLELG-287).  
The Christian democrats did not have the same direct influence over the 
negotiations leading up to the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euroatom as 
WKH\ KDG KDG RYHU WKH GHOLEHUDWLRQV RQ WKH (&6& 6WLOO .DLVHU LQVLVWV WKDW ³WKH
determined collective push by transnational Christian democracy for horizontal 
economic integration in the form of a common market with clear supranational features 
from 1954 to 1956 strongly influenced the course of integration, once more 
KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHQHHGIRUDUHFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHRULJLQVRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ´
(ibid: 294-295). This time around, however, the consensus on core Europe stretched 
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well beyond the Christian democrats. Their efforts were importantly supplemented by a 
federalist network among socialists with Paul-Henri Spaak at the centre, and by Jean 
MonQHW¶V$FWLRQ&RPPLWWHHZKLFKDVDOUHDG\LQGLFDWHGZDVFUXFLDOLQFRQYHUWLQJWKH
German social democrats and trade unions to the Treaties of Rome (ibid: 296). 
3URWHVWDQWOLEHUDODQGVRFLDOLVWSROLWLFLDQVDVZHOODVIDUPHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVQRZMRLQHG
a growing advocacy coalition for a supranational core Europe.  
In February 1955, the MRP went as far as making their support of the 
government of Edgar Faure contingent on French participation in the process leading 
to the adoption of the treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom. Moreover, after the 
election on 12 January 1956, the party colluded with other groups in inducing president 
René Coty to appoint the pro-European socialist Guy Mollet new prime minister, 
instead of the Euro-sceptic Mendès-)UDQFH ³2QO\ the formation and continued 
stability of the Mollet government and of this advocacy coalition across the 
government-opposition divide eventually  guaranteed the ratification of the Rome 
WUHDWLHVZLWKIXOO053VXSSRUWE\WRYRWHVLQ-XO\´.DLVer 2007: 300). 
The Common Agricultural Policy was a significant element of the European 
Economic Community. Its inclusion was in part a concession to farmers, who 
represented a significant share of the electoral constituency of the Christian democratic 
parWLHV QRWDEO\ RI WKH053 DQG WKH&'8&68+RZHYHU WKH IDUPHUV¶ DVVRFLDWLRQV
only reluctantly embraced the EEC. Kaiser (ibid: 301) also observes that both the 
German and the French federations of industry initially opposed the common market 
plan. With reference to the emphasis Milward and Moravcsik have placed on national 
HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV LQ WKHFUHDWLRQRI WKH((&.DLVHU LELGDUJXHV WKDW WKHUH LV³QR
FRQYLQFLQJ HYLGHQFH´ WKDW SUR-Community leaders in Christian democratic and other 
political parties were motivated by trade statistics and predictions about the sectoral 
and regional economic effects of economic integration.  
The Christian democratic network discussed core Europe integration mainly as a 
political project. Economic benefits were certainly not neglected, especially for two of 
WKH&KULVWLDQGHPRFUDWV¶PRVWLPSRUWDQWHOHFWRUDOFRQVWLWXHQFLHVWKHPLGGOHFODVVDQG
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the farmers. However, Kaiser argues that organised interest groups had to be persuaded 
of these economic benefits. Crucially,  
The CKULVWLDQGHPRFUDWV¶LGHDWLRQDOPRWLYDWLRQIRUWKHVHSROLWLFDOREMHFWLYHV
continued to be embedded in their shared, predominantly Catholic experience of 
confessional and regional identities and opposition to the overbearing centralised 
liberal and socialist nation-state and its perversion in the totalitarian Machtstaat 
of interwar Europe. For Christian democrats, European integration was not a 
means of rescuing this type of nation-state, but for the first time of creating in 
their own image a tamed Europeanised nation-state embedded in a supranational 
constitutional system. This vision also informed their continued support for 
supranational forms of integration, which was actually more ideologically 
coherent by the mid-1950s than at the time of the Schuman Plan. (Kaiser 2007: 
301-302)  
Evidence of the federalist convictions of transnational Christian democracy is the 
insertion of the long-WHUPJRDORI³HYHUFORVHUXQLRQDPRQJWKHSHRSOHVRI(XURSH´LQ
the preamble of the Treaty of Rome; the planned introduction of majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers from stage two of the integration process at the start of 1966; the 
sole right of initiative for the European Commission; and the provision for the future 
direct election of the Parliamentary Assembly (Kaiser 2007: 302).  
4.7 Enlargement and European Union 
Although invited to send its foreign minister, the UK government only sent a civil 
servant to observe the Messina conference and the subsequent Spaak Committee 
leading to the Treaties of Rome. Instead, the UK together with Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal established the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in May 1960. However, already half a year later the Conservative 
cabinet under Anthony Eden decided to apply for EEC membership. In subsequent 
negotiations (1961 and 1965), British Conservative governments consistently sought 
H[FHSWLRQV WKDW FRXOG SUHVHUYH%ULWDLQ¶V JOREDO FRPPLWPHQW LQ SDUWLFXODU WUDGHZLWK
WKH &RPPRQZHDOWK DQG WKH VWHUOLQJ¶V VWDWXV DV DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVHUYH FXUrency. 
However, the British (and thus the Danish, Irish and Norwegian) application for 
membership were blocked by President de Gaulle in 1963 and 1967.  
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The negotiations that were to take Britain into the Community in 1972 were 
initiated by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Like his fellow socialists on the 
continent earlier, Wilson seems to have been convinced by the functionalist logic of 
European integration. His grand design for membership was the erection of a 
µ(XURSHDQ 7HFKQRORJLFDO &RPPXQLW\¶ KRZever without surrendering sovereignty 
(Morgan 1982).  
The British ambivalence to European integration was again demonstrated by 
/DERXU¶V WXUQDURXQG DQG DQWL-Market campaign on the occasion of the 1975 
referendum on EC membership. The referendum was largely KHOGDWWKHSDUW\¶VEHKHVW
The party returned to a pro-European stance after the European elections in 1984. The 
Liberals, by contrast, were early supporters of British EC membership and have 
remained ardent Europeanists, even at the cost of electoral setbacks (Lieber 1970: 146-
147).   
In the 1975 referendum a majority of voters in every region of the UK preferred 
to stay in, though the preponderance of favourable votes was slim in Northern Ireland, 
Wales and Scotland. The Protestant Reverend and Ulster Unionist Ian Paisley fought a 
EOXQWO\ QDWLRQDOLVW FDPSDLJQ ODPEDVWLQJ WKH (& DV D ³SDSDO SORW´ DQG FRPPLWWLQJ
KLPVHOI WR WKH VWDWHPHQW WKDW ³WKH 9LUJLQ 0DU\ LV WKH 0DGRQQD RI WKH &RPPRQ
0DUNHW´%XWOHUDQG.LW]LQJHU,QKHDYLO\&DWKROLFDQGUXUDl Ireland, only 
the small Labour Party (which has since changed its mind) opposed membership 
during the referendum campaign in 1972.  
In Denmark mostly left socialists and communists opposed Danish membership 
of the EC in the 1972 referendum, while in Norway these were joined by the agrarian 
Centre Party and large fractions of the social-liberal Left party, the (Lutheran, mostly 
ORZFKXUFK&KULVWLDQ3HRSOH¶V3DUW\DQGRIWKH6RFLDO'HPRFUDWV$PDMRUGLIIHUHQFH
between these two Scandinavian countries, and one that has probably been decisive in 
forging negative majorities twice in Norway, was that while competitive Danish 
farmers (like their Swedish counterparts in 1994) lobbied actively in favour of 
PHPEHUVKLS 1RUZHJLDQ IDUPHUV¶ DVVRFLDWLRQV KDYH FDPSDLJQed vigorously against. 
Economic interest calculation indicated that the farmers in Denmark (and later Sweden 
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± the assessment was more complex in Finland) would gain from membership, whereas 
those in Norway would lose, as generous Norwegian farm subsidies would have to be 
replaced by the less munificent CAP. In Denmark, the urban conurbation of 
Copenhagen remains the area most sceptical to European integration, and agrarian 
Jutland most favourable. In the Danish EC/EU referenda, areas with predominantly 
agricultural or industrial economies have voted heavily in favour of the EC, while 
those with a stronger (public) service sector have been more reluctant (Gilljam et al., 
eds., 1998; see also above, page 49).  
However, while economic interests and foreign policy considerations have 
differentiated Nordic attitudes to the EU, the widely shared commitment to undivided 
national sovereignty and identity has inspired a joint euro-scepticism. Generally, the 
Nordic states have been reluctant Europeans, clearly prefering functional economic 
integration over political union (Matlary 2004).  
Southern enlargement offers an interesting contrast. Greece joined in 1981 and 
Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Greek socialist party (PASOK) was long critical of 
Greek membership and European integration, and still retains a nationalist, Euro-
sceptical wing (Philpott and Shah in Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006: 55-56). The 
conservative, western-oriented Nea Demokratia has however been consistently 
Europeanist. In Spain and Portugal, there has been little political controversy over 
EC/EU membership and European integration. Except for the Portuguese communist 
party, only industrial interests in Portugal expressed reservations against joining in 
1980. The need for economic modernisation and to shore up democracy weighed 
KHDYLO\ LQ IDYRXU RI PHPEHUVKLS EXW DOVR WKHVH WUDGLWLRQDOO\ &DWKROLF FRXQWULHV¶
historical contributions to, and identification with, the common European cultural 
heritage have been stressed. Both countries have important Christian 
democratic/centre-right parties belonging to the EPP. 
As a result of structural changes in European politics related to secularisation, 
economic growth and demographic change, the Christian democratic hegemony over 
the European policy of core Europe governments began to crumble in the early sixties. 
The French MRP was dissolved in 1967 and the German CDU/CSU went into 
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opposition in 1969. The Europeanist core Europe project was challenged by the 
intergovernmentalism of Charles de Gaulle (president of France 1959-1969) and by the 
application for EC membership by Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. De Gaulle 
FDXVHG D SURORQJHG KLDWXV E\ KLV µHPSW\ FKDLU SROLF\¶ DQG E\ SUHYHQWLQJ WKH
introduction of majority voting as foreseen by the Treaty of Rome. British, Irish and 
Danish accession in 1973 brought Christian democratic hegemony in the supranational 
European institutions to an end. When the Labour Party terminated its boycott of the 
European Parliament following the favourable 1975 referendum, the socialists came to 
form its largest political group. The enlargement by three northern European countries, 
two of them predominantly Protestant and national-liberal, made intra-community 
policy-making more complex and unpredictable. 
However, the EC summit meeting at The Hague in December 1969, when the 
more pro-European Georges Pompidou had replaced de Gaulle as president of France, 
re-infused dynamism into the integration process. Momentously, the focus now shifted 
to monetary and HFRQRPLF XQLRQ DQG IRUHLJQ SROLF\ FRRSHUDWLRQ 'H *DXOOH¶V
resignation also led to the lifting of the implicit French veto against direct election of 
the European Parliament. In 1977, ahead of the first such elections, the Christian 
democrats formed the EuURSHDQ 3HRSOH¶V 3DUW\ WKH GHVLJQDWLRQ (XURSHDQ3HRSOH¶V, 
and not 3HRSOHV¶, Party is significant) and agreed on a joint, solidly federalist European 
programme.  
The opening up of the EPP to the British Conservatives and Scandinavian, 
Central and Eastern European parties in the 1980s and 1990s helped widen the 
Europeanist advocacy coalition beyond its original core. In this effort, the CDU/CSU 
under the guidance of the German federal chancellor, Helmut Kohl, was instrumental. 
Like Adenauer, Kohl was a liberal Catholic from the Rhineland. Other Christian 
democrats in key Christian democratic network positions from the 1960s onwards were 
Walter Hallstein, Etienne Davignon, Leo Tindemans, Jacques Santer, and Wilfried 
Martens. Former Belgian prime minister MartenVUHPDLQVWKH(33¶VSUHVLGHQW2QWKH
EPP website, he presents the party as follows:  
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the EPP is the leading political force on the continent.  The EPP is a family of the 
political centre-right, whose roots run deep in the history and civilisation of the 
European continent and has pioneered the European project from its inception. 
The EPP is committed to a federal Europe, based on the principle of subsidiarity 
± DGHPRFUDWLFWUDQVSDUHQWDQGHIILFLHQW(XURSH>«@0DUWHQV 
According to the website, after the European elections of June 2009, the EPP has 
74 member-parties from 38 countries, 20 heads of government (13 EU and seven non-
EU), nine European commissioners (including the president of the Commission), and 
constituted, with 265 members, the largest group in the European Parliament. Jerzy 
%X]HNDIRUPHUSULPHPLQLVWHUUHSUHVHQWLQJWKH(33¶V3ROLVKDIILOLDWHLVQRZWKHILUVW
Parliament president from a formerly Communist member state. Unsurprisingly, the 
first permanent president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, appointed in 
November 2009, is also a Christian democrat, city-belt European (Belgian) and 
federalist. 
Kohl and the EPP easily consented to the Catholic socialist Jacques Delors as 
new president of the European Commission in 1984, after the Christian democrat 
Luxemburger Gaston Thorn. Delors had once been a member of the MRP and was well 
disposed towards federalism, subsidiarity and regionalism (Kaiser 2007: 325).  Robert 
Lecourt, a convinced MRP federalist, for domestic reasons appointed by de Gaulle to 
the European Court of Justice in 1962, had played a crucial role in shifting the ECJ in a 
supranational direction. Under his influence, the two landmark decisions Van Gend en 
Loos of 1963 and Costa versus E.N.E.L. in 1964 for the first time declared the direct 
effect of Community law and its supremacy over national law (ibid: 324).  
Analyses of public opinion surveys confirm the continued importance of 
Catholicism as an influence on individual attitudes to European integration. The 
findings of Fraser, Nelsen and Guth (1997) correspond to my own earlier conclusions 
(Nedrebø 1986). Based on a Eurobarometer cumulative file of surveys taken from 
WR1 WKH\ILQGWKDW³5RPDQ&DWKROLFDQG2UWKRGR[EHOLHYHUVDUH
most supportive of the Union, while Protestants as a category is slightly less supportive 
than purely secular citizens, although their position often depends on national 
  
317 
 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ LELG , WRR IRXQG WKDWDIWHUQDWLRQDOLW\ UHOLJLRXVFRQIHVVLRQZDV
the best single predictor of Europeanism (Nedrebø 1986: 182, 204).  
According to Fraser, Nelsen and Guth as well as my own study, there is moreover 
a tendency that greater religious commitment makes for greater Europeanism, 
regardless of confession (the main exception appears to be Protestants in Northern 
Ireland). But Europeanism is also significantly correlated with education and 
subjective class identification. Besides, Fraser, Nelsen and Guth confirm that the 
continental and southerly member states (before the 1995 and 2004 enlargements) are 
more Europeanist and the northerly less so, and that the left and right fringes are less 
Europeanist than the political centre. 
Christian democrats have remained a driving force behind the increasingly 
frequent treaty revisions since the Single European Act of 1987. However, successive 
enlargements have diluted the influence in the Union not only of Christian democracy, 
EXW DOVR RI µFRUH (XURSH¶ (8 PHPEHUVKLS KDV LQFUHDVHG IURP VL[ UHODWLYHO\
homogeneous member states with 169 million inhabitants in 1958, to 12 more diverse 
states with 367 million people in 1995, to a heterogeneous 27 countries with 494 
million citizens in 2007.  
7KLV ZLGHQLQJ DQG WKH FRUH¶V UHVSRQVH WR LW DFFHOHUDWHG GHHSHQLQJ KDV
XQGHUPLQHGWKHRULJLQDOµSHUPLVVLYHFRQVHQVXV¶RQ(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ6LQFH
controversial popular referenda have led to five national vetoes against governmentally 
agreed EU treaty revisions.56  
The enlargement of 2004 was unprecedented not only as regards the number of 
new member states, but also in the degree to which it increased the diversity and thus 
the conflict potential within the Union. Obviously, the post-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe have considerably lower living standards and therefore 
economic interests that are in part contrary to those of the older members. Moreover, 
                                              
 
 
56 There were majorities against the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in 1992; against the Nice Treaty in Ireland in 2001; 
against the Constitutional Treaty in The Netherlands and France in 2005; and against the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland on 12 June 
2008. 
 318 
 
 
their historical experience is significantly different. Crucial in the present historical-
institutionalist perspective would be their falling under Soviet control and subsequent 
exclusion from the Christian democratic party network after World War II. This 
prevented them from sharing in the foundation of European integration and the crucial 
adaptation, deliberation and learning that followed. It is arguable that these countries 
joined the EU more out of a wish to secure their Europeanness (independence from 
Russia, democracy, rule of law, human rights, market economy, membership itself, etc. 
± WKHIDPRXVµUHWXUQWR(XURSH¶DQGPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWVSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQVLQJOHPDUNHW
and common agricultural policy, access to funds and transfers, etc.) than due to 
enthusiasm for Europeanist ideals.  
It is possible that, if allowed, heavily Catholic Poland could have played an 
important role in the post-war Europeanist advocacy coalition. However, as the 
GHOLEHUDWLRQVRQWKHGUDIW&RQVWLWXWLRQDO7UHDW\¶VYRWLQJUXOHVVKRZHGWKH3ROHVKDYH
many historical scores to settle not only with Germany, but also with France (not to 
mention Russia). This would probably have impeded a constructive Polish contribution 
to European union right after a conflict with neighbouring Germany that cost the lives 
of six millions of its citizens.  
However, the fall of communism, the drafting of a Constitutional Treaty, and 
radical enlargement, potentially even including Turkey, have again increased the 
relevance of religion as a factor in EU politics (Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006). 
The Protestant Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, as well as the secularised (arguably 
crypto-Protestant or Hussite) Czech Republic, have tended to take a market-oriented, 
national-liberal attitude to integration, whereas Catholic Poland now contributes new, 
if nationally self-conscious, vigour to the traditional Christian-democratic discourse in 
favour of Europe. The Polish Pope John Paul II (1978-2005) renewed and reinforced 
WKH 9DWLFDQ¶V ORQJVWDQGLQJ VXSSRUW RI (XURSHDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ /LNH KLP PRVW RI WKH
Catholic Church of Poland has embraced European union both as a laudable peace 
project and as a chance to reinvigorate reunitHG(XURSH¶V&KULVWLDQLGHQWLW\)RUVLPLODU
reasons, most of the leadership of the respective Orthodox Churches have supported 
EU membership for Bulgaria and Romania (and Greece).  
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+RZHYHUWKH2UWRGR[&KXUFK¶VEDFNLQJRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQKDVEHHQPRUH 
equivocal than that of the Catholic Church. Arguably, the reason is its historical, 
µF VDURSDSLVW¶ DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK QDWLRQ-building and its traditional antagonism with 
Rome and the West (see above, Section 3.7.1). A minority of Bulgarian and Romanian 
as well as Polish (and Greek) clerics have criticised the EU as a vehicle of Western 
European secularism and liberalism, joining ethnic nationalists in their opposition to 
membership. For the same reason, also conservative Catholics in Ireland and Germany 
(notably the Bavarian CSU) have tended towards Euro-scepticism in the recent debates 
over treaty change and enlargement (Byrnes and Katzenstein, eds., 2006.). 
Among the Western European member states, the influence of secularism was 
VXFK WKDW LW SURYHG LPSRVVLEOH WRPHQWLRQ &KULVWLDQLW\¶V FRQVWLWXWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ WR
Europe in the draft constitutional treaty. On the other hand, that controversy and the 
issue of Turkish membership led to a great mobilisation on the part of the Vatican, in 
conjunction with Poland and the Orthodox Churches of Europe, in favour of a 
UHVWDWHPHQW RI (XURSH¶V &KULVWLDQ LGHQWLW\ &XULRXVO\ VHFXODULVW )UDQFH RSSRVHG WR
Turkish membership, has in effect been reduced to championing a Union limited to 
historically Christian Europe.  
We are thus now in the midst of an unprecedented political controversy over the 
identity, nature and limits of the EU, with history, religion, values and culture at the 
centre of attention (Berglund, Duvold and Ekman 2009). The entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in late 2009, after the favourable new vote in Ireland on 2 October 2009 
and some last-ditch brinkmanship by a quintessentially national-liberal Czech 
president, hardly signals the end of the debate either over Europeanness or over 
Europeanism. 
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5. Conclusion  
So, returning to the original research question, why has there been a territorial 
division in attitudes to European integration in Western Europe, with the southern parts 
being consistently more favourable than the north? The theoretical discussion in Part 2 
ended with a Rokkanian-'HXWVFKLDQ ZRUNLQJ K\SRWKHVLV WKH (XURSHDQ µFLW\-EHOW¶
stretching roughly from Central Italy to the North Sea, may be the historical and 
territorial core of European identity (Europeanness) and pro-EU, federalist attitudes 
(Europeanism). The proposition suggested that citizens of well-established nation-
VWDWHVLQWKH3URWHVWDQWQRUWKHUQDQGZHVWHUQ(XURSHDQµSHULSKHU\¶ZLWKORQJ-standing 
loyal and relatively homogeneous political cultures could be expected to be less 
Europeanist than those of more problematic state- and nation-building cases in Roman 
Catholic-cum-city belt Europe.  
The historical discussion in Part 3, which traced the tradition for unity in Europe 
and its interplay with that of diversity, the nation-state and nationalism, however 
modified this interpretation in important ways. It identified the Roman Empire, the 
Roman Church and the Holy Roman/Habsburg Empires as the institutional 
protagonists of proto-Europeanist, universalist discourse in pre-1945 European history. 
Ancient Rome was the paradigmatic empire, and the Papacy, the Byzantine empire and 
the Holy Roman Empire (as well as its close relative and progeny, the Habsburg 
monarchy) all claimed to succeed it institutionally and ideologically and to have some 
kind of universal authority, at least over Christians. While the long-lived Holy Roman 
and Habsburg empires eventually declined and fell, the Holy See, located in Rome and 
intensely alert to its Roman lineage and universalist mission, remained a foremost 
supranational agency.  
Criticising nationalism as a political religion, the Papacy came to terms with the 
modern, secular nation-state and national mass politics only with difficulty. However, 
the Church ultimately concluded that the atheism advanced by communists was the 
greater threat. In the late nineteenth century, it allowed the formation of Catholic 
parties to enable Catholics to participate in secular, democratic politics.  
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But Catholicism continued to look beyond the nation-state. What I have called 
the Christian-democratic paradigm, favouring supranational European governance, was 
formulated by networked Catholic parties of Western Continental Europe after World 
War II. The European Union was launched on its supranationalist path when these 
parties, led mainly by statesmen from Carolingian-Lotharingian Europe, dominated the 
governments of the six founding states from about 1945 to 1965. Transnational 
Christian democracy, now represented by the European PHRSOH¶V3DUW\KDV UHPDLQHG
WKHIHGHUDOLVWµSDUW\RI(XURSH¶WKURXJKRXWWKHKLVWRU\RI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ 
The main territorial base of European political Catholicism remains Western and 
Southern Continental Europe, but it has now been supplemented by more conservative 
3ROLVK &KULVWLDQ GHPRFUDWV 7KLV µFRUH (XURSH¶ FRQWDLQV D VWURQJ IHGHUDOLVW DQG
cosmopolitan tradition as well as a deep legacy of cultural unity. I submit that is why 
even non-Catholics from these parts are historically predisposed to be more 
Europeanist than citizens from other parts of Europe.  
North-western European Protestants, on the other hand, are historically inclined 
towards scepticism towards the EU by their historically determined, particularist 
identity and ideology. The growth of particularist, or nationalist, discourse resulted 
from the fragmentation of unitary Christendom into a Europe of states. Absolutist 
rulers propagated the notion of territorial sovereignty, which turned into the 
particularist idea of national sovereignty. Here France and the Protestant states of 
north-ZHVWHUQ(XURSHZHUH WKHSLRQHHUV WKHLUNLQJV¶ FRQWURORI WKH&KXUFKEHLQJDQ
important factor. Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism was particularly conducive to 
particularism. In the German context nationalism turned exclusivist and eventually 
racist.  
The result was two cataclysmic showdowns in the twentieth century in which 
nationalism was a major driving force. However, the particularist paradigm survived in 
its more benign, North Atlantic form. Thus in the debate over European integration, the 
natural inclination of national-liberal, Protestant Britain and Scandinavia has been to 
advocate retention of as much sovereignty as possible in the nation-state. For most 
people in these countries, the European project advocated by Continental Christian 
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democracy was unacceptably supranational. Arguably, they have joined only due to its 
success. 
The Rokkanian-Deutschian thesis itself belongs in the modernist, national-liberal 
tradition. It neglects the ancient and medieval tradition for unity and universalism. 
Moreover, the thesis is too structuralist, conveying a notion that the European Union 
emerged more or less by default as the result of impersonal, almost mechanical forces. 
Like intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theory, it underestimates the 
role of ideologically aware human agency.  
However, important elements of the working proposition survived the historical 
discussion in Part 3. Its territorial, centre-periphery perspective remains relevant, as 
does the emphasis on the confessional differentiation brought about by the 
Reformation. Moreover, the fragmented political structure of city-belt Europe, its role 
as buffer area and battleground for the centralising Great Powers around it, and the 
growth of trade and capitalism (as well as Calvinism) there indeed facilitated the 
growth of Europeanness and Europeanism, notably among the emerging middle class 
and liberal intellectuals. Similarly, the emergence of varieties of Protestantism that 
tended to identify with the nation-state north of the city-belt (England, Scandinavia, 
Prussia) encouraged particularist attitudes.  
,Q 3DUW  , GLVFXVVHG WKH EDODQFH EHWZHHQ µSDVW¶ DQG µSUHVHQW¶ VRXUFHV RI
European union. I argued that the European Union is a contingent political 
construction launched by transnationally networked, ideologically aware agents, 
strategically placed both in governments and political parties, who acted upon a 
historically unique window of opportunity when the balance of power between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces in Europe favoured European union. Structurally 
enabling factors shaped by the past were related to economic interest, political 
ideology, reason and learning, as well as territorial context.  However, the decisive 
factor was the influence of Christian democratic parties in the six states of core Europe 
for about twenty years after the war. The Europeanist cause had sympathisers across 
the political spectrum, but it was transnational Christian democracy that provided it 
ZLWK µVXIILFLHQW¶ LQVWLWXWLRQDO PRPHQWXP DQG OHJLWLPDF\ LQ SRVW-war Europe. The 
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Christian democratic parties had changed the universalist-Europeanist discourse they 
inherited from the Roman Church and the Roman Empire from defending descending 
to advocating an ascending locus of sovereignty. Thus the promotion of a 
democratically elected European Parliament, controlling a constitutionally constrained 
European government, became a key element of the post-war Christian democratic 
discourse on Europe. Considerations of commercial interest played a more ambiguous 
and secondary role. 
Successive enlargements since 1973 have however strengthened the influence of 
Euro-sceptical, national-OLEHUDORUSODLQO\QDWLRQDOLVWGLVFRXUVH6RKDYHFRUH(XURSH¶V
attempts to reform and extend the remit of European institutions, as well as the 
undeniable shortcomings of the Union itself.  Acrimony has also been fed by the 
prospect of Turkish accession.  
However, as the final adoption of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates, Europeanism 
is still alive and kicking. This is the first of at least five reasons I see why the European 
Union will continue to evolve. The chief political champion of European union, the 
(XURSHDQ 3HRSOH¶V 3DUW\ UHPDLQV WKH ODUJHVW WUDQVQDWLRQDO(XURSHDQSDUW\ JURXSing. 
Moreover, many of the other European parties, notably the socialists and the liberals, 
are preponderantly pro-European too. The latest European elections confirmed that 
scepticism and opposition is generally strongest on the fringes, and notably on the 
right. It is indeed the centrist consensus that has ensured the elaboration and adoption 
of increasingly ambitious treaty changes and policies even as EU membership has 
expanded. 
Second, public opinion surveys continue to register significant majorities in 
favour of European unification, EU membership and decision-making at the European 
level in practically all member states. In the fall Eurobarometer survey of 2007, overall 
support for EU membership reached its highest level since 1994 (Eurobarometer 
2007). In the following survey, the overall majority of respondents even said they had 
greater confidence in EU than in national institutions (Eurobarometer 2008).  
Third, the community achievement, the acquis communautaire, is obviously 
hugely significant. LLNH DQ\ LQVWLWXWLRQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ LV µSDWK-GHSHQGHQW¶
  
325 
 
Although most member states today have only recently joined, the institutional shape 
and logic it acquired at the inception means the EU cannot easily be changed into 
something quite different. This is a result not only of ideology and institutional inertia, 
but also of common interest, reason and learning.  
Fourth, the extensive activities of EU institutions are involving and affecting a 
huge and growing number of people, thus helping to socialise them into the EU 
political culture. Path dependency combined with growing functionalist 
interdependence, neo-functionalist spillover and institutional acculturation may be 
strengthening the case for integration. At the end of the day, retreat may turn out to be 
more difficult than advance. 
Fifth, deep structural developments related to globalisation may be strengthening 
the Europeanist cause. In a long-term perspective, the neofunctionalists may have been 
right that changes in the economic and technological base are making the national-
liberal international superstructure increasingly obsolete. Moreover, the rise of new 
Great Powers outside the West, notably China, India and Brazil, may focus minds on 
the need for Europe to speak with fewer voices in world politics. 
However, as I argued in the Introduction, there is of course no straightforward 
link from changing social structures to commensurate polity adjustment. Human, 
political agents must mediate, and they are constrained not only by individual ideology 
and interest, but also by existing collective power structures. The overwhelmingly most 
important social structure of our time remains the modern nation-state and its 
international system. Thus more European union is far from preordained. Viewing 
integration as polity-building highlights its contingent, inherently political nature.  
Still, the prospects for union remain far better in Europe than in other regions of 
the world. The historical-institutionalist perspective adopted here indicates that 
European integration is predicated on uniquely favourable regional dynamics. Other 
regions and the world at large may try to replicate the European model, but lack the 
historically informed, ideological predispositions that were decisive in Europe as well 
as the path dependency they caused. In spite of globalisation, the structural bias of the 
world outside Europe still heavily favours intergovernmentalism. To become 
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effectively supranational, regional integration elsewhere therefore must rely even more 
on rationalist advocacy of the common interest than Europe has done.  
As for European integration theory, I conclude that like the public debate over 
European integration it has suffered from a poverty of historical awareness and from 
national-liberal myopia. Intergovernmentalists still reify interest, either political or 
economic, as an explanatory variable in a rationalist and positivist theoretical 
framework. Constructivists, poststructuralists and discourse analysts have started to 
focus on ideas, identity and ideology, but due to their shallow historical perspective 
have difficulty escaping the national-liberal paradigm. Both sides seriously 
underestimate the importance of historically shaped Europeanness and Europeanism. 
This study has attempted to offer a corrective to these deficiencies.  
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